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Workers' Compensation Law
1. Compensable Injuries

a.

OccupationalDisease

To recover under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation
Act,' the claimant must show that an injury or death resulted from either an accident arising out of and in the course of employment 2 or an
"occupational disease as defined by the Act. ' 3 The North Carolina
Supreme Court in 1979 broadly construed the occupational disease
provisions to make coverage for them more comprehensive.
In Booker v. Duke Medical Center,4 the supreme court reversed a
decision by the court of appeals5 and upheld an award to the dependents of a laboratory technician who died after contracting serum hepatitis6 from blood samples he tested in the laboratory. 7 The court of
appeals had concluded that because serum hepatitis is a disease caused
by a single exposure to a virus rather than one that develops gradually
over a long period of time, it is not a compensable occupational disease.' In upholding the award to Booker's dependents, 9 the court re1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -101 (1979).
2. Id. § 97-2(6).
3. Id. § 97-53. G.S. 97-53 contains a list of 27 specific diseases that qualify as compensable
occupational diseases and one "catch-all" provision, § 97-53(13), which provides coverage for
"[a]ny disease. . . which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of
and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding allordinary diseases
of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment." Id. § 97-53(13).
4. 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979).
5. 32 N.C. App. 185, 231 S.E.2d 187 (1977).
6. Serum hepatitis is an inflammation of the liver caused by a virus which is transmitted
when blood from a person infected with the disease is introduced into the blood of another.
297 N.C. at 462, 256 S.E.2d at 192.
7. Booker worked as a technician in the Clinical Chemistry Laboratory from October 25,
1966, until early July, 1971, during which time he performed various chemical analyses on blood
samples that were often infected with serum hepatitis. He ran the tests manually and routinely
spilled blood on his fingers. On July 3, 1971, Booker developed symptoms and was diagnosed as
suffering from serum hepatitis. After the diagnosis Booker ceased his work with the blood samples and began work in the lab as an electrical engineer, but due to his illness he was unable to
continue work at all. On October 15, 1973, his physician certified that he was unable to work.
Booker died on January 3, 1974. Id. at 462-63, 256 S.E.2d at 192.
8. 32 N.C. App. at 192, 231 S.E.2d at 192-93.
9. Booker had filed a claim in his own behalf with the Industrial Commission in October,
1973, but because of his death the case was removed from the hearing docket. His dependents
then filed a claim for death benefits in December of 1974. Id. at 462, 256 S.E.2d at 192.
The supreme court rejected the conclusion of the court of appeals that the dependents' claim
was governed by the statute in effect prior to July 1, 1971, when Booker contracted the disease.
Because the dependents' right to compensation is a right separate and distinct from the employee's
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jected this reliance on the early definition of "occupational disease,"' 0
which stressed the requirement of gradual development, and declared
that G.S. 97-53(13)" "is to be interpreted independently of any prior
right and does not become enforceable until after the employee's death, Wray v. Carolina Cotton
& Woolen Mills, 205 N.C. 782, 172 S.E. 487 (1934), the dependents' claim should be governed by
the law in force on the date of the employee's death. 297 N.C. at 467, 256 S.E.2d at 195.
The court also rejected the argument that Booker's death came too late for compensation,
Under G.S. 97-38, compensation for dependents of a deceased employee is allowed only "[i]f
death results proximately from the accident and within two years thereafter, or while total disability still continues. . . within six years of the accident." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38 (1979). Defendants argued that the date of the "accident" should be construed to mean the date of contracting
the disease. The court disagreed, concluding that the date of the "accident" should be construed
as the date on which disablement occurs. 297 N.C. at 483, 256 S.E.2d at 204; see IB A. LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW

§ 39.50 (1980). For an elaboration on this construction, see

Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979); text accompanying notes 22-31
infra. The court then concluded that since Booker was paid his full salary at least through October 1, 1973, that date was the earliest possible date of disablement. 297 N.C. at 483, 256 S.E.2d at
204.
The court criticized the restriction in the statute as "sometimes hav[ing] the effect of barring
an otherwise valid and provable claim simply because the employee did not die within the requisite period of time." Id. at 483, 256 S.E.2d at 205. Professor Larson also criticizes these types of
restrictions. IB A. LARSON, supra, § 41.80.
In another 1979 case, the court of appeals construed a second restriction contained in G.S. 9738. Section 97-38 on its face limits death benefits to no more than $80 per week. The status of the
limitation has been in some doubt since 1973 when the legislature amended another section of the
Act, G.S. 97-29, which provides for compensation for total incapacity. Section 97-29 provides that
"[i]f death results from the injury then the employer shall pay compensation in accordance with
the provisions of G.S. 97-38." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (1979). The 1973 amendment to § 97-29
provides for the amount of compensation under that section to be calculated by means of a
formula. The amount of compensation as determined by the formula may exceed $80 and will
vary depending on the average weekly wage of the employee. Law of April 3, 1974, ch. 1103, § I,
1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 234 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (1979)). The question was thereby
raised whether this amendment to G.S. 97-29 applied to G.S. 97-38 as well, so as to no longer limit
death benefits to $80 per week.
In Andrews v. Nu-Woods, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 591, 259 S.E.2d 306 (1979), an employee was
injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and died as a result of
those injuries. The Hearing Commissioner applied the 1973 amendments to G.S. 97-38 and determined that decedent's dependents were entitled to $158 per week for 400 weeks. The court in
Andrews affirmed the award over a dissent by Chief Judge Morris and held that
the amendment applies to G.S. 97-38 so that the plaintiffs in this case are not limited in
their recovery to $80.00 per week. The amendment says it "shall apply to all provisions
of this Chapter." This would include G.S. 97-38. To say that G.S. 97-38 is not governed
by this amendment would, we believe, be contrary to the will of the General Assembly as
expressed in the plain words of the statute.
Id. at 592, 306 S.E.2d at 307.
10. The court of appeals relied on Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 234 N.C. 126, 66
S.E.2d 693 (1951), in which occupational disease is defined as "a diseased or morbid condition
which develops gradually, and is produced by a series of events in employment occurring over
time. It is the cumulative effect of a series of events that causes the disease." 32 N.C. App. at 192,
231 S.E.2d at 192 (quoting Henry v. Leather Co., 234 N.C. at 130-31, 66 S.E.2d at 697. For similar
definitions see Watkins v. Murrow, 253 N.C. 652, 661, 118 S.E.2d 5, 11-12 (1961), and MacRae v.
Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 217 N.C. 769, 777, 9 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1940).
11. Since serum hepatitis is not among the diseases specifically enumerated in G.S. 97-53, it
must fall within the broad provisions of § 97-53(13) to be compensable.
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definitions."' 2 The court recognized that early definitions of occupa-

tional disease were often drawn narrowly because the statute at that
time generally provided no recovery for such diseases, 3 and thus to
classify an injury as an occupational disease was to deny compensation. 14 These definitions, if allowed to persist, would defeat the legislative purpose of the current statute which does provide comprehensive
occupational disease coverage.' 5
Having rejected the prior definitions of occupational disease, the
court in Booker turned to the interpretation of the language of G.S. 9753(13).6 In order to be compensable, an occupational disease must be
"characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment."' 7 The court interpreted a disease to be "'characteristic' of
a profession when there is a recognizable link between the nature of the
job and an increased risk of contracting the disease in question"' 8 and
rejected the argument that a disease must be unique to an injured employee's profession before it can qualify for coverage. 9 The court
12. 297 N.C. at 472, 256 S.E.2d at 198.
13. Occupational diseases were not even covered by the Act until 1935 and even then, and for
more than 30 years thereafter, only a few specified diseases were covered. See generally Note,
Development of North Carolina OccupationalDisease Coverage, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341
(1970-71).
14. See 297 N.C. at 471, 256 S.E.2d at 197.
15. As the court in Booker points out, to embrace the older definitions as did the court of
appeals would be to repeal part of the current version of G.S. 97-53 since at least three of the
diseases specifically listed by the statute as being occupational diseases would not fall within the
narrow definition adopted by the lower court. Id. at 471,256 S.E.2d at 198. Professor Larson also
warns against placing too much reliance on the older definitions. See lB A. LARSON, supra note
9, §§ 41.32, .40 (1979).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1979).
17. Id.
18. 297 N.C. at 472, 256 S.E.2d at 198.
19. Id.at 474, 256 S.E.2d at 199. Many other jurisdictions have also rejected this argument.
See, e.g., Young v. City of Huntsville, 342 So. 2d 918, 921 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976), cert. denied, 342
So. 2d 924 (Ala. 1977); Aleutian Homes v. Fisher, 418 P.2d 769, 777 (Alas. 1966); LeLenko v.
Wilson H. Lee Co., 128 Conn. 499, 24 A.2d 253 (1942); Russell v. Camden Community Hosp., 359
A.2d 607, 612 (Me. 1976); Underwood v. National Motor Castings Div., 329 Mich. 273,45 N.W.2d
286 (1951); Collins v. Neeval Luggage Mfg. Co., 481 S.W.2d 548, 554 (Mo. App. 1972); Ritter v.
Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 178 Neb. 792, 135 N.W.2d 470 (1965); Marble v. Singer Business
Mach., 92 N.M. 261, 586 P.2d 1090 (1978); Newton v. County of Erie, 7 A.D.2d 29, 180 N.Y.S.2d
163 (1958); State ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Krise, 42 Ohio St. 2d 247, 327 N.E.2d 756 (1975);
Utter v. Asten-Hill Mfg. Co., 453 Pa. 401, 309 A.2d 583 (1973).
The court also rejected defendant's contention that even if serum hepatitis is "characteristic
of and peculiar to" Booker's employment, the disease is still not compensable since serum hepatitis is an "ordinary disease of life". See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13)(1979). The court agreed that
serum hepatitis is an ordinary disease of life in that members of the general public may contract
the disease, but noted that the statute only precludes recovery for ordinary diseases of life "to
which the general public is generally exposed," id., and that "the public is exposed to the risk of
contracting serum hepatitis to a far lesser extent than was Mr. Booker." 297 N.C. at 475, 256
S.E.2d at 200. See also lB A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 41.33, at 7-376 (1979).

1188

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

found the necessary link between the job of laboratory technician and
the disease serum hepatitis.20

Another issue raised by the statutory expansion of coverage for
occupational diseases is which version of the statute applies when an
illness extends over a period of several statutory amendments. The

North Carolina Supreme Court faced this issue in Wood v. JP.Stevens
& Co. 21 In Wood a cotton mill worker alleged that she contracted byssinosis z prior to July 1, 1958 and became permanently disabled on November 12, 1975.23 The Industrial Commission denied compensation
on the ground that the case was governed by the 1958 version of G.S.
20. 297 N.C. at 474, 256 S.E.2d at 199. The court noted in summary of the evidence that
Booker's employment required him to manually test blood samples, that while running these tests
he routinely spilled blood on his fingers, that he came into contact with blood samples infected
with serum hepatitis at least once a day, and that two physicians testified that Booker was exposed
to a much greater risk of contracting the disease than the general public or other hospital employees. Id See generally Note, OccupationalDiseases and the HospitalEmployee-A Survey, 5
MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 368 (1975).
In reaching its decision, the court was satisfied with the circumstantial proof of causation
offered, recognizing that in occupational disease cases, causation must of necessity be based on
circumstantial evidence. The court noted that the extent of exposure to the disease during employment, the extent of exposure outside of employment and the absence of prior medical history
of the disease are all relevant circumstances to consider. 297 N.C. at 476, 256 S.E.2d at 200. See
County of Cook v. Industrial Comm'n, 54 Ill. 2d 79, 295 N.E.2d 465 (1973); Evans v. Indiana
Univ. Medical Center, 121 Ind. App. 679, 100 N.E.2d 828 (1951); Peterson v. State, 234 Minn. 81,
47 N.W.2d 760 (1951); Vanore v. Mary Immaculate Hosp., 260 App. Div. 820, 22 N.Y.S.2d 350
(1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 631,33 N.E.2d 556 (1941). See generally W. MALONE & M. PLANT, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 322-24 (1963); Comment, Workmen's Compen.
sation--DiseasesArlsing Out of Employment-A Problem of Proof,2 PAC. L.J. 678 (197 1).
The court also rejected the argument that compensation should be denied for Booker's failure
to comply with the notice requirements of G.S. 97-58. 297 N.C. at 481, 256 S.E.2d at 203. Under
this statute the employee has 30 days from the date that he is informed by competent medical
authority that he has an occupational disease to provide written notice of his condition to his
employer. If notice is not given within the 30 days, compensation is barred unless reasonable
excuse is made and accepted by the Industrial Commission. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58(b) (1979).
The court agreed that it appeared Booker had not complied with the statute but held that
defendants waived the issue of notice by failing to raise it at the hearing before the Industrial
Commission. 297 N.C. at 482, 256 S.E.2d at 204. Cf. Plemmer v. Matthewson, 281 N.C. 722, 190
S.E.2d 204 (1972), and Bland v. City of Wilmington, 278 N.C. 657, 180 S.E.2d 813 (1971) (issue of
constitutionality cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). Other jurisdictions have reached
similar results in workers' compensation cases. See, e.g., Priedigkeit v. Industrial Comm'n, 20
Ariz. App. 594, 514 P.2d 1045 (1973); Sanford v. University of Ga. Bd. of Regents, 131 Ga. App.
858, 207 S.E.2d 255 (1974); Paull v. Preston Theatres Corp., 63 Idaho 594, 124 P.2d 562 (1942);
Wood v. Oklahoma Osteopathic Hosp., 512 P.2d 135 (Okla. 1973); Stewart v. Barr, 471 P.2d 462
(Okla. 1970); United States Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 9 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 281, 305 A.2d 913 (1973). See also 3 A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 78.70 (1976).
21. 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979). The court briefly touched on this issue in Booker v.
Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979). See text accompanying note 8 supra.
22. Byssinosis is defined as "Cotton-mill fever, an occupational respiratory disease of cotton,
flax, and hemp workers. It is characterized by symptoms (especially wheezing) most severe at the

beginning of each work week."

STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY

1976).
23. 297 N.C. at 638, 256 S.E.2d at 694.

207 (4th unabr. lawyer's ed.
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97-53(13)24 and that under that version byssinosis was not a compensable occupational disease.25 The court of appeals, with Judge -Mitchell
dissenting, affirmed the denial of compensation.2 6 Concluding that the
Commission and the lower court erred in applying the 1958 version of
the statute, the supreme court reversed. The court held that the statute
in effect on the date of disability should govern 27 and remanded to the

Industrial Commission for a determination of when plaintiff became
disabled.2 8
The holding that the employee's right to compensation is governed
by the statute in effect on the date of disability is, as the court points
out, clearly consistent with the statutory scheme of coverage for occu24. Law of March 26, 1935, ch. 123, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 130. Plaintiff's last exposure to
cotton dust was in 1958 when she retired from her employment with defendant.
25. Id. at 639, 256 S.E.2d at 695. At the time plaintiff retired, G.S. 97-53(13) provided coverage for "[i]nfection or inflammation of the skin or eyes or other external contact surfaces or oral or
nasal cavities due to irritating oils, cutting compounds, chemical dust, liquids, fumes, gases or
vapors, and any other materials or substances." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1979).
26. Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 36 N.C. App. 456, 245 S.E.2d 82 (1978).
27. 297 N.C. at 644, 256 S.E.2d at 698.
28. Id. at 651, 256 S.E.2d at 702. The court indicated that it would have remanded the case
for further findings of fact even if it had agreed that the 1958 version of the statute should apply
because the Commission heard no medical evidence to determine whether byssinosis was covered
by the statute, ie., whether the disease was "an infection or inflammation of the. . . oral or nasal
cavities." Instead, the Commission simply took judicial notice of the nature of the disease and
concluded that it was an irritation of the pulmonary air passages and thus noncompensable. The
court noted that "[kinowledge of this disease is [not] so notorious as to justify judicial notice." Id.
at 641, 256 S.E.2d at 696.
The determination of when plaintiff became disabled is of course crucial to the outcome of
the case. If she became disabled prior to 1963, the version quoted at note 28 supra will govern her
claim, and it is doubtful that byssinosis would be covered by that version of the statute. In 1963
the statute was amended to provide coverage for
[i]nfection or inflammation of the skin, eyes, or other external contact surfaces or oral or
nasal cavities or any other internal or external organ or organs of the body due to irritating oils, cutting compounds, chemical dust, liquids, fumes, gases or vapors, and any
other materials or substances.
The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to cases of occupational diseases
not included in said subdivision prior to [July 1, 1963] unless the last exposure in an
occupation subject to the hazards of such disease occurred on or after [July 1, 1963].
Law of June 18, 1963, ch. 965, § 1, 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws 1224 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9753(13) (1977). If plaintiffs claim is deemed to be governed by this version of the statute, she will
also be denied compensation because it specifically requires the last exposure to the hazard to
have occurred after July 1, 1963, and plaintiff's last exposure to cotton dust was prior to that date.
Plaintiff, however, will unquestionably be entitled to compensation if she became disabled after
July 1, 1971. The current version of G.S. 97-53(13) became effective after that date and provides
coverage for
[any disease, other than hearing loss covered in another subdivision of this section,
which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases
of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1979).
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pational diseases.2 9 G.S. 97-52 provides that "[d]isablement or death of
an employee resulting from an occupational disease ... shall be
treated as the happening of an injury by accident."3 Because in North
Carolina compensation for accidental injury is determined according to
the law in effect at the time of the injury,3 "it follows that the employee's right to compensation in cases of occupational disease should
be governed by the law in effect at the date of disablement." 32 The
court recognized that some jurisdictions3 3 have refused to adopt this
construction where the statute providing compensation did not become
effective until after the employee terminated his employment on the
grounds that such a construction would allow an impairment of contract.3 4 The court, however, said:
[t]he proper question for consideration is not whether the amendment affects some imagined obligation of contract but rather whether
it interferes with vested rights and liabilities....
An employee has no right to claim compensation in occupational disease cases until disablement occurs; and, until that date, the
employer is exposed to no liability. Consequently, applying the law
in effect at the time of disablement to a claim arising from that dis29. Id. at 644, 256 S.E.2d at 698.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1979).
31. Arrington v. Engineering Corp., 264 N.C. 38, 140 S.E.2d 759 (1965); Oaks v. Mills Corp.,
249 N.C. 285, 106 S.E.2d 202 (1958); McCrater v. Engineering Corp., 248 N.C. 707, 104 S.E.2d 858
(1958). This comports with the general rule. See 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workmen's Compensation § 346
(1976); 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 21 (1958 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
32. 297 N.C. at 644, 256 S.E.2d at 698. Professor Larson also argues that the date of disability should determine which statute governs the compensation of an occupational disease. 4 A.
LARSON, supra note 9, § 95.21 (1979). Cf. lB id. § 39.50 (when it is difficult to fix a specific date
for an accident, the date on which disability manifests itself should be used).
Other jurisdictions with similar statutes have construed them similarly to the court in Wood
See, e.g., McCann v. Walsh Constr. Co., 282 App. Div. 444, 123 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1953), afd, 306
N.Y. 904, 119 N.E.2d 596 (1954); McIntyre v. E.J. Lavino & Co., 344 Pa. 163, 25 A.2d 163 (1942).
The court also noted that G.S. 97-53 expressly applies to all causes of action arising after its
effective date. That the statute expressly so provides is not controlling, however, since the court
went on to hold that even absent such a provision, "the better rule in cases involving occupational
disease is to apply the law in effect at the time the employee becomes disabled, at least where the
statute does not dictate a contrary result." 297 N.C. at 645, 256 S.E.2d at 698. Accord, Dickow v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 34 Cal. App. 3d 762, 109 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1973); Agronaut
Mining Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 104 Cal. App, 2d 27, 230 P.2d 637 (1951); Frisbee v.
Sunshine Mining Co., 93 Idaho 169, 457 P.2d 408 (1969); Hirst v. Chevrolet Muncie Div. of Gen.
Motors Corp., 110 Ind. App. 22, 33 N.E.2d 773 (1941); Ross v. Oxford Paper Co., 363 A.2d 712
(Me. 1976); Biglioli v. Durotest Corp., 26 N.J. 33, 138 A.2d 529 (1958); Rogala v. John Deere Plow

Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 867, 297 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1969); McCann v. Walsh Constr. Co., 282 App. Div.
444, 123 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1953), af'd,306 N.Y. 904, 119 N.E,2d 596 (1954); McIntyre v. E.J. Lavino
& Co., 344 Pa. 163, 25 A.2d 163 (1942); Romano v. B.B. Greenberg Co., 108 R.I. 132, 273 A.2d
315 (1971).
33. See, e.g., Walker v. Johns-Mansville Prod. Corp., 311 So. 2d 506 (La. Ct. App, 1975);
Anderson v. Sunray Elec., 173 Pa. Super. 566, 98 A.2d 374 (1953).
34. 297 N.C. at 648, 256 S.E.2d at 700.
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ablement does not involve a retroactive application of the law.35

The result reached by the court in Wood is another encouraging
sign that the North Carolina courts are endeavoring to construe liberally the Workers' Compensation Act so as to provide genuinely comprehensive benefits to employees who are crippled or killed by
occupational diseases. The ruling will enable many seriously ill employees, who might have been denied significant benefits under the interpretation adopted by the court of appeals to receive benefits that are
36
more in proportion to the magnitude of their loss.
35. Id. at 650, 256 S.E.2d at 701.
36. A recent decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals indicates, however, that the
courts are drawing some lines in the area of occupational disease coverage. In Sebastian v. Mona
Watkins Hair Styling, 40 N.C. App. 30, 251 S.E.2d 872, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 301, 254 S.E.2d 921
(1979), plaintiff was a hair stylist who had been employed by defendant for over three years. Id.
at 30, 251 S.E.2d at 873. She developed contact dermatitis from her exposure to the various chemicals she used in her work and was forced to quit her job. Id. Within 30 days her skin had
returned completely to normal and she was physically able to return to any work not involving
chemicals. Id. Plaintiff was unable to find other work, however, and sought disability compensation. 1d.
The Commission found that plaintiff had suffered a compensable occupational disease under
the catch-all language of G.S. 97-53(13) and awarded her temporary disability payments for the
30 days that the contact dermatitis persisted. The Commission concluded, however, that because
plaintiff was physically sound after the disease was cured, although unable to find work, she had
suffered no compensable disability after that time. Id. at 31, 251 S.E.2d at 873.
The court of appeals affirmed the Commissioner's ruling, stating that "in order to be compensable, plaintiffs 'disability' must result from an occupational disease. In the present case, there is
no evidence whatsoever that ... plaintiff's incapacity to earn wages was the result of an occupational disease; rather, it was the result of her personal sensitivity to chemicals used in her work."
Id. at 32, 251 S.E.2d at 874. The court distinguished Mabe v. North Carolina Granite Corp., 15
N.C. App. 253, 189 S.E.2d 804 (1972), in which claimant was a stonecutter who was forced to quit
because he contracted silicosis from his exposure to silica during his employment. The Commission found claimant to be fully incapacitated even though he had only a 40 percent medical disability. The Sebastian court noted that in Mabe "it was clear that plaintiff's incapacity to earn
wages was the result of his having silicosis, which in turn was a result of his work. Furthermore,
there is a radical difference between silicosis and the skin condition of plaintiff in the present
case." 40 N.C. App. at 33, 251 S.E.2d at 875.
While the line drawn by the court is a fine one, it is arguably justified at least on the ground
that in Mabe the claimant was in fact faced with significant medical disability even after he quit
work while claimant in Sebastian was perfectly healthy. The argument could be made, however,
that even this distinction does not justify the result because "disability" under the Act is defined in
terms of wage-earning power and not physical well-being. "The term 'disability' means incapacity
because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the
same or any other employment.' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (1979).
Nevertheless, given the wording of the statutory definition of disability, which speaks of incapacity because ofinjury and not incapacity because of susceptibility to conditions in a particular
job, id., the court's interpretation is understandable. Any expansion of occupational disease coverage to encompass a fact situation such as the one in Sebastian would better be left to the legislature. For an example of such a statute, see N.Y. WORK. CoMP. § 37 (McKinney 1965), in which
disability is defined as "the state of being disabled from earning full wages at the work at which the
employee was last employed." Id. (emphasis added)
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b. By Accident Arising out of andin the Course of Employment

In addition to recovering for an occupational disease, a claimant
may recover by showing that an injury resulted from an accident arising out of 3 7 and in the course of 38 employment. 39 "The basic and indispensable ingredient of 'accident' is unexpectedness. 40 In addition,
North Carolina, along with a majority of jurisdictions,4 requires that
there be unusual exertion before an injury can be classified as "accidental." 42 In Reams v. Burlington Industries,4 3 the North Carolina

Court of Appeals illustrated the unworkable nature of this minority
rule.
In Reams, plaintiff showed that his normal duties consisted of lift-

ing bales of cloth weighing seventy to eighty pounds onto a measure
graft, inspecting them, and then lifting the bales off the graft.

4

Plaintiff

normally inspected no more than thirty bales of cloth per day.45 On
one occasion, however, plaintiff was asked to perform an absent employee's duties that consisted of removing the bales of cloth from an
inspection table and placing them on a pallet.46 Plaintiff moved over
one hundred bales of cloth in two hours before he was unable to continue due to what was later diagnosed as a ruptured intevertebral

disc.47 The Commission found that plaintiffs injury "'did not result
from an accident as the word "accident" is defined [in the Act], as there
was no interruption of the plaintiffs work routine, and he was merely
performing his usual and normal duties in the customary manner.' ",48
37. The phrase "arising out of" refers to the origin or cause of the accident. Harless v. Flynn,
I N.C. App. 448, 455, 162 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1968). This does not mean the accident must have been
caused by the employment, only that there must be a reasonable relationship between the accident
and the employment. Id. "Most courts. . . have interpreted 'arising out of employment' to require a showing that the injury was caused by an increased risk to which claimant, as distinct from
the general public, was subjected by his employment." I A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 6.
38. The words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the
accident occurs. Harless v. Flynn, I N.C. App. 448, 455, 162 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1968). "An injury is
paid [sic] to arise in the course of the employment when it takes place within the period of the
employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his
duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto." I A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 14.
39. Bryan v. First Free Will Baptist Church, 267 N.C. 111, 147 S.E.2d 633 (1966); see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 99.2(6) (1979).
40. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 6 (1979).
41. See IB A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 38.00 (1980).
42. See Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 124 S.E.2d 109 (1962).
43. 42 N.C. App. 54, 255 S,E.2d 586 (1979).
44. Id. at 55, 255 S.E.2d at 587.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 56, 255 S.E.2d at 587.
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The court of appeals affirmed the Commission's ruling that "[plaintiff's] injury was not caused by any particular movement, exceptional
weight or other circumstances which could constitute an 'unlooked for
and untoward event' or a 'fortuitous cause.' "9 While there is arguable
case support for the court's decision,5" there is an overwhelming
51
amount of authority in North Carolina that suggests a different result.
The usual/unusual dicotomy that North Carolina continues to
stress is of dubious value, as the majority of American jurisdictions
have recognized. 2 This becomes even more apparent upon examination of the decisions in the area that point in various directions and
cannot be reconciled. As the case law now stands, a court could un49. Id. at 57, 255 S.E.2d at 588.
50. The court relied on Russell v. Pharr Yams, Inc., 18 N.C. App. 249, 196 S.E.2d 571 (1973),
in which plaintiff was also denied compensation. Plaintiff in Russell was a "doffer and creeler," a
position that required her to hang cones of yam on defendant's machines. She was reaching down
to remove cones of yam from a box in front of her when she was injured. The two cases are
clearly distinguishable: In Russell, plaintiff was doing her usual job in the usual way; in Reams
plaintiff was doing a different job, albeit one involving the same bales of cloth. For other cases
denying recovery to employees doing their usual jobs in the usual way, see Laurence v. Hatch
Mill, 265 N.C. 329, 144 S.E.2d 3 (1965); Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 124
S.E.2d 109 (1962); Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n Co-op., 246 N.C. 274, 98 S.E.2d 289 (1957); Curtis v.
Carolina Mechanical Sys., Inc., 36 N.C. App. 621, 244 S.E.2d 690 (1978); Smith v. Burlington
Indus., Inc., 35 N.C. App. 105, 239 S.E.2d 845 (1978).
There is, however, more persuasive authority supporting the court's result. For example, in
Rhinehart v. Roberts Super Mkt, Inc., 271 N.C. 586, 157 S.E.2d 1 (1967), a stock boy who usually
loaded cases of canned goods onto a "float" by himself was injured when he twisted to hand cases
to a fellow employee who was on this occasion helping him load the float. The court held there
had been no "accident" and denied compensation.
51. See, e.g., Keller v. Electric Wiring Co., 259 N.C. 222, 130 S.E.2d 342 (1963); Faires v.
McDevitt & St. Co., 251 N.C. 194, 110 S.E.2d 898 (1959); Moore v. Engineering & Sales Co., 214
N.C. 424, 199 S.E. 605 (1938); Searsey v. Perry M. Alexander Constr. Co., 35 N.C. App. 78, 239
S.E.2d 847, cert. denied, 294 N.C. 736, 244 S.E.2d 154 (1978); Key v. Wagner Woodcraft, Inc., 33
N.C. App. 310, 235 S.E,2d 254 (1977); Dunton v. Daniel Constr. Co., 19 N.C. App. 51, 198 S.E.2d
8 (1973).
There is even authority for the proposition that an injury incurred while doing a normal job
in a usual way is a compensable accident. See Glace v. Pilot Throwing Co., 239 N.C. 668, 80
S.E.2d 759 (1954).
52. See lB A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 38.00 (1980).
Professor Larson has three major criticisms of the usual/unusual distinction:
[1] its assumption that the accidental character must be found in the cause rather than
the result ...
[2] the assumption that whatever is unusual is accidental. This, whether one takes the
everyday colloquial meaning or the most technical dictionary meaning, is simply
not true. ...
[3] the unworkability of the ... distinction in practice. The distinction assumes that
there is a quantum of exertion or exposure in any occupation which is usual or
normal-an assumption which is questionable at best, and certainly difficult to apply.
Id. §§ 38.61-63, at 7-145, -148, -150.
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doubtedly find support for any result it wanted to reach on the

"usual/unusual" issue.

In another 1979 case, the supreme court considered the circumstances under which an accident will be deemed to arise "in the course

of employment." In Martin v. Bonclarken Assembly,

3

a fifteen-year-

old boy drowned in a lake on his employer's premises during his lunch

hour. 54 The young man was swimming in the lake in violation of regulations requiring a swimming test before entering certain areas of the
lake and forbidding swimming while the lifeguard was off duty. 5 Reversing an award to the boy's dependents, the supreme court concluded:
[w]hen deceased jumped into the deep water of the lake during his
lunch hour ... [he] was acting outside the scope of his employment,
in contravention of specific instructions from his employer, and...
The risk of
he had no reasonable grounds to believe otherwise ....
his drowning during the lunch hour in a lake he was forbidden to
enter at that time was a risk foreign to his employment. 6

The result in Martin would be easier to understand if the boy was in
fact acting in violation of express prohibitions from the employer.5 7 It
is difficult, however, to find a violation of an express prohibition. The

employees received no instructions one way or the other on the availability of the lake for swimming." In addition, a posted sign was silent
on the regulation prohibiting swimming when the lifeguard was off
duty.5 9 Although the sign did set out the regulation prohibiting swimrming beyond the chained area without a swimming test, the forbidden
areas of the lake were not clearly marked, at least to someone unfamil53. 296 N.C. 540, 251 S.E.2d 403 (1979). In overturning the award, the court reversed the
court of appeals. For a discussion of the lower court's opinion, 35 N.C. App. 489, 241 S.E.2d 848
(1978), see Survey of Development in North Carolina Law, 1978, 57 N.C.L. Rev. 827, 886-87

(1979).
54. Injuries occurring on the employer's premises during the lunch hour are generally compensable. IA A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 21.21(a). See Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C.
276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976).
55. A swimming test was required before entering the lake's deep area, demarcated by a
floating chain. The lifeguard was on his lunch break when decedent dove into the lake and
drowned. 296 N.C. at 545, 251 S.E.2d at 406.
56. Id. at 545-46, 251 S.E.2d at 406.
57. As Professor Larson points out, "[v]iolations of express prohibitions relating to incidental
activities, such as seeking personal comfort, as distinguished from activities contributing directly
to the accomplishment of the main job, are an interruption of the course of employment." IA A.
LARSON, supra note 9, § 31 (1979).

58. 296 N.C. at 541, 251 S.E.2d at 404.
59. In any event, the sign indicated that a lifeguard was on duty allday until 4:30 p.m. when
in fact he was off duty during the noon hour. See id. at 542, 251 S.E.2d at 403.
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iar with the lake.6"
While it is clear that young Martin was in violation of certain regulations regarding the use of the lake by employees, it also seems clear
that he received little if any instructions on those regulations. The decision in Martin, then, appears to shift from the employer to the employee the burden of responsibility concerning employee knowledge of
regulations governing the use of the employer's premises. Consequently, an employee must take care to educate himself as to those regulations and cannot hold his employer responsible for providing that
education for him.
2.

Sole Proprietors and Partners

The North Carolina General Assembly in 1979 expanded the
scope of the Workers' Compensation Act to reach sole proprietors and
partners of a business. 6 ' The statute provides that
Any sole proprietor or partner of a business whose employees are
eligible for benefits under the Article may elect to be included as an
employee under the workers' compensation coverage of such business if he is actively engaged in the operation of the business and if
the insurer is notified of his election to be so included. Any such sole
proprietor or partner shall, upon such election, be entitled to employee benefits and be subject to employee responsibilities prescribed
in this Article.62
The statutory amendment extends coverage to a significant number of
workers whom the courts were generally unwilling to include in the
absence of an express statutory provision.63
60. Martin was outside the chained-in area of the lake, but he was apparently within a ropedin area when he drowned. Id. Martin had not been seen in the lake before the date of his death.
296 N.C. at 545, 251 S.E.2d at 406.
61. Law of February 26, 1979, ch. 86, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-2(2) (1979)).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (1979)).
63. There are two serious obstacles to such an extension of coverage by judicial decision.
The first is that a partnership is not, except for a few specific purposes, an entity separate
from its members. Therefore, since the partnership is nothing more than the aggregate
of the individuals making it up, a partner-employee would also be an employer. The
compensation act cannot be supposed to have contemplated any such combination of
employer and employee status in one person. ...
Even if the conceptual difficulty of lack of legal entity in the partnership could be
surmounted, there would remain a more stubborn obstacle, which is the fact that in any
ordinary partnership each partner has by law an equal share in management, and is
therefore in actual possession of the powers of the employer. Unless he has contracted
away these powers, which he can theoretically do, he is as much the employer as anyone
can be, not as a matter of conceptual reasoning but as a matter of actual functions and

rights.
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3. Discharge After Compensation
In response to the court of appeals' refusal6' to recognize the theory of retaliatory discharge, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a statute designed to protect workers' compensation claimants

from discharge or demotion by their employers.65 The statute states
that "[n]o employer may discharge or demote any employee because
the employee has instituted or caused to be instituted, in good faith,

any proceeding under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act,
or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding. ' 66 An
employer's violation of the statute will subject him to liability for reasonable damages suffered by the employee as a result of the wrongful
discharge and will entitle the wrongfully discharged employee to be
reinstated to his former position. 67 The statute also sets out certain affirmative defenses available to the employer 6 and certain actions
deemed not to be violations.6 9
The amendment to the Act should ensure that employees who suf-

fer compensable injuries will not forego their statutory remedies for
fear of employer retaliation. North Carolina joins a growing number
ofjurisdictions that have passed legislation to deal with the problem of
IC A.

LARSON, supra note 9, §§ 54.3 1-.32, at 9-197, -202 (1980).
The courts' reluctance to extend coverage to partners and sole proprietors in general should
be distinguished from allowing a partner or sole proprietor to recover benefits for himself on the
theory of estoppel. Under this theory, which the North Carolina courts have not been reluctant to
apply, a workers' compensation insurance carrier can be estopped to deny that an individual is
covered by an insurance policy if the carrier represents to that person that he is in fact covered, or
if the carrier considered the individual to be an "employee" when computing the employer's insurance premium. See e.g., Aldridge v. Foil Motor Co., 262 N.C. 248, 136 S.E.2d 591 (1964);
Pearson v. Newt Pearson, Inc., 222 N.C. 69, 21 S.E.2d 879 (1942); Garrett v. Garrett & Garrett
Farms, 39 N.C. App. 210, 249 S.E.2d 808 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 736, 254 S.E.2d 178 (1979).
64. Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E,2d 272, cert. denied, 295 N.C.
465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978), discussed in 57 N.C.L. REv., supra note 57, at 890-91.
65. Law of June 1, 1979, ch. 738, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 806 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-6.1 (1979)).
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1(a) (1979).
67. Id. § 97-6.1(b).
68. Any employer shall have as an affirmative defense to this section the following: willful or habitual tardiness or absence from work or being disorderly or intoxicated while at
work, or destructive of an employer's property; or for failure to meet employer work
standards not related to the Workers' Compensation Claim; or malingering; or embezzlement or larceny of employer's property; or for violating specific written company policy of which the employee has been previously warned and for which the action is a
stated remedy of such violation.
Id. § 97.6.1(c).
69. "The failure of an employer to continue to employ, either in employment or at the employee's previous level of employment, an employee who receives compensation for permanent
disability, total or partial, shall in no manner be deemed a violation of this section." Id. § 976.1(e).
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retaliatory discharge.7"
4.

The Powers of the Industrial Commission

The extent of the North Carolina Industrial Commission's authority to reconsider a decision by a commissioner or deputy commissioner
was challenged in Lynch v. M.B. Kahn Construction Co. 7" In Lynch a
deputy commissioner awarded plaintiff permanent partial disability

compensation for an injury he found to have been caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs employment.7 2 On
73
appeal by defendant, the full Commission, pursuant to G.S. 97-85,
ordered on its own motion that the case be remanded to take additional
evidence on causation.7 4 From that order the defendant petitioned the

court of appeals for writ of certiorari to review the Commission's order.75 Defendant argued that the Commission had exceeded its authority under G.S. 97-85 by ordering that new evidence be taken because
no "good ground" to seek new evidence, as required by the statute, had
depbeen shown. Therefore, the Commission should have reversed the 76

uty commissioner's award as being unsupported by the evidence.

The court of appeals, however, refused to place any restrictions on
70. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378-32
(1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 39A (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-39-1 (West Supp. 1980);
N.Y. WORK. CoMP. § 120 (McKinney Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 5 (West Supp.
1979); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307C (Vernon Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-1
(1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.35 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
71. 41 N.C. App. 127, 254 S.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 298, 259 S.E.2d 914 (1979).
72. Id. at 128, 254 S.E.2d at 237.
73. If application is made to the Commission within 15 days from the date when notice
of the award shall have been given, the full Commission shall review the award, and, if
good ground be shown therefor, reconsider the evidence, receive further evidence, rehear
the parties or their representatives, and, if proper, amend the award.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-85 (1979).
74. Plaintiff had presented evidence at the initial hearing to show that he had slipped and
fallen at work and had struck his hip on a piece of lumber. He did not report the fall to his
foreman until four days after the accident because he originally thought that he had not been hurt.
He was operated on approximately two weeks later to remove a ruptured disc. The deputy commissioner refused to allow the medical expert at the hearing to testify as to what in his opinion
caused plaintiffs injury, but the doctor did go on to testify that the condition could have been
caused by factors other than a blow or fall. 41 N.C. App. at 127-28, 254 S.E.2d at 236-37.
75. Defendant's appeal from the order of the Commission was dismissed by the court on the
ground that no appeal lies from an interlocutory order of the Commission. Id. at 129, 254 S.E.2d
at 237. See Vaughn v. Department of Human Resources, 37 N.C. App. 86, 245 S.E.2d 892 (1978),
ard, 296 N.C. 683, 252 S.E.2d 792 (1979). The court, however, granted defendant's petition for
certiorari. 41 N.C. App. at 129, 254 S.E.2d at 237.
76. Defendant argued that plaintiff had failed to present any competent medical evidence of
a causal connection between the accident and his ruptured disc and that, therefore, no "good
ground" was shown justifying the Commission to receive further evidence. Id. at 129-30, 254
S.E.2d at 237-38.
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the power of the Commission to review an award by a commissioner or
deputy commissioner. The court, going beyond prior decisions con77
struing the scope of the Commissioner's power to hear new evidence,
held that the powers granted to the full Commission by G.S. 97-85 "are
plenary powers to be exercised in the sound discretion of the Commission"" and that decisions of the Commission would not be reviewed on
appeal "absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion. ' 79 Finding
no abuse of discretion in the case at bar, the court affirmed the Commission's order.80
B.

EnvironmentalLaw8
1. Toxic and Hazardous Substances
In the wake of the heavily publicized PCB dumping incident in

77. See Hall v. Thomason Chevrolet, Inc., 263 N.C. 569, 139 S.E,2d 857 (1965) (power to
hear newly discovered evidence); Lewallen v. National Upholstery Co,, 27 N.C. App, 652, 219
S.E.2d 798 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 298, 222 S.E.2d 698 (1976); Harris v. Frank L. Blum

Constr. Co., 10 N.C. App. 413, 179 S.E.2d 148 (1971) (discretionary authority to receive further
evidence regardless of whether it was newly discovered evidence).
78. 41 N.C. App. at 130, 254 S.E.2d at 238.
79. Id. at 131, 254 S.E.2d at 238.
80. Id. The court's decision is in line with the general view that the powers of a reviewing
commission, board, or director should be broad ones. See 3 A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 80.12, at
15-370 to -371.
81. The General Assembly in 1979 passed two amendments to the Sedimentation Pollution
Control Act of 1973, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ I 13A-50 to -66 (1978), an Act designed to control the
sedimentation of streams and lakes caused by erosion of soil from construction sites into the state's
waters. One of the amendments is designed to provide for a new avenue of appeal from decisions
of local governments concerning the approval of erosion control plans. Law of June 8, 1979, ch.
922, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws. 1270 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-61(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
If a local government's decision to disapprove an erosion control plan is upheld after a public
hearing, the person submitting the plan can appeal to the North Carolina Sedimentation Control
Commission. The initial appeal is to be heard by a designated employee of the Department of
Natural Resources and Community Development. The decision of that employee is reviewable by
a newly created three person erosion control plan review committee, composed of members of the
Sedimentation Control Commission. After this review process is exhausted, judicial review is
available in superior court. Id. § 113A-61(c). Under the former version of the statute, if a local
government disapproved a plan, the person submitting it could immediately seek judicial review.
Id. (1978).
The second amendment to the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act will be especially
beneficial to those in the construction business because it allows for more leeway in dealing with
erosion on construction sites. Law of May 14, 1979, ch. 564, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 596 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-57(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The former version of the statute required
any person engaging in land-disturbing activity involving more than one acre to plant ground
cover within 30 working days after construction began in order to control erosion. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 113A-57(3)(1978). The current version does not require that permanent ground cover be
provided until after completion of the construction project. Id. (Cum. Supp. 1979). All that is
required during construction is that the person engaged in land-disturbing activity "install such
sedimentation and erosion control devices and practices as are sufficient to retain the sediment
generated by the. . . activity within the boundaries of the tract during construction upon ...

1980]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1199

North Carolina in 1978,82 the North Carolina General Assembly acted
to toughen state law governing the discharge of toxic substances. The
most obvious manifestation of legislative concern was the passage of an
83
act designed specifically to control the disposal of toxic substances.
The Act makes it a felony to "deposit, place, dump, discharge, spill,
release, burn, incinerate, or otherwise dispose of any toxic substances8 4
. . .or radioactive materials. . . into the atmosphere, in the waters, or
on land, except where such disposal is conducted pursuant to . . .
law." 5 The Act also amended the Oil Pollution and Hazardous Substances Control Act of 1978,86 designed to protect the state's land and
waters from pollution by oil and other hazardous substances and to
cover intentional discharges on land whether or not in proximity to
waters.8 7 Prior to this amendment, the statute covered discharges upon
land only if the land was so close to water that the hazardous substance
was "reasonably likely to reach the waters.""8 Finally, the new Act
seeks to clarify and coordinate the State's response to incidents of hazardous substance discharge by creating a Toxic Substances Task
Force. 9 While the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety is

to continue to coordinate the initial State response to a "dumping" incident,9" the Task Force is to coordinate further response. 9 1
said tract .. " Id. The amendment thus provides more flexibility in dealing with erosion of the
construction tract.
82. See, e.g., News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 1, 1978, at 1, col.3; id., Apr. 3, 1979,
at 23, col.6.
83. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 981, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1318 (codified in scattered sections of
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14, 113A, 143 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).

84. "Toxic substances" are separated into two categories. In one category are the heavy metals: mercury, plutonium, selenium, thallium and uranium. In the other category are halogenated
hydrocarbons: polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and kepone. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-284.2(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1979).
85. Id. § 14-284.2(a).
86. Law of May 16, 1973, ch. 534, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 816 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 143-215.75 to .102 (1978)).
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.77(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979).

88. Law of May 16, 1973, ch. 534, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 816 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-215.77(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-202 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The Task Force is to consist of five
persons, with one person designated by each of the following: the Secretary of Administration, the
Commissioner of Agriculture, the Secretary of Crime Control and Safety, the Secretary of Human
Resources, and the Secretary of Natural Resources and Community Development. Id.
90. Id. § 113A-203(a).
91. Id. § l13A-203(b). The Task Force in performing its coordinating function is to designate one or more agencies to be responsible for subsequent phases of the state's response. Id. The
Task Force is authorized to recommend that the Governor create regional or local task forces to
respond to an incident and is empowered to study and make recommendations on any issue involving toxic or hazardous substances. Id. § 113A-203(c).
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In addition to legislation dealing directly with the dumping of
toxic substances, 92 the General Assembly amended the Oil Pollution
Control Act of 1973, 91 which regulated only discharges of oil, to expand its coverage to regulate other "hazardous substances" 94 as well. 95
The amendment reflects the recognition that the existing law was simply inadequate to protect the waters and lands of the state from most
types of pollution problems. The amendments also plug a loophole in
the Act by requiring notice to be given to the Environmental Management Commission9 6 in the event of a discharge of oil or a hazardous
substance. Prior to the amendment, the Act required a person who
owned or controlled the discharged substance to report the discharge
only if it was in violation of the Act. 97 The amendment significantly
expands the notice requirement to require the reporting of a discharge
"in any circumstances other than pursuant to existing regulation," 98
thus assuring that notice will be given even if there has technically not
been a violation of the law. Provision is also made for a procedure
whereby designated local agencies may be enlisted in clean-up operations and be reimbursed for their expenses. 99 In addition, the procedure for calculating damages owed from violators was amended to
allow the state to recover costs of investigating violations,1°0 and a new
92. See notes 92-100 and accompanying text supra.
93. Law of May 16, 1973, ch. 534, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 819 (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-215.75 to .102 (1978 & Cum.Supp. 1979)).
94. "Hazardous substance" is defined as
any substance, other than oil, designated by regulation of the Commission upon a finding that the discharge of the substance in any minimum prescribed quantity into or upon
the waters of the State or upon lands in the State presents an imminent and substantial
danger to public health or welfare; or to fish, shellfish, wildlife, or vegetation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.77(5a) (Cum.Supp. 1979). No substance, however, that has not been
designated as a hazardous substance by the federal government shall be so designated by the state.
Id. For the current list of substances designated as hazardous by the Environmental Protection
Agency, see 40 C.F.R. § 116.4 (1979).
95. Law of May 9, 1979, ch. 535, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 551 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 143-215.75 to .94 (Cum.Supp. 1979)).
96. The Commission, a division of the Department of Natural Resources and Community
Development, has the power "to promulgate rules and regulations to be followed in the protection, preservation, and enhancement of the water and air resources of the State." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143B-282 (1978). See generally id. §§ 143B-282 to -285.
97. Law of May 16, 1973, ch. 534, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 846 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-215.85 (Cum.Supp. 1979)). Thus, for example, a discharge caused by an act of
God would not place the owner of the substance in violation of the Act and would not have had to
be reported even though the discharge could have caused serious environmental damage.
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.85 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
99. Id. §§ 143-215.86, -215.88.
100. Id. § 143-215.90(a). The state is entitled to have included in the damage calculation "an
amount equal to the cost of all reasonable and necessary investigations made or caused to be made
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administrative procedure for collecting damages was established.10
These two acts are significant improvements of the regulatory
scheme governing the discharge of harmful substances within the state.
In addition to clarifying the procedures for dealing with incidents of

dangerous discharge, they sufficiently broaden the reach of prior legislation to make it more effective in protecting the resources of the state
from contamination.
2.

Water

The North Carolina General Assembly in 1979 passed the North
Carolina Safe Drinking Water Act,' °2 the State's first comprehensive
water supply legislation. North Carolina drinking water standards had

been primarily regulated by the federal Envrionmental Protection
Agency pursuant to the federal Safe Drinking Water Act.10 3 The new
statute will allow the state to assume primary enforcement responsibility for regulation of water standards," a displacement of federal authority clearly intended by Congress when it enacted the legislation. 0 5

The North Carolina Act applies to all public water systems' 0 6 in
the state,10 7 and provides that the Commission for Health Services'0 8
by the Environmental Management Commission in connection with the violation." Id. These
investigation costs formerly were not included in the damage calculation.
101. Id. § 143-215.90(b). Under the prior version of the section, the only procedure provided
for the collection of damages was an action brought by the Attorney General in the name of the
state. See Law of May 16, 1973, ch. 534, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 816 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-215.90 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). Under the new version, after the violator is notified
by registered mail of the amount of damages, he has 30 days to request an administrative hearing.
The violator has the right to pursue an appeal from that hearing under G.S. 143-215.5. The courts
will become involved at the outset only if the damages are not paid or a hearing is not requested
within 30 days of receipt of the notice. In that case, the Attorney General may bring an action to
collect the award. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.90 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
102. Law of June 5, 1979, ch. 788, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 908 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 130-166.39 to .56 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-l to -9 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-166.56 (Cum. Supp. 1979); see 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (1976 & Supp.
11977). The Federal. Safe Drinking Water Act provides that once a state meets certain conditions,
it may assume primary enforcement responsibility for assuring compliance by public water systems within the state with national drinking water regulations. The conditions include the adoption of state regulations at least as stringent as national regulations, of adequate surveillance and
enforcement procedures, and of measures to assure that any variances and exemptions allowed are
permitted under conditions at least as stringent as those in the federal act. Id.
105. See H.R. REP.No. 1185, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1974] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6454, 6474.
106. "Public water system" is defined to include any "system for the provision to the public of
piped water for human consumption if such a system serves 15 or more service connections or
which regularly serves 25 or more individuals." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-166.41(12) (Cum. Supp.
1979).
107. Id. § 130-166.42(a). The Act does, however, exclude from its coverage those public water
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shall promulgate regulations governing contaminant levels in water
systems supplying drinking water to the public.' 0 9 In addition, the Act
provides that the Department of Human Resources shall examine
water sources that are being used or are planned to be used as sources
of public water supply to determine if they are suitable for that purpose." 10 Any person constructing or altering a public water system
must give the Department prior notice of such construction and submit
plans and specifications therefor so that the Department can determine
whether the proposals are in compliance with the Commission's regulations. The Department must approve the plans before construction
may begin."'I The Department is also empowered to promulgate a
plan for the provision of drinking water under emergency circumstances."12 According to the statute, "[elmergency circumstances shall
exist whenever the available supply of drinking water is inadequate." 1 3 It is not clear whether this power" 4 will be activated by a
local water emergency or only by a statewide emergency. A fair reading of the statute, however, suggests that any emergency circumstances
within the state, whether state or local in character, would trigger the
Department's power. This would apparently allow the state to promulgate regulations that would supersede any emergency plan adopted by
local authorities.
systems that consist only of distribution and storage facilities, obtain all of their water from a
public water system to which the regulations apply, do not sell water to any person and are not
carriers that convey passengers in interstate commerce. Id.
108. The Commission for Health Services, a division of the Department of Human Resources,
has the power and duty to adopt rules and regulations to be followed in the conduct of public
health programs to protect and promote public health. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-142(1978 &
Cum. Supp. 1979).
109. Id. § 130-166.43 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The Commission is also directed to promulgate
regulations governing the sanitation of watersheds from which public drinking water supplies are
obtained. Id. § 130-166.48.
110. Id. § 130-166.44.
I11. Id. § 130-166.45(c)(5). This section also requires the Department to provide advice to
persons constructing a public water system concerning the most appropriate source of water supply and the best method of purifying the water. Id. § 130-166.45(a).
112. Id. § 130-166.51(a).
113. Id. § 130-166.51(b).
114. Other powers of the Department include the power to require disinfection by public
water systems, id. § 130-166.46, the power to authorize variances and exemptions from the regulations, id. § 130-166.49, and the power to order elimination of an "imminent hazard," id. § 130166.50(b). An "imminent hazard" is deemed to exist "when in the judgment of the Secretary [of
Human Resources] there exists a present or ... immediate risk to public health." Id. § 130166.50(a). The Act also gives all units of local government operating public water systems and all
water companies operating under franchise from the state or units of local government the power
to acquire by condemnation property interests necessary for the successful operation of their systems. Id. § 130-166.47.
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In order to encourage strict compliance with the Drinking Water
Act, the legislature has included stringent enforcement provisions.
Each day of violation is to be treated as a separate violation and
the civil penalty may be up to $5000 for each day the violation
continues. 1 5
In addition to enacting the Drinking Water Act, the General Assembly amended the state's water pollution control statutes to make
them consistent with the 1977 amendments to the Federal Water Pollu-

tion Control Act."I 6 This will allow the State to continue to control the
National Pollutant Discharge System which governs discharges of
wastewater into the waters of the State.' '" The new legislation empowers the Environmental Management Commission to promulgate "waste

treatment management practices"I" necessary to prevent or reduce the
quantity of pollutants that enter the state's waters." 9 The Act also empowers the Commission to approve under its permit authority requests
by publicly owned pretreatment programs for the control of pollutants
that pass through their systems.' 20 The Commission of course has the

authority to require those pretreatment programs to comply with applicable federal legislation. 2 ' Finally, the Act allows the Commission a

from the promulgated reguladegree of flexibility in granting variances
22
tions that it formerly did not enjoy.'
115. Id. § 130-166.54(a).
116. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West 1977). The 1977 Clean Water
Act was a response to recommendations made by the National Commission on Water Quality, a
Commission authorized by Congress when it passed the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, on how best to achieve the objectives of the 1972 amendments. See S. REP.
No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4326, 4338.
117. Law of May 23, 1979, ch. 633, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 664 (codified in scattered sections of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143 (Supp. 1979)).
118. The term "waste treatment management practice" means any method, measure or
practice to control plant site runoff, spillage or leaks, sludge or waste disposal and drainage from raw material storage which are associated with, or ancillary to the industrial
manufacturing or treatment process of the class or category of point sources to which the
management practice is applicable.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-213(30) (Cum. Supp. 1979). This definition was taken from the federal
act. See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(e) (West 1977).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The legislative history to the federal
counterpart of this section indicates that Congress believed an effective measure would be direct
regulation of the toxic pollutant problem through management requirements in permits. See S.
REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4326,
4377.
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.3(a)(14). For the relevant federal amendment, see Clean
Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b)(8) (1977). See generally S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 59, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4326, 4384.
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.3(a)(14) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
122. Under the amendment the Commission can grant a variance for up to 90 days without
holding a public hearing, id. § 143-215.3(e); prior to the amendment a public hearing was required
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Air Pollution

The legislature adopted several amendments to the Air Pollution
Control Law 23 that comport with changes made at the federal level by
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.124 The amendments to the

state law significantly stiffen penalties for noncompliance by treating
each day of continuing violation as a separate violation 25 and by providing for a fine that includes the amount of money that the violator
saved by not having made the expenditures necessary to comply with
pollution control requirements.126 It is clear, however, that the General
Assembly intends that state regulations go no further than those
promulgated at the federal level.' 2 7 For example, one major change in
the North Carolina Act was the adoption of a provision granting the
Environmental Management Commission the authority to develop and
before any variance was granted. See Law of May 23, 1973, ch. 698, § 9, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws,
1039. In addition, the old version of the statute had as one of its criteria for granting a variance
the finding that compliance with the regulation could not be achieved by application of the best
available technology economically achievable at the time of application. Id. The new statute
only requires compliance to be unachievable after application of the best available technology
economically reasonable. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.3(e)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Presumably, the
latter standard is a less stringent one. Although technology may exist that would enable an applicant to comply with regulations, ie., the technology is "achievable," a variance may nevertheless
be granted if the cost of obtaining that technology would be unreasonable.
Another statute passed by the General Assembly in the water pollution area authorizes the
Environmental Management Commission, upon petition by any person subject to water pollution
control regulations, to revise applicable water quality standards. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 929,
1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1275 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-214.3 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The
revision process is essentially to be one of balancing the possibility of compliance, given the natural or "irretrievable man-induced conditions," and the cost to petitioner of achieving compliance
with the public benefits of compliance. If the costs of compliance would be disproportionately
high compared to the benefits achieved, the Commission should revise the standards. Given the
lack of specific criteria in the statute, the decision on whether to revise the standards will of necessity be a judgment call rendered by the Commission on a case by case basis.
123. Law of May 11, 1979, ch. 545, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 562 (codified in scattered sections of
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.107 to .144 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 1 1977).
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.114(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
126. Id. § 143-215.114(a)(3). For the relevant federal amendment, see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (Supp. I 1977).
127. The General Assembly amended G.S. 143-215.107(0 to limit the Environmental Management Commission's authority in this regard. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 931, 1979 N.C. Sess,
Laws 1276 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.107(0 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The statute is a
belated response to a 1975 opinion of the Attorney General of North Carolina that the Commission is not precluded from adopting air quality rules, regulations and procedures covering matters
on which there are no corresponding EPA regulations. 45 Op. N.C. AT''Y GEN. pt. I, at 170, 171
(1975). It is now clear, however, that the legislature intends that the Commission does not adopt
regulations more stringent than existing federal regulations and does not adopt regulations on
matters not covered by federal legislation without investigating their economic impact. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-215.107(0 (Cum. Supp. 1979). This economic impact analysis must focus on the economic and social costs of compliance to commerce and industry, units of local government, and
agriculture, along with the economic and social benefits of compliance. .d.
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implement programs for the prevention of "significant deterioration"

28

and for the attainment of air quality standards in "nonattainment
areas,"' 29 but only insofar as such programs are required by federal
guidelines.' 3° The Environmental Management Commission is now
also authorized "to prohibit any stationary source within the state from

emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will prevent attainment or
maintenance by any other state of any national ambient air quality
standard." 131
4.

Plant Protection and Conservation Act

The North Carolina General Assembly in 1979 enacted the Plant

Protection and Conservation Act,' 32 a comprehensive law designed to
protect endangered and threatened species of plants. The Act creates a
seven-member Plant Conservation Board within the Department of
Agriculture' 33 and gives it a broad range of regulatory powers 34 in35
cluding the authority to adopt a list of endangered species,
128. "The term 'prevention of significant deterioration' refers to the statutory and regulatory
requirements arising from the Federal Clean Air Act designed to prevent the significant deterioration of air quality in areas with air quality better than required by the national ambient air quality
standards." Id. § 143-213(29). For the relevant federal amendment, see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (Supp. 1 1977). For a discussion of what a state must do to
comply with this section, see H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprintedin [1977] U.S.
CODE CONo. & AD. NEws 1077, 1085-86. See also Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253
(D.D.C. 1972) (memorandum) (Clean Air Act requires prevention of significant deterioration of
air quality in clean air areas of country), af'dsub nom. FRI v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973)
(equally divided Court).
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-213(28) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Nonattainment areas are those that
exceed any national ambient air quality standard for a particular pollutant. Id. For the relevant
federal amendment, see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (Supp. I
1977). See generally H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14, reprintedin 119771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Nnws 1077, 1091-92.
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.107(a)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
131. Id. § 143-215.108(b)(7). For the relevant federal amendment, see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (Supp. 1 1977). The issue of interstate pollution abatement has
generated problems since at least the beginning of this century. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Corp., 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907) (state can sue in own behalf under common law to prevent
harmful pollution that originates in another state). See generall, H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 329-30, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1408-09.
The General Assembly also adopted conflict of interest standards for boards that approve
permits or enforcement orders. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.112(c)(2)d (Cum. Supp. 1979). For
the relevant federal amendment, see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7428 (Supp.
1 1977).
132. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 964, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1298 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 106-202.12 to .19 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-202.14(a) & (b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
134. Id. § 106-202.15.
135. "'Endangered species' means any species or higher taxon of plant whose continued existence as a viable component of the State's flora is determined to be in jeopardy by the Board; also
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threatened species 36 and species of special concern. 37 The Board is to
be assisted by a newly created Conservation Scientific Committee com-

prising botanical experts from other agencies and organizations across
the state. 13 The Act also establishes a procedure for placing plants on

the protected plant lists, 139 and provides that any North Carolina resident, in addition to the Board and the Scientific Committee,
may pro40
pose that a plant be added to or removed from a list.'
In addition, the Act makes it unlawful to disturb or remove from
someone else's land any plant on a protected plant list without written

permission from the owner.' 4' It is also illegal to "sell, barter, trade,
exchange, export.

.

or give away for any purpose.

. .

any plant on a

protected plant list, except as authorized by rules and regulations
promulgated by the Board.' 42 " A first offense is punishable by a fine43of
$100 or more and a subsequent offense by a fine of $500 or more.1

In many of the environmental laws passed in 1979, the legislature
spoke to the issue of whether warrantless inspections can be used to
enforce the statutes. The legislature's inconsistent approaches indicate

confusion on the issue of administrative searches and the permissible
procedures for conducting them.
In the Plant Protection and Conservation Act," 4 the legislature
provided for the warrantless inspection of "any place within the State
any species of plant determined to be an 'endangered species' pursuant to the Endangered Species
Act." Id. § 106-202.12(4).
136. "'Threatened species' means any resident species of plant which is likely to become an
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its
range, or one that is designated as threatened by the Federal Fish and Wildlife Service." d.
§ 106-202.12(12).
137. "'Special concern species' means any species of plant in North Carolina which requires
monitoring but which may be collected and sold under regulations adopted under the provisions
of this Article." Id. § 106-202.12(11).
138. Id. § 106-202.17. The members of the Scientific Committee are to conduct investigations
and make recommendations to the Board concerning all aspects of the regulation of endangered
and threatened species. Id. § 106-202.18.
139. Id. § 106-202.16.
140. If the Board, with the aid of the Scientific Committee, finds there is merit to the proposal,
it will conduct an investigation, make a tentative determination, and then hold at least one public
hearing on the proposal before making a final determination on whether to add the plant to a
protected list. Id. §§ 106-202.16(b)-(e). In addition, all plants on the current federal protected
plant lists pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1543 (West 1977 & Cum.
Supp. 1979), are to be placed on the North Carolina lists. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-202.16(a) (Cum.
Supp. 1979). For the current federal lists see 50 C.F.R. § 17.12 (1978).
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-202.19(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
142. Id. § 106-202.19(a)(2). Thus, the Act is designed to regulate not just commercial businesses such as nurseries, but the conduct of private individuals as well.
143. Id. § 106-202.19(a).
144. Id. §§ 106-202.12 to .19. See notes 140-51 and accompanying text supra.
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S.. where plant materials are being grown, transported or offered for
sale. . . after giving notice in writing to the owner. . .of the premises
to be entered."' 4 5 Failure to allow such an inspection could subject the
owner to a contempt charge.' 46 The legislature grafted onto the Safe
Drinking Water Act 47 an existing administrative inspection provision

that allows warrantless entry "upon any and all parts of the premises of
any place in which such entry is necessary to carry out the provisions of
this Chapter."' 48 In addition, the 1979 amendments to the Oil Pollu-

tion Control Act of 1973 left virtually intact a provision authorizing
warrantless inspections of any private or public property in order to
determine compliance with the Act.' 4 9 Despite its insistence in these
three instances on adding or retaining warrantless inspection provi-

sions, however, the General Assembly, deleted a provision in the Air
Pollution Control Law

51

that authorized warrantless inspections of

any premises for the purposes of conducting any investigation provided
for in the Act.'

The General Assembly clearly needs to rectify this

confusion by reexamining existing administrative inspection procedures and amending them to conform with the Supreme Court's guidelines in Marshall v. Barlow's,Inc. Barlow's, 5 2 which held warrantless

USHA inspections unconstitutional,' 53 arguably indicates that a warrantless administrative inspection is permissible only when the business

is regulated to a degree sufficient to support an implied consent theory

54

and when no alternative enforcement opportunity to a warrant-

less inspection exists.' 55 Under this analysis, the warrantless inspection
provisions of the Plant Protection and Conservation Act, Safe Drinking
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-202.19(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
146. Id.
147. Id. §§ 130-166.39 to .56 See notes 110-23 and accompanying text supra.
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-204 (1974). See id. § 130-166.53(3) (Cum.Supp. 1979).
149. Id. § 143-215.79.
150. Id. §§ 143-215.107 to .144. See text accompanying notes 131-39 supra.
151. Law of May 24, 1973, ch. 821, § 6, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1216 (formerly codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-215.114(a)(1)(e) (1978) (repealed 1979)).
152. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). For an excellent analysis of Barlow's, see Note, Marshallv. Barlow's
Inc.- OSHA4 Needs a Warrant, 57 N.C.L. REv. 320 (1979).
153. 436 U.S. at 325. Accord, Gooden v. Brooks, 39 N.C. App. 519, 215 S.E.2d 682, cert.
granted, 297 N.C. 299, 254 S.E.2d 923 (1979).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1972) (regulation of interstate
traffic in firearms); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) (regulation of liquor industry). "[B]usinessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises as [alcohol and firearms] accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade.... The
businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973).
155. See Note, supra note 160 at 330.
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Water Act, and Oil Pollution and Hazardous Substances Control Act

of 1978 appear vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
5.

Nuisance Liability of Agricultural Operations

When nonagricultural land uses extend into agricultural areas,
agricultural operations often become the subject of nuisance suits.
As a result, agricultural operations are sometimes forced to cease operations. Many others are discouraged from making investments in
farm improvements. It is the purpose of this Article to reduce the
loss to the State of its agricultural resources by limiting the circum1 56
stances under which agricultural operations may be a nuisance.
With this statement of legislative purpose and concern, the North Car-

olina General Assembly enacted legislation sharply limiting the expoThe Act
sure of agricultural operations 57 to nuisance liability.'
further provides that "[a]ny and all ordinances of any unit of local government now in effect or hereafter adopted that would make the operation of any such agricultural operation. . . a nuisance or providing for
59
abatement thereof as a nuisance. . . are and shall be null and void."
Although the problem identified by the legislature is undoubtedly

a serious one, the constitutionality of the sweeping legislative remedy is
questionable. By depriving surrounding landowners of causes of action
for nuisance and thus potentially depriving them of the complete use
and enjoyment of their property, the statute arguably violates the state
constitutional provision that provides "[n]o person shall be . . . disseized of his freehold. . . but by law of the land." 60 The North Caro-

lina Supreme Court has held "law of the land" to be synonymous with
"due process" as used in the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the
156. Law of March 26, 1979, ch. 202, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 140 (codified at N.C. GEN.
§ 106-700 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
157. "'[Algricultural operation" includes. . . any facility for the production for commercial
purposes of crops, livestock, poultry, livestock products, or poultry products." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 106-701(b) (Cum.Supp. 1979).
158, Law of March 26, 1979, ch. 202, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 140 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 106-700 to -701 (Cum.Supp. 1979)). The Act provides that
No agricultural operation ...shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, by any
changed conditions in or about the locality thereof after the same has been in operation
for more than one year, when such operation was not a nuisance at the time the operation began; provided, that. . . this subsection shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from the negligent or improper operation of any such agricultural operation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
159. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(d). Local governments can, however, still control nuisances
resulting from negligent or improper operation of an agricultural operation located within the
corporate limits of a city. Id.
160. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
STAT.

1980]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1209

Federal Constitution. 6 ' In addition, the court has held the word
"property" to include not only the thing possessed, but also the right of
the owner to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of the possession.16 2 Finally, the court has held that in order to constitute a taking, an actual

seizure is not necessary; a nuisance that substantially impairs the value

of private property is sufficient.163 There exists, however, no magic

formula for determining when an interference with a property interest
is substantial enough to be deemed a "taking."'" Since the determination must be made on an adhoc basis, 165 it is impossible to predict how
66
the statute would fare in a constitutional challenge.'
161. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib., 285 N.C. 469, 208 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
162. Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 219 N.C. 402, 14 S.E.2d 252 (1941).
163. Eller v. Board of Educ., 242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E.2d 144 (1955).
164. As one commentator has pointed out, "[flew legal problems have proved as resistant to
analytical efforts as that posed by the Constitution's requirement that private property not be
taken for public use without payment of just compensation." Sax, Takings, PrivatePropertyand
Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 (1971-72) (footnotes omitted).
165. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Penn. Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). The Court in Penn. Central did, however, point to several
factors that have particular significance:
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations. . . . So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A "taking" may more readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government ... than when interference arises
from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
438 U.S. at 124. See generally Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County In Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court ExpropriationLaw, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63; Sax, supra note 172; Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964-65).
166. This statute also raises another constitutional issue but one that would most likely be
resolved in favor of its validity. The North Carolina Constitution provides that "[tihe General
Assembly shall not enact any local, private, or special act or resolution ... relating to health,
sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances." N.C. CoNsT. art. II, § 24. Since this statute relates to
the abatement of nuisances, it is clearly unconstitutional if it is classified as a "local law." It is
arguable, however, that this statute should be classified as a general rather than a local law and
would thus withstand constitutional scrutiny. As the North Carolina Supreme Court has recently
stated,
the distinguishing factors between a valid general law and a prohibited local act are the
related elements of reasonable classification and uniform application. A general law
defines a class which reasonably warrants special legislative attention and applies uniformly to everyone in the class. On the other hand, a local act unreasonably singles out a
class for special legislative attention or, having made a reasonable classification, does not
apply uniformly to all members of the designated class.
Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural and Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 690-91, 249
S.E.2d 402,407 (1978). The statute, apparently meets both requirements of.4dams: the classification is reasonable given the magnitude of the problem and there is no reason to suspect the statute
could or would be applied in a nonuniform manner. See generally Ferrell, Local LegislationIn the
North Carolina GeneralAssembly, 45 N.C.L. REv. 340 (1966-67).
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Election Laws

1. Voting Challenge Procedure
The North Carolina Supreme Court's recent decision in Lloyd v.

Babb 67 brought to light some of the inadequacies of the statutory procedure 68 for voter challenges and prompted the General Assembly to
revise that procedure. In 1977 plaintiffs in Lloyd, several registered
voters in Orange County, fied petitions with the State Board of Elections complaining that thousands of students at the University of North

Carolina at Chapel Hill were registered on the voting rolls of Orange
69
County even though those students were not residents of the county.

The state board, after an informal hearing, refused to grant the relief
plaintiffs sought. 7 ° Plaintiffs subsequently fied suit in superior court

joining as defendants members of the state board and members and
officials of the Orange County Board of Elections.' 7 ' The superior

court ordered the county board to purge from the rolls all University
listed their home addresses as
students whose most recent enrollment
72
being outside Orange County.

On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court 73 held that judicial purging of the voting rolls was not an available remedy as it was
167. 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 416 (1979).
168. Law of May 24, 1973, ch. 793, §§ 33, 35, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1150 (current version at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-84 to -90.3 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979)).
169. 296 N.C. at 420, 251 S.E.2d at 847.
170. Id. at 421, 251 S.E.2d at 848. The petitioners had sought the purging of all students from
outside Orange County from the registration books, or alternatively the holding of a completely
new registration for the county. Ad. at 420 n.1, 251 S.E.2d at 847 n.l.
171. Id. at 421, 251 S.E.2d at 848.
172. Id. at 422, 251 S.E.2d at 848-49. In addition, the lower court ordered the Orange County
Board to presume that any student applying to register was domiciled where his parents resided.
This presumption could be rebutted by evidence in addition to the student's statement of intention
to reside permanently in Orange County. The court also required election officials to use a certain
questionnaire when questioning voter applicants. Id.
173. The court agreed to hear the case before the court of appeals rendered its decision, Id. at
423, 251 S.E.2d at 849. The court rejected defendant's contention that the trial court was without
original jurisdiction. Defendants argued that the state board's decision not to pursue the matter
was a "final agency decision in a contested case," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (1978), and that
G.S. 150A-45 and -46provide the only basis for review of such a decision. Because plaintiffs did
not follow the review procedures set out in G.S. 150A-45 and -46, they could not invoke the
original jurisdiction of the superior court. 296 N.C. at 424, 251 S.E.2d at 849-50; see Ponder v.
Joslin, 262 N.C. 496, 138 S.E.2d 143 (1964); Axler v. City of Wilmington, 25 N.C. App. 110, 212
S.E.2d 510 (1975). The court held that the state board's hearing was not a contested case because
it did not meet one of the statutory requirements of a contested case-it did not determine the
rights of the parties involved. 296 N.C. at 424-25, 251 S.E.2d at 850. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 150A-2(2) (1976). See also High Rock Lake Assocs. v. North Carolina Environmental Management Comm'n, 39 N.C. App. 699, 252 S.E.2d 109 (1979).
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duplicative of the statutory challenge process. 174 The large number of
voters involved and the corresponding lengthy process of challenging
so as to
them did not render the administrative remedy "ineffective"
175
allow it to be bypassed in favor of judicial review.
In response to the Lloyd decision, the General Assembly revised
the procedures for handling voter challenges. 176 Under the old version
of the procedure, voter challenges made prior to the day of election
were governed by G.S. 163-85 to 86 and were to be heard and decided
by the county board before election day. 177 Challenges could also be
made on the day of the election pursuant to G.S. 163-87 to 88, with the
decision on the challenge to be made by precinct officials at the poll.'78
The legislature amended G.S. 163-86 to provide that "if the [county]
board finds that because of the number of challenges, it cannot hold all
hearings before the date of the election, it may order the challenges to
be heard and decided at the next time the challenged person appears
and seeks to vote, as if the challenge had been filed under G.S. 16387."' 17 Because challenges filed before election day can now be pursued at the polls under G.S. 163-87 instead of through the more cumbersome process of G.S. 163-86, the legislature has made it easier to
challenge the right of a large group of citizens to vote. Other significant
amendments to the challenge procedure include a provision for the
county board to schedule a preliminary hearing when a challenge is
made to determine if there is in fact cause to schedule a full scale hearing on the challenge, 8 ' and a provision for a challenged voter to re174. 296 N.C. at 428, 251 S.E.2d at 852. The court did not agree, however, with defendants'
contention that the action should be dismissed. The defendants had argued that because plaintiffs
had not pursued the voter challenge procedure set out by the statute the trial court should have
dismissed the action. The court agreed that when an effective administrative remedy exists, it is
exclusive, but held that insofar as the plaintiffs sought relief from alleged registration improprieties by Board officials, they had stated a cause of action for which relief could be granted since the
statutory procedure would not provide an effective remedy for that grievance. Id. So while judicial purging of the rolls is not an available remedy, plaintiffs might still be entitled to some relief if
on remand they prove their allegations. Id. at 429, 251 S.E.2d 852.
175. Id. The court recognized the impracticality of using the procedure to challenge large
numbers of voters but said "there is in this case no other proper course." d.
176. Law of April 13, 1979, ch. 357, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 300 (codified in scattered sections of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
177. Law of May 24, 1973, ch. 793, §§ 33, 35, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1136 (current version at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-84 to -86 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-87 to -88 (1976).
179. Id. § 163-86(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
180. Id. § 163-85(d). The challenger has the burden of proof. Id. The Board is authorized to
take testimony and receive other evidence to determine if the challenger has shown that there is
probable cause to believe the challenged voter is in fact unqualified. Absent such a showing, the
challenge should be dismissed. Id.
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If a challenge is upheld, a voter may
quest a "challenged ballot."''
still vote on a challenged ballot. The ballot is not immediately counted,
but the chairman of the county board must hold it for six months. In
the event of a contested election, further hearings may be held to8 2determine which if any of the challenged votes should be counted.
2.

83
Campaign Finance

The North Carolina General Assembly in 1979 significantly ex181. Id. § 163-88.1.
182. Id.
183. The North Carolina General Assembly in 1979 enacted an amendment to G.S. 163278.43 providing for the audit of the records of any political party or committee that receives
funds from the North Carolina Campaign Election Fund or the Presidential Election Year
Candidate Fund. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 926, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1272 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 163-278.43(c) & (d) (Cum. Supp. 1979)). G.S. 163-278.43 requires the state chairman of
each political party and the treasurer of each political committee or candidate receiving such
funds to maintain full and complete records of their receipt and disbursement. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 163-278.43(a) (Cum.Supp. 1979). In addition, the state chairman is required to file with the
State Board of Elections an itemized statement reporting all receipts, expenditures and
disbursements of the campaign funds and verifying that all funds received were dispensed in
accordance with the election laws. Id. § 163-278.43(b).
The 1979 amendment of G.S. 163-278.43 reflects the legislature's concern that the prior
version of the statute, with no provision for the examination of records beyond the itemized
statement required to be filed, simply did not provide enough protection against potential abuses
of campaign funds. Consequently, the amendment makes provision for the appointment by the
Legislative Service Commission each year of an independent auditor to examine the financial
records of the party, candidate or committee receiving the funds. Id. § 163-278.43(c) (Cum. Supp.
1979). Clearly, such an annual independent audit is a much more effective means of ascertaining
compliance with the election laws than the examination of a report prepared by the organization
receiving the funds. The cost of the audit is to be paid from the funds held by the State Treasurer
for disbursement to the audited party, candidate, or committee. Id. § 163-278.43(d).
The General Assembly in 1979 also amended Article 22A of the North Carolina General
Statutes, which regulates contributions and expenditures in political campaigns, Id. §§ 163-278.6
to .35 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979), to expand its coverage to referendum campaigns. Law of June
8, 1979, ch. 1073, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1383 (codified in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 163-278 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). "Referendum" is defined as "any question, issue, or act referred to
a vote of the people of the entire State by the General Assembly and includes constitutional
amendments and State bond issues." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.6(18a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
"Referendum committee" is defined to be "a combination of two or more individuals or any
business entity, corporation, insurance company, labor union, professional association, committee,
association, or organization, the primary or incidental purpose of which is to support or oppose
the passage of any referendum on the ballot, or to influence or attempt to influence the result of a
referendum, or which accepts contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing
or attempting to influence the outcome of any referendum." Id. § 163-278.6(18b). Referendum
committees, by virtue of the amendment, are now required to comply with the provisions of
Article 22A. These provisions include the requirement to appoint a treasurer, id. § 163-278.8, to
file an organizational, pre-referendum, final, and annual report, id. § 163-278.9A, and to file a
treasurer's statement that includes lists of all contributions, expenditures, and loans. Id. § 163278.11. In addition, referendum committees must comply with the disclosure provisions of the
Article before soliciting contributions. Id. § 163-278.20. Any business entity, corporation,
insurance company, labor union or professional association may lawfully contribute to a
referendum committee, id. § 163-278.19A, but the-committee is precluded from making any
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panded the scope of permissible corporate participation in political
campaigns by amending the statute that places limits on such participation. 8 4 G.S. 163-278.19 provides that
it shall be unlawful for any corporation, business entity, labor union,
professional association or insurance company directly or indirectly
(1)to make any contribution or expenditure. . . in aid or in behalf
of or in opposition to any candidate or political committee in any
election or for any political purpose whatsoever
(2) to pay or use or offer, consent or agree to pay or use any of its
in aid of or in opposition to any candidate
money or property for or
85
or political committee.'
The amendment, however, adds a new subsection to the statute that
authorizes a corporation, business entity, labor union, professional association or insurance company that has organized a political committee to provide the committee with "reasonable administrative
support."' 8 6 Such support may include, but is not limited to, "record
keeping, computer services, billings, mailings to members of the comis reasonably necessary for the admittee, and such other support as
ministration of the committee.'8 7 The approximate cost of
such
administrative support is to be included in the political committee's
final report in its list of "contributions."' 8 8
Given that the purpose of G.S. 163-278.19 is to protect the public
from undue influence by corporations and to insure the responsiveness
of elected officials to the public at large, 8 9 the amendment is somewhat
startling. It is apparently now permissible for a corporation to "donate" thousands of dollars worth of administrative support to a particular candidate even though a direct donation of $1 is not allowed.
D.

State and Local Government

In a continuing effort to increase state employee productivity, 190
the General Assembly enacted a statute to award pay incentives to state
contribution to another referendum committee, candidate or political committee if it receives such
a contribution. Id. § 163-278.13(el).
184. Law of May 4, 1979, ch. 517, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 608 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. 163278.19(e) (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
185. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.19(a) (1976).
186. Id. § 163-278.19(e) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Louchheim, Eng & People, Inc. v. Carson, 35 N.C. App. 299, 241 S.E.2d 401 (1978).
190. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-7 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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employees who show demonstrable gains in efficiency in their work.'91
The statute creates a committee to oversee the pay incentive program, 192 provides for an application procedure, 193 and sets out the

qualifications for and methods of determining when a pay incentive
has been earned. It grants an award not in excess of twenty-five per-

cent of the savings to the State generated by a governmental unit's in194

creased efficiency, to be divided equally among the unit's employees.
In addition, the statute disallows an award when any savings result
from a lowering in the level or quality of services rendered by the
unit. 195 The thrust of the statute is to encourage savings through better
communication methods and the elimination of unnecessary travel, advertising, and membership dues, printing and mailing, overtime, con-

sultants' fees, and budgeted positions. 196 The new pay incentive statute
is an obvious response to increasing public dissatisfaction with government spending. It complements last year's merit pay increase statute, 197 which abolished automatic pay increases for government
employees and tied salary raises to performance.

While the incentive pay act encourages greater efficiency in government administration, it is important to ensure that savings are not at
the expense of the quality and effectiveness of government programs.
The value of savings could be outweighed by diminished quality of

government services. Although annual measurements of program
quality will be difficult to make and evaluate, they should help maintain acceptable service levels.

The 1979 General Assembly enacted other legislation affecting
state and local government employees. The General Assembly created

an Employees Liability Insurance Committee to negotiate group liability insurance plans on behalf of law enforcement officers and county
191. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 945, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1285 (to be codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 126-46 to -50). The new act abolishes 1977 legislation designed to determine the feasibility of pay incentives.
192. The Committee is made up of the Secretary of Administration, the State Auditor, the
State Budget Officer, and the State Personnel Director. Id. § 2 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 126-46). The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Speaker of the House of Representatives
must each appoint one person, who has experience administering incentives in industry, to the
Committee. Id. (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-47).
193. All units within the General Assembly and within the Governor's, Lieutenant Governor's, and State Auditor's offices are expressly excluded from the program. Id. (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-47).
194. Id. (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-49).
195. Id. (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-48).
196. Id.
197. Id. (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-7).
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and city employees.' 98 Local governments are not required to participate, but may elect to have the Committee negotiate insurance plans
for some or all of their employees on a departmental basis. 199
Another act requires all state employees who owe money to the
State to make full restitution of the debt within a reasonable time as a
condition of continued employment. 00 An employee who owes money
to the State is entitled to written notice that his job will be terminated
unless he begins repayment within a reasonable time.2"' Additionally,
an indebted employee who can establish that there is a genuine dispute
regarding the existence of the debt, its amount, or potential insurance
coverage will not be dismissed so long as he is pursuing administrative
or judicial remedies to settle the dispute." 2
The North Carolina courts decided two cases in 1979 that significantly limited the authority of the State Personnel Commission. In
Reed v. Byrd," 3 the court of appeals held that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by ordering the reinstatement of a discharged employee without first finding that his discharge had been
wrongful. Plaintiff, an employee of the Department of Corrections,
was demoted and transferred for failing to assist in an investigation by
the Division of Prisons. 2" Plaintiff was given a -hearing before the
Commission and claimed that he had been wrongfully demoted. The
Commission, without making any conclusions regarding the facts relied
upon by the Department of Corrections in finding that Byrd failed to
assist the investigation, ordered plaintiff reinstated to his former rank
and pay.2 0 On appeal by the Department of Corrections, the superior
court affirmed the Commission's actions.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Commission has
authority to provide relief only when it finds that an employee has been
198. Law of April 10, 1979, ch. 325, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 248 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 143B-422 to -426.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
199. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-424 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
200. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 864, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1185 (to be codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 143-540 to -550, 115-142, 120-102). Special provisions are made for debtors who are
public officials, id. (to be codified at §§ 143-543 to -545, or legislators, id. (to be codified at §§ 143546 to -547).
201. The statute specifically provides that an employee may meet the reasonable time requirement by permitting not less than 10% of his net earnings to be withheld each pay period until the
debt is repaid. Id. § 1 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-541(c)).
202. Id. (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-541(b)).
203. 41 N.C. App. 625, 255 S.E.2d 606 (1979).
204. Id. at 626, 255 S.E.2d at 607.
205. Id. at 627, 255 S.E.2d at 608.
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demoted or discharged wrongfully or without just cause.2 °6 In construing the statute that created the State Personnel Commission, the court
focused primarily on the statute's frequent use of the just cause standard. In particular, the majority relied on G.S. 126-35, which provides
that "[n]o permanent employee subject to the State Personnel Act shall
be discharged, suspended, or reduced in pay or position, except for just
cause." 20 7 The court did recognize the broader language of G.S. 12637: "The State Personnel Commission is hereby authorized to reinstate
any employee to the position from which he has been removed, to order the employment, promotion, transfer, or salary adjustment of any
individual to whom it has been wrongly denied ....,20 Nevertheless,
the court held that all sections in Chapter 126 must be read together to
determine legislative intent. 20 9 The court found that the General Assembly had not "intended that the State Personnel Commission would
have the power to restore a State employee to a position from which he
had been demoted without
some finding that the employee had been
210
treated wrongfully.
In a second action involving the State Personnel Commission's authority, the court of appeals held that the Commission may not exercise
discretion in choosing among available remedies;2 ' the Commission
must return a wrongfully dismissed state employee to substantially the
same rank and pay he would have had but for the dismissal.
In Jones v. Department of Human Resources plaintiff was dismissed from his job as a boiler room operator for poor performance of
his work. He appealed the dismissal through proper grievance procedures on the grounds that he was dismissed without just cause and that
he had not been given adequate warnings that his job performance was
unsatisfactory.21 2 After conducting a full investigation, 21 3 the State
Personnel Commission's hearing officer found that plaintiff and been
wrongfully dismissed and recommended that plaintiff be reinstated, re206. Id. at 629, 255 S.E.2d at 609.
207. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-35 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (quotedin 41 N.C. App. at 628, 255 S.E.2d
at 608-09).
208. Id. § 126-37 (quotedin 41 N.C. App. at 628-29, 255 S.E.2d at 608-09).
209. 41 N.C. App. at 629, 255 S.E.2d at 609.
210. Id.
211. Jones v. Department of Human Resources, 44 N.C. App. 116, 260 S.E.2d 654 (1979),
212. Id. at 117, 260 S.E.2d at 654.
213. In his finding of facts, the Commission's hearing officer found that while plaintiff had
been given oral warnings, he had not received a final written warning as prescribed by the NORTH
CAROLINA STATE PERSONNEL POLICY MANUAL, DISCIPLINARY ACTION, SUSPENSION AND Dis-

MISSAL 5-2 to -3 ("Personal Conduct"). Id. at 118-19, 260 S.E.2d at 657.
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imbursed for wages lost during his discharge, restored all lost benefits,
and paid his attorney's fees.2 14 The full Commission reviewed the action and agreed that plaintiff had been wrongfully discharged, but limited his recovery to mere reinstatement. 2 15 Plaintiff appealed to the
superior court, which reversed the Commission insofar as it had overturned recovery for net pecuniary loss. Defendant, the Department of
Human Resources, appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that the
remedies afforded a wrongfully discharged employee under the State
Personnel Act are discretionary and the Commission is not required to
give all the remedies available under G.S. 126-37.216
In upholding the trial court's decision, the court of appeals reasoned that the policy underlying the State Personnel Act is to return, as
nearly as possible, a wrongfully discharged employee to his predischarge position. The Commission's failure to do so was arbitrary, in2 17
consistent with its own findings, and, therefore, clearly erroneous.
The court focused on the unequivocal language of G.S. 126-35, which
provides that no permanent employee shall be discharged except for
just cause. The court reasoned that to construe the statute to give the
Commission discretionary power over a discharged employee's remedies would "serve to defeat or impair the object of the statute."2 Instead, the statutory remedies must be provided to the extent necessary
to correct wrongs done to an employee by the State and to return him
to his prior position without detriment. In response to defendant's argument that the powers of the Commission should be discretionary,
Judge Martin stated:
If.. .these remedies are merely discretionary with the Commission
and the Commission is not under any obligation to order effective
remedies for wrongs committed by State employers upon subject employees after having determined that such wrongs were in fact committed, then there is no reason at all for the Personnel Commission to
exist, and its creation by the Legislature was no more than a meaningless gesture which conveys no benefits upon anyone and affords
no protection to any State employee from unfair or discriminatory
214. 44 N.C. App. at 119, 260 S.E.2d at 657.
215. When the Department was ordered to reinstate plaintiff, it wrote him a letter informing
him of the Commission's decision and notifying him that his services would no longer be needed
as of the date of his reinstatement. Although plaintiff did not challenge this later dismissal, it is
clear that this second termination had some influence on the superior court and the court of appeals decisions. Id. at 120, 260 S.E.2d at 657.
216. Id. at 123, 260 S.E.2d at 659.

217. Id. at 122-23, 260 S.E.2d at 659.
218. Id. at 125, 260 S.E.2d at 660. See also State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 213 S.E.2d 291 (1975)
(criminal statutes should not be construed to defeat or impair their purpose).
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2 19
actions by any State employing agency.
In Reed and Jones the court of appeals clarified its view that the
only function of the State Personnel Commission is to determine if discharged employees have been wrongfully dismissed and, if so, to provide remedies to the fullest extent necessary to return them to their
rightful place. Relying on these purposes of the State Personnel Act,
the court limited the general language of the statute and restricted the
discretionary authority of the State Personnel Commission. By construing the statute to grant more narrow decision-making powers to the
Commission, the court has taken a firm and consistent position that
focuses on protecting state employees and insures that legislatively
mandated review procedures are strictly followed.

The court of appeals decided another issue concerning government
authority in James v. Hunt,2 2 ° in which the court upheld the authority
of the Governor to suspend from duty a political appointee pending a
final determination of cause for removal. Defendant, the Governor of
North Carolina, requested that plaintiff, an attorney and member of the
State Cemetary Commission, resign from his post for alleged conflicts
of interest that, if proven, would constitute just cause for removal.2 2'
The plaintiff refused to resign, and the Governor suspended him pending a final resolution of the matter. On appeal from a lower court decision 2 22 denying plaintiff's request for reinstatement, the court of
appeals held that when the Governor has been granted the power to
remove a state official for cause, the power to temporarily suspend is an
implicit and necessary element of that power. Relying on a policy rationale, the court noted:
The safety of the state, which is the highest law, imperatively re219. 44 N.C. App. at 123, 260 S.E.2d at 659. Judge Martin went on to confirm:
We are unwilling to assume that the legislative intent in enacting the subject legislation
was to create a hollow procedural facade which would serve to identify and adjudicate
wrongful acts by State agency employing units and yet which would house no remedies
of right to redress the employees who suffered thereby.
Id. at 124, 260 S.E.2d at 660.
220. 43 N.C. App. 109, 258 S.E.2d 481 (1979).
221. The Governor claimed that plaintiff's "legal representation of thirteen ... cemeteries
and Cemetery Funds of North Carolina, Inc. erodes the public's confidence in the ability of the
Cemetery Commission to represent the people in matters which the Commission considers." Id.
at 110, 258 S.E.2d at 482.
222. Plaintiff brought suit against the Governor seeking I) an order restraining the hearing
scheduled by the Governor, 2) a declaratory judgment that the Governor had no authority to
suspend him, 3) a declaratory judgment that prior to his removal from office he is entitled to a
hearing and opportunity to be heard, and 4) an order directing the Governor to reinstate him
pending a decision by a hearing officer appointed pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act.
Id.
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quires the suspension, pending his trial, of a public officer,--espe-

cially a custodian of public funds,--charged with malfeasance or
nonfeasance in office. Suspension does not remove the officer, but

merely prevents him, for the time being,from performing thefunctions
of his office.... 223
Plaintiff also challenged the procedures for removal employed by
the Governor, arguing that the procedures set out in the Administrative
Procedures Act 224 should have been followed. Plaintiff argued specifically that a hearing on the merits prior to his suspension from office
was required by the Act. The court found, however, that because the
statute creating the Cemetary Commission made no reference to the
Act, the Act was not applicable. The court said:
[W]e find no cause nor indication by any court that the courts should
bind the Governor to any statutory procedure unless the Constitution

of the State or the statutory provision giving him the power of removal specify a specific procedure therefor. Hence, G.S. 65-50 gives
the Governor the power to remove a member of the Cemetary Commission for cause .... [but] there is no reference to the Administra-

tive Procedures Act.2 25
In short, the court held that the Administrative Procedure Act only applies to removals by the Governor when specifically required by the
statute giving him authority to remove for cause.
E.

Mental Health: Involuntary Commitment

In 1979 the legislature amended the involuntary commitment statute226 in an attempt to expedite commitment of the mentally il to the
223. Id. at 122, 258 S.E.2d at 489 (quoting State ex rel. Clapp v. Peterson, 50 Minn. 239, 244,
52 N.W. 655, 656 (1892)) (emphasis in original).
224. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-1 TO -6.4 (1978).
225. 43 N.C. App. at 120,258 S.E.2d at 488. As additional support for the governor's power of
removal pending a final hearing, the court quoted by analogy from a case upholding the routine
practice of suspending police officers pending disciplinary investigations, the rationale being that
the suspension is only temporary and designed to protect the public. Id. at 121-22, 258 S.E.2d at
489.
226. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 915, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1260 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 122-58.1 to .26 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The involuntary commitment procedure allows a
person with knowledge of the facts to appear before a superior court clerk or district court magistrate to execute an affidavit and petition for a custody order. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.3(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1979). If the clerk or magistrate is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the facts in the affidavit are true and that the respondent meets the substantive commitment standard, see note 237 infra, he must issue a custody order for an examination by a
qualified physician. Id. § 122-58.3(b). The respondent must be taken into custody within 24
hours after the order is signed and transferred to a qualified mental health center or physician for
an examination. A physician must examine the respondent within 24 hours after his arrival. Id.
§ 122-58.4(a), (c). If the physician finds that the respondent meets the substantive commitment
standard, he is then taken to a qualified mental health facility pending a hearing. Id. § 12258.4(c). Within 24 hours after his arrival at this facility, he must be examined again by a "quai-
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state's mental health facilities.22 7 The purpose of the amended statute
is to insure that those who are mentally ill and in "desperate need" will
be kept under close supervision and given the necessary treatment to
protect themselves and the general public.
The most significant change toward this end was the replacement
of the "imminently dangerous" standard for commitment 228 by a simpler and expanded "dangerous" standard. 9 Under the old standard,
fled physician" and can only be further detained if this doctor also finds that the standard is met.
Id. § 122-58.6 (a). A hearing in the district court must be held within 10 days of the first day of
custody, Id. § 122-58.7(a), at which time the court may order either inpatient or outpatient treatment, or both, for a maximum of 90 days if it finds by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence"
that the standard for commitment is satisfied. Id. § 122-58.8.
227. As a safeguard, Law of Mar. 20, 1979, ch. 164, § 2, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess, 106
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-81.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979)), provides that all involuntary commitments to private institutions must also comply with the involuntary commitment procedures in
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.1 to .26 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
228. The North Carolina Mental Health Study Commission proposed the elimination of the
word "imminent." In doing so, the Commission expressed concern that in balancing the risk of
erroneous confinement against the risk of deprivation of needed treatment, the prior statute gave
insufficient consideration to the latter risk, thereby denying treatment to those in "desperate
need." MENTAL HEALTH STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 15 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FiNAL REPORT]; see also, INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, NORTH CAROLINA LEGls. (1979) [hereinafter cited as NORTH CAROLINA LEGIs.]. The Commission also pointed out that the failure to
provide treatment can lead to "tragic consequences." FINAL REPORT, supra, at 15. See generally
NORTH CAROLINA LEGIS., supra, at 150:
Last year (1978) in Hearings before the Mental Health Study Commission many mental
health professionals, law enforcement officers, and mental health patient advocates contended that, under the law at that time, commitments were too difficult to obtain. They
pointed out that the standard of "imminent danger" was very narrow, usually difficult to
prove, and vague.
229. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.2(l) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The amended definition provides:
a. 'Dangerous to himself' shall mean that within the recent past:
1. The person has acted in such manner as to evidence:
I. that he would be unable without care, supervision, and the continued
assistance of others not otherwise available, to exercise self-control,
judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities
and social relations, or to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or
medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety; and
II. that there is a reasonable probability of serious physical debilitation to
him within the near future unless adequate treatment is afforded pursuant to this Article. A showing of behavior that is grossly irrational
or of actions which the person is unable to control or of behavior that
is grossly inappropriate to the situation or other evidence of severely
impaired insight and judgment shall create a prima facie inference
that the person is unable to care for himself; or
2. The person has attempted suicide or threatened suicide and that there is a
reasonable probability of suicide unless adequate treatment is afforded
under this Article; or
3. The person has mutilated himself or attempted to mutilate himself and that
there is a reasonable probability of serious self-mutilation unless adequate
treatment is afforded under this Article.
b. 'Dangerous to others' shall mean that within the recent past, the person has
inflicted or attempted to inflict or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another or

1980]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1221

an individual had to be "imminently dangerous to himself or others,"
suggesting the potential for causing immediate harm.2 30 Under the

amended version the court need only find "that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate, and is dangerous to himself or others, or is mentally retarded, and because of an accompanying behavior disorder, is
dangerous to others .... ,,231 A showing that (1) a person is unable to

care for himself or to exercise self-control, and (2) that his behavior is
"grossly irrational," or "grossly inappropriate," or there is "evidence of
severely impaired insight and judgment," gives rise to a prima facie
inference that he is unable to care for himself and, thus is "dangerous
to himself."23' 2

Another change in the statute permits the committing judge to order outpatient treatment for a person in lieu of hospitalization. 233 The
statute implies the necessity of some finding that the terms of the less
restrictive outpatient treatment would be appropriate to and understood by the particular respondent. 3
Despite this greater discretion to commit the mentally ill to both
inpatient and outpatient treatment, some officials feel that the changes

really will not stop the "revolving door of commitment and release of
'
The real problem is not difficulty of commitmentally ill patients."235
ment, but loose procedures that allow dangerous patients to be re-

leased. Until procedures for release are tightened these officials fear
that patients in genuine need of treatment to protect themselves and the
has acted in such a manner as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to
another and that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated.
Id. Dangerousness is a constitutional as well as a statutory requirement:
Our legislative statement of public policy and the statutory requirements. . . are consistent with the recent case of O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). . . ,which,
inter alia, holds that there is no constitutional basis for the involuntary confinement of
an individual who is mentally ill if he is dangerous to no one and can live safely in
freedom.
In re Hatley, 291 N.C. 693, 696, 231 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1977).
230. See note 236 supra. The court of appeals has defined "imminently dangerous" as "a
danger to himself or others in the immediate future." In re Salem, 31 N.C. App. 57, 61, 228
S.E:2d 649, 652 (1976). The requirement of imminent danger has been "taken seriously.", In re
Doty, 38 N.C. App. 233, 235, 247 S.E.2d 628, 629 (1978). Numerous commitment orders under
the old statute were reversed because the danger shown was not "imminent." Id. See also In re
Carter, 25 N.C. App. 442, 213 S.E.2d 409 (1975).
231. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.8(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
232. Id. § 122-58.2(l)(a)(II).
233. Id. § 122-58.8(b).
234. Id. If the respondent fails to follow the outpatient treatment procedures, the mental
health center is to notify the Attorney General's office. The Attorney General may then notify the
court and have the patient taken into full custody. Id. § 122-58.8(c).
235. Chapel Hill Newspaper, Jan. 21, 1980, at 2B, col. 1.
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public will be more readily commited, but will be released from the

state's mental facilities while still in need of treatment, just as they were
under the old statute.
F.

Education

The 1979 General Assembly divested the State of much of its control over private education, particularly parochial primary and secondary schools. 23 6 Under the new legislation, the state generally retains
only two controls: it can require private schools to keep attendance and
238
immunization records23 7 and to administer annual aptitude tests.
of
The most significant aspect of the new law is the virtual exemption 239
Act,
Testing
Competency
School
High
1977
the
from
schools
private

which requires all seniors to pass a standardized test as a prerequisite to
high school graduation. The new statute merely requires that each pri-

vate school administer a standardized test of its own choice to graduating seniors; the school is given wide leeway to select its own minimum
passing score on the test it chooses.2 40 This partial testing exemption
could substantially undermine the policy behind the Competency Testing Act; because the new law permits each school to choose its own
minimum passing score, private school administrators could insure that

all their students pass. Thus, students who do not possess the minimum
skills necessary to function effectively in society could receive high
school diplomas.2 4 '
236. Law of May 2, 1979, ch. 505, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 529 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
115-257.6 to .13 (Cum. Supp. 1979)); Law of May 2, 1979, ch. 506, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 531
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-257.19 to .26 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). Earlier in 1979, directors
of several private religious schools flouted N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-256 (1978), which required
private school teachers to be certified to teach in the public schools. The directors refused to file a
mandatory annual report with the State Department of Public Instruction. Their refusal, based on
a first amendment defense, led to legal action by the Attorney General. Before the state supreme
court could rule on the case, however, the General Assembly enacted the new law. X ScH. L.
BULL., 7 (1979).
237. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-257.7, .20 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
238. Id. § 115-257.8, .21. The private school is free to select the test it desires. The test must
be given to students in grades 1, 2, 3, 6, and 9 and must measure achievement in English grammar,
reading, spelling, and mathematics. Id.
239. Id. §§ 115-320.6 to -320.13 (1978). The new statute effectively repealed G.S. 115-320.13
which authorized the application of the North Carolina competency test for graduation to nonpublic schools. See id. §§ 115-257.13, .26 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (qualified schools that comply with
these new statutory requirements are exempt from most other education laws).
240. Id. §§ 115-257.9, .22 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
241. Several education associations have announced an intention to challenge the lesser graduation requirement as a denial ofequal protection. In addition, the United States Attorney for the
Middle District of North Carolina has asked the United States Department of Justice to review
the constitutionality of the private school exemption. X ScH. L. BULL. 7-8 (1979).
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Another key problem with the new law, raised when the bill was in
committee, was not addressed in the final draft. Because the statute

fails to clarify what is meant by a parochial school,242 the state is likely
to receive many applications for religious home education that will

technically comply with the vague statutory requirements for parochial
schools243 and thus be protected from state control and regulation.
The General Assembly clarified North Carolina's General Com-

pulsory Attendance Law .24" For the first time, a school principal must
notify parents in writing when their child has five consecutive or ten
accumulated days of unexcused absence from school in one academic
year.24 5 This notification must also alert parents that they may be criminally prosecuted under the attendance law if they are unable to justify
the child's absences.2 4 6 If the absences total thirty days or more, the
principal must notify the state prosecutor. 247 Finally, if the prosecutor

can establish that the parents of a child who has accumulated thirty
absences without excuse were notified and did nothing to remedy the

situation, then a prima facie case that the parents are responsible is
established.2 48
Prior to the 1979 amendment, the principal had wide discretion in
deciding when, if ever, to take action to enforce the attendance laws.
No statutory procedure for notice to parents existed, nor did the statute
clarify what the State had to establish to penalize parents who kept or
discouraged their children from attending school. 24 9 The new amend-

ment, therefore, not only clarifies the Compulsory Attendance Law, but
also limits the principal's discretion in handling student absenteeism.
The statute governing suspension and dismissal of students was
242. More specifically, the statute fails to define fully a school organized or operated "as part
of a religious ministry." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-257.13 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
243. Interview with Anne M. Dellinger, Institute of Government, in Chapel Hill, North Carolina (Jan. 30, 1980).
244. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-166 to -175 (1978). The general purpose of the statute is to
prevent those in control of children from unlawfully keeping them out of school. See In re McMillan, 30 N.C. App. 235, 226 S.E.2d 693 (1976). See generally Wettach, North Carolina School
Legislation-1956, 35 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1956) (overview of the original attendance law and related
educational legislation passed at the same time).
245. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-166 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
246. Id. § 115-169 provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny parent, guardian or other person violating the provisions of [the attendance law] shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
shall be fined not more than fifty dollars ($50.00) or imprisoned not more than 30 days, or both
247. Id. § 115-166.
248. Id.
249. North Carolina common law did provide a standard for the conviction of a parent who
kept a child unlawfully from school. State v. Johnson, 188 N.C. 591, 125 S.E. 183 (1924).
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completely rewritten in 1979.250 Although the statute gives school offi-

cials greater authority to remove disruptive students through suspension and permanent expulsion, it also codifies judicially-created due
process protections for suspended and expelled students. 25' Like the
old statute, the new one gives the principal authority to suspend a student for ten days or less without further approval and still requires the
principal to secure his superintendant's approval for any suspension
lasting longer than ten days. 52 For the first time, however, the local
school board may expel any student "convicted of a felony.

. .

whose

continued presence in school constitutes a clear threat to the safety and
health of other students or employees. 253 The new statute also provides that a student suspended for less than ten days be given an opportunity to take all exams he missed during the suspension period. 254 If
suspended for more than ten days a student may appeal to the school
board. 55 A suspension for over ten days that is subsequently upheld
by a school board, as well as an expulsion, are subject to judicial review. 56 Finally, the new legislation requires that all policies governing
the conduct of students and all procedures for their suspension or expulsion adopted by a local school board must be published and made
available
to parents and students at the beginning of each academic
7

year.

25

The General Assembly also broadened the scope of a teacher's responsibilities to give medical care to students. 58 Under the new statute, a North Carolina teacher, if given authority by the local board of
education, may administer prescribed medication to a student at the
written request of the student's parents, may give reasonable emergency medical care and may perform any first aid or lifesaving techniques in which he has been trained.25 9 To protect teachers from civil
liability in their performance of these new responsibilities, the statute
provides for a legal defense at state expense if the teacher gives prompt,
250. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 874, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1200 (codified at N.C.
§ 115-147 (Cum.Supp. 1979)).
251. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-147(a) (Cum.Supp. 1979).
252. Id. § 115-147(b), (c).
253. Id. § 115-147(d).
254. Id. § 115-147(b).

GEN. STAT.

255. Id. § 115-147(c).

256. Id. § 115-147(e).
257. Id. § 115-147(a).
258. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 971, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1306 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 115-146.1, -143-300.13 to .18 (Cum.Supp. 1979)).
259. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-146.1 (Cum.Supp. 1979).

19801

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1225

written notice to the Attorney General's office. 2 6°Any judgment or
settlement made on behalf of the teacher will be paid out of appropriations for State tort claims. 26 1 The new statute gives teachers additional
protection when providing further care for students and encourages
teachers to learn and use lifesaving and first aid techniques.

The supreme court in 1979 also decided two questions that will
significantly affect the rights and liabilities of school officials and non26
tenured school emloyees who have been dismissed from their jobs. 1
In Presnell v. Pell2 63 plaintiff, a school cafeteria manager, was fired by
defendants, the school principal and board of education, for allegedly

bringing liquor onto school premises and dispensing it to other employees. No notice or opportunity to be heard on the charges was given to
the plaintiff before her dismissal. After telling plaintiff she was fired,
the principal also told plaintiffs co-workers and revealed to them the

reasons for her dismissal. Plaintiff brought suit alleging wrongful dismissal and defamation. 2" In addition, plaintiff alleged that her wrong-

ful dismissal without prior notice and hearing and the accompanying
slander denied her vested liberty interest in violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 65

Although the trial court dismissed the complaint because plaintiff
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, the court of appeals

pointed out that exhaustion is not required when plaintiff is not offered
an effective administrative remedy. The court found that plaintiff
made a good faith allegation that she had been wrongfully discharged

without a prior hearing, that the statements made by the principal upon
260. Id. § 143-300.14.
261. Id. § 143-300.16 (punitive damages are not payable from this fund).
262. In two other school employment cases, Kurtz v. Board of Educ., 39 N.C. App. 412, 250
S.E.2d 718 (1979), and Baxter v. Poe, 42 N.C. App. 404, 257 S.E.2d 71 (1979), the court of appeals
upheld the discharges of two teachers for failure to comply with school board policies regarding
corporal punishment procedures. In Kurtz the court rejected plaintiff-teacher's claim that the local school board's policy allowing corporal punishment only as a last resort and only in the presence of another adult conflicted with the statutory policy of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-146 (1978),
permitting the reasonable exercise of corporal punishment. 39 N.C. App. at 417-18, 250 S.E.2d at
721-22. The court also held that the private hearing afforded plaintiff under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115-142(j)(1) (1978), while possibly an anomaly when contrasted with the Open Meetings Law,
is full, fair, and properly safeguarded. 39 N.C. App. at 419-20, 250 S.E.2d at 722-23 (1979). In
Baxter the court held that admission of hearsay evidence in a dismissal hearing and of evidence of
conduct that occurred more than three years before did not violate the rules of evidence for dismissal hearings as outlined in Thompson v. Board of Educ., 31 N.C. App. 401, 230 S.E.2d 164
(1976), rev'd on other grounds, 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 (1977). 42 N.C. App. at 410, 257
S.E.2d at 75.
263. 298 N.C. 715, 260 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
264. Id. at 717-18, 260 S.E.2d at 613.
265. Id. at 724, 260 S.E.2d at 617.
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which her discharge was based were false and that publication of the
false charges constituted a slander reflecting unfavorably on her good
name, character, and reputation related to her employment. Because
the defendant dismissed plaintiff for alleged job misconduct and, without cause, published the reasons for her dismissal, the court found that
plaintiff made out a colorable claim that protection of her liberty interest had been denied.26 6
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that plaintiff
had stated a good claim for defamation against the principal but that
this claim could not extend to the school board or its members individually. The court noted that the complaint failed to allege any involvement of the individual board members in the publication of the alleged
slander and that the corporate school board had not waived its governmental immunity by consenting to be sued.26 7
Further, the court held that plaintiff should have exhausted her
administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.2 68 Even though
a liberty interest was involved, the court held that "[d]ue process is satisfied under these circumstances by providing plaintiff an opportunity
either before her discharge or
to clear her name in a hearing of record
269
within a reasonable time thereafter.
The differences between the supreme court and court of appeals
decisions hinge on their diverse interpretations of the United States
Supreme Court's holdings in BoardofRegents v. Roth2 70 and Bishop v.
Wood.2 7 ' Both the supreme court and court of appeals found that
plaintiff had a liberty interest at stake by virtue of being dismissed for
reasons that were false and published to others as true; the court of
appeals, however, understood Roth and Bishop to require a
pretermination hearing 272 while the supreme court understood them
only to require that some opportunity be afforded plaintiff to clear her
266. 39 N.C. App. 538, 546-47, 251 S.E.2d 692, 697-98 (1979).
267. 298 N.C. at 720-21, 260 S.E.2d at 614-15. The court of appeals had denied defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had in fact stated a claim for slander
against the principal and the school board. 39 N.C. App. at 541-42, 251 S.E.2d at 695.
268. 298 N.C. at 722-23, 260 S.E.2d at 616.
269. Id. at 724, 260 S.E.2d at 617 (emphasis in original).
270. 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (employee discharge without prior hearing does not violate due proc-

ess because nonrenewal of employment contract not based on charge that could damage employee's reputation).
271. 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (employee discharge does not violate due process because employee's
job was terminable at will and there was no public disclosure of reasons for discharge).
272. 39 N.C. App. at 545-47, 251 S.E.2d at 696-97.
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name either before or after the dismissal.2 73 In Roth and Bishop the
Supreme Court discussed in dicta the ramifications of a situation in
which the property or liberty interests of public employees had been
infringed by their dismissals. z7 4 Neither case, however, definitively established what is required when a liberty interest is at stake other than
that plaintiff is entitled to notice, a hearing, and other due process protections.2 7 5
The North Carolina Supreme Court decision is basically sound:
plaintiff does have reasonable and effective procedures for notice and
hearing to clear her name by proving that the charges causing her dismissal were false. The emphasis in the supreme court's decision, however, should be on insuring that the hearing be held "within a
reasonabletime" after dismissal.2 7 6 Even when a dismissed employee
is able to disprove the charges against him, if he must bear the stigma
of the false accusations for a long period of time, his ability to find
other employment during the interim could be significantly hindered.
Finally, in a major decision affecting control over special education, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the General Assembly and the North Carolina Constitution dictate that state and local
boards of education, and not county governments, have the sole authority to make policy and budget decisions regarding special education. In Hughey v. Cloninger,277 the Court enjoined the Gaston County
Board of Commissioners from disbursing any funds to the Dyslexia
School of North Carolina, a nonprofit corporation that operates "exclusively for educational purposes and to furnish programs of instruction
for children with dyslexia."278
The Board of Commissioners relied on the statute279 that gives
them authority to appropriate revenues "to a sheltered workshop or
other private, nonprofit, charitable organization offering work or train273. 298 N.C. at 724-25, 260 S.E.2d at 617. The supreme court also relied on language from
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974): "1i]t is clear that 'a hearing afforded by administrative
appeal procedures after the actual dismissal is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
Due Process Clause.'" 298 N.C. at 724-25, 260 S.E.2d at 617 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. at 157).
274. Both Roth and Bishop held that no property or liberty interest was infringed. 408 U.S. at
572-78; 426 U.S. at 348.
275. For a more complete understanding of Supreme Court cases on employee due process
rights, Arnett should be read in conjunction with Roth and Bishop.
276. 298 N.C. at 724, 260 S.E.2d at 617 (emphasis added).
277. 297 N.C. 86, 253 S.E.2d 898 (1979).
278. Id. at 87, 253 S.E.2d at 899.

279. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-248 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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ing activities to the physically or mentally handicapped. ..,"I" and
argued that the Dyslexia School qualified under the statute. The majority held that the Dyslexia School did not qualify based on a very
narrow interpretation of "sheltered workshop." The court reasoned
that the General Assembly intended the term "sheltered workshop" to
mean an organization that attempts to rehabilitate handicapped pato treat the underlying causes of the
tients rather than one that seeks
28
physical or mental disability. '
The therapeutic philosophy of a sheltered workshop is to rehabilitate
the handicapped patients rather than to treat the underlying causes
of their physical or mental disability. Treatment represents a direct
attack on the disabilities of the patient, while [rehabilitation] represents an effort to identify and exploit the patient's
282 assets to the end of
providing the best possible community role.
The court sought to support this narrow construction by pointing out
that the General Assembly, in G.S. 115-315.7, had provided for dyslexic children by delegating responsibility for educating learning-disabled children to the state and local boards of education; 283 under a
well-established rule of statutory construction, when two statutes are
under consideration, the one that deals specifically with the issue controls over the more general one.284
In a second and perhaps more significant line of reasoning, the
court pointed out that the North Carolina Constitution, in requiring
that the General Assembly provide for "a general and uniform system
of free public schools, '285 does not support a delegation of authority to
boards of commissioners. The court reasoned that the Constitution
gives the legislature the duty to establish a general and uniform system,
and the legislature has delegated the control and supervision of all public education to county and city boards of education.286 Thus, the court
held, only local boards of education are authorized to initiate educa280. Id. § 153A-248(a)(2).
281. 297 N.C. at 89-90, 253 S.E.2d at 900.
282. Id.
283. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 115-315.7 (1978) sets forth the legislative policy regarding education
expense grants for exceptional children. The court noted that the General Assembly has specifically authorized direct subsidies by state and local boards to private schools for exceptional children. 297 N.C. at 91-92, 253 S.E.2d at 901-02.
284. The court relied on Utilities Conm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 451, 232 S.E.2d 184 (1977),
in support of this rule of construction. 297 N.C. at 91, 253 S.E.2d at 901.
285. N.C. CONsT. art. 9, § 2(1).
286. 297 N.C. at 93-94, 253 S.E.2d at 903. See also Coggins v. Board of Educ., 223 N.C. 763,
28 S.E.2d 527 (1944) (establishment and operation of North Carolina public schools under legislature's control).
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tional funding proposals. County commissioners have no constitutional or statutory authority to initiate public education proposals and
are only empowered to study the proposals, to levy taxes to create the
funds, and to distribute the funds in accordance with the education
boards' desires.
In dissent, Justice Exum argued that these two statutes were complementary. 87 He criticized the majority for creating such a "supposed
difference" between rehabilitation and treatment. Even if there is a
proper distinction, he argued, the restrictive definition of "sheltered
workshop" should still not exclude the Dyslexia School from falling
under the statute's broader category of "other private, nonprofit, charitable organizations."28
Justice Exum's challenge to the majority on statutory construction
grounds is well-warranted. Seeking a broader base for potential
financial support for education, Justice Exum more liberally interpreted the General Assembly's efforts to provide quality education for
all North Carolina students. While the majority is more concerned
with strict lines of authority and delegation of appropriation power, the
dissent correctly places greater weight on the strong public policies underlying the state's educational programs.
G. Insurance
1. Ratemaking
In 1977, the General Assembly changed the statutory method of
ratemaking to a "file and use" system.28 9 Under this system, proposed
rates become effective on a date specified in the rate filing despite disapproval by the Commissioner of Insurance, with challenged amounts
placed in escrow and made subject to refund.2 90 As originally enacted,
the 1977 amendments had an expiration date of September 1 1980.291
The 1979 General Assembly, however, removed the expiration date
from the 1977 ratemaking statute,2 92 thereby permanently retaining the
287. 297 N.C. at 98, 253 S.E.2d at 905 (Exum, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 97, 253 S.E.2d at 904-05.
289. Law of June 30, 1977, ch. 828, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1119 (codified in scattered sections
of N.C. GEN. STAT. chs. 58, 97 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). See generally State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v.
North Carolina Rate Bureau, 40 N.C. App. 85, 93, 252 S.E.2d 811, 817, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 452,
256 S.E.2d 810 (1979); Survey of Developments in North CarolinaLaw, 1977, 56 N.C.L. REv.1084
(1978).
290. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-124.20 to .22 (Cum.Supp. 1979).
291. Law of June 30, 1977, ch. 828, § 25, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1137.
292. Law of June 4, 1979, ch. 824, § 8, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1039.
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file and use system.293 In addition, both the 1979 legislature and the
court of appeals resolved some of the questions raised by the 1977
ratemaking amendments.2 94
Under a 1979 amendment to the statutory ratemaking scheme, the
Commissioner must consider the amount.of investment income earned
by insurance companies in deciding whether a proposed rate increase is
justified. 95 The former version of the ratemaking statute was silent on
this issue, 96 but in 1979 the court of appeals in State ex rel Commissioner of Insurance v. North CarolinaRate Bureau interpreted the ear-

lier version as allowing the Commissioner to consider investment
income in determining the reasonableness of the underwriting profit,
another of the factors he must consider.2 97 Although the court's hold293. See generally, INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1979, at
113-20 (1979).
294. Both the legislature and the court of appeals considered the Commissioner's powers in
the ratemaking process. Under a provision of the 1977 ratemaking statute still in effect, the Rate
Bureau is directed to establish a classification plan that separates automobile insurance risks on
the basis of use and a subclassification plan that further divides the risk. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5830.4 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
In State exrel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 43 N.C. App. 715, 259 S.E.2d
922, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 452, 256 S.E.2d 810 (1979), the court of appeals held that the Commissioner has no authority to put his own or the insurance department's classification plan into effect
under the guise of a modification of the Rate Bureau's plan. Prior to 1977, the statute allowed the
Commissioner to direct that "classifications or classification assignments be altered or revised."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.1 (repealed by Law of June 30, 1977, ch. 828, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws
1119); the 1977 statute, however, limits the Commissioner's authority, after conducting a hearing,
to issuing an "order determining wherein and to what extent such filing is deemed to be improper
and fixing a date thereafter. . . after which such filing shall no longer be effective." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-124.21(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The court found in this statutory change a legislative
intent to exclude classification from the powers of the Commissioner. 43 N.C. App. at 720, 259
S.E.2d at 925.
In a further clarification of the 1977 ratemaking amendments, the court of appeals held that
the Commissioner's failure to specify his reasons for disapproval of a rate increase will cause a
rate filing to be "deemed" approved. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau,
40 N.C. App. 85, 96, 252 S.E.2d 811, 819 (1979), cert. denied, 297 N.C. 452, 256 S.E.2d 805 (1980).
The court also discussed at length the burdens of proof of the Commissioner and the Rate Bureau.
Id. at 96-97, 252 S.E.2d at 819. See also State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate
Bureau, 41 N.C. App. 310, 312-13, 255 S.E.2d 557, 559-60 (1979) (discussing burden of proof),
295. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.19(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
296. Law of June 30, 1977, ch. 828, § 6, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1130 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-124.19(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979)). See Survey of Developments in North Carolina
Law, 1977, 56 N.C.L. REV. 1089 & nn.32-35 (1978).
297. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 40 N.C. App. 85, 107, 252
S.E.2d 811, 825, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 452, 256 S.E.2d 810 (1979).
In prior decisions the court had held that the Commissioner was not required to take investment income into account, and had avoided the question whether the Commissioner may consider
investment income if he chose to do so. Id. at 106-07. 252 S.E.2d at 825. (citing State ex rel.
Comm'r of Ins. v. Attorney General, 19 N.C. App. 263, 198 S.E.2d 575, cert. denied, 284 N.C. 252,
200 S.E.2d 652 (1973)); State ex. rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. Attorney General, 16 N.C. App. 724, 193
S.E.2d 432 (1972).
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ing apparently authorized the Commissioner to consider investment income from all sources, 298 the new statute specifies that "[d]ue
consideration shall be given to. .. investment income earned or realised by insurers from their unearned premium, loss, and loss expense
reserve funds generated from business within this State. ' 299 The new
statute appears to preclude consideration of investment income from
other sources, such as capital, and the court of appeals so held in
1979.300

Even if the statute obviates the court's holding on the types of investment income to be considered, the decision continues to have significance for its holding that investment income must be calculated for
ratemaking purposes at the actual rate of return rather than the higher
risk-free rate. 301 The court held that use of a risk-free rate of return
298. 40 N.C. App. at 107-08. 252 S.E.2d at 825-26. Although the court spoka of investment
income in general terms, the case dealt with investment income from unearned premium and loss
reserves. 1d. at 91, 105. 252 S.E.2d at 816, 824. In a subsequent case the court held that the
Commissioner could properly consider earnings from invested capital. State ex rel. Comm'r of
Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 41 N.C. App. 310, 318, 255 S.E.2d 557, 563 (1979). Although
the latter case was decided after the amendment was enacted, it was decided prior to the June 30,
1979 effective date.
299. N.C. GFN. STAT. 58-124.19(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
300. State ex. rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 44 N.C. App. 191, 206-07,
261 S.E.2d 671, 680-81 (1979). In addition, the court held that there was no substantial evidence
to support the Commissioner's finding that unaudited data was not reliable for ratemaking purposes. Id. at 199, 261 S.E.2d at 671. See note 319 infra. The Rate Bureau presented uncontradicted expert testimony that its unaudited data was reliable and that any error in data would not
materially affect the reasonableness of rates. Id. at 202-03, 261 S.E.2d at 678. The court rejected
the testimony of the certified public accountant offered by the insurance department on the
ground that he was not competent to determine whether the Rate Bureau's methods would discover any errors in the source data. Id. at 202, 261 S.E.2d at 678. Moreover, the insurance department's witness failed to testify that source data errors would materially affect the reasonableness
of rates. Id. Finally, the court held that "the action of the Commissioner in requiring audited
data in this case was arbitrary and capricious, violated principles of due process and contravened
the spirit if not the letter of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act." Id. at 204, 261
S.E.2d at 681. The Commissioner's disapproval order required the Rate Bureau to use audited
data on the ground that prior orders in separate rate filings had required the use of audited data.
Id. at 204-05, 261 S.E.2d at 679. The court held, however, that the Commissioner's disapproval
notice and order "was made upon an unlawful procedure," id. at 204, 261 S.E.2d at 679, by treating the prior orders as a rule without complying with the procedural requirements for rulemaking
in the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 205, 261 S.E.2d at 680. In addition, the Commissioner's order was held to be unreasonably vague and burdensome by requiring the Rate Bureau
to audit past records. Id. at 205-06, 261 S.E.2d at 680. The court concluded that "[tihe overall
manner in which the Commissioner has handled the issue of auditing offends traditional notions
of substantial justice and fairness and thus deprives the Bureau of the quintessential elements of
due process." Id. at 206, 261 S.E.2d at 680.
301. 40 N.C. App. at 108, 252 S.E.2d at 826.
The court of appeals has twice reaffirmed that investment income must be calculated at the
actual rate of return. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 44 N.C. App.
75, 259 S.E.2d 926 (1979); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 41 N.C.
App. 310, 319, 255 S.E.2d, 557, 563 (1979).
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would deter insurance companies from making investments that might
earn less income than the amount of income on which their rates are

based.3 °2 Because the legislature permits insurance companies to invest
in many opportunities that are not risk-free, 30 3 use of a risk-free rate of

return in ratemaking would contravene legislative intent.3 °4
The 1979 legislature also amended the ratemaking statutes to pro-

vide for greater emphasis on North Carolina data in determining
whether a proposed rate increase complies with statutory standards.30 5
The Rate Bureau's reliance on nationwide data has been an issue in

many ratemaking cases 30 6 and will continue to be contested under the
new statute. The former statute provided that "countrywide data shall
be considered where credible North Carolina experience or data is not
available. ' 30 7 Under the new statute, however, nationwide data may
30
now be considered only where credible statewide data is unavailable. 1
The implications of the new statute are unclear. Both the old and new
statutes require the absence of credible North Carolina data as a prerequisite to the consideration of nationwide data.30 9 Use of nationwide
data, however, is now permissive rather than mandatory. If the Rate
Bureau can decide whether to consider nationwide data, then the
change in wording is insignificant because the Bureau will almost invariably choose to rely on the higher expense and loss experience re-

302. 40 N.C. App. at 107-08, 252 S.E.2d at 826.
303. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-79 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides a wide range of investments for
fire, casualty and miscellaneous lines of insurance.
304. 40 N.C. App. at 107-08, 252 S.E.2d at 826.
305. Law of June 7, 1979, ch. 824, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1038 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-124.19 (Cune. Supp. 1979)).
306. See generally Survey, supra note 304, at 1089 n.35.
307. Law of June 30, 1977, ch. 828, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1119 (codified at N.C. GEN, STAT.
§ 58-124.19(2)).
308. Law of June 7, 1979, ch. 824, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1038 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-124.19 (Cum.Supp. 1979)).
309. The use of the word "only," in the new statute appears superfluous.
The 1979 amendments do not alter the method of determining whether North Carolina data
is available. In State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 40 N.C. App. 85, 252
S.E.2d 811, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 452, 256 S.E.2d 810 (1979), the Commissioner disapproved a
rate filing on the ground that the Rate Bureau improperly used national data when North Carolina data was available in evaluating the effect on insurance rates of workers' compensation benefit increases and higher medical costs. Id. at 88-91, 97, 252 S.E.2d at 815-16, 820. In addition, the
Commissioner found that the Rate Bureau used nationwide expense data and credibility factors.
Id. at 89-100, 752 S.E.2d 815-21. The court rejected the Commissioner's findings, however, because the Rate Bureau produced substantial evidence that its proposed rate increase was based on
North Carolina data when available. Id. at 98-99, 252 S.E.2d at 820-21. Specifically, the Rate
Bureau's expert witness testified that nationwide data was used only for changes that were not
fully reflected in North Carolina experience, and was required because the North Carolina data
base was too small to be reliable and that the expenses of the workers' compensation business are
uniform throughout the country. Id. at 98-100, 252 S.E.2d at 820-21.
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flected by nationwide figures. If, however, the new statute allows the
Commissioner to ignore nationwide data even when no credible North

Carolina310data is available, then the statute has undergone a significant
change.

The 1979 amendments also provide that "[d]ue consideration shall

be given to actual loss and expense experience within this State for the
most recent three-year period for which such information is avail-

able." 31 ' Specific consideration must now be given to data reflecting
actual experience for the most recent three-year period for which it is

available, even if that data is outdated. Thus, it may now be more
difficult for the Rate Bureau to justify using nationwide data because
the Bureau will first have to prove that the statewide data for that specific three-year period is not credible.
In a related statutory change, the legislation deleted the require-

ment that due consideration in ratemaking be given to relevant judgment factors.31 2 Although the new statute still requires that due
consideration be given "to all other relevant factors within this
310. The court of appeals construed the former statute to authorize the Rate Bureau to rely
upon nationwide data "if there is insufficient experience in North Carolina to provide credible
statistics." 40 N.C. App. at 99, 252 S.E.2d at 821. If the new statute permits the Commissioner to
ignore countrywide data even under those circumstances, he would arguably be acting in an arbitrary or capricious manner and, therefore, be subject to reversal under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 589.6(b)(6) (1975). Another reading of the statute is that the Rate Bureau may choose to rely on
countrywide data in the absence of credible North Carolina data, but is not compelled to do so.
311. Law of June 7, 1979, ch. 824, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1038 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-124.19 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The legislature also clarified that the Commissioner may
require the Rate Bureau to file a breakdown of incurred losses into subcategories of "paid losses,
reserves for losses and loss expenses, and reserves for losses incurred but not reported." Id. § 2
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.20 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
In another case dealing with the nature of data to be considered in ratemaking, the court of
appeals upheld the Commissioner's finding that the unaudited data submitted by the Rate Bureau
was unreliable because unaudited reports have been found to be inaccurate and unreliable in
ratemaking projections. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 41 N.C.
App. 310, 317, 255 S.E.2d 557, 562 (1979). The court implied, however, that the Rate Bureau
might have rebutted the expert testimony concerning the value of unaudited data or might have
shown that such an audit would be prohibitive in cost or time. Id. at 317-18, 255 S.E.2d at 562.
The court of appeals later held that the Commissioner's conclusions that the unaudited data were
unreliable "cannot be sustained in the light of all of the evidence offered in connection with that
question in this case." State exrel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 44 N.C. App.
75, 76, 259 S.E.2d 926, 927 (1979). It is unclear from the court's brief opinion in that case whether
the record contained evidence that the data was sufficiently audited or that the unaudited data was
nevertheless reliable. See note 308 supra. Under the new statute, the Commissioner may require
the filing of the Rate Bureau's interpretation of its data and a description of the methods used in
ratemaking. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.20(e)(1), .20(e)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979). In addition, the
Commissioner may require the filing of the number and amount of paid claims. Id. § 58124.20(e)(4). These amendments do not specifically require the use of audited data.
312. Law of June 7, 1979, ch. 824, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1038 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-124.19 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
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State,"3' 13 the legislature has clearly precluded the use of subjective

judgment in the ratemaking process. While the elimination of subjective factors may be a valid policy decision by the legislature, it has been
shown that the subjective judgment of insurers does have validity in
projecting future losses from a particular set of risks.3 14

The 1979 legislature also enacted several measures to protect drivers assigned to the North Carolina Reinsurance Facility, "a pool that
insures bad driving risks that companies do not want to individually
insure. "315 Policyholders assigned to the facility may be surcharged to
recoup the facility's losses.31 6 Because insurance companies are allowed to choose the risks to assign to the facility, 31 7 some drivers with

good records are so assigned.31 8 The 1979 amendments, however, provide that "clean risks" within the facility may not be charged more

than "clean risks" outside the facility.319 The statute defines "clean
313. Id.
314. For example, assigned insureds with clean records cause more claims to be made than
nonassigned insureds. 41 N.C. App. at 326, 255 S.E.2d at 567 (Clark, J., dissenting).
According to INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 301, at 113-14, "[t]here is no published
material indicating what is an undesirable risk, and this determination probably varies from company to company. Reportedly, young drivers, single or divorced persons, as well as such occupational groups as doctors and ministers, often fall within this category."
315. N.C. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSIONER REPORTS, 1979, pt. 1, at 12 [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION.] See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.26 to .40
(Cum. Supp. 1979).
316. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.34(e) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Prior to the comprehensive 1977
amendments, assigned insureds paid the same premiums as nonassigned insureds. Sur'ey, supra
note 304, at 1092; LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, supra note 323, at 12.
317. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.35 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
318. Surcharging good drivers assigned to the facility has been challenged as unfairly discriminatory. For example, in State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 41 N.C.
App. 310, 255 S.E.2d 557 (1979), decided under the former statute, the court of appeals upheld the
Commissioner's disapproval of a proposed 10% rate differential for insureds assigned to the facility on the ground that it would be unfairly discriminatory. Id. at 321, 255 S.E.2d at 564. The
mere absence of objective criteria for assigning drivers to the pool does not support a conclusion
that the proposed facility rate is excessive and unfairly discriminatory because the statute clearly
gives an insurer the choice of risks to assign. Id. at 320, 255 S.E.2d at 563-64. The court held,
however, that the absence of objective criteria combined with the large number of assigned risks
without points or claims payments support the conclusion that the 10% rate differential is unfairly
discriminatory. Id. at 320-21, 255 S.E.2d at 564.
The court did not address the Commissioner's conclusion that such a rate differential was
excessive. Id. Nor did the court refer to the statute's "strong presumption that the rates and
premiums for the business of the facility are neither unreasonable nor excessive." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-248.33(l) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
319. Law of May 29, 1979, ch. 676, § 2, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 721 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-248.33(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The new act became effective on October 1, 1979. The former
statute had permitted the Commissioner to establish and define a clean risk subclassification; the
1979 amendment now requires the Board of Governors of the North Carolina Reinsurance Facility to do so. Id See generally LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, supra note 323, at 47. The
provisions for recoupment of the loss remain essentially unchanged. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58248.33(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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risk" to require that the owner of a private passenger vehicle and all
licensed drivers in his household have two years of driving experience
and no chargeable accidents or moving violations for the three years
prior to the application for insurance or preparation of a renewal policy.3 2 0 The 1979 legislature further protected assigned insureds by providing that when a policy or renewal is assigned with a higher21 rate, the
3
insurer must give notice and explanation of the assignment.
2.

3 22
Consumer Legislation

The 1979 Legislature enacted several statutes in an attempt to im320. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.33(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
321. Law of June 1, 1979, ch. 732, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 802 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-248.31 (Cum.Supp. 1979)). The insurer must inform the policyholder of the assignment, the
rate differential, and the insured's option to seek coverage with a different insurer, who may not
assign the policy, and upon written request provide in writing the reasons therefor.
The new statute also provides that communication of the fact of assignment or the reasons for
assignment will not give rise to liability unless those communications were "made in bad faith
with malice in fact." Id. Apparently, this would provide a limited privilege to make statements
that would otherwise be defamatory.
Finally, the new statute requires that insurers provide the same "type of service" to assigned
and nonassigned risks. Id This provision, however, does not appear to require that insurers
provide the same types of coverage. See generally INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 301, at
116-17 (1979) (facility does not provide collision or comprehensive coverage).
322. Several recent legislative actions and cases in the insurance area are of interest to
consumers. In one action the legislature increased the possibility of recovering attorneys' fees in a
suit against an insurance company. Law of April 18, 1979, ch. 401, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 348
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.1 (Cum.Supp. 1979)) When a court finds an unwarranted
refusal to pay a claim, plaintiff may be allowed reasonable attorneys' fees if awarded a judgment
of $5000 or less. The former statute limited such attorneys' fees awards to judgments of $2000 or
less. Law of June 2, 1959, ch. 688, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 641 (repealed 1979).
The court of appeals dealt with the issue of an insurer's duty to defend in two recent cases. In
National Mortgage Corp. v. American Title Ins. Co., 41 N.C. App. 613, 255 S.E.2d 622 (1979), the
court held that when an insurer offers to defend only under a reservation of rights and the offer is
refused by the insured, the insurer must indemnify the insured for the costs of defending an action
on a loss covered by the policy. This holding is in accord with North Carolina precedent. See,
e.g., Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Harrison-Wright Co., 207 N.C. 661, 178 S.E. 235 (1935). The
court of appeals held in a second case that the failure to allege compliance with conditions
precedent was not fatal to the complaint in an action for breach of the insurer's duty to defend
because plaintiffs other allegations gave sufficient notice to the defendant insurer. Lupo v.
Powell, 44 N.C. App. 35, 259 S.E.2d 777 (1979).
In the area of policy construction, the court of appeals held that a "collision" did not occur
when the collapse of a bridge caused a truck to slide into a creek and overturn. Allison v. Iowa
Mut. Ins. Co., 43 N.C. App. 200, 258 S.E.2d 489 (1979). The court distinguished Morton v. Blue
Ridge Ins. Co., 255 N.C. 360, 121 S.E.2d 716 (1961), in which the supreme court held that a car
sliding down a boat ramp into a canal during launching was damaged by "collision", on the
ground that the driver in Morton started the chain of events resulting in the impact. The Allison
court construed the term "collision" so as to permit recovery by the insured on a comprehensive
policy that excluded coverage for collision; the Morton court construed the term to permit
recovery on a policy that covered collision.
In Wells v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 43 N.C. App. 328, 258 S.E.2d 831
(1979), the court of appeals again followed its policy of construing in favor of the insured in
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prove the public's understanding of insurance policies. The Readable
Insurance Policies Act,32 3 for example, requires most insurance policies 324 to meet a quantitative readability score325 that corresponds to an
eleventh grade reading level. 326 Although the statute does not provide
a private cause of action for violation of the act, the Commissioner
must approve policies before they are used.32 7 In addition, a policyholder or claimant bringing an action arising out of an approved policy
may rely on either that language or any substantive language prescribed by law, or both. 328 This section would allow an insured to take
advantage of the more favorable language; an insurer, however, would
not be penalized in an action against it on the ground that it violated
the readability statute.
Although experts differ on the ultimate value of quantitative meaholding that an insurer's waiver of a nonoccupancy/vacancy clause was not revoked by occasional
occupancies. The court's holding wisely allows for the reasonable reliance of the insured, who has
no reason to inform an insurer who acquiesced in the vacancy that the premises have returned to
their original unoccupied condition.
For a discussion of a case dealing with the presumption of accidental death in an action on a
life insurance policy, see this Survey: Evidence, n. 1.
323. Law of June 4, 1979, ch. 755, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 835 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 58-364 to -372 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
324. The act applies, with some exceptions, to life, accident and health, homeowners and private automobile policies. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-366(a) & (b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
325. Id. § 58-370. The readability score is computed by use of the Flesch scale, id. § 58-369,
which is "a precise mathematical calculation based on the number of syllables in the words used
and the number of words in the sentences." Prendergast, FormulaforPlain English, Nat'l L. J.,
May 14, 1979, at 8. Policy language required by law or collective bargaining agreement, medical
terminology and terms defined in the policy are not counted in calculating the readability score.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-369(e)(Cum. Supp. 1979). An exception is also provided for technical information such as tables and captions. Id.
The statute specifies the score on the Flesch scale that each type of policy must meet by a
certain date. Id. § 58-370(b). In contrast to the Flesch score of 50 required by the North Carolina
act, id., the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Model Life and Health
Insurance Policy Language Simplification Act requires a score of 40, II TASK FORCE ON LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY LANGUAGE SIMPLIFICATION STANDARDS, 1978 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 298-300 [hereinafter cited as 1978 PROCEEDINGS], which corresponds to a college reading level. See Raleigh, N.C. News & Observer,

October 7, 1979, at 5. In addition, the North Carolina act applies readability requirements to
more lines of insurance than the NAIC model act, and omits the model act's suggestion that the
Commissioner be given the power to permit a lower score under certain circumstances. Compare
111978 PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 298-302, with N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-366(a) & (b), -370(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1979).
The 1980 amendment to the North Carolina act retained the score of 50 but postponed the
effective dates. Law of June 23, 1980, ch. 1161, 1979 N.C. Sess Laws
The Readable Insurance Policies Act also requires policies to meet certain format requirements. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-368 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
326. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-370 (Cum. Supp. 1979); Raleigh News & Observer (N.C.), October
7, 1979, § 4, at 5, col. 1.
327. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-370 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
328. Id. § 58-372.
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tests have several advantages, including objectivity, cer-

tainty, uniformity and ease of administration. 330 Despite the potential
for improved comprehension, the statute may create new problems for
policyholders by abandoning traditional language that courts have construed over many years. 3 3' In addition, policy length will probably increase as insurers substitute explanations in lay terms for contingencies

formerly covered by a single term of art.
In a related attempt to improve the understanding of prospective
buyers and to facilitate cost comparison among policies,3 32 the legislature enacted a statute regulating the solicitation of life insurance.3 33
The act requires all life insurers to deliver a Policy Summary to all

prospective purchasers.334 The Policy Summary must contain premium
and benefit amounts as well as certain indices that quantify the policy's
value.335 In addition, life insurers must deliver a Buyer's Guide explaining insurance policy comparison 336 to all prospective purchas-

329. "It is generally recognized that these [readability] tests all have limitations in that they
only measure the difficulty of the style of writing and do not measure understandability." 1978
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 333, at 518. See Prendergast, supra note 333, at 8. Even Dr. Rudolf
Flesch, creator of the test, warned: "What I hope for are readers who won't take the formula too
seriously and won't expect from it more than a rough estimate." R. FLESCH, THE ART OF READABLE WRITING, preface (1949).
330. See 11978 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 333, at 518; 111978 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 333,
at 298.
331. See generally Appleman, "Jabberwocky" Revisited-Or, What Does My Policy Cover?,
1977 INs. L. J. 279, 282.
332. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-213. 6 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
333. Law of April 23, 1979, ch. 447, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 399 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-213.6 to .12 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The new statute applies, with certain exceptions, "to any
solicitation, negotiation or procurement of life insurance occuring within this State." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-213.7 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
Although the statute does not apply to other types of insurance, the Commissioner is now
required to compile lists of rates and explanations of coverage for the public concerning automobile and homeowners' insurance. Law of June 4, 1979, ch. 755, § 19, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 835
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9(8) (Cum. Supp. 1979)). Such explanations of coverage must
comply with the Readable Insurance Policies Act. Id.
334. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-213.9 (Cum. Supp. 1979). See id. § 58-213.8(7) for other requirements.

335. THE LIFE INSURANCE SURRENDER COST INDEX, see id. § 58-213.8(6)(a), and THE LIFE
INSURANCE NET PAYMENT COST INDEX, see id. § 58-213.8(6)(b), for example, are single numbers
based on complex calculations of cash surrender value, interest factors, premiums and benefits
that allow comparison between different policies. Similarly, the Equivalent Level Annual Dividend, see id. § 58-213.8(3), is a calculation of dividends, interest and guaranteed death benefits.
The method of calculating each index is set forth at id. § 58-213.8.
336. Id. § 58-213.11 sets out requirements for the guide. Use of the Buyer's Guide in the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Model Life Insurance Solicitation
Regulations will comply with the statute. Id. See also id. § 58-213.8(1). Although the Buyer's
Guide and Policy Summary facilitate comparison among similar insurance policies, they do not
help consumers compare insurance with noninsurance investments. See generally Life Insurance
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ers. 337 Failure to deliver a Policy Summary and Buyer's Guide is a
violation of G.S. 58-199,331 which forbids policy misrepresentation, and
the Unfair Trade Practice Act of the Insurance Law. 3 39 Finally, the
new statute strictly regulates solicitation practices of life insurance
companies and agents. 340 Although no enforcement provision is specifically provided in the new statute, the Commissioner's general remedies may be applicable. 34 '
When the entire package of insurance consumer legislation is considered as a whole, the need for stringent readability standards must be
Marketing and Cost Disclosure, Report by Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978).
337. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-213.9 (Cum. Supp. 1979). In general, the Buyer's Guide and Policy Summary must be delivered prior to acceptance of the initial premium deposit. If a policy is
subject to an unconditional refund offer for at least 10 days, the Buyer's Guide and Policy Summary must be delivered prior to or with the policy. Id. The statute also requires delivery of the
Buyer's Guide and Policy Summary to prospective purchasers upon request, but permits the substitution of a shorter written statement instead of the Policy Summary if the Equivalent Level
Death Benefit, see note 343 supra, is not more than $5000. Id.
338. Id. § 58-199 (1975) forbids any life insurance company or agent from making any "state... The new disclosure statute makes
ment of any sort misrepresenting the terms of the policy.
the failure to furnish the Buyer's Guide and Policy Summary "an omission which misrepresents
... Id. § 58-213.12 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Although no
the. . . terms of an insurance policy.
remedy is specifically provided in § 58-199, the Commissioner has the power under § 58-9(5) "to
institute civil actions or criminal prosecutions either by the Attorney General or such other attorney as the Attorney General may select, for any violation of the provisions of this Chapter." The
Commissioner also has the discretionary power to revoke an insurer's license when it fails to
comply with applicable laws. Id. § 58-39(1) (1975).
339. Id. §§ 58-54.1 to .13 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The Act prohibits any "unfair or deceptive act
or practice in the business of insurance," id. § 58-54.3, and includes within the definition of unfair
and deceptive acts or practices "making. . . any. . . statement misrepresenting the terms of any
Id.
I" § 58policy issued or to be issued or the benefits or advantages promised thereby ....
54.4(1). The new disclosure statute provides that failure to furnish a Buyer's Guide or Policy
Summary as required is "an omission which misrepresents the benefits, advantages, conditions or
ld.
I..."§ 58-213.12. The Unfair Trade Practice Act authorizes
terms of an insurance policy .
the Commissioner to issue cease and desist orders. Id. § 58-54.7. Willful violation of a cease and
desist order is punishable by a penalty of up to $1000 per violation. Id. § 58-54.11. Such powers
are in addition to the Commissioner's other powers under law. Id. § 58-54.12.
340. Id. § 58-213.10. Before beginning a sales presentation, an agent must identify himself as
such and specify the full name of the insurance company. Id. An insurer must fully identify itself
if no agent is involved. Id. The agent may not refer to himself as a financial advisor so as to
imply that his compensation is unrelated to sales, unless such representation is true. Id. References to policy dividends must be qualified by a statement that they are not guaranteed, id., and
any statement concerning the Life Insurance Cost Indexes, see note 343 supra, must be accompanied by an explanation that such indexes "are useful only for the comparison of the relative costs
of two or more similar policies." Id. § 58-213.10(g). In addition, an index that is based upon
dividends shall be clarified as being based on current dividends and, therefore, not guaranteed.
Id. § 58-213.10(h).
The solicitation provisions also prohibit the use of presentations that disregard the time value
of money in comparing policies, id. § 58-213.10(e), require a distinction between guaranteed and
nonguaranteed benefits, id. § 58-213.10(0, and require that premiums variable by the insurer be
shown as the maximum premium, id. § 58-213.10(i).
341. See note 346 supra.
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questioned in light of the requirement that the insurer provide a Policy
Summary and Buyer's Guide, which purportedly tell the consumer
what he wants and needs to know. A further problem involves the inevitability of conflict among language in the Buyer's Guide, Policy
Summary and the policy itself. Whether a court will enforce representations set forth in the Policy Summary or Buyer's Guide that conflict
with language in the policy is unclear.3 42
H.

343

Health Law

1. Generic Drugs
Following the lead of over thirty states,344 the legislature in 1979
enacted a "generic drug" law,345 designed to reduce the costs of drugs.
342. See 13 APPLEMAN, PREFACE TO APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, III (1976).
343. In developments in the health care field, the General Assembly made changes in the
statutory scheme for natural death. Law of March 6, 1979, ch. 112, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 76
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (Cum. Supp. 1979)); Law of May 30, 1979, ch. 715, 1979
N.C. Sess. Laws 782 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320, -322, -323 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The
"right to die" statute was enacted in 1977 to allow physicians to withhold extraordinary means of
life support from terminally ill patients who have consented in advance. Law of June 29, 1977, ch.
815, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1101 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321. (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
See Comment; North Carolina'sNaturalDeath Act: Confronting Death With Dignity, 14 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 771 (1978). Under the original version of the statute, a person desiring a natural
death is required to sign a consent form before a superior court clerk. Id. The amended version
allows notaries public to certify the declaration of a desire for natural death. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-321 (Cum. Supp. 1979). In addition, both versions of the statute permit physicians to
discontinue extraordinary means of life support in the absence of a declaration under certain
conditions. Law of June 29, 1977, ch. 815, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1101 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). Under the old version, one of the conditions required
the attending physician to determine that the patient suffered "an irreversible cessation of brain
function." Id. The new version simply requires that the physician determine that the patient's
condition is "irreversible." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The 1979
legislature also added a section that clarifies the criteria for determining if death has occurred.
"Brain death, defined as irreversible cessation of total brain function, may be used as a sole basis
... Id. § 90-323. Nevertheless, the statute specifies
for determination that a person has died.
that other medically-accepted criteria for determining if death has occurred are still allowed. Id.
Finally, the new version of the statute expressly states that it is not the sole authority for legally
withholding life-sustaining procedures: "Nothing in this Article shall impair or supersede any
legal right or legal responsibility which any person may have to effect the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in any lawful manner." Id. § 90-320(b). See Comment,
supra, at 791-92.
Finally, the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-86 to -113.8
(Cum. Supp. 1979), was also amended in 1979 to provide that a licensed physician may possess
and administer tetrahydrocannabinol for purposes of treatment. Law of June 5, 1979, ch. 781,
1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 905 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-101(h) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
344. Note, Consumer Protectionand PrescriotionDrugs: The Generic Drug SubstitutionLaws,
67 Ky. L.J. 384, 395 (1978-79).
345. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 1017, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1348 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
f§ 90-76.1 to .6 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The Act also repeals the antisubstitution law, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-76 (1975), which made it a misdemeanor for a registered drugstore or its employees to
knowingly sell a drug other than the one ordered or prescribed. See generally Note, supra note
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Under the new statute, a pharmacist may substitute any "equivalent
drug product" that costs less than the prescribed brand 346 and meets
certain other criteria3 41 unless the physician has prohibited substitution.3 48 An "equivalent drug product" must have the same "established
name," 349 "active ingredient, strength, quantity, and dosage form" 350 as
the prescribed brand name drug. In addition, it must be "therapeutidrug, a determination apparently
cally equivalent" 35 1 to the prescribed
352
left to the individual pharmacist.
The drug product selection law is probably most significant for
what it does not do. No physician is required to prescribe in generic
terms or to permit substitution for a drug prescribed by brand name.

Nor is any pharmacist required to substitute an equivalent drug. 35 3 In
addition, although a substitute must be priced below its equivalent
352, at 389-91. Under Law of June 7, 1979, ch. 838, § 23, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1112, a Medicaid
prescription for a brand name drug is considered an order by generic name unless the physician
indicates otherwise, notwithstanding the antisubstitution law then in force. It is unclear whether
the new generic drug law subjects drug substitution for Medicaid prescriptions to the specific
requirements of the generic drug law. See generally Hearings on Substitution PrescritionDrug
Act, H.R. 1963, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 53 (1978); THE SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF DRUG
EQUIVALENCY, PROCEEDINGS OF A COLLOQUIUM 65, 91-94 (1974); INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT,
NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1979, at 86.
346. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-76.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).

347. Under G.S. 90-76.2(a), the substituted drug must meet certain manufacturing, marketing
and labeling criteria. For example, the manufacturer of a substituted drug must be specified on
the label.
348. Id. § 90-76.2(b).
349. 'Id. § 90-76.1(1). G.S. 90-76.1(2) provides that the term "established name" have the
meaning used in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 1 U.S.C. § 352(e)(3)(1976).
350. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-76.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
351. Id. The difference between various types of equivalence has been explained as follows:
Two drugs are chemically equivalent when they contain the same amount of the
same active ingredients. . . .Generic and brand name drugs are chemically equivalent.
The bioavailability of a drug refers to a measurement of the rate and extent to which
an administered drug reaches general circulation in the blood stream....
Two chemically equivalent drugs are also bioequivalent if when administered in the
same amount to the same individual they result in essentially the same bioavailability.
Finally, two chemically equivalent drugs are therapeuticallyequivalent if when administered in the same amount to the same individual they result in essentially the same
therapeutic response.
Note, supra note 352, at 392 n.32 (emphasis in original).
352. A nationwide controversy exists over the means of determining therapeutic equivalence,
See generally Hearings,supra note 353; SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF DRUG EQUIVALENCY, supra

note 353; Note, supra note 352, at 394. Some states rely on lists of equivalent drugs prepared by
drug experts. Id. at 400-03. Other states use the procedure recently adopted in North Carolina.
Id. at 403.
353. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-76.2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979). See generally Note, supra note
352, at 396-400, which categorizes generic drug statutes according to whether the physician or
pharmacist can prevent substitution.
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brand, 54 there is no requirement that a pharmacist dispense or stock
the lowest priced equivalent among those available.
The statute also provides that a physician and pharmacist shall
incur no greater liability for dispensing a substitute than they would
incur if a prescription were dispensed as written.355 This limitation of
liability, however, is only available if the pharmacist selected an
"equivalent drug product" in accordance with the requirements of the
statute.356
2. Health Maintenance Organizations
A health maintenance organization (HMO) is a system of health
care financing and delivery 35 7 based on prepayment rather than indemnification for costs incurred.358 Consumers make payments to an
HM0

35 9

ices.360

which contracts with health care providers to deliver serv-

In general, HMOs operate as either prepaid group practices,

354. Although the North Carolina statute does not address the issue, a patient could apparently insist on a higher priced brand name in the belief that it is superior.
355. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-76.5 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The liability of a pharmacist and physician, therefore, would be governed by the ordinary rules of the professional standard in the community. See Id. §§ 90-21.11 & .12. See generally Comment, Missouri's Drug Product Selection
Law and PharmacistLiability, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 135 (1979).
356. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-76.5 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Because the limitation of liability only
applies to "[t]he selection of an equivalent drug product pursuant to [the generic drug law]," id.,
there would be no limitation of liability for substitution of a nonequivalent product or substitution
against a physician's orders. Nevertheless, the liability of pharmacists for drug product substitution may be merely an academic issue. See Note, supra note 352, at 406 n.111: "[t]hus far, no
known reported cases have been found in which a pharmacist has been held liable for inappropriate prescription product sources selection [substitution]." (quoting Myers & Fink, LiabilityAspects
of DrugProductSelection, 17 J. AM. PHARM. A. 33,33 (1977)). See also Comment, supra note 363,
at 156: "[c]ourts have refused to impose liability on pharmacists who exercise the standard of care
required and to apply the theories of breach of implied warranty and strict liability to retail druggists ...."
357. 1 NORTH CAROLINA COMMISSION ON PREPAID HEALTH PLANS, INTERIM REPORT 42
(1979). [hereinafter "INTERIM REPORT"].
Note that HMO evidences of coverage are subject to the recently enacted Readable Insurance
Policies Act, Law of June 4, 1979, ch. 755, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 835 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 58-364 to -372 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).

358. HEW, THE HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION FACILITY DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK iv-v (1975).
359. Id. at v.
360. J. KRESS & J. SINGER, HMO HANDBOOK: A GUIDE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF PREPAID
GROUP PRACTICE HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS 15, 39-40, 62 (1975). The statute defines HMO to include "any person who undertakes to provide or arrange for one or more health
care plans." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57B-2(f) (Cum. Supp. 1979). "Health care plan" means "any
arrangement whereby any person undertakes on a prepaid basis to provide, arrange for, pay for,
or reimburse any part of the cost of any health care services and at least part of such arrangement
consists of arranging for or the provision of health care services, as distinguished from mere indemnification against the cost of such services on a prepaid basis through insurance or otherwise.'
Id. § 57B-2(d).
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with a staff providing services at one central location, or independent
practice associations, with member physicians providing services for
enrolled patients in their private offices and usually treating nonenrolled patients as well. 36 ' By making it financially advantageous to
keep patients healthy, to use less expensive methods of treatment, to
3 62 the
emphasize preventive care and to avoid unnecessary surgery,
363
HMO system has been found to control health care costs.

After the North Carolina Office of State Planning recommended
the passage of an enabling act to remove certain legal barriers to
HMOs, 3" the legislature enacted the HMO Act of 1977.365 The 1977
act, however, was found to create barriers to HMO development by
regulating HMOs and the private providers with whom they contracted
in ways that insurance companies and providers in general were not
regulated, for example with certificate of need and quality control requirements.366
In an attempt to deal with these impediments to HMO development, the legislature enacted the HMO Act of 1979.367 The new statute
simplifies the regulation of HMOs by vesting sole regulatory authority
361. 1 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 365, at 15.
362. I INTERIM REPORT, supra note 365, at 1, 4, 13. See HEW, supra note 366, at iv-vi. "Because the physicians who participate in these plans as providers of care often share in any income
surplus at the end of the fiscal year, they have an incentive to seek out the least expensive mode of
treatment and to avoid unnecessary laboratory tests, hospitalization and surgery." I INTERIM REPORT, supra note 365, at 14. See generally J. KRESS & J. Singer, supra note 368, at 13 & 14.
363. I INTERIM REPORT, supra note 365, at 1, 4, 13.
364. Id. at 42. Traditional legal barriers to prepaid health delivery include the rule against
corporate practice of medicine and regulation by insurance departments in ways that are appropriate for insurance companies but not for prepaid delivery systems. II INTERIM REPORT, supra
note 365, at 246-48. See generally, J. KRESS & J. SINGER, supra note 368, at 34.
365. Law of June 16, 1977, ch. 580, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 683 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 57A-1 to -29 (Cum. Supp. 1977), as amended by Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 876, 1979 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1202 (recodified at N.C, GEN. STAT. §§ 57B-1 to -25, 131-178(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979)), The
1977 statute was based on the model act promulgated by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC). I INTERIM REPORT, supra note 365, at 42.
366. I INTERIM REPORT, supra note 365, at 43-44. Although doctors' offices are not generally
subject to the certificate of need law, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131-176(10) (Cum. Supp. 1979), an
HMO ambulatory facility was subject to certificate of need requirements. I INTERIM REPORT,
supra note 365, at 9-10. In addition, according to the Commission on Prepaid Health Plans, see
note 365 supra, physicians participating in an independent practice association HMO were required to obtain certificates of need for their private offices in which they treated non-HMO patients. I INTERIM REPORT, supra note 365, at 44. Physicians in the independent practice
association were also subject to control by the local health planning agency in the location of their
offices, quality of work and financial records. Id. at 44. Finally, physicians in all types of HMOs,
unlike providers reimbursed by Blue Cross/Blue Shield, were subject to quality control by the
Departments of Insurance and Human Resources-a task ordinarily reserved to the State Board
of Medical Examiners. .d. at 10.
367. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 876, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1202 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 57B-131-178(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
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in the Commissioner of Insurance and omitting joint regulation with
the Secretary of Human Resources.3 68 In addition, the certificate of
need requirement, in general, now only applies to HMOs when they
make capital expenditures over $150,000 or certain purchases of equipment, and to hospitals controlled by HMOs when they make changes in
bed capacity.3 69 The new statute further encourages HMO development by eliminating the requirement that HMOs provide a minimum
benefit package.37 0 Additionally, HMOs and their contracting providers may now furnish services to nonmembers and noncovered services
to members on a "fee for services basis" as long as delivery of covered
services to members is not impaired. 37 1 The 1979 act also frees the internal operations of HMOs from much regulatory control.
The new statute changes the HMO enrollment procedure by providing a "dual choice" provision3 72 which requires employees who are
offered an HMO option to elect between HMO and insurance coverage
when the offer is first made373 with an annual option to change plans.37 4
Although the "dual choice" provision as originally drafted would have
required public and some private employers offering health plans to
give their employees an option to enroll in an HMO if one is available,375 this requirement was not retained in the enacted version of the
statute.3 76 In addition, under the 1977 statute, HMOs were generally
required to hold an annual "open enrollment period," during which
patients had to be accepted for coverage in the order they applied regardless of medical condition.3 77 The open enrollment requirement has
now been deleted. 378 The new statute provides, however, that an HMO
shall not deny enrollment to any employee unless it is unable to provide services.379
368. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57B (Cum. Supp. 1979).
369. Id. § 131-178(b). The statutory language, however, does not clarify whether the contracting providers for an HMO are subject to certificate of need review.
370. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 876, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1202 (repealing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 57A-2(b), -4(b)(3)(Cum. Supp. 1977)). The "basic health care services" that HMOs were required to offer included "emergency care, inpatient hospital and physician care, and outpatient

medical service." Id.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57B-3(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
Id. §57B-11.
Id. § 57B-ll(b).
Id.
H.R. 1127, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57B-11 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
Id. § 57A- I1 (repealed by Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 876, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1208).
See id.

379. Id. § 57B-12(e).
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Finally, the 1979 legislation significantly amends the categories of
persons who may operate HMOs under the Act. Under both the 1977
and 1979 versions of the statute, no "person" may operate an HMO
without complying with the Act's requirements.38 0 The 1979 legislation
revised the definition of "persons" to include corporations but excluded
individuals and professional associations . 38 Thus, the recent amendment may prohibit individual and incorporated physicians from operating prepaid health plans. Alternatively, however, the new act could
be construed to allow such physicians to operate HMOs independent of
state regulation. 82
I

ProfessionalStandards83 andAdministration of Justice384
Since the creation of the Judicial Standards Commission in
380. Id. § 57B-3(a).

381. Id. § 57B-2(g).
382. Other changes in the 1979 statute include a requirement that HMOs maintain minimum
financial reserves. Id. § 57B-6. HMOs are exempt from this requirement, however, during their
first full year of operation. Id. See also id. § 57B-4(a)(4) (Commissioner has authority to ensure
HMOs are financially responsible.)
383. The General Assembly in 1979 revised the licensing requirements and procedures for
several trades and professions. The provisions relating to licensing of architects were completely
rewritten, Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 871, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1191 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 83A-1, -17 (Cum. Supp. 1979)), and some changes were also made in the provisions
pertaining to landscape architects, Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 872, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1198
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89A-3, -8 (Cum. Supp. 1979)), plumbing and heating contractors,
Law of June 7, 1979, ch. 834, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1099 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 87-16, 27.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979)), engineers and land surveyors, Law of June 7, 1979, ch. 819, 1979 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1030 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 89c-4, -25.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979), and general
contractors, Law of May 13, 1979, ch. 713, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 779 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 87-2, -6 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). In each of these instances the membership of the licensing board
was changed to include two members who have no ties with the profession or trade and who
represent the interests of the public.
384. In an effort to increase the efficiency of the trial court system, states have begun to use
court administrators. Butler, PresidingJudges' Role Perceptions of Trial Court Administrators, 3
Jus. Sys. J. 181 (1977-78). Experimental positions of trial court administrators were created in
three districts in North Carolina in 1977 under the supervision of the resident superior court

judge.

NORTH CAROLINA INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION

1979.

G.S. 7A-355 and G.S. 7A-356 made these positions permanent effective July 1, 1979, and created
seven more positions to be located in districts selected by the administrative office of the courts.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-355, -356 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The trial court administrators' duties will
be to assist judges in managing civil dockets, to improve jury utilization, and to increase the use of
modem management techniques, planning and programming in running the courts. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-356 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The North Carolina Court Commission was recreated in
1979 by Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 1077, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1391 (codified as N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-506-10 (Cum. Supp. 1979)), in response to a need for a permanent agency to oversee the
functioning of the judicial system, NORTH CAROLINA INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, NORTH
CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1979, and has been assigned the task of studying the effectiveness,
qualifications, duties and compensation of the office of trial court administrator. The commission
must report to the General Assembly on or before February 1, 1980. Law of June 8, 1979, ch.
1072, § 11, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1380.
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1973,385 the administrative procedure for judicial discipline has resulted in seven recommendations to the supreme court to censure or
remove a judge for "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
that brings the judicial office into disrepute" or for "wilful misconduct
in office."3 86 In the latest of these cases, In re Peoples,3 87 the supreme
court settled several questions concerning the procedure for judicial
discipline. The court held that: (1) once the Judicial Standards Commission's jurisdiction over a judge attaches in a disciplinary proceeding, the judge's subsequent resignation does not destroy its
jurisdiction, 38 8 and (2) the judge's resignation prior to termination of
the disciplinary action does not render moot the question before the
Commission.3 89 In addition, the court held that "wilful misconduct in
office" 39 ° is necessary to remove a judge from office. The lesser offense
of "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" warrants only
39
censure. 1

385. The Judicial Standards Commission was created by an amendment to the North Carolina
Constitution, which changed art. IV, § 17(1), and added art. IV, § 17(2), and by its enabling legislation, Law of June 17, 1971, ch. 590, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 517 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 7A-375 to -377) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (effective 1973). The Commission has the power to recommend to the supreme court the censure or removal of a judge for enumerated reasons. The Commission may conduct preliminary investigations on its own motion or upon a citizen complaint. A
due process hearing before the Commission is then conducted on the basis of which the Commission may recommend to the supreme court that a judge be removed or censured. Only the
supreme court, however, has the actual power to censure or remove. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7a-375
to -377 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
The Judicial Standards Commission is also empowered to institute proceedings for the removal of a justice of the supreme court. A 1979 amendment to the statute provides that the
Commission's recommendation for censure or removal of a justice of the supreme court will be
acted upon by the court of appeals. Law of April 30, 1979, ch. 487, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 476
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-378 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). Prior to this amendment the supreme
court had the power to remove its own justices.
For a discussion of the Judicial Standards Commission and the judicial discipline procedure,
see 54 N.C.L. REv. 1074 (1976).
386. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109,153, 250 S.E. 2d 890,915 (1978). The seven cases making
these recommendations are: In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978); In re Martin, 295
N.C. 291, 245 S.E.2d 766 (1978); In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978); In re Nowell,
293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246 (1977); In re Stuhl, 292 N.C. 379, 233 S.E.2d 562 (1977); In re Edens,
290 N.C. 299, 226 S.E.2d 5 (1976); In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975):
387. 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979).
388. Id. at 145-46, 250 S.E.2d at 910-11.
389. Id. at 147-51, 250 S.E.2d at 912-14.
390. Id. at 158, 250 S.E.2d at 918. The term "willful misconduct in office" has been defined by
the supreme court as "improper and wrong conduct of a judge acting in his official capacity done
intentionally, knowingly and, generally, in bad faith. It is more than a mere error of judgment or
an act of negligence. While the term would encompass conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, these elements need not necessarily be present." In re Edens, 290 N.C.
299, 305, 226 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1976).
391. See 296 N.C. at 158, 250 S.E.2d at 918. The phrase "conduct prejudicial to the administration ofjustice that brings the judicial office into disrepute" has been defined as "conduct which
a judge undertakes in good faith but which nevertheless would appear to an objective observer to
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In December 1977 the Judicial Standards Commission notified
Judge Peoples3 92 that it had ordered a preliminary investigation of his
conduct in office to determine whether formal proceedings should be
instituted against him.3 93 In January 1978, Judge Peoples tendered his
resignation to Governor Hunt, which the Governor accepted to be effective February 1. Two days before his resignation was to become
effective the judge was served with a complaint and notice that formal
proceedings would be instituted against him.319 The complaint charged
him with the separate offenses of "wilful misconduct in office" and
"conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute."3 95 Although Judge Peoples did not answer
the complaint, he made a special appearance in which he moved to
dismiss on the ground that the Commission's jurisdiction extended only
to judges and he was no longer a judge.3 96 The Commission denied the
motion and conducted a formal hearing. 397 Based on the evidence
398 to suppresented, the Commission made extensive findings of fact
port its conclusion that the judge's actions constituted wilful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
that brings the judicial office into disrepute.39 9 In April 1978, the Commission submitted its recommendation to the North Carolina Supreme
Court that Judge Peoples be removed from office with loss of retirement benefits and be disqualified from holding further judicial offlce. 4 o
be not only unjudicial conduct but conduct prejudicial to public esteem for the judicial office." 290
N.C. at 305, 226 S.E.2d at 9.
392. Judge Peoples was a judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division in the
Ninth District. 296 N.C. at 112, 250 S.E.2d at 894.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 113, 250 S.E.2d at 894.
395. Id. at 112, 250 S.E.2d at 894-95. The grounds for censure or removal of a judge are
"willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the administra-

tion of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute." If a judge is removed based on these
grounds, he receives no retirement compensation and is disqualified from holding further office.
A judge may also be removed for permanent physicial or mental incapacity, but is entitled to
retirement or disability benefits. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
396. 296 N.C. at 114, 250 S.E.2d at 895.
397. Id. Judge Peoples did not appear personally at the hearing but was represented by counsel.
398. The Commission found that Judge Peoples had on several occasions dismissed cases
outside of court, some of which were never placed on the court calendar, had kept a "file" of cases
that were removed from the docket and were not disposed of in open court, and had on three
occasions taken small sums of money, ostensibly to cover court costs, from defendants whose cases
he pulled from the active file. 296 N.C. at 131-41, 250 S.E.2d at 905-09.
399. Id. at 142, 250 S.E.2d at 909.
400. Id. The case was argued before the supreme court on November 15, 1978.
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Meanwhile, on February 1, Judge Peoples had filed his candidacy
40 1
for the office of Superior Court Judge. He was elected in November.
The supreme court acted on the Commission's recommendations in
November prior to the election. The first question the court faced was
the effect of the judge's resignation on the jurisdiction of the Commission and the court. 402 The court found that since the complaint was
served before the effective date of the judge's resignation the Commission's jurisdiction attached."
Once the jurisdiction of a court or administrative agency attaches, the general rule is that it will not be
impaired or destroyed by subsequent events even if they would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place. 4 04 The court
reserved the question whether the result would differ had the complaint
been filed after the effective date of the judge's resignation. 0 5
In addition to attacking the court's jurisdiction, the judge argued
that the isssues before the Commission and the court were rendered
moot by his resignation.40 6 Noting that this was a question of first impression in North Carolina, the court looked to the law of other jurisdictions. It found that as a general rule other courts have held that if
the only purpose of the proceeding is removal from office the incumbent's resignation renders the proceeding moot, but if there are other
sanctions that may be imposed, the proceeding may be prosecuted. 0 7
Because North Carolina law provides for loss of retirement benefits
and disqualification from future judicial office, the judge's resignation
disposed only of the question of his removal, leaving the imposition of
401. Id. Judge Peoples won the election November 28, and the supreme court's decision was
filed December 29.
402. 296 N.C. at 143, 250 S.E.2d at 909. The claim of lack of jurisdiction was based on the
language of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (Cum. Supp. 1979), which reads in part: "Upon recommendation of the Commission, the Supreme Court may censure or remove any justice or judge for
wilful misconduct in office." Judge Peoples argued that since the statute confers the power to
adjudicate only cases pertaining to certain classes of persons (judges), the court has no jurisdiction
over those who are not members of the class. 296 N.C. at 143, 250 S.E.2d at 910.
403. 296 N.C. at 144-45, 250 S.E.2d at 910-11.
404. Id. at 146, 250 S.E.2d at 911. Judge Peoples also argued that even if the Commission
acquired jurisdiction the supreme court did not. The court quickly disposed of this argument,

stating that the removal proceeding is a single administrative proceeding that begins with the
Commission and culminates in the supreme court. The supreme court sits as a court of original
jurisdiction, not as an appellate court, in judicial removal proceedings. Id. at 147, 250 S.E.2d at
912.
405. Id. at 145, 250 S.E.2d at 911. Although this factual change would make for a closer case,
the same policy reasons that dictated the result in Peoples would be relevant. See text accompanying notes 417-18 infra.
406. 296 N.C. at 147, 250 S.E.2d at 912.
407. Id. at 148, 250 S.E.2d at 913.
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the other two sanctions to be adjudicated.4 °8
The court's resolution of these two important questions is sup-

ported by policy considerations. As the court stated, "it would indeed
be a travesty if a judge could avoid the full consequences of his miscon-

duct by resigning from office after removal proceedings had been
brought against him. .

.

. [An opposite result] would emasculate the

statute and thwart the legislative intent entirely. ' 40 9 Allowing a judge
to avoid the penalties of loss of retirement and disqualification from
office by simply resigning before he is actually removed would in es-

sence allow him to escape discipline altogether. 410 As the Peoples case
illustrates, it may not be at all difficult for a judge who has resigned
under pressure of pending disciplinary action to be promptly elected to
another, in this case higher, judicial office.

Cases involving a denial of admission to the bar on the grounds
that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that he is of "good moral
character" 41 ' have been infrequent in North Carolina. 41 2 In 1979, the
408. Id. at 150, 250 S.E.2d at 914. Judge Peoples also argued that the statutory provisions that
bar a judge who has been removed from office for misconduct from again holding office are not
authorized by the North Carolina Constitution. Id. at 159, 250 S.E.2d at 919. The argument was
based on the language of the amendment which directs the General Assembly to "prescribe a
procedure, in addition to impeachment and address. . . for the. . . censure and removal of a
Justice or Judge of the General Court of Justice for wilful misconduct in office." N.C. CONST. art.
IV, § 17(2). The court found that the amendment's purpose is to provide an additional procedure
for removal, not to change the consequences of removal. Because disqualification from office is
authorized in other sections of the Constitution that the amendment supplements, it is also authorized under the new procedure. 296 N.C. at 159-61, 250 S.E.2d at 919-20.
409. 296 N.C. at 150-51, 250 S.E.2d at 914.
410. But see Note, JudicialDiscollne-The Powerof North CarolinaSupreme Court to Remove
State Judges-In re Hardy, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1187, 1190 n.32 (1978) (literal reading of
act would seem to allow a judge to resign without forfeiture of retirement benefits or disqualification from future judicial office prior to actual removal).
411. An applicant for admission to the bar must "be of good moral character." BOARD OF
LAW EXAMINERS OF NORTH CAROLINA, RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF

LAW INTHE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA .0501(l) (1977) [hereinafter cited as RULE]. The applicant has the burden of proving that he is possessed of good moral character and is entitled to the
confidence of the public. Id. at .0601. Each applicant is required to disclose to the Board all facts

relating to any disciplinary proceedings or charges as to his professional conduct, id. at .0603(1),
and any civil or criminal proceedings, charges or investigations in which he was involved. Id. at
.0603(2).
The Board is empowered by statute to conduct investigations and hearings to determine
whether an applicant "possesses the qualifications of character and general fitness requisite for an
attorney." To this end it is given the power to subpoena witnesses and records. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 84-24 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute authorizes the Board to promulgate rules, subject to the
approval of the council of the North Carolina State Bar. Id. Appeals from the decisions of the
Board lie as of right to the superior court of Wake County. RULE, supra, at .1404. Any party,
including the Board, may appeal to the supreme court from the decision of the superior court. Id.
at .1405.
412. The last case before Rogers was.In re Willis, 288 N.C. 1,215 S.E.2d 771 (1975). The next
prior decision was In re Applicants for License, 191 N.C. 235, 131 S.E. 661 (1926).
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supreme court considered such a case. In In re Rogers4 13 the supreme
court resolved three questions concerning the bar admission procedure
that have not before been considered. The court held that: (1) where
the facts that would support a conclusion that the applicant is not of
good moral character are in dispute, the Board of Law Examiners must
resolve the factual disputes before it can reach a conclusion as to the
applicant's character;4 14 (2) when an applicant makes a prima facie
showing of his good moral character and to rebut this showing the
Board relies on specific acts of misconduct that the applicant denies,
the Board must assume the burden of proving the specific acts by the
greater weight of the evidence;4 - and (3) the appropriate scope ofjudicial review of a finding of the Board of Law Examiners is the "whole
record" test. 1 6
The Board's decision to deny Rogers admission to the bar was
based on his alleged involvement in two incidents-an attempt to cash
a lost or stolen check4 17 and a forgery of a mail order form.41 8 At two
hearings before the Board, Rogers denied any involvement in either of
the two incidents, cross-examined the only witness against him, casting
doubt on her identification of him as the person who tried to cash the
check, and offered other evidence to refute the charges.4 1 9
Shortly after the hearings, the Board issued an order denying Rogers admission to the bar, which was affirmed on appeal to the Wake
County Superior Court.4 20 The Board's order contained no findings of
fact that Rogers had indeed been involved in either of the incidents.
The Board in fact "made no findings of fact at all. It merely recited
some of the evidence presented and stated it conclusion 42that
Rogers
1
had not satisfied the Board of his good moral character."
The supreme court on appeal rejected the Board's argument that it
is not required to make findings of fact. Noting that in all prior cases
cited by the parties there had been no actual dispute as to the underlying facts, 422 the court held that in a case where the facts are in sharp
413. 297 N.C. 48, 253 S.E.2d 912 (1979).
414. Id. at 56, 253 S.E.2d at 917.
415. Id. at 57, 253 S.E.2d at 918.
416. Id. at 64, 253 S.E.2d at 922.
417. Id. at 50, 253 S.E.2d at 914.
418. Id. at 51, 253 S.E.2d at 914-15.
419. Id. at 51-54, 253 S.E.2d at 915-16.
420.. Id. at 49, 253, S.E.2d at 914.
421. Id. at 55, 253, S.E.2d at 917.
422. Id See In re Willis, 288 N.C. 1, 215 S.E.2d 771 (1975); In re Applicants for License, 191
N.C. 235, 131 S.E. 661 (1926); In re Dilligham, 188 N.C. 162, 124 S.E. 130 (1924).
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dispute the Board "must necessarily serve as the adjudicator of the
facts in dispute and must ultimately find with regard to them what it
believes the truth to be."'42 3 The court's reason for its holding was simple: because under the applicable statute42 4 the Board is the primary
investigatory and fact-finding agency in the bar admissions process, it
must resolve factual disputes
brought before it. No other agency exists
42 5
to make such resolutions.
Because under the rules for admission to the bar the applicant has
the burden of proving that he is of good moral character, 42 6 the Board
argued that the burden of disproving the alleged acts of misconduct
also fell upon the applicant. The court rejected this view. In the court's
opinion, since it is inherently difficult to prove the negative, when the
investigation narrows down to one or two alleged instances of misconduct, the burden of affirmatively proving the specific acts must shift to
the Board. Otherwise, an applicant who can only deny his involvement
in the alleged acts could be denied admission to the bar on the basis of
suspicions and accusations alone.42 7
The court also rejected the proposition that the Board only be required to produce substantial evidence of misconduct to meet its burden of proof. Sound administrative procedure does not allow the
establishment of a fact unless supported by the greater weight of the
evidence.4 2 8
Having found that the Board erred in failing to make findings of
fact, the court noted that the usual procedure in such a case is to remand for such findings. Because the prolonged proceedings had already held Rogers' application in abeyance for two years, however, the
court proceded to determine whether the findings of fact would have
been supported by the evidence had they been made.4 29 This required
the court to decide upon the proper scope of judicial review to be ac423. 297 N.C. at 56, 253 S.E.2d at 917.

424. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
425. 297 N.C. at 57, 253 S.E.2d at 918.
426. RULE, supra note 419 at .0601. The traditional view in North Carolina and other jurisdictions has been that the applicant has the initial burden of showing prima facie his good moral
character. The reason for this approach is that the facts relevant to the proof of an applicant's
character are largely within his knowledge. Requiring the examiners to assume the burden of
producing evidence would place an insurmountable investigatory burden on them. 297 N.C. at
58, 253 S.E.2d at 918-19.
427. 297 N.C. at 58-59, 253 S.E.2d at 919. That suspicions and accusations do not constitute a
sufficient basis for a denial of admission to the bar is well settled in other jurisdictions. See
Coleman v. Watts, 81 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1955); In re Crum, 103 Or. 296, 204 P. 948 (1922).
428. 297 N.C. at 59, 253 S.E.2d at 919.
429. The court noted that other jurisdictions follow a practice of examining the record of a
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corded a finding of the Board of Law Examiners. Rogers urged the

"whole record test," while the Board proposed a standard of "any competent evidence."43 The court's adoption of the whole record test was
based primarily on the State's public policy as it is reflected in the various statutes providing for judicial review of the actions of other administrative agencies." I

The three procedural questions presented by Rogers seem to have
been properly answered. The court's resolution of these issues brings
the bar admission investigation procedure into line with the procedures

followed by other administrative agencies in the state.
J

Employment Regulation and Unemployment Compensation

The rights of handicapped persons to equal employment opportunities are protected in North Carolina by G.S. 168-6,432 which provides

that handicapped persons shall be employed on the same terms and
conditions as the able-bodied unless their disability impairs the performance of the particular work involved. In Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz
Brewing Co. ,'433the supreme court adopted a narrow interpretation of
the statute by refusing to include a person with glaucoma, but with
434
20/20 corrected vision, within the definition of handicapped person.
Defendant brewing company had informed plaintiff that it intended to hire him, but when a preemployment physical revealed that

he had glaucoma the company told him that it was against company
policy to hire persons with the disease. Plaintiff's complaint alleging

violation of rights granted by G.S. 168-6 was dismissed for failure to
state a claim based on a finding that he did not meet the definition of a
case justifying remand to see if there would have been sufficient evidence to support the necessary
findings. Id. at 60, 253 S.E.2d at 920.
430. Id. at 61, 253 S.E.2d at 920. The Board's argument was based on the language of RULE
.1404, which reads in part: "The findings of fact by the board, when supported by competent
evidence, shall be conclusive and binding upon the court." The court found this language to be
inconclusive because the word "any" does not modify "competent evidence." Id.
431. Id. at 63-65, 253 S.E.2d at 921-22. The court went on to find that the whole record did
not support a finding that Rogers was not possessed of good moral character, and issued an order
that he be allowed to stand for the bar.
432. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-6 (1976). This section provides:
Handicapped persons shall be employed in the State service, the service of the political
subdivisions of the State, in the public schools, and in all other employment, both public
and private, on the same terms and conditions as the ablebodied, unless it is shown that
the particular disability impairs the performance of the work involved.
Id.
433. 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979).
434. Id. at 528, 259 S.E.2d at 253-54.
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handicapped person.43 5 The court of appeals reversed. 36 Noting that
G.S. 168-6 is a remedial statute, and therefore "should be construed
broadly rather than narrowly to achieve its purposes,

'437

the court of

appeals found that the legislature "intended to grant broad protection
of basic rights to all persons with any type of disability. '438 Citing the
definition of the United States Department of Health, Education and
Welfare 439 that includes as handicapped those "regarded as having" a
physical or mental impairment, the court of appeals found that defendant had denied plaintiff employment because of a disability. Because
plaintiffs handicap would not impair performance of the work involved he was held entitled to relief." 0
The supreme court, on appeal, reversed. It did not consider the
HEW definition of handicapped persons. Instead it defined "disability" to mean "a present, non-correctable loss of function which substantially impairs a person's ability to function normally.""44 Since
plaintiff had an eye disease, but his corrected vision with glasses was
normal, he was not visually disabled under this definition. 442 The court
further stated that the statute was intended to protect only those currently disabled, not those who suffer from conditions that may disable
them in the future. 443
The supreme court's decision in Burgess is not in keeping with the
remedial purpose of the statute. Courts that have construed other antidiscrimination laws have treated conditions such as diabetes, 444 leuke435. G.S. 168-1 defines handicapped persons: "The definition of 'handicapped persons' shall
include those individuals with physical, mental and visual disabilities. For the purposes of this
Article the definition of 'visually handicapped' in G.S. 111-I1 shall apply." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 168-1 (1976). G.S. 111-11 defines visually handicapped to include persons whose vision is so
defective as to prevent the performance of ordinary activities for which eyesight is essential. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 111-11 (1978).
436. 39 N.C. App. 481, 250 S.E.2d 687 (1979).
437. Id. at 485, 250 S.E.2d at 689.
438. Id.
439. 45 C.F.R. § 84.30) (1979).
440. 39 N.C. App. at 486, 250 S.E.2d at 690.
441. 298 N.C. at 528, 259 S.E.2d at 253. On appeal to the supreme court defendant argued
that the statute applied only to persons who are visually handicapped as defined by N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 11I-11 (1978). The court found, however, that the protection of G.S. 168-6 extends not
only to the visually handicapped, but also to the visually disabled. This decision was based primarily on the language of § 168-1. See note 443 supra.

442. 298 N.C. at 528, 259 S.E.2d at 253.
443. Id. at 528, 259 S.E.2d at 253-54.
444. Frase Shipyards, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 13 F.E.P.
Cases 1809 (D. Wis. 1976).
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mia 45 and asthma 44 6 as handicaps. Like glaucoma, none of these
conditions, except in their very advanced stages, would fit the definition
of disability adopted by the North Carolina Court. Yet the courts that
considered these cases realized that the intent of antidiscrimination
statutes is to preclude the rejection of an otherwise qualified applicant
solely because of a physical condition that does not impair his ability to
perform the work involved. This was just the sort of discrimination
that occurred in Burgess.
The rationale behind HEW's treatment of those "regarded as hay-"
ing" a handicap as being handicapped is also applicable in Burgess.
These persons often have physical or mental conditions that are not
truly handicaps because they do not impair ability to work.4 7 "If such
persons were not considered handicapped. . . an anomalous situation
would exist: People with severe handicaps would be protected against
discrimination, while persons with lesser disabilities would not be protected (even though there might be less reason to think that their disability would affect their work)."" 8 This "anomalous situation" exists
in North Carolina after the Burgess decision. North Carolina is not
alone, however. At least one other state court in a similar case has
construed its antidiscrimination statute to deny protection to persons
with nondisabling conditions and diseases. 449
In the area of unemployment compensation the court of appeals
decided two cases that arose under G.S. 96-14. The statute provides
that an individual who is unemployed "because he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer '45 ° shall be disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits. In re
Scaringelli451 involved a graduate student who worked as a teaching
assistant at the University of North Carolina for a small stipend. He
quit school and filed for unemployment benefits. In disqualifying Scar445. Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 14 F.E.P.
Cases 344 (Wis. 1976).
446. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974).
447.

H. TURNBULL, THE LAW AND THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED IN NORTH CAROLINA

ch.

11-4 (2d ed. 1979). The only possible detrimental effect of such a handicap is on the employer's
attitude toward the worker. Id.
448. Id. chs. 11-4, -5.
449. Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 512, 385 N.E.2d
39 (1978) (kidney transplant recipient could be refused clerical employment even though fully

capable of doing work). A petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was fied in
the case. 48 U.S.L.W. 3359 (1979).
450. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(1) (1975).
451. 39 N.C. App. 648, 251 S.E.2d 728 (1979).
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ingelli from receiving benefits, the Employment Security Commission
determined that he had left the teaching assistantship without good
cause attributable to the employer. 452 The trial court reversed. 453 The
court of appeals, affirming the trial court, held that the teaching assistantship did not constitute "work" within the meaning of the G.S. 9614454 Noting that the word "work" is not defined by the Employment
Security Law, 455 the court of appeals adopted a dictionary definition of
work as "'the labor, task or duty that affords one his accustomed
means of livelihood.' ",456 Since the work performed by graduate students "is not a permanent method of earning a livelihood, but only a
temporary job taken on and performed along with normal school work
and subordinate thereto, ' 45 7 students who terminate their studies and
leave their assistantships do not voluntarily quit work within the meaning of G.S. 96-14.
Although the facts of the case are unusual, the holding may have
implications beyond this limited situation. It would seem that other
temporary or intermittent jobs could also fall outside the court's definition of "work," so that persons who voluntarily leave such jobs could
still receive benefits if they meet the other statutory requirements. This
could clearly lead to results inconsistent with the statute's general policy-to provide benefits for those "unemployed through no fault of
their own. 458
The statute's general policy provided the basis for the decision in
the second "voluntary leaving" case, In re Vinson.459 Vinson involved
an employee who was arrested on the job for felonious possession and
sale of drugs. When Vinson admitted the truth of the charges, his supervisor suggested that he resign. 460 The court of appeals found Vinson's immediate resignation to be a voluntary leaving without good
cause attributable to the employer.46 1 Since Vinson's resignation was
Id. at 648, 251 S.E.2d at 729.
Id. at 649, 251 S.E.2d at 729.
Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-1, -29 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
39 N.C. App. at 651, 251 S.E.2d at 730 (citing WBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (1976)).
457. Id.
458. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-2 (1975).
459. 42 N.C. App. 28, 255 S.E.2d 644 (1979).
460. Id. at 28, 255 S.E.2d at 645.
461. Id. at 31, 255 S.E.2d at 646. The trial court held that based on the facts as found by the
Commission, Vinson's resignation, although voluntary, was with good cause attributable to the
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.

employer as a matter of law. Id. at 29, 255 S.E.2d at 645. The opinion does not disclose the basis
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ultimately caused by his arrest, it was he who was at fault.462
Another case 463 arose under the section of the unemployment
compensation statute that requires a claimant to be available for work
in order to be eligible for benefits.4 64 Claimant was discharged by his
employer after he pleaded guilty to drug charges. Although the Commission found that the discharge itself did not disqualify claimant from
receiving benefits, 465 it ultimately found him ineligible because he re-

ceived a "prayer for judgment continued" until four months later when
he would be sentenced.46 6 Claimant testified at the hearing before the

Commission that he thought some employers would hire him but for
the uncertainty of the upcoming sentence. The Commission found, and

the court of appeals agreed, that claimant in pleading guilty to the
charge created an impediment to his availability for work and therefore
467
did not meet the statute's requirements.
Judge Martin dissented. In his view, supported by most other jurisdictions, availability depends on whether the individual is ready,

willing and able to accept work, not whether employers are willing to
468
hire him.

K.

Utilities Regulation

An across-the-board increase in the rates charged by a public utility normally requires a general ratemaking hearing, in which the North

Carolina Utilities Commission must consider the value of the utility's
for the trial court's conclusions of law. Presumably the court found that Vinson's resignation was
prompted by his supervisor's suggestion that he resign and was thus attributable to the employer.
462. The court cited various cases from other jurisdictions that have reached the same result.
In Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Delker, 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 148, 354 A.2d 59 (1976), an
employee arrested on charges of possession and sale of drugs was given the choice to resign or face
possible termination. He chose to resign. The court found that his resignation was voluntary
because he was in no way coerced. In Mastro v. Levine, 382 N.Y.S.2d 589, 52 A.D.2d 708 (1976),
an employee told that she would be discharged in two weeks chose to leave work immediately.
The court simply stated that leaving work in anticipation of discharge is not good cause for leaving work.
463. In re Yarboro, 42 N.C. App. 684, 257 S.E.2d 658 (1979).
464. N.C. GaN. STAT. § 96-13(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides:
"(a) An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any
week only if the Commission finds that
(3) He is able to work, and is available for work."
465. Apparently the Commission found that claimant's drug connected activities off the job
did not constitute misconduct in connection with his work. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2)
(1975).
466. 42 N.C. App. at 686, 257 $.E.2d at 658.
467. Id. at 685, 257 S.E.2d at 659.
468. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
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property,469 its reasonable operating expenses and the revenues to be
expected in order to fix a rate structure that allows the utility a "fair
return for its shareholders.

' 470

The procedure is necessarily cumber-

some and lengthy, since it requires an evaluation of the utility's property as well as a determination of reasonable operating expenses. An
exception to the requirement of a general rate case proceeding is contained in G.S. 62-133(f). 4 71 The statute allows the Utilities Commission
to approve rate changes for natural gas distributors without resort to
the general rate case procedure when the reason for the change is a
change "in the wholesale rate of such natural gas."41 2 In a 1979 case,
Utilities Commission v. CF Industries,473 the court of appeals construed the term "changes in the wholesale rate of such natural gas."
In July 1977 North Carolina Natural Gas requested permission to
adjust its retail rates to recover the cost of leasing additional storage
capacity from its gas supplier, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation. 474 The Utilities Commission determined that the charges for
increased storage capacity paid to the gas wholesaler were "an increase
in the wholesale cost of natural gas within the meaning of G.S. 62133(f)." 475 The court of appeals disagreed, and found that G.S. 62133(f) has the limited purpose of allowing a utility to pass on automatically any increase in the price it pays for gas "over which neither the
retailer nor the Utilities Commission has control. ' 476 Increasing storage capacity was a discretionary determination on the part of the util469. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133 (1975 & Cur. Supp. 1979).
470. Id. § 62-133(b)(4).
471. G.S. 62-133(0 reads in part:
(f) Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission subsections (b), (c), and (d) shall not
apply to rate changes of utilities engaged in the distribution of natural gas bought at
wholesale by the utility for distribution to consumers to the extent such rate changes are
occasioned by changes in the wholesale rate of such natural gas.
Id. § 62-133(0. (Subsections (b), (c) and (d) contain the provisions for a general rate change
procedure).
472. Id.
473. 39 N.C. App. 477, 250 S.E.2d 716 (1979).
474. Id. at 477, 250 S.E.2d at 716.
475. Id. at 478, 250 S.E.2d at 717. The Commission issued an order requiring all customers of
North Carolina Natural Gas to share the cost on a proportionately volumetric measure. Id. This
was in effect an authorization of an across-the-board rate increase. The basis for the Commission's determination is not clear. Apparently it was based on the increased storage costs paid to
the wholesaler. Since the statute applies to "changes in the wholesale rate" paid by utilities, the
Commission may have reasoned that its coverage extended to all changes in wholesale costs. Furthermore, since no change in the utility's rate base was involved, there was no obvious indication
that a general rate case proceeding was required.
476. 39 N.C. App. at 479, 250 S.E.2d at 717-18.
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ity, not a change in wholesale cost beyond its control.47 7
The court's interpretation of the statutory language in CF Industries is in harmony with other ratemaking provisions. A decision by
the natural gas company to build additional storage facilities and recover the costs would unquestionably have required a general rate case
proceeding in which the Commission would have ruled on the necessity
of the additional storage. The fact that the additional storage was
leased from the wholesaler rather than built by the utility should not
remove the question of its necessity from the Commission's determination.
In another utility rate case, Wall v. City ofDurham,4 7 8 the court of
appeals held that the procedure used by the City of Durham to compute the charges for water and sewer services to apartment complexes
served by one meter "unreasonably discriminated" among customers of
essentially the same service."7 9 The city used a procedure known as
"decapping," whereby the water usage shown by the one meter serving
an apartment building is divided by the number of apartments served
through the meter; the charge for the quantity obtained by this division
is calculated, and the charge is multiplied by the total number of apartments to obtain the total charge for the building.4 8° Because the city
used a declining rate structure, the use of decapping resulted in a substantially higher charge for the apartment owners than was paid by
other users of the same amount of water.4 8 1
The court noted that G.S. 160A-314(a), which authorizes cities to
fix and enforce rates for public enterprises, provides that schedules of
charges "may vary according to classes of service. ' 482 The supreme
court, in State ex rel Utilities Commission v. Mead Corp.,4 83 has interpreted this language to mean that "[t]here must be substantial differences in services or conditions to justify difference in rates. There must
be no unreasonable discrimination between those receiving the same
kind and degree of service. ' 48 4 In Wall v. City of Durham the court of
appeals found that because it cost the city no more to deliver the water
to an apartment complex than it did to deliver the same amount of
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.

Id.
41 N.C. App. 649, 255 S.E.2d 739 (1979).
Id. at 660, 255 S.E.2d at 745.
Id. at 652, 255 S.E.2d at 741.
Id. at 659, 255 S.E.2d at 745.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-314(a) (1976).
238 N.C. 451, 78 $.E.2d 290 (1953).
Id. at 462, 78 S.E.2d at 298.

1258

NORTH CA4ROLINA LAW REVIEW

[[Vol. 58

water to another customer, there was no difference in service and the
different rates were not justified.48 5
Another basis for the court's decision was that the decapping procedure was not uniformly applied to all apartment complexes,486 although it appears that the procedure would have been held
discriminatory nonetheless. In addition, the court noted that some
identical users received preferential treatment in the form of "recapping," a procedure in which the readings of several meters serving one
user are added together and the charge computed on the total amount.
not before it, the
Although the validity of the recapping procedure4 8 was
7
court noted that it too appeared discriminatory.
Plaintiffs-apartment owners in Wall had elected to install a single
meter in their buildings because it meant substantial savings in installation and maintenance costs. 4 88 Those who received the benefit of recapping, however, were primarily users who had built new buildings or
additions on their property during a period when the city used a flat
rate structure and installing several meters did not mean an increase in
water use costs. 48 9 If the city must now compute charges strictly on a
meter-by-meter basis, as it appears it must, the latter users may have to
consider a substantial capital investment to reduce their water use
costs.

Another development that will affect utilities is the 1979 General
Assembly's enactment of substantial changes in the way public utilities
appeal their property tax valuations when the appeal is based on the
ground that the utility's property is appraised substantially higher than
other property in the county or municipality. 490 There are two possible
sources of inconsistency in valuation between public utility property
and other property. First, public utility property is appraised by the
Department of Revenue49 while other property is locally appraised.
485. 41 N.C. App. at 659-60, 255 S.E.2d at 745. The court did not consider significant the
city's argument that the use of decapping was motivated by a desire to equalize the cost of water

and sewage service among family units. See id. at 656, 255 S.E.2d at 743-44. The court was
clearly correct in disregarding this argument since it can hardly be reconciled with the requirement that there be differences in services or conditions.
486. Id. at 660, 255 S.E.2d at 745.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 656, 255 S.E.2d at 743.
489. Id. at 650, 255 S.E.2d at 740.
490. Law of May 28, 1979, ch. 665, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 706 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-342 (c) (1979)).
491. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-335 (1979) provides that the property of public utilities shall be
appraised "at its true value" by the Department of Revenue. Once the appraisal value for each

utility's entire system is determined, it is allocated among the taxing units (counties and cities) in
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Second, public utility property is revalued every year 492 while most

counties revaluate property only every eight years. During an inflationary period the eight-year span can result in a large difference in

valuation.
The numerous appeals of property valuations filed by utility companies in 1978 brought to light the deficiencies in the old statutory provisions.4 93 Under the earlier version of the statute the utility filed a
notice of appeal to the Property Tax Commission, a hearing was held,
and if the Commission determined that there was an "inequitable dif-

ference" between the valuation of utility property and that of other
property in the county or city, it made an adjustment.4 9 4 There were at

least three major problems with the old statute: (1) the key term "inequitable difference" was not defined; (2) the utilities could appeal every
year,495 and (3) collection of property taxes was delayed during the appeal process, thus causing budgeting difficulties for some local governments.49 6

Under the new version of the statute, the public utility petitions
directly to the board of county commissioners for a reduction in the
assessment of its property. The board may approve the reduction as
requested, deny the request, or grant a lesser reduction. 497 If the board
and the utility agree on the reduction, they notify the Department of

Revenue which then makes the appropriate adjustment in its certification. A hearing before the Property Tax Commission is required only

upon the request of a utility unsatisfied with the board's decision.49 8
In addition to providing for a simpler first step in the appeal procthe state pursuant to id. § 105-338. The Department of Revenue then certifies to each county and
municipality the value of the property of the utilities that has been allocated to that county or
municipality under the provisions of §§ 105-339 to -341.
492. Id. § 105-335.
493. Transcript of Meeting of Gaston County Commissioners, Gastonia, N.C. (Sept. 29, 1978)
(discussing applications filed before the Property Tax Commission by Duke Power Co. and other
public service utilities).
494. Law of July 9, 1971, ch. 806, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1069; Law of May 14, 1973, ch.
476, § 193, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 576. Notice of the hearing had to be given to the board of county
commissioners as well as to every other public utility that had property taxable in the same
county.

495. Id.
496. Transcript, supra note 501, at 43-44.
497. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-342(c)(1) (1979). The board is required to notify the utility of its
decision within 60 days of its receipt of the request for reduction.
498. Id. Law of May 17, 1979, ch. 584, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 611 revised the procedure
for appeal from decisions of the Tax Commission and added the Tax Commission to the list of
administrative agencies from which appeal lies as of right to the court of appeals under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-29 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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ess, the new statute defines "inequitable difference" as a difference of
15 per cent or more between the level of appraisal used by the Department of Revenue for utility property and the level used by the county
for other property.499 The statute requires the utility to pay taxes when
due, subject to a possible refund, 5" and allows it to appeal its property
valuation only in the year of the county's revaluation and on the third
and seventh year thereafter. 50 ' The new statute thus eliminates most of
the problems presented by the old version. In addition, by allowing the
utilities and the counties to bargain directly before resorting to administrative hearings, the new procedure could result in a savings of the
state's administrative time and costs.
JEFFREY PAIGE BROWN
PAUL BALDASARE JR.
DEAN MURRAY HARRIS
HADA DE VERONA HAULSEE

499. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-342(c)(4) (1979).
500. Id. § 105-342(c)(1).
501. Id.

II.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. Appeal & Error
1. Partial Summary Judgment
In Tridyn Industries, Inc. v. American Mutual Insurance Co.,I the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that an order granting a motion
for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, but reserving the
issue of damages for trial, is not, by itself, immediately appealable as a
final judgment under rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure2 or under the interlocutory appeal provisions of G.S. 1277(a) and G.S. 7A-27 3 despite the trial court's characterization of the
order as final.4 The trial court in Tridyn had granted plaintiff's motion
for partial summary judgment5 and, in an effort to make the order immediately appealable under rule 54(b), had recited that the order was
final and that no just reason for delaying an appeal of the order existed.6 The court of appeals dismissed defendant's appeal without
opinion and the supreme court accepted defendant's petition for further review. In determining what constitutes a final and therefore appealable order under rule 54, the supreme court applied the traditional
rule that final judgment completely disposes of a single claim and not a
fragmented part of a claim. The court also held that the trial judge's
1. 296 N.C. 486, 251 S.E.2d 443 (1979).
2. Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that
[w]hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may enter a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only if there is no just reason for delay and it is so determined in the judgment.
Such judgment shall then be subject to review by appeal or as otherwise provided by
these rules or other statutes ...
N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-277(a), 7A-27 (1969).
4. 296 N.C. at 491, 251 S.E.2d at 447. As a general rule a final judgment is required before
an appeal may be taken. G.S. 1-277(a) and 7A-27, however, allow the immediate appeal of an
interlocutory order or judgment that "affects a substantial right" of a party, "discontinues the
action," "grants or refuses a new trial" or "in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment
from which an appeal might be taken." N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-277(a), 7A-27 (1969). G.S. 1277(a) has been a part of North Carolina law without amendment since 1868. Oestreicher v.
American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 126, 225 S.E.2d 797, 803 (1976). G.S. 7A-27 repeats
G.S. 1-277(a) in substance and was enacted to account for the creation -of courts of appeal in
North Carolina.
5. The trial court held that the liability insurance policy issued by defendant covered certain
claims made against plaintiff by two of its customers and ordered that a trial be held on the issue
of damages. 296 N.C. at 487, 251 S.E.2d at 445.
6. Id. The recitations made by the trial court are prerequisites for an appeal under rule
54(b). See N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b), quoted in note 2, supra.
7. 296 N.C. at 491, 251 S.E.2d at 447. In explaining the difference between interlocutory
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description of the order as a final judgment did not invoke rule 54(b)
because the order was not in fact a final judgment."

The court's interpretation of rule 54(b) endows a trial court, in a
multiple party or multiple claim lawsuit, with the discretionary power
to enter a final judgment on a distinctly separate claim or on claims
involving fewer than all of the parties. 9 This construction is consistent
with the rule's function as a companion to the procedural rules permitting the liberal joinder of claims and parties t° and does not compro-

mise the general policy against splitting claims and allowing piecemeal
appeals.I

Because the right to appeal from a partial summary judg-

ment would clearly split claims and make joinder difficult, the court
correctly held that rule 54(b) did not apply.

Finding the grant of partial summary judgment to be interlocuorders and final judgments the court quoted Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d
377, 381 (1950):
A final judgment is one which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing
to be judicially determined between them in the trial court. . . . An interlocutory order
is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but
leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire
controversy.
The court also noted that appeal of partial summary judgment is described as interlocutory in
N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(c).
8. Id. at 491, 251 S.E.2d at 447. In construing rule 54(b) the court in Tridyn looked to
federal authority for guidance. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) similarly provides that:
[W]hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action. . . or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more
but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there
is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for entry of judgment.
When presented with a fact situation similar to that in Tridyn, the United States Supreme Court,
in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976), held that the district court's recitation that
its grant of partial summary judgment on the issue of plaintiff's liability was final and that no just
reason for delaying an appeal existed did not make the order immediately appealable because
partial summary judgments are by definition interlocutory. Id. at 743, 745-46 (citing FED. R. Civ.
P. 56(b) ("A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone.
...)). Lower federal courts have reached the same conclusion. See Leonidakis v.
International Telecoin Corp., 208 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1953); Russell v. Barnes Foundation, 136 F.2d
654 (3d Cir. 1943).
For a discussion of Rule 54 of the federal rules see 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 2654-2660 (1973). See also Arnold v. Howard, 24 N.C.
App. 255, 210 S.E.2d 492 (1974) (North Carolina rule 54(b) and Federal Rule 54(b) compared).
9. By reiterating that rule 54(b) requires that a judgment on a single claim rather than a
fragmented part of a claim be final before it can be appealed, the court sanctioned the current
practice allowing trial judges to split multiple claim lawsuits at their discretion for purposes of
appeal but did not expand the appealability of interlocutory orders. 296 N.C. at 490, 251 S.E.2d at
446.
10. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 13, 14, 17-24.
11. This policy is reflected in the supreme court's statement in Veazey v. City of Durham, 231
N.C. 357, 363, 57 S.E.2d 377, 382 (1950), that the most effective way to delay the administration of
justice is to bring cases to an appellate court "piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals
from intermediate orders."
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tory, the Tridyn court considered whether the order was appealable

under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27, the statutory provisions governing
interlocutory appeals.' 2 The court found that the order was not immediately appealable under these provisions because it did not affect a
substantial right of defendant. 13 The court reasoned that because de-

fendant can, by excepting to the order, obtain review of the grant of
partial summary judgment on appeal from a final judgment following
the trial on the issue of damages, defendant's rights are fully protected

without allowing an appeal. 14 The court further stated that the most
harm a party can suffer from the denial of an immediate appeal is the
time and expense occasioned by a trial on the issue of damages, 5 and
mere avoidance of a trial on the issue of damages is not a substantial
right entitling a party to an immediate appeal. 16
In the subsequent case of English v. Holden Beach Realty Corp., 7
the court of appeals held that an order granting a motion for partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability, reserving the issue of damages for trial, was immediately appealable when the order included a

mandatory injunction that clearly affected a substantial right of the de12. See note 3 supra.
13. 296 N.C. at 491, 251 S.E.2d at 447.
14. Id. at 492, 251 S.E.2d at 448-49.
15. Id. at 491, 251 S.E.2d at 447.
16. In Waters v. Personnel Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 344 (1978), the supreme
court stated that avoidance of a trial is not a substantial right. While the court in Waters made
this statement when discussing the appealability of a denial of a summary judgment motion, it
clearly applies to the appealability of a grant of a partial summary judgment as well. See Survey
of Develofpments in North CarolinaLaw 1978, 57 N.C.L. REv. 827, 908-09 (1979) (discussing Waters and interlocutory appeal in North Carolina).
Tridyn implicitly considered the overall economic effects of permitting this type of appeal.
The court discussed Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 12 N.C. App. 226, 182 S.E.2d
810, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 512, 183 SE.2d 688 (1971), in which the court of appeals heard an
appeal of an order granting partial summary judgment on the issue of liability and reserving the
issue of damages for trial. The court noted that the end result was that the litigation "took a
tortuous route up and down the appellate ladder":
After certiorari was denied by this Court the case went back for trial. Anx appeal from
this trial was then heard by the Court of Appeals which affirmed ....
We allowed
Thus there was
certiorari and reversed. . . on the damages issue and remanded ....
one full blown appeal on the issue of liability and still another on the issue of damages.
The case illustrates the wisdom of not permitting appeals from a partial summary judgment on the question of liability only.
296 N.C. at 494 n.3, 251 S.E.2d at 449 n.3 (citations omitted). Allowance of interlocutory appeal
of partial summary judgments would increase the costs and delays of litigation because multiple
appeals often would be required to fully dispose of a case. In contrast, the denial of immediate
appeal permits the entire case to be reviewed on one appeal from final judgment. Under Tridyn,
the court will sanction these appeals only if the substantive injury to a party's rights resulting from
the denial of an immediate appeal offsets the basic economic advantages of reviewing a case in its
entirety.
17. 41 N.C. App. 1, 254 S.E.2d 223 (1979).
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fendant.18 In accord with Tridyn, the opinion emphasizes that the test
for immediate appeal is not the existence of a partial summary judgment, but whether the order affects a substantial right of the party.
English involved an action for continuing trespass in which plaintiffs sought damages and a mandatory injunction to stop defendant
from completing construction of a road across plaintiffs' property and
to restore plaintiffs' land to its original condition.' 9 The trial court
granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of
defendant's liability for the trespass and reserved the issue of damages
for jury determination. The trial court also granted plaintifs request
for a mandatory injunction, which it included in its order of partial
summary judgment.2 °
On review of this order the court of appeals noted that although a
partial summary judgment on liability generally is not immediately appealable, it is immediately appealable when the order includes a
mandatory injunction because the injunction affects a "substantial
right."' 2 1 The court did not discuss whether the grant of partial summary judgment could be reviewed apart from the mandatory injunction. It implicitly assumed that the order was reviewable in its entirety
because part of it affected a substantial right, and it proceeded to determine whether the trial court properly awarded partial summary judgment for plaintiffs.22 When partial summary judgment is accompanied
by injunctive relief, the issue is whether to allow review of the partial
summary judgment incidentalto the appeal of the injunction. Review
of a grant of partial summary judgment under facts similar to those in
English is not only necessary to adequately review the issuance of the
injunction but also to make efficient use of the judges' time and the
parties' funds.
2. New Trial
In addition to allowing the immediate appeal of orders that affect
18. Id. at 10, 254 S.E.2d at 231. An injunction, like a final judgment, directly affects the
rights of a party and thus is generally subject to immediate appeal under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S.
7A-27(d). See, eg., Pruitt v. Williams, 288 N.C. 368, 218 S.E.2d 348 (1975); Freeland v. Greene,
33 N.C. App. 537,235 S.E.2d 852 (1977); Forest Paschal Mach. Co. v. Milholen, 27 N.C. App. 679,
220 S.E.2d 190 (1975). Immediate appeal of injunctive orders is permitted in the federal courts
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(I) (1976).
19. 41 N.C. App. at 2, 254 S.E.2d at 227. A mandatory injunction is an injunction that commands a party to take affirmative action. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 923 (4th ed. 1968).
20. 41 N.C. App. at 3, 254 S.E.2d at 228.
21. Id. at 10, 254 S.E.2d at 231.
22. Id.
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a substantial right of a party, G.S. 1-277(a) expressly provides for the
immediate appeal of an interlocutory order that "grants or refuses a
new trial."2 3 Faced with the general undesirability of allowing immediate appeal of new trial orders24 and the supreme court's recent decision in Tridyn,25 the court of appeals in UniguardCarolinaInsurance
Co. v. Dickens26 attempted to limit the scope of the new trial provision
of G.S. 1-277(a) by holding that it does not encompass orders granting
only partial new trials.27
The trial court in Uniguard accepted the jury's verdict fixing defendant's liability in a subrogation action brought by plaintiff insurance
company and granted plaintiffs motion for a partial new trial limited
to the issue of damages.28 The court of appeals held that this order was
not immediately appealable under G.S. 1-277(a). 29 In reaching this decision the court relied upon Tridyn, emphasizing that defendants in
both Uniguard and Tridyn faced an order that fixed liability and retained the cause solely for a determination of damages.3 0 Adopting the
Tridyn analysis, the court in Uniguardreasoned that disallowing immediate appeal of the interlocutory order would not deprive defendant
of a substantial right because defendant could, by a timely exception to
the denial, preserve his right to appellate review of the order on appeal
from a final judgment.3 Thus, the court of appeals, in effect, excluded
an order for a partial new trial from the new trial provision of G.S. 1277(a) on the basis that an order for a partial new trial does not affect a
substantial right of defendant under the same section. The two provifor an intersions of G.S. 1-277(a), however, provide separate grounds
32
locutory appeal and should be analyzed accordingly.
Although G.S. 1-277(a) expressly allows the immediate appeal of
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (1969). G.S. 7A-27(d))(4) contains an identical provision
relating to appeal to the court of appeals. IM.§ 7A-27(d)(4).
24. See text accompanying notes 37-40 infra.
25. For a discussion of Tridyn see notes 1-16 and accompanying text, Su ra.

26. 41 N.C. App. 184, 254 S.E.2d 197 (1979).
27. Id. at 187, 254 S.E.2d at 198.
28. Id. at 185, 254 S.E.2d at 197.
29. Id. at 186, 254 S.E.2d at 198.
30. Id.

31. Id. This conclusion is consistent with past North Carolina cases. The North Carolina
Supreme Court stated long ago, in construing the identical precursor of G.S. 1-277(a), that denial
of an immediate appeal of a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial when no question of
law or legal inference is involved does not affect a substantial right of a party because, by taking
an exception, the party can raise the issue on review of the final judgment after trial. Billings v.
Charlotte Observer, 150 N.C. 540, 64 S.E. 435 (1909).
32. G.S. 1-277(a) explicitly states that an "appeal may be taken from every judicial order...
which affects a substantial right. . . or grants or refuses a new trial." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a)
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interlocutory orders, granting or denying a new trial, all orders for a
new trial historically have not been appealable under this section.
North Carolina courts have long held that no immediate appeal from a
trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial can be taken unless the
ruling is based on a controlling question of law, as opposed to one of
fact.3 3 The basis for this rule lies in the traditional notion that discretionary decisions of the trial court, including grants of new trials, are
not reviewable and thus not appealable.34 Today, however, a new trial
order is reviewable for abuse of discretion. 35 Thus the historical basis
for distinguishing between new trials granted as a matter of law and
those granted as a matter of discretion no longer exists. One could argue, therefore, that under the plain language of G.S. 1-277(a) any new
trial order, including a grant of a partial new trial, is immediately appealable.
The court in Uniguardrejected this argument, 36 however, choosing
37
instead to limit the scope of interlocutory appeal of new trial orders.

While this decision displays a blatant disregard for the plain language
(1969) (emphasis added). G.S. 7A-27(d) stresses the independent nature of these grounds for immediate appeal by numbering the provisions separately. Id. §§ 7A-27(d)(1) & (d)(4).
33. See Billings v. Charlotte Observer, 150 N.C. 540, 64 S.E. 435 (1909); Braid v. Lukins, 95
N.C. 123 (1886); Thomas v. Meyers, 87 N.C. 31 (1882); Johnson v. Bell, 74 N.C. 355 (1876); Moore
v. Edmiston, 70 N.C. 471 (1874).
34. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, § 2820 at 127-28.
35. See Howard v. Mercer, 36 N.C. App. 67, 243 S.E.2d 168 (1978). In Howard the court of
appeals for the first time allowed the immediate appeal of a discretionary order for a partial new
trial on the issue of damages. The opinion, however, does not discuss G.S. 1-277(a) or G.S. 7A27(d)(4). For a discussion of Howard see Survey, supra note 16, at 911.
For a discussion of the appealability of discretionary orders see generally 12 STRONO's
NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 3D Trial §§ 52, 52.1 (1979) (allowing appellate review ofjury verdicts);
6A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.08[6], at 59-182 (2d ed. 1974) (new trial orders reviewable
in federal court for abuse of discretion).
36. The Uniguardcourt expressly overruled Digsby v. Gregory, 35 N.C. App. 59, 240 S.E.2d
491 (1978), which held that an order for a partial new trial on damages is immediately appealable
under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(4). The court in Digsby applied the interlocutory appeal
provisions literally and did not discuss the traditional distinction between new trials granted as a
matter of law and those granted as a matter of discretion.
37. The court in Uniguardabsolutely excluded partial new trials from the new trial provision
of G.S. 1-277(a). It could have reached the same result without violating the express language of
G.S. 1-277(a), however, by holding that the order was not immediately appealable because it
involved a discretionary ruling by the trial judge. See Grove v. Baker, 174 N.C. 145, 94 S.E. 528
(1917) (allowing immediate appeal of a grant of a partial new trial granted as a matter of law and
not discretion); Billings v. Charlotte Observer, 150 N.C. 540, 64 S.E. 435 (1909). Thus, the court
could have limited the appealability of new trial orders by holding that these orders are appealable only when they involve a controlling question of law. While decisions immediately prior to
Uniguardhave allowed the review of discretionary grants of a new trial, see Howard v. Mercer, 36
N.C. App. 67, 243 S.E.2d 168 (1978); Digsby v. Gregory, 35 N.C. App. 59, 240 S.E.2d 491 (1978);
these cases have not discussed the distinction between new trials granted as a matter of law and
those granted as a matter of discretion. Because Grove and Barker have not been overruled, the
distinction is arguably still viable.
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and past judicial interpretations of G.S. 1-277(a), an explanation for
the court's approach can be found in the basic policy against allowing
fragmentary appeals that waste judicial resources. 38 When an immediate appeal of an order granting a new trial is allowed and an appellate
court determines that the motion was properly granted, the possibility
of another appeal remains. 39 Because of this potential for multiple appeals, the federal courts generally prohibit immediate appeal from the
trial court's grant or denial of a new trial regardless of whether the
the order was
order is for a partial or an entire new trial or whether
4
based on a matter of discretion or a matter of law. 0
Thus by excluding partial new trials from G.S. 1-277(a), albeit
through a contorted interpretation of this provision, the court in
Uniguardreached a result consistent with the rationale of Tridyn and
the practice in the federal courts. After Uniguard, however, orders
granting or denying entire new trials in North Carolina remain immediately appealable under G.S. 1-277(a). In view of the judicial disdain
for piecemeal appeals reflected in both Tridyn and Uniguardand the
anomalous treatment of partial and entire new trials, the legislature
should reconsider the value of the new trial provision of G.S. 1-277(a).
B. Argument of Counsel
In North Carolina attorneys have the statutory right to argue
before the court in all jury trials.4' Although attorneys do not have a
statutory right to argue in nonjury cases in North Carolina, the United
States Supreme Court has held that counsel has an absolute constitutional right to present a closing argument in nonjury, criminal trials.42
In the recent decision of Roberson v. Roberson,43 however, the court of
appeals refused to recognize a right of an attorney to argue in nonjury,
civil cases. In Roberson, a case of first impression, the court held that
in a civil, nonjury trial, argument of counsel before the court is a privi38. See, e.g., City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C. 528, 529, 67 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1951);
Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 363, 57 S.E.2d 377, 382 (1950).
39. See, e.g., Steele v. Wiedemann Mach. Co., 280 F.2d 380, 383-84 (3d Cir. 1960).
40. See 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, § 2818, at 114.
41. G.S. 84-14 gives counsel the right to argue in jury trials in superior court. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 84-14 (1969). This right appears to extend to district court proceedings by reason of G.S.
7A-193, which provides that references to the superior court in the chapters of the general statutes
governing civil procedure shall be deemed also to apply to the district courts. Id. § 7A-193.
42. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975). In Herringthe Supreme Court held that the
denial of an opportunity for counsel to make closing argument in a nonjury, criminal case violated
the accused's sixth amendment right to adequate representation by counsel. Id. at 865.
43. 40 N.C. App. 193, 252 S.E.2d 237 (1979).
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lege subject to the trial judge's discretion instead of an absolute right.44
The trial court in Roberson denied defendant's attorney permission to speak on behalf of his client at the conclusion of a hearing upon
an order directing defendant to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt for a violation of a previous alimony decree. The court
ordered the defendant jailed for four months or until he purged himself
of the contempt violation.45
On review, the court of appeals found no reversible error and upheld the trial court's refusal to allow defendant's attorney to argue
before the court.46 The court inferred from the failure of the legislature
to provide counsel the statutory right to argue in civil, nonjury cases
that the legislature did not intend for counsel to have this right and that
control of arguments of counsel in these cases was therefore within the
discretion of the trial judge. 47 The court, however, failed to discuss the
value of closing arguments or the wisdom of placing control of these
arguments within the discretion of the trial judge. This decision reflects
a judicial reluctance to limit the broad power of the trial judge to maintain absolute control of his courtroom. 48 The court's simplistic analysis, however, does not supply an acceptable rationale for providing a
potential limit on the ability of counsel to argue before the court.
Attempts have been made to justify denying closing arguments in
nonjury trials on the basis of the trial judge's alleged ability in a bench
trial to discern those instances in which closing arguments would be
valuable. 49 The United States Supreme Court, however, in Herring v.
New York,50 recently found this rationale unpersuasive.-" The Court
44. Id at 195, 252 S.E.2d at 238.
45. Id In Roberson the trial court held that defendant wilfully refused to obey a previous
order of the court directing that defendant pay alimony to plaintiff and sentenced defendant to a
jail term contingent upon nonpayment of the alimony. Given the criminal nature of this action,
the case is arguably within the scope and spirit of Ilerring,see supranote 42. The court in Roberson, however, did not discuss this possibility. See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1973) ("No person may be imprisoned for any offense ... unless he was represented by counsel
at trial.").
46. 40 N.C. App. at 195, 252 S.E.2d at 238.
47. Id Numerous states have held that in a civil, nonjury case argument of counsel is a
privilege and not an absolute right. See Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1396, 1431-34 (1954 & Supp. 1980).
The court in Roberson expressly adopted the reasoning of those courts that have held that the
opportunity of counsel to argue in civil, nonjury cases is discretionary because no state statute
guarantees this right. 40 N.C. App. at 195, 252 S.E.2d at 238.
48. 40 N.C. App. at 194, 252 S.E.2d at 238. The court, quoting State v. Miller, 75 N.C. 73, 74
(1876) (emphasis in original), stated that "the judge holds his court as a driver holds the reins...
to govern, guide, restrain, except where he is himself restrained by law."
49. See, e.g., People v. Don Carlos, 47 Cal. App. 2d 863, 865, 117 P.2d 748, 750 (1941).
50. 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
51. Id. at 864 n. 15.
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noted that in many cases a closing argument will not affect the decision
of the court, yet on occasion the final argument will prevent an erroneous verdict. z The Court held that it is reversible error to deny counsel
the opportunity to make a closing argument in nonjury criminal
cases. 53 Although this holding was based upon constitutional
grounds54 and involved a criminal trial, the court's statements concernof the argument of counsel are equally applicable to
ing the importance
5
litigation.
civil
In one significant respect, final arguments are potentially more important in nonjury trials than in jury trials. A jury, by definition,
makes a collective decision and, as Mr. Justice Powell has perceived,
"[tlhis collective judgment tends to compensate for individual shortcomings and furnishes some assurance of a reliable decision. ' 56 In a
bench trial, however, a judge formulates his decision without the immediate stimulation of opposing perspectives. Unlike a juror, a judge
in a nonjury trial is exposed to differing points of view only during the
trial itself and the closing arguments by counsel. The denial of closing
arguments further reduces the inputs into the factfinding process and
thus increases the possibility of an erroneous verdict.57
In addition, closing argument facilitates the factfnding process in
a bench trial by providing the trial judge with a refreshed opportunity
to view and evaluate the dispute before the court. 58 Requiring closing
arguments assures that the judge will be presented the controversy in
52. Id. at 863.
53. Id.
54. See note 42 supra.
55. The Supreme Court of North Dakota in Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97 (N.D.
1977), found the statement of the United States Supreme Court in Herringconcerning the value of
final arguments applicable to civil litigation. The court held that:
Litigants in civil nonjury cases ...have a right to have their attorneys make a final
argument. This right may be limited as to time and may be limited as to content so as to
preclude improper argument, but it cannot be totally denied. In civil nonjury cases the
right may be waived.
Id. at 101.
Two other states have held that counsel has an absolute right to closing arguments in civil,
nonjury cases. See Callan v. Biermann, 194 Kan. 219, 398 P.2d 355 (1965); Aladdin Oil Burner
Corp. v. Morton, 117 N.J.L. 260, 187 A. 350 (1936).
56. Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1,4 (1966).
57. See F. JAMES, CRISIS IN THE COURTS 191, 192 (1967). The author quotes Jacob Fuchsberg, former president of the American Trial Lawyers Association:
Judges have no monopoly on intelligence, insight, or fairness. They are ordinary human
beings like anyone else. Ibelieve the opinions of 12 people are better than the opinion of
one--and I don't care whether they are 12 lawyers, 12judges, or 12 laymen.... When
12 people must come to a decision, the prejudices that are inherent m most people get
worked out in the discussion that is involved.
58. A judge is an ordinary human being and thus lacks any inherent abilities to recollect or
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summary and will be exposed again to developments he might have
missed during trial.5 9
While providing an absolute right to closing argument necessarily
involves the time and resources of the trial court,60 it eliminates the
burden on the appellate court to review the decision of the lower court
and forecloses the possibility of a retrial of the case in the event that the
appellate court finds that the trial court abused its discretion in not
allowing counsel to make a closing argument. 6' Because every denial
of the opportunity of counsel to argue has the potential to both waste
judicial resources with appeals and subsequent retrials and deny a
party the effective representation of counsel, the better approach is to
require the trial court to hear the arguments as a matter of law.62
C

Directed Verdict

A motion for a directed verdict under rule 50 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure may be granted only if the evidence is
63
insufficient as a matter of law to justify a verdict for the nonmovant.
In two recent cases the North Carolina Supreme Court outlined the
circumstances in which it may be appropriate to grant a directed verdict in favor of the party with the burden of proof.
In Murray v. Murray,64 the court recognized for the first time that
reconstruct the facts and arguments presented in a judicial proceeding. See generally F. JAMES,
supra note 57, at 192.
59. In describing the importance of closing argument in a nonjury case one author wrote:
Before counsel waives oral argument, he would do well to consider whether the judge
may have only appeared to be listening to the witnesses but did not in fact hear them.
Counsel cannot really be sure that during the trial the judge was not thinking of some
other case (or perhaps about his troublesome prostate).
Gordon, Non-Jury Summations, 6 AM. JUR. TRIALs, 771, 777 (1967). See F. JAMES, supranote 57,
191, 192 (discussion of inattentiveness as a cause of incompetence among trial judges).
60. Because Roberson was the first North Carolina case to raise the issue of whether counsel
has an absolute right to argue before the court in civil, nonjury cases, it is reasonable to believe
that trial courts in North Carolina allow arguments of counsel in these cases as a matter of course.
Thus the provision of an absolute right to argue will not significantly increase the burden on the
trial courts.
61. Extensive litigation has been generated over whether the trial court abused its discretion
in denying counsel the opportunity to argue in all types of cases. See Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1396,
1410-20 (1954 & Supp. 1980).
62. Allowing the trial court the discretion to deny counsel the opportunity to argue means
that these decisions will be reversible only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. An aggrieved
party, therefore, has the onerous burden of showing that the argument that was denied would
have somehow affected the outcome. For an indication of the showing necessary to warrant a
reversal for abuse of discretion in denying the closing arguments of counsel, see Annot., 38
A.L.R.2d 1396, 1410 (1954 & Supp. 1980).
63. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 50(b); see also Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. 533, 251 S.E.2d 452 (1979).
64. 296 N.C. 405, 250 S.E.2d 276 (1979).
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it may be proper to grant a directed verdict to a party with the burden
of proof when credibility is established as a matter of law. Plaintiff
filed an action for alimony without divorce alleging that defendant
wilfully abandoned her. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a
directed verdict and, following a jury verdict in defendant's favor, denied her motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).
Both the court of appeals and the supreme court affirmed the trial
court's decision, not on the ground that the movant was the party with
the burden of proof, but because the conflicting testimony presented a
factual issue of whether the parties consented to the separation.65
66
In its decision the supreme court in Murray cited Cutts v. Casey
for the proposition that a directed verdict cannot be granted for the
party with the burden of proof on testimonial evidence unless its credibility can be established as a matter of law. 67 The majority in Cutts,
however, had stated that a trial judge could not direct a verdict in favor
of the party with the burden of proof when recovery depended upon
the credibility of the movant's witnesses. 68 Although the Cutts majority
briefly noted authority stating that there may be instances when credibility is established as a matter of law,69 the concurring opinion of Justice Huskins70 and subsequent courts and commentators have
consistently interpreted the majority's opinion in Cutts to stand for the
basic proposition that it is always improper to direct a verdict in favor
of the party with the burden of proof on testimonial evidence because
the credibility of witnesses is for the jury to determine.71 Several courts
have even interpreted the broad language in Cutts to absolutely pro65. Id. at 406, 250 S.E.2d at 277.
66. 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971).
67. 296 N.C. at 408, 250 S.E.2d at 278. The opinion in Murrayis consistent with that of Kidd
v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976), in which the court granted a summary judgment to
the party with the burden of proof based solely upon testimonial evidence when credibility was
established as a matter of law. Id. at 369-70, 222 S.E.2d at 410.
68. 278 N.C. at 417, 180 S.E.2d at 311. The Culls court reasoned that a directed verdict in
favor of a party with the burden of proof based on testimonial evidence would violate the nonmovant's right to trial by jury because testimonial evidence by its nature involves questions of
credibility that must be presented to the jury. Id. at 417, 180 S.E.2d at 311.
69. 278 N.C. at 421, 180 S.E.2d at 314 (citing J. Dickson Phillips in McITosH, N.C. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1488.20, (Supp. 1970)). In noting the contention that credibility may be
established as a matter of law, the majority chose "to recognize that situation when it confronts
us." Id.
70. 278 N.C. 390, 423, 180 S.E.2d 297, 319 (Huskins, J., concurring).
71. See, e.g., Louis, A Survey ofDecisions Under the New North CarolinaRules of Civil Procedure, 50 N.C.L. REV. 729, 739, 746-54 (1972); SHUFORD, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE § 50-6, at 411. For a more recent case see Ludwig v. Hart, 40 N.C. App. 188, 192, 252
S.E.2d 270, 274 (1979); see also Stuart v. Bryant, 40 N.C. App. 206, 207, 252 S.E.2d 286, 287
(1979), for an example of how Culls has been read by counsel.

1272

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

hibit a directed verdict for the party with the burden of proof, regardless of the type of evidence supporting the motion.72 By expressly
recognizing that a directed verdict may be granted for the party with
the burden of proof on testimonial evidence when credibility can be
established as a matter of law, however, the Murray decision adopts the
federal position espoused by Justice Huskins in his Cults concurring
opinion.73
Although the supreme court limited the broad propositions of
Cults in Murray, it was not until North CarolinaNationalBank v. Burnette,74 in an opinion by Justice Huskins, that the court expressly outlined the circumstances in which credibility can be established as a
matter of law and a directed verdict in favor of the party with the burden of proof is appropriate.75
In Burnette the trial court entered JNOV for plaintiff on the
ground that plaintiff had, as a matter of law, complied with G.S. 25-9601,76 which provides for the commercially reasonable disposition of
collateral by public sale.77 The court of appeals reversed the JNOV on
the ground that plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements
of G.S. 25-9-603.78 On certiorari the supreme court held that plaintiff's
evidence was credible and established substantial compliance with G.S.
25-9-603 as a matter of law.79
In holding that the trial court properly granted JNOV, the
supreme court had to consider whether a trial court may grant JNOV
in favor of the party with the burden of proof. The court reasoned that
because the motion for JNOV is in effect a renewal of the earlier motion for a directed verdict,80 the same considerations should control the
72. See, e.g., Weeks Motor Co. of Kinston, Inc. v. Daniels, 18 N.C. App. 442, 197 S.E.2d 29
(1973); American Personnel, Inc. v. Harbolick, 16 N.C. App. 107, 191 S.E.2d 412 (1971).
73. 278 N.C. at 423, 180 S.E.2d at 319. Justice Huskins disagreed "with that portion of the
opinion which holds that the trial judge cannot under Rule 50, under any circumstances, direct a
verdict in favor of the party carrying the burden of proof." Id. Justice Huskins argued that rule
50(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure should be interpreted in accordance with the
comparable federal rule, id.at 427, 180 S.E.2d at 321-22, and thus when credibility is established
as a matter of law it may be proper to grant a directed verdict to the party with the burden of
proof. Id. at 425, 180 S.E.2d at 319. 5A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE %50.02[l], at 2318-19 (2d
ed. 1975).
74. 297 N.C. 524, 256 S.E.2d 388 (1979).
75. Id. at 537-38, 256 S.E.2d at 396.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-601 (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
77. 297 N.C. at 528, 256 S.E.2d at 390.
78. Id at 528, 256 S.E.2d at 390.
79. Id at 533, 256 S.E.2d at 392-93.
80. Id. at 536, 256 S.E.2d at 395.

1980]

CIVIL PROCEDURE

1273

determination of the propriety of granting either motion,,' Thus the
court considered the question of
when a verdict can be directed to the
82
party with the burden of proof.
The court found no constitutional or procedural barriers to the
grant of a motion for directed verdict when the "credibility of movant's
evidence is manifest as a matter of law."'83 Although credibility is generally for the jury to determine, the court described three recurrent situations when credibility can be established as a matter of law: when the
non-movant admits the essential elements of the movant's claim, when
the evidence is documentary and not challenged, and when only latent
doubts about the credibility of the oral testimony
exist and the non84
movant has failed to challenge the evidence.
Thus Justice Huskins' decision in Burnette clarifies a decade of
confusion surrounding the propriety of granting a directed verdict to
the party with the burden of proof. In the aftermath of Burnette North
Carolina attorneys must take affirmative steps to impeach or contradict
the evidence of the party with the burden of proof in order to avoid the
risk that the evidence will be regarded as credible as a matter of law
and therefore susceptible to a directed verdict.
1

Rule 60(b) Relieffrom Judgment

An appeal generally divests the trial court of jurisdiction to take
any additional action in a case except to aid in the appeal.85 Consequently, while an appeal is pending the trial court lacks the power to
grant affirmative relief under rule 60(b) of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure86 without the permission of the appellate court.87 The
81. Id.Rule 50(b) states that a motion for JNOV shall "be granted if it appears that the
motion for directed verdict could properly have been granted." N.C. R. Civ. P. 50(b)(l). See
Sizemore, GeneralScope and Philosophy of The New Rules, 5 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1,41 (1969);
see also 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, § 2537, at 598 (1973).
82. 297 N.C. at 536, 256 S.E.2d at 395.
83. Id.at 537, 256 S.E.2d at 396. The court stated that the constitutional right to trial by jury
provided under art. I, § 25 of the North Carolina Constitution was not absolute but subject to the
initial determination by the trial judge that genuine issues of fact existed. In addition, the court
noted that the "no comment" provision of rule 51(a), under which the trial judge must explain the
law to the jury but give no opinion on the facts, applies only after this preliminary determination
by the trial judge. Id.
84. Id.at 537-38, 256 S.E.2d at 396.
85. Traditionally, only one court has jurisdiction over a case at a given time. See Bowen v.
Hodge Motor Co., 292 N.C. 633, 636, 234 S.E.2d 748,750 (1977); Wiggins v. Bunch, 280 N.C. 106,
111, 184 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1971).
86. Rule 60(b) provides that a court may grant relief from a final judgment or order on the
grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, .misrepresentation, or other misconduct by an adverse party. N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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North Carolina Court of Appeals recently held in Bell v. Martin,"8
however, that although a trial court cannot grant a rule 60(b) motion89
while an appeal in the case is pending, it must consider the motion for
the limited purpose of indicating how it would have ruled on the motion in the absence of the appeal. 90
Defendant in Bell filed a notice of appeal following the trial
court's entry of summary judgment for plaintiff and then fied a rule
60(b) motion for relief from the judgment with the trial court. 9' The
trial judge dismissed the motion on the ground that the pending appeal
deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear or determine the motion.92
have heard the
The court of appeals held that the trial court should
93
motion and indicated how it would have ruled.
The court of appeals based its decision on dicta in the prior
supreme court case of Sink v. Easter.94 In Sink, the supreme court
noted the availability of two alternative procedures by which a trial
court could state how it would rule on a rule 60(b) motion after an
appeal had been taken. 95 First, assuming the lower court lacks the
87. See Wiggins v. Bunch, 280 N.C. 106, 11I,184 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1971); see also 7 MOORE'S
(2d ed. 1976) (discussion of comparable federal rule).
88. 43 N.C. App. 134, 258 S.E.2d 403 (1979).
89. As a general proposition a motion for relief under rule 60(b) is within the discretion of
the trial court and appellate review is limited to the determination of whether the trial court
abused its discretion. See Sink v. Easter, 288 N.C. 183, 198, 217 S.E.2d 532, 541 (1975).
90. 43 N.C. App. at 143, 258 S.E.2d at 409. The court noted that this procedure has been
accepted by the second, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and D.C. circuits. Id.at 142, 258
S.E.2d at 409.
This technique parallels that adopted under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under
rule 33 of these rules the district court cannot grant a new trial once notice of appeal has been filed
but can hear the motion and indicate whether it is inclined to grant it. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33; see 2
FEDERAL PRACTICE, %60:30[2]

C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 557, at 535 (1969).

The technique adopted in Bell parallels that used with rule 52 of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, which gives a court the power to amend or change its findings within 10 days of
judgment. N.C.R. CIv. P. 52. The court of appeals in Parrish v. Cole, 38 N.C. App. 691, 248
S.E.2d 878 (1978), held that a pending appeal does not prevent the trial court from adjudicating a
rule 52(b) motion. See Survey, supra note 16, at 910-I1 (discussion of Parrish).
91. 43 N.C. App. at 136, 258 S.E.2d at 405. In Bell, upon defendant's failure to file an answer
to the complaint, the trial court entered summary judgment for plaintiff, holding defendant to be
the father of plaintiffs illegitimate child and ordering support payments. Thereafter, defendant
gave notice of appeal, filed an answer to the complaint without the leave of the court and then
filed a rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment accompanied by an affidavit alleging that plaintiff's attorney misled defendant concerning the time allowed for filing an answer. The trial judge
dismissed defendant's rule 60(b) motion on the ground that the pending appeal deprived the court
of jurisdiction to hear or determine the motion. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 143, 258 S.E.2d at 409.
94. 288 N.C. 183, 217 S.E.2d 532 (1975).
95. Id. at 199, 217 S.E.2d at 541 (quoting I1 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, § 2873,
at 263-65 (1973)).
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power to consider a rule 60(b) motion after notice of appeal has been
filed, a party seeking relief from a judgment while an appeal is pending
could first present the motion to the appellate court, which could remand the case to the trial court if it deemed necessary.96 Alternatively,
indicated the supreme court, a lower court could consider a rule 60(b)
motion while an appeal is pending for the limited purpose of indicating
how it would rule on the motion.97 Although the supreme court did not
adopt or reject either of these approaches, 98 the court of appeals in Bell
interpreted the higher court's discussion of the available techniques by
which a trial court could state its position on a rule 60(b) motion while
an appeal is pending as an indication that "such options were available." 99
The court of appeals in Bell reasoned that because rule 60(b) allows a motion to be made while an appeal is pending' 00 and because
the trial court is better able to decide the issues presented in a rule 60(b)
motion than an appellate court,' 0 ' the better approach is to permit the
lower court to consider the motion while an appeal is pending for the
limited purpose of indicating how it would rule on the motion absent
the pending appeal.'0 2 Under this procedure, when a rule 60(b) motion
is made at the trial court level while an appeal is pending, the movant
must notify the appellate court so that it may postpone consideration of
the appeal until after the trial court has acted.' 03 If the lower court
indicates that it would have granted the motion, the appellant can
move the appellate court to remand the case to the trial court for judgment on the motion.1 4 If, however, the trial court indicates that it
96. 288 N.C. at 199, 217 S.E.2d at 541.
97.

Id.

98. 288 N.C. at 200, 217 S.E.2d at 543. The court did not reach the issue of whether the trial
court could rule on a rule 60(b) motion while an appeal was pending because the court found that
the appeal had been abandoned. Thus, the trial court retained jurisdiction. Id.
99. 43 N.C. App. at 141, 258 S.E.2d at 408.
100. Id. A Rule 60(b) motion in the trial court is generally subject to a one year time limit
that is not tolled by the pendency of an appeal. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b). Therefore, the court
reasoned that an appellant has the right to make a rule 60(b) motion in the trial court while an
appeal is pending. Cf 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, § 2866, at 233 (discussion of
comparable federal rule).
101. 43 N.C. App. at 141, 258 S.E.2d at 408. The United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged that the trial court "is in a much better position to pass upon'the issues presented in a
motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)." Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 19 (1976), (citing
Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 405 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1968)). See I1C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 8, § 2873, at 269 (1973).
102. 43 N.C. App. at 142, 258 S.E.2d at 409.
103. Id.
104. Id. Although the court did not expressly state that the lower court's indication that it
would grant the motion is binding, it is evident that the trial court must fully consider the motion
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would have denied the motion, the appellant can request the appellate
court to immediately review the trial court's holding. 05
The technique outlined in Bell implicitly recognizes the greater fa06
miliarity of the trial court with the merits of the rule 60(b) motion.
By allowing the trial court to deny or indicate that it would grant the
motion while an appeal is pending, the lower court is the first to rule on
the motion, and the appellate court is able to review the trial court's
decision on the motion at the same time that it reviews the full case on
will not intrude upon
appeal. Under this procedure the appellate 0court
7
a function better suited for the trial court.1
In addition, this technique for allowing trial court review while an
appeal is pending is judicially economical because it avoids the potential of a wasted remand. To require that a rule 60(b) motion be made
at the appellate level because of a pending appeal means that the court
will either rule on the motion itself or remand the motion for consideration by the trial court if it deems necessary.10 On remand, however,
the trial court may or may not grant the motion and thus the possibility
of a pointless remand that needlessly burdens the appellate court and
increases the costs and delays of litigation remains. By allowing the
trial court to indicate its opinion on a motion made before it during the
pendency of an appeal, the appellate court would remand only if the
trial court intended to grant the motion.
Although Bell involved a motion under rule 60(b), the procedure
adopted by the court seems equally applicable to the trial court's review of a motion under rule 59 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure for a new trial made during the pendency of an appeal.' 09
before it and not wait until the appellate court has remanded. For all practical purposes the trial
court's grant of the motion on remand should be automatic.
105. Id.
106. Rule 60(b) has been described as a "grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a
particular case." 7 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 160:27[2], at 375 (1976), quoted in Jim Walter
Homes, Inc. v. Peartree, 28 N.C. App. 709, 712, 222 S.E.2d 706, 708 (1976). Because of the trial
court's unique exposure to all facets of a case it is able to make the rulings equity requires. See I I
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 8, § 2873, at 269 (1973).
107. The court stated that "the initial consideration of rule 60(b) motions at the appellate level
does not provide the essential ingredient of trial court review" and that "this procedure should not
be encouraged." 43 N.C. App. at 142, 258 S.E.2d at 409 (1975).
108. Once an appeal is pending a party has the option of filing the rule 60(b) motion either in
the appellate or the trial court. See Wiggins v. Bunch, 280 N.C. 106, 184 S.E.2d 879 (1971). The
appellate court may adjudicate the motion itself; however, such motions are not generally heard
first at the appellate level. See Locklear v. Snow, 5 N.C. App. 434, 437, 168 S.E.2d 445, 448
(1969).
109. Rule 59 requires that a motion for a new trial be made within 10 days of judgment while
rule 60(b) motions can be made within one year ofjudgment. N.C.R. Civ. P. 59, 60(b). There-
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In both situations allowing the trial court to hear the motion while the
appeal is pending facilitates the trial court's disposition of the motion
and promotes the economical use of judicial resources.
E

Jurisdiction

In United Buying Group, Inc. v. Coleman, 10 the North Carolina
Supreme Court rejected the per se approach of the court of appeals"'
and held that a nonresident's guaranty or endorsement of a debt to be
paid to North Carolina creditors does not necessarily constitute sufficient "minimum contacts"' 1 2 to support in personam jurisdiction over
the nonresident. In reaching this decision, the court ruled that the acts
of an individual nonresident defendant in his capacity as president and
principal shareholder of a foreign corporation may be attributed to him
personally for the purpose of establishing the existence of minimum
contacts between him and North Carolina.
Plaintiff, a North Carolina corporation, periodically sold shoes to
the Coleman Shoe Company, a Virginia corporation. During the
course of this business relationship, defendants Lawrence and Morton
Coleman each signed "conditional promissory notes" to guarantee payment to plaintiff for any merchandise ordered by the Coleman Shoe
Company." 3 When Lawrence Coleman signed his promissory note, he
was a resident of Virginia and president of the shoe company. Aside
from the promissory note itself, Lawrence's only contacts with the state
of North Carolina arose out of his status as agent of the Coleman Shoe
Company. In that capacity he ordered substantial amounts of footwear
from plaintiff and attended trade shows in North Carolina." 4 Lawrence's brother Morton Coleman was a physician who resided in New
fore, a motion for a new trial is less likely to be made while an appeal is pending than a motion for
relief under rule 60(b).
110. 296 N.C. 510, 251 S.E.2d 610 (1979).
111. See notes 122-24 and accompanying text infra.
112. For a discussion of the "minimum contacts" test for asserting in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant, see notes 125-27 and accompanying text infra.
113. 296 N.C. at 513, 251 S.E.2d at 613.
114. In an affidavit in support of his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Lawrence Coleman stated:
I am a resident of the State of Virginia, and am not now nor have I ever been a resident
of the State of North Carolina. I do not now and never have in the past maintained any
office, bank account, mailing address, telephone listing or other business or personal
facilities in the State of No% Carolina. . . .I do not now nor have I ever owned any
real property in the State of North Carolina. I have visited the State of North Carolina
for business purposes at which time to attend shoe shows for the purpose of selecting
shoes to be purchased on behalf of the Coleman Shoe Company ....
Record at 31.
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York and had no financial interest in the shoe company. His only contact with North Carolina was the promissory6 note,"' from which he
could derive no personal monetary benefit."1
When the shoe company failed to pay for merchandise received
and refused to honor purchase orders yet to be filled, plaintiff sued defendants individually on the notes. 117 Plaintiff asserted personal jurisdiction over defendants under G.S. 1-75.4(5), the North Carolina "long
arm" provision that creates jurisdiction in actions arising out of
promises to pay for services to be performed in the state."8 In spite of
defendants' contention that the statute applied only to promises to pay
for services and, therefore, did not apply to the notes in question because the notes guaranteed payment of debts arising out of the sale of
goods,19 neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court had any
difficulty in finding that the execution by defendants of the promissory
notes brought them within the scope of the statute. 20 Both courts
therefore focused primarily on the issue of whether an assertion of jupursuant to the statute would violate their
risdiction over defendants
2
rights to due process.' '

The court of appeals, 122 in holding that jurisdiction could be as115. Morton Coleman's affidavit was substantially identical to that of Lawrence Coleman,
note 114 supra, except for the last quoted sentence. In lieu of that statement Morton asserted: "I
have never visited the State of North Carolina for any business-related purpose whatever, nor do I
maintain any business interests in the State of North Carolina. I have, moreover, never maintained any business interests in that state." Record at 29.
116. The court remarked that the "only conceivable benefit accruing to Dr. Coleman as a
result of signing the note was the personal satisfaction of helping his brother Lawrence." 296 N.C.
at 517, 251 S.E.2d at 615.
117. Plaintiff alleged that the Coleman Shoe Company owed it $4,906 from previous orders
and had cancelled orders for approximately $26,198 worth of merchandise. Plaintiff resold the
merchandise covered by the cancelled orders at a loss and alleged total damages of $14,609.24, for
which it sued defendants individually. Lawrence Coleman's note guaranteed payment up to
$36,718.75, and Morton Coleman's note guaranteed payment up to $25,000. Record at 11-13.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(5) (1969).
119. Brief of Appellee to the Court of Appeals at 3-6.
120. 37 N.C. App. 26, 28, 245 S.E.2d 402, 404 (1978); 296 N.C. at 514, 251 S.E.2d at 613.
Neither court discussed this issue to any significant extent. The court of appeals characterized
plaintiffs delivery of merchandise to and acceptance of orders from the Coleman Shoe Company
as a service rendered in North Carolina, 37 N.C. App. at 28, 245 S.E.2d 403, and the supreme
court merely noted that "the Coleman brothers promised to pay for services, namely the acquisition of shoes from manufacturers .. " Id. at 514, 251 S.E.2d at 613.
121. 27 N.C. App. at 28-29, 245 S.E.2d at 404; 296 N.C. at 514,251 S.E.2d at 613. The court of
appeals and the supreme court employed the two-step analysis of Dillon v. Numismatic Funding
Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977), the leading North Carolina case in this area. Under
this analysis the court must first determine whether the long-arm statute itself applies to the particular transaction and then decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction by North Carolina violates
due process of law. Id. at 675, 231 S.E.2d at 630.
122. 37 N.C. App. 26, 245 S.E.2d 402 (1978), modjfed, 296 N.C. 510, 251 S.E.2d 610 (1979).
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serted over both defendants, relied on its earlier decision in First-Citizens Banks and Trust Co. v. McDanie' 23 in which the court held that
[w]here the nonresident defendant promises to pay the debt of another, which debt is owed to North Carolina creditors, such promise
is a contract to be performed in North Carolina and is sufficient minimal contact upon which this State may assert personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. 24
The supreme court, however, rejected this per se rule and applied the
well-established standard announced by the United States Supreme
Court in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington 25 instead. Under InternationalShoe, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant is constitutional if the defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 126
As indicated by the Supreme Court, the determination of the jurisdictional importance of the contacts between a particular defendant and
is made on case-by-case basis and cannot be based on
the forum state127
rigid formulae.
In Coleman, the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that
defendant Lawrence Coleman had sufficient contacts with the state to
over him,128 but that defendant Morjustify an assertion of jurisdiction
129
ton Coleman did not.
In a threshold determination, the court held without discussion
that Lawrence Coleman's corporate acts could be attributed to him personally for the purpose of its minimum contacts analysis. Conse123. 18 N.C. App. 644, 197 S.E.2d 556 (1973).
124. Id. at 647, 197 S.E.2d at 558.
125. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
126. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The Court in InternationalShoe stated that a finding that due process is satisfied depends on the quality and nature of
defendant's activity in the forum state "in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." Id. at 319. More recently, in
World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980), the Supreme Court listed
several factors that should be considered in assessing the fairness of extending jurisdiction to a
nonresident. These factors include the burden on defendant of having to defend a lawsuit in a
foreign state, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, plaintiffs interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief, the interest of the judicial system in effecting efficient resolution of
controversies and "the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental social policies." 100 S. Ct. at 564.
127. In Kulko'v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978), the Supreme Court noted
that "[l]ike any standard that requires a determination of "reasonableness," the "minimum contacts" test of InternationalShoe is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of
each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite "affiliating circumstances" are present."
128. 296 N.C. at 516, 251 S.E.2d at 614.
129. Id. at 517, 251 S.E.2d at 615.
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quently, the promissory note signed by Lawrence Coleman
individually was part of an "ongoing relationship" between him and
plaintiff rather than a mere casual or fortuitous contact with the
state. 130 The note, the court stated, evidenced Lawrence Coleman's
continuing efforts to secure plaintiff as a regular supplier of merchandise for his shoe stores. Because of this ongoing relationship, the court
considered it fair and reasonable 3to1 require Lawrence to defend this
suit in the North Carolina courts.1
In contrast, the court held that Morton Coleman's signing of his
promissory note constituted an "isolated, fortuitous contact" with
plaintiff. Because Morton could derive no financial benefit, either direct or indirect, from the note, 32 the court concluded that he could not
be said to have purposefully invoked the benefits and protection of
North Carolina's laws and that his right to due process would be violated if he were required to appear in North Carolina.
In holding that North Carolina could not assert jurisdiction over
Morton Coleman, the court explicitly rejected the McDaniel rule as applied by the court of appeals. The McDanieldecision was an extension
of suggestions by the United States Supreme Court that jurisdiction
33
may be based on a single contract with a resident of the forum state.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, correctly observed that
per se rules like the one adopted in McDaniel are inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's requirement that the facts and circumstances of each
case be examined carefully to determine whether an assertion of jurisdiction conforms
to "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
3 4
justice."'1
The court's conclusion that an assertion of jurisdiction over Morton Coleman would offend those "traditional notions" is a reasonable
one. Although many courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have predicated in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident on
a single contract with a resident of the forum state, additional factors in
130. Id. at 515, 251 S.E.2d at 614.
131. Id at 516, 251 S.E.2d at 615.
132. See note 116 supra.
133. The court of appeals in McDanielrelied heavily on McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957), in which the Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant on the basis of a single insurance contract with a resident of the forum state. In McGee
defendant insurance company had solicited a reinsurance contract with a California resident. Defendant had no office or agents in California, and insured no other California residents. Nevertheless, the Court held that the contract had a "substantial connection" with the state and upheld
the California court's assertion of jurisdiction. Id. at 223.
134. 296 N.C. at 518, 551 S.E.2d at 615.
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these situations have always been relied upon to make the assertion of
jurisdiction conform to constitutional standards.1 35 When, as here, additional "affiliating circumstances"'' 36 are not present, the inconvenience to defendant of having to come to North Carolina to defend a
of the state and the plaintiff in resolving
lawsuit outweighs the interests
137
the dispute within the state.
Although the court in Coleman found additional affiliating circumstances in the relationship between Lawrence Coleman and North
Carolina; those additional factors consisted entirely of Lawrence's acts
as agent of the shoe company, which acts the court imputed to him
138
personally. This imputation, although supported by some authority,
is by no means indisputable. Courts that have been faced with the
question whether it is fair to impute a person's acts as a corporate agent
to him personally in order to establish in personam jurisdiction over
him appear to have split; 39 some have adhered strictly to the rule that
jurisdiction over an individual may not be predicated upon jurisdiction
over a corporation, 140 while others have been willing to pierce141the corporate veil and balance the interests of the parties involved.
135. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the Supreme Court noted several factors that
had been important in its decision in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
The Court stressed that defendant had solicited the contract with the California resident, that the
contract had been accepted in California, that all premiums had been mailed from California, and
that California had, through regulatory legislation, expressed a strong state interest in providing
its citizens with legal recourse against nonresident insurers. 357 U.S. at 251-52.
In cases factually similar to Coleman, other courts, in asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, have stressed, in addition to the existence of a contract between defendant and a resident of the forum state, factors such as previous business dealings between the parties, Standard
Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. W. Finance, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Gubitosi v.
Buddy Schoellkopf Prods. Inc., 545 S.W.2d 528 (rex. Civ. App. 1976); solicitation by defendant,
O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971); and execution or payment of the
note in the forum state, Federal Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Shawnee v. Moon, 412 F. Supp. 644
(W.D.Okla. 1976); Einhorn v. Home State Savings Ass'n, 256 So. 2d 57 (Fla. App. 1971).
136. See note 127 supra.
137. See generall,, Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. at 92.
138. See cases cited note 141 infra.
139. But see note 139 infra.
140. See, e.g., Spelling-Goldberg Prods. v. Bodek & Rhodes, 452 F. Supp. 452, 454 (E.D. Pa.
1978) ("Establishing personal jurisdiction over an individual on the basis of 'doing business' requires that the evidence show ...that the business was done by the individual for himself and
not for or on behalf of his corporation."); Feld v. Tele-view, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1100, 1104 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) ("[A]n individual's transaction of business solely as an officer or agent of a corporation
does not create personal jurisdiction over that individual."); Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc. v. Birenbaum, 389 F. Supp. 798, 803-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aft'd, 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[A]n individual's transaction of business within the state solely as an officer of a corporation does not create
personal jurisdiction over that individual.").
141. See, e.g., Costin v. Olen, 449 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1971) (individual defendant held to be
alter ego of corporation); Odell v. Signer, 169 So. 2d 851 (Fla. App. 1964) (individual defendants
held subject to liability for their corporate acts, corporate acts could therefore be imputed to them
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The Coleman court followed the latter approach; however, it limited its consideration of defendant's corporate acts to situations in
which "defendant is a principal shareholder of the corporation and
conducts business in North Carolina as principal agent for the corporation." '4 2 The court further limited its holding by stating that corporate
acts may be imputed to an individual defendant only for the purpose of
43
determining the sufficiency of defendant's contacts with the state.
This limitation makes it clear that the court is not imposing liability on
defendant for his acts as corporate agent. It is merely stating that if
defendant's actions as an individual bring him within the scope of the
long-arm statute, the court may consider all of his actions, including
those on behalf of his corporation, in its inquiry into the constitutional
validity of requiring defendant to come to North Carolina to defend
the lawsuit. 44
The court's holding, so limited, is clearly correct. It would have
been unfair to allow Lawrence Coleman to hide behind his role as
agent of his own corporation in order to avoid the reach of the North
Carolina courts. Because the corporate acts of an individual who is
president and controlling shareholder of a corporation will inure
largely to his own benefit, a substantial identity exists between his interests and those of the corporation. It is only reasonable to take those
corporate acts into account in determining whether, based on all defendant's contacts with the state, it is fair to require him to defend a
lawsuit in North Carolina.
In the wake of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heiner' 5 that all assertions of jurisdiction by state courts must
conform to the due process standards set forth in InternationalShoe Co.
for purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over them); Hunter-Hayes Elevator Co. v. Petroleum Club
Inn Co., 77 N.M. 92, 419 P.2d 465 (1966) (individual defendants subject to personal jurisdiction
for guaranteeing debt of corporation).
142. 296 N.C. at 515, 251 S.E.2d at 614.
143. Id.
144. It is not unlikely that even the courts that have followed the strict rule, see note 140 and
accompanying text supra, would approve of this approach. In asserting that jurisdiction over an
individual may not be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation, those courts focused on the
question whether the corporate acts of the individual defendants brought them within the scope of
the state's long-arm statutes. Because the courts decided that the statutes did not apply to an
individual defendant for his acts as agent of a corporation, they did not reach the question
whether an application of the statute would violate the defendant's right to due process. In Coleman, on the other hand, the court first explicitly held that the long-arm statute encompassed
Lawrence Coleman's individual act of endorsing the promissory note and then examined the totality of his contacts with North Carolina in its minimum contacts analysis. 296 N.C. at 518, 551
S.E.2d at 615.

145. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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v. Washington, 46 considerable doubt has been raised about the continued viability of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 47 The North Carolina Court
of Appeals, in the recent decision of Holt v. Holt,148 expressed its view
that, in particular circumstances, quasi in rem jurisdiction is still a legitimate means by which the state may compel nonresidents to come
into its courts. The court in Holt held that quasi in rem jurisdiction can
be constitutionally asserted when a defendant owns real estate in North
Carolina and this real estate bears "some relation" to the underlying
controversy between the parties.
Plaintiff in Holt alleged that defendant failed to make alimony
and child support payments as ordered by a Missouri divorce decree
previously obtained by the parties. She also alleged that defendant had
several other outstanding obligations arising out of the parties' separation agreement. Neither plaintiff nor defendant lived in North Carolina at the time of the separation agreement or divorce decree, and
neither lived in North Carolina at the time of the suit. The parties had
jointly owned some real estate in North Carolina prior to their divorce,
however, and, at the time of the suit, defendant owned real estate in
North Carolina that he had purchased soon after the divorce. 149 Plaintiff sought judgment against defendant in North Carolina for accrued
alimony and child support as well as the obligations owed her pursuant
to the separation agreement, and procured an order of attachment
against defendant's real property in North Carolina pursuant to G.S.
1-440.2.150
The court of appeals construed plaintiff's attachment proceeding
as an attempt to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction over defendant 5 and
146. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a discussion of these standards, see notes 125-27 and accompanying text supra.
147. Several commentators have questioned whether, if minimum contacts must be established in any event, quasi in rem jurisdiction serves any further useful purpose. See, e.g., Casad,
Shaffer v. Heitner: An Endto Ambivalence in JurisdictionTheory?, 26 U. KAN. L. REv. 61 (1977);
Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court's Latest Last Words on State CourtJurisdiction,26
EMORY L.J. 739 (1977); Moore, ProceduralDue Process in Quasi in Rem Actions Afler Shaffer v.
Heiner,20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 157 (1978); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Endof an Era,
53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 33 (1978).
148. 41 N.C. App. 344, 255 S.E.2d 407 (1979).
149. Id. at 345, 255 S.E.2d at 408.
150. ld. at 345, 255 S.E.2d at 408. G.S. 1-440.2 provides for a proceeding to attach property in
order "to secure a judgment for money, or in any action for alimony or for maintenance and
support, or an action for the support of a minor child." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.2 (1969).
151. The court stated that "the basis of the court's jurisdiction must rest on plaintiff's proceeding to attach defendant's realty under G.S. 1-440.1 in order to give the court jurisdiction quasiin
rem. . . ." 41 N.C. App. at 352, 255 S.E.2d at 412. G.S. 1-440.1(c) sets forth an exception to the
general rule that no personal judgment can be entered against a defendant unless the court has
personal jurisdiction over him. It states that "[a]lthough there is no personal service on the de-
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recognized that Shaffer controlled the validity of such assertions. 15 2 In
applying Shaffer, the court relied on its previous interpretation of that
decision in Balcon, Inc. v. Sadlerl'5 3 in which the court, pursuant to
suggestions in the Shaffer decision,154 indicated that "[w]here real
property has some relation to the controversy," the state's interest in
controlling real estate within its borders coupled with defendant's substantial relationship with the forum in connection with that real estate
should support jurisdiction.155 The Holt court followed the Balcon rule
that if the realty in question has "some relation" to the controversy, its
presence alone can be an adequate minimum contact to satisfy Shaf56

fer. 1

Conceding that no direct relationship existed between the real
property owned by defendant in North Carolina and the Missouri separation agreement and divorce decree, 57 the court nevertheless found
that defendant's ownership of North Carolina real estate bore "some
relation" to the controversy, thereby satisfying the minimum contacts
test and supporting jurisdiction over defendant.' 58 The court based its
conclusion on several factors. First, the court noted that one purpose of
the prior divorce action was to determine the property rights of the
parties, 159 and that the North Carolina action could therefore be regarded as a continuation of the Missouri litigation. Viewed in this
fendant. . . and although he does not make a general appearance, judgment may be rendered in
an action in which property of the defendant has been attached. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.1(c)
(1969).
Neither the record nor plaintiffs briefs indicate, however, that she intended to employ a quasi
in rem theory. Defendant appears to have created the jurisdiction issue in his motion to dismiss,
in which he alleged that plaintiff was proceeding pursuant to G.S. 1-75.8 and 1-75.9, which provide for the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction by attachment of a defendant's property. Record
at 28.
152. 41 N.C. App. at 348, 255 S.E.2d at 410.
153. 36 N.C. App. 322, 244 S.E.2d 164 (1978).
154. In Shaffer, the Supreme Court noted that, while the mere presence in a state of property
owned by a defendant would not support that state's assertion of jurisdiction, the presence of the
property might suggest the existence of other ties capable of supporting such an assertion. Elaborating on this point, the Court suggested that "when claims to the property itself are the source of
the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the
State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction." 433 U.S. at 207.
155. 41 N.C. App. at 352, 255 S.E.2d at 412. In Balcon the court of appeals applied Shafer to
a situation in which a nonresident plaintiff attached real property owned by a nonresident defendant in North Carolina in order to collect on a debt owing from an account that arose in Margland.
Because the "controversy had no relation to the realty," the court refused to uphold jurisdiction.
36 N.C. App. at 326, 244 S.E.2d at 167.
156. 41 N.C. App. at 352, 255 S.E.2d at 412.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 352-53, 255 S.E.2d at 412-13.
159. Id. at 352, 255 S.E.2d at 412.
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light, defendant's real estate in North Carolina related to the overall
controversy. Next, the court pointed out that defendant purchased his
North Carolina real estate less than a month after he was ordered to
begin making payments to plaintiff and that those payments ceased the
following month. 6 0 The court surmised that defendant chose to spend
a large part of his income on his North Carolina property instead of
making payments under the Missouri divorce decree. Finally, the court
took notice of the parties' former joint ownership of real property in
North Carolina. 61 Although this property had no relation to the present litigation, the court considered it an additional contact between defendant and the state.
While the factors noted by the court suggest a connection between
defeAdant and North Carolina, the Holt decision is unsatisfactory in
that it fails to justify its invocation of quasi in rem rather than in personam jurisdiction. The court's holding that minimum contacts existed
between defendant and the state should have warranted an assertion of
in personam jurisdiction according to the Shaffer doctrine, but the
court clearly stated its view that jurisdiction over defendant must be
quasi in rem. 162 While the court may have felt, as does at least one
commentator, 163 that the test for minimum contacts in a quasi in rem
action is less stringent than in a strict in personam action, the decision
gives no indication that the court made such an assumption.
The court also failed to address the question whether a judgment
recovered by plaintiff would be limited to the value of defendant's
property in the state. 164 A traditional quasi in rem judgment would be
so limited, and if the court applies a relaxed minimum contacts test this
limitation would continue to be appropriate. However, if the court has
found contacts sufficient to invoke in personam jurisdiction, and has
simply labeled it quasi in rem, a limitation of plaintiffs recovery to,the
value of defendant's North Carolina property would be incongruous.
Another weakness in the decision, discussed by Judge Clark in his
160. Id. at 352-53, 255 S.E.2d at 412-13.
161. Id. at 353, 255 S.E.2d at 413.
162. See note 151 supra.
163. See Moore, supra note 147, at 183.
164. See generally Moore, supra note 147, at 184:
The existence within a state of property owned by a defendant may give rise to sufficient
expectations or duties of the defendant to justify requiring him to defend a suit, at least
Principles of fairness may not be ofto the extent of the value of the property ...
fended if the judgment is limited to the value ofthe property, though the contacts may be
insufficient to justify the imposition of general liability.
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dissent,165 is the court's failure to explain why it is fair to require defendant to defend this lawsuit in North Carolina when a more appropriate forum exists. Although the majority expressed its concern that
defendant might be able to completely avoid his obligations ifjurisdiction were not asserted in North Carolina, 66 no apparent reason exists
why plaintiff could not obtain relief in the courts of Missouri. A final
Missouri judgment establishing that defendant owed plaintiff a sum
certain could be enforced in the courts of North Carolina under the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution 67 without raising any jurisdictional problems. The majority mentioned this approach, but dismissed it as an alternative and totally distinct means by which plaintiff
could obtain relief.168 It seems, however, that the availability of a more
efficient resolution of the controversy ought to be an important factor
in the court's due process analysis. Although it is not necessary that
North Carolina be the most appropriate forum for due process to be
satisfied, 69 fairness to defendant and the "orderly administration of the
170
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure"'
requires that the existence of a more appropriate forum be considered.
In another jurisdictional development, the North Carolina legislature responded to a request by the court of appeals to resolve an inconsistency 7 ' between the statute of limitations tolling provision of G.S. 121 172 and the state's long arm statute, G.S. 1-75.4.' 73 Under of G.S. 121, the applicable statute of limitations was tolled whenever a defendant was absent from the state, even if the defendant was subject to
165. 41 N.C. App. 344, 356, 255 S.E.2d 407, 414 (Clark, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 354, 255 S.E.2d at 413.
167. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 210 n.36.
168. 41 N.C. App. at 347, 255 S.E.2d at 409.
169. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsen, 100 S.Ct. 559, 582 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting): "[T]he Constitution does not require that trial be held in the State which has the 'best
contacts' with the defendant."
170. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319.
171. See Duke Univ. v. Chestnut, 28 N.C. App. 568, 221 S.E.2d 895 (1976). The court in
Duke noted the inconsistency but declined to amend G.S. 1-21 by judicial decree. The court
applied the tolling statute despite defendant's amenability to process in North Carolina during the
time he Was absent. Id. at 571-72, 221 S.E.2d at 898.
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-21 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides:
If when the cause of action accrues or judgment is rendered or docketed against a person, he is out of the State, action may be commenced, or judgment enforced within the
times herein limited after the return of the person into this State, and if, after such cause
of action accrues or judgment is rendered or docketed, such person departs from and
resides out of this State, or remains continuously absent therefrom for one year or more,
the time of his absence shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement of
the action or the enforcement of the judgment.
173. Id.§ 1-75.4 (1969).
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process under the long arm statute. The legislature amended G.S. 1-21
to provide that it "shall not apply to the extent that a court of this State
over the person under the provihas or continues to have jurisdiction
'' 4
sions of the long arm statute. 1
The purpose of this tolling statute is to prevent a defendant from
avoiding a lawsuit by removing himself from the state.'7 5 When a defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the North Carolina courts
notwithstanding his absence from the state, however, there is no reason
to deny him the protection of the statute of limitations or to permit a
plaintiff to delay bringing his claim.' 76 This amendment is therefore a
reasonable resolution of the77conflict and brings North Carolina in line
with the majority of states.'

F

Summary Judgment

In Moore v. FieldcrestMills, Inc.,178 the supreme court held that
when a defendant's motion for summary judgment is supported by affidavits showing a lack of negligence on his part and the credibility of
the affiants is not in question, summary judgment is appropriate if the
plaintiff fails to raise an issue of material fact in response.17 9 This decision overrules sub silentio the holding of the court of appeals in Goode
v. Tait, Inc.' s0 that summary judgment should be granted only when
the moving party affirmatively shows not only that, based on the evidence presented in support of the motion, he is entitled to judgment,
but also that the opposing party could not possibly present other evidence from which a jury could reach a different conclusion as to a material fact.' 81
In Goode, a negligence action, defendant moved for summary
judgment on the basis of a deposition of plaintiff that indicated a lack
of negligence on the part of defendant. Although plaintiff submitted no
evidence in response, the court of appeals held that because other evidence of defendant's negligence could be presented at trial, a material
174. Law of May 8, 1979, ch. 525, § 1, 1979 Sess. Laws 543 (codified at N.C. GEN.
21 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
175. Broadfoot v. Everett, 270 N.C. 429, 432, 154 S.E.2d 522, 525 (1967).
176. See generally 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1041 (1976).
177. See id. at 1045-46.
178. 296 N.C. 467, 251 S.E.2d 419 (1979).
179. Id. at 474, 251 S.E.2d at 424.
180. 36 N.C. App. 268, 243 S.E.2d 404 (1978).
181. Id. at 270, 243 S.E.2d at 406.

STAT. §
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issue still existed and defendant's motion could therefore not be
granted.
The supreme court in Moore implicitly rejected the court of appeals' approach in Goode, which in effect required a defendant to conclusively prove his lack of negligence before summary judgment could
be entered in his favor. Without mentioning Goode, the Moore court
made it clear that Rule 56 of the rules of civil procedure8 2 does not
require a defendant to meet such a heavy burden.18 3 In a fact situation
almost identical to that of Goode,184 the Moore court noted that the
rule requires only that the moving party demonstrate that no issue of
material fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The court concluded that because the depositions offered by defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment established
their lack of negligence, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law "unless forestalled by a forecast of evidence by plaintiff sufficient to counter the effect" of the depositions. 5 Plaintiff offered no
evidence in response to defendant's motion, and the court entered judgment against plaintiff.
Clearly, plaintiff could have produced other evidence of defendant's negligence at trial; the court, however, held that if plaintiff failed
to produce such evidence at the appropriate time, summary judgment
should be entered against him. This holding is consistent with the purpose of the summary judgment procedure, which is to eliminate formal
trials when only questions of law are involved and to dispose of unfounded claims when fatal weaknesses in them are revealed.' 86 If a
plaintiff is unable to present any evidence to support his claim when
challenged to do so by his opponent's summary judgment motion, it is
unlikely that any evidence will be forthcoming at a trial of the claim.
Accordingly, the action should be dismissed at the earliest possible
stage of the litigation.
The court of appeals applied Moore in Middleton v. Meyers, 8 7 a
tort action for malicious prosecution. Defendant moved for summary
182. N.C.R. Civ. P. 56.
183. For a comparison of the holdings, see Middleton v. Meyers, 41 N.C. App. 543, 547, 255
S.E.2d 255, 257 (1979), discussed at text accompanying notes 78-79 infra.
184. Plaintiff in Goode was injured when a stack of water pumps and tanks he was unloading
fell against him, and plaintiff in Moore was injured when bales of fiber he was unloading fell on
him. In both cases plaintiff testified by deposition that he did not know what caused the piles to
fall.
185. 296 N.C. at 473, 251 S.E.2d at 423.
186. Id. at 470, 251 S.E.2d at 422.
187. 41 N.C. App. 543, 255 S.E.2d 255 (1979).
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judgment, offering evidence of his good faith and lack of malice. Plaintiff, relying on Goode, claimed that defendant had failed to show that
no other evidence could be produced to establish malice, and defendant's motion must therefore be denied. The court rejected this contention, however, and followed the supreme court's guidelines as set forth
in Moore. The court in Middleton held that because a showing of malice is an essential element of an action for malicious prosecution, the
burden shifted to plaintiff to make an affirmative showing that a material issue of fact existed on that element. Ruling that, as a matter of
law, plaintiff's showing was inadequate to raise an issue of fact, the
court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 8 This result is consistent with the Moore decision and with the spirit of rule 56.
BARRY JAMES SOBERING
PETER WILLIAM SHEIL

188. Id. at 547, 255 S.E.2d at 257.

III.

A.

COMMERCIAL LAW

Contracts

When awarding damages in breach of contract actions, North Carolina courts have generally followed the rule that only those damages
which were "foreseeable" by the parties when they contracted are compensable.' Plaintiffs generally have not been allowed to recover for alleged mental anguish on the grounds that such damages are too remote
to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time of contract. u The courts have recognized a line of exceptions, however, and
awarded damages for mental anguish resulting from the breach of burial3 and marriage4 contracts. The accepted rule is that damages for
mental anguish will be awarded in cases where the contract was "personal" in nature, and one party's duty was "so coupled with matters of
mental concern or solicitude. .. " that a breach of that duty rendered
mental anguish foreseeable.' The North Carolina Supreme Court recently reexamined this rule in Stanback v. Stanback.6
Stanback was an action for damages resulting from the breach of a
supplementary provision to a separation agreement.' Under the contract plaintiff-wife agreed to pay her attorneys' fees on the condition
that defendant-husband reimburse her by increasing four of his periodic separation payments by 25% of the total legal fees paid by his
wife.8 In addition, the husband agreed that if the wife was not allowed
a deduction for the attorneys' fees on her 1968 federal and state income
tax returns, he would pay the resulting increase in the wife's taxes. 9
The dispute arose when the IRS disallowed the wife's deduction for
attorneys' fees and the husband failed to pay her tax deficiency.' 0
1. See Seymour v. W.S. Boyd Sales Co., 257 N.C. 603, 127 S.E.2d 265 (1962); Price v.
Goodman, 226 N.C. 223, 37 S.E.2d 592 (1946).
2. See Carroll v. Rountree, 34 N.C. App. 167, 237 S.E.2d 566 (1977). Courts have held that
mental anguish damages are less likely to be foreseen by the parties in "pecuniary" as opposed to
"personal" contracts, thus have often referred to the "pecuniary" nature of the contract rather
than the lack of foreseeability as grounds for rejecting such claims. See general/v, McCoRMICK,
DAMAGES § 145, at 592 (1935).
3. Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949).
4. Allen v. Baker, 86 N.C. 91 (1882).
5. Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. at 14, 55 S.E.2d at 813.
6. 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
7. Id at 183, 254 S.E.2d at 614.
8. Id
9. 1d
10. Id Plaintiffwas forced to borrow the sum needed to pay the deficiency, but was unable
to repay the loan. At the time of the complaint her home was the subject of a foreclosure action
by the private lender. Id at 186, 254 S.E.2d at 616.
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When the wife could not afford to pay the additional tax assessment,
the IRS filed a tax lien against her home, levied, and published a formal notice of sale."
Plaintiff alleged that she suffered "great mental anguish and anxiety""2 as a result of public knowledge of her tax deficiency, and that
consequential damages of that nature were within the contemplation of
the parties when the separation agreement was made. 3 The trial court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss the part of the complaint seeking
recovery for mental anguish' 4 and the court of appeals affirmed. 5 The
court of appeals, citing the rule that damages for mental anguish resulting from the breach of pecuniary contracts are not recoverable,' 6 concluded that the disputed separation provision was "commercial" rather
than "personal" in nature.' 7 Although plaintiffs complaint alleged
that the parties contemplated consequential mental anguish damages,
the court held that the very nature of the contract prohibited recov8
ery.'

On appeal, the supreme court thoroughly reviewed North Carolina cases on the mental anguish issue and scrutinized the standards
adopted in other jurisdictions. t9 While the court acknowledged the

policy argument for limiting contractual risk by awarding damages
11.

Id

12. Id at 186, 254 S.E.2d at 616.

13. Id at 184, 254 S.E.2d at 615. Plaintiff alleged that actions taken by the IRS to foreclose
the tax lien
were given publicity in the local media thereby causing her to suffer great embarrassment, humiliation, and degradation in the eyes of her friends and the public in that "this
information has been interpreted by the members of the public as indicating that she has
failed to pay taxes which were justly due the Internal Revenue Service and indicating a
lack of public responsibility and personal integrity" .
Id at 186, 254 S.E.2d at 616.
14. Id at 184, 254 S.E.2d at 615. In addition to the mental anguish claim, plaintiff sought
recovery for actual damages equal to the amount of the tax deficiency and the punitive damages.
She also joined a claim for "abuse of process" by defendant resulting from a related action. The
actual damages issue was not disputed. The court's disposition of the abuse of process and punitive damage claims will not be discussed.
15. 37 N.C. App. 324, 246 S.E.2d 74 (1978).
16. Id at 328, 246 S.E.2d at 78.
17. Id at 330, 246 S.E.2d at 79. The court referred to the contractual provision as a "tax
arrangement," stressing that they were not holding that a separation agreement provision could
never be "personal" in nature. Id
18. Id Plaintiffs claim that by its very nature a separation agreement contemplates mental
anguish damages was rejected. It is thus apparent that the separation agreement was not viewed
by the court as an agreement "coupled with matters of mental concern or solicitude, or with the
sensibilities of the party to whom the duty is owed.... " so as to automatically indicate that the
parties contemplated mental anguish damages upon breach. Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10,
15, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1949) (burial contract). See also Allen v. Baker, 86 N.C. 91 (1882).
19. 297 N.C. at 189-94, 254 S.E.2d at 617-20. See F. Becker Asphaltum Co. v. Murphy, 224
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only for injuries that are clearly foreseeable, it also recognized that special situations arise in which unusual damages are not unreasonably
remote, either because of information communicated between the parties or because of the knowledge of the breaching party at the time of
contracting.20 In an attempt to clarify prior case law and state a workable standard for evaluating a claim for mental anguish damages in a
contract action, the Stanback court concluded that such a claim is not
valid unless plaintiffs complaint shows:
First, that the contract was not one concerned with trade and commerce with concomitant elements of profit involved. Second, that the
contract was one in which the benefits contracted for were other than
pecuniary, ie., one in which pecuniary interests were not the dominant motivating factor in the decision to contract. And third, the
contract must be one in which the benefits contracted for relate drect0, to matters of dignity, mental concern or solicitude, or the sensibilities of the party to whom the duty is owed, and which directl
involves interests and emotions recognized by all as involving great
probability of resulting mental anguish if not respected. 21
Applying the three elements to the case before it, the court found
that the disputed separation agreement provision clearly was not one
concerned with trade or commerce or elements of profit. 22 The complaint, however, failed the second and third tests. Plaintiff's pecuniary
interest in assuring herself either an income tax deduction for her legal
expenses or an equivalent increase in settlement payments was found to
be the "motivating factor in the decision to enter into the contract. 23
The agreement also was not one relating directly to matters of mental
concern or the interests and emotions of the plaintiff.24 The court

therefore declared the claim for mental anguish damages properly dismissed.25
In limiting recovery for mental anguish to contracts directly related to "personal" factors, the Stanback court rejected a more liberal
approach taken in other jurisdictions.26 California, for example, has
Ala. 655, 141 So. 630 (1932); Westervelt v. McCullough, 68 Cal. App. 198, 228 P. 734 (1924);

Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957).
20. 297 N.C. at 187, 254 S.E.2d at 616. See also Troitino v. Goodman, 225 N.C. 406, 35
S.E.2d 277 (1945).
21. 297 N.C. at 194, 254 S.E.2d at 620 (emphasis in original).
22. Id at 195, 254 S.E.2d at 621.
23. Id
24. Id
25. Id at 195-96, 254 S.E.2d at 621.
26. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967);
Mitchell v. Shreveport Laundries, 61 So.2d 539 (La. Ct. of App. 1952). These courts recognized
that a contract may be primarily concerned with trade, commerce or pecuniary benefits, yet still
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established a standard allowing mental anguish damages when the
breached contract relates to "matters which concern directly the comfort, happiness, or personal welfare of one of the parties. '27 The North
Carolina Supreme Court viewed this rule as overly broad and adhered

to a more restrictive standard of foreseeability when considering recovery for mental anguish in breach of contract cases.28 Thus, Stanback's

primary significance lies in the court's apparent elimination of the possibility of recovery for mental anguish damages when a breached con29
tract contains significant commercial or pecuniary attributes,

although it also is personal in nature.
B.

The Uniform Commercial Code

1. Negotiable Instruments
Two cases reached the North Carolina appellate courts in 1979
concerning forged indorsement of checks. In IFCO v. Southern Na3" plaintiff IFCO, a financier of insurtional Bank of North Carolina,
ance premiums, delivered presigned checks to one Clamp, who was
instructed to fill in the name of an insurance company as payee and
deliver the check to that company. 3 IFCO also had an agreement with
contain elements of a personal nature that make mental anguish a foreseeable consequence of
breach.
27. Westervelt v. McCullough, 68 Cal. App. 198, 208-09, 228 P. 734, 738 (1924). The Westervelt court reasoned that:
Whenever the terms of a contract relate to matters which concern directly the comfort,
happiness, or personal welfare of one of the parties, or the subject-matter of which is
such as directly to affect or move the affection, self-esteem, or tender feelings of that
party, he may recover damages for physical suffering or illness proximately caused by its
breach.
Id
28. 297 N.C. at 194, 254 S.E.2d at 620. The Stanback court did not address the question
whether physical injury is a necessary element for recovery of mental anguish damages upon
breach of contract. That it did not include this element in its list of essential items for a cause of
action indicates actual physical manifestation of harm is not required. Absent such a requirement,
mental anguish damages for breach of contract may be more readily available than mental
anguish damages in a tort action. Under tort law, the long-standing rule in North Carolina is that
recovery for mental anguish will not be allowed unless accompanied by a physical injury. See,
e.g., Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960); Byrd, Recovery for Mental
Anguish in North Carolina,58 N.C.L. Rev. 435 (1980). The courts, however, have defined "physical injury" so broadly that one commentator has speculated that recovery inay be allowed in any
case in which significant and genuine mental or emotional harm is established. Id at 458.
29. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
30. 42 N.C. App. 499, 256 S.E.2d 825, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 568, 261 S.E.2d 122 (1979).
31. Id at 500, 256 S.E.2d at 825. Clamp was apparently an insurance agent who sold policies
under a premium-financing arrangement. The lump-sum premium was paid to the insurance
company by IFCO, who was repaid in periodic payments by the policy holder. Record at 34-36.
IFCO gave Clamp authority to enter the name of the insurance company issuing the policy on a
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Southern National Bank, the drawer, that allowed an agent of IFCO to

inspect and approve each check completed by Clamp and presented to
the bank for payment.3 2 The dispute arose when Clamp filled in the
name of an unauthorized payee on a series of IFCO checks, forged the

payee's indorsement, and deposited the checks in his personal account.3 3 IFCO inspected the checks when they were presented to the
drawee bank and authorized payment. 4

Upon discovering Clamp's unauthorized actions and its own mistaken approval of the checks, IFCO demanded restitution from Southern National.3 5 When the bank refused, IFCO filed suit, claiming that

defendant breached its duty to IFCO, which was to make payment on
checks drawn by plaintiff only when those checks bore the genuine indorsement of the payee.36

Southern National defended on two

grounds, that IFCO's prior inspection and approval of each check estopped it from disputing defendant's subsequent payment, and that

Clamp, who indorsed the checks, was IFCO's agent and authorized to
so act, thus rendering the indorsements genuine and binding upon
IFCO. 37 The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and the court of appeals affirmed, barring plaintiff from seeking
reimbursement for payment of the checks because of its prior inspection and approval.3" The only authority cited by the court was dictum
from a previous supreme court case in which drawer specifically re-

quested his drawee bank to make payment on a particular check.3 9 In
check presigned by IFCO. Clamp would then forward the check, equal to the full premium due,
to the payee-insurance company. 42 N.C. App. at 500, 256 S.E.2d at 825.
32. Id at 500, 256 S.E.2d at 826.
33. Id
34. Id
35. IFCO alleged that Clamp improperly deposited 106 checks, totalling $45,097.56, into his
personal account. Record at 4-7.
36. Plaintiff IFCO apparently based its theory of defendant's duty upon N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-4-401(1) (1965), which provides that "as against its customer, a bank may charge against his
account any item which is otherwise properly payable from that account even though the charge
creates an overdraft." Plaintiff argued that a check presented to a drawee bank bearing a forged
indorsement of a payee was not "properly payable" by the bank.
IFCO also argued on appeal that in paying the checks defendant bank "breached its warranty
and duty to Plaintiff depositor to pay only in conformity with its order." Brief for Plaintiff at 2.
This theory of defendant's duty is apparently drawn from specific contract provisions, as the Uniform Commercial Code contains no such language.
37. Brief for Defendant at 7-22.
38. 42 N.C. App. at 501, 256 S.E.2d at 826.
39. Modem Homes Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank & Trust Co., 266 N.C. 648, 657, 147 S.E.2d
37,44(1969). In Modern Homes, plaintiff was the legitimate payee of a check drawn on defendant
bank. When the check was presented to defendant bank by plaintiffs employee, who did not have
authority to cash or indorse the check, the drawer told defendant's employee, "[Tihis man is Modem Homes Constuction Company and you cash it for me." Id at 650, 147 S.E.2d at 39.
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that case the court held that the drawer's conduct would estop it from

later disputing the propriety of the payment.4"
While the IFCO decision is logically sound, the brief opinion is
unsatisfactory because the court failed to address several provisions of
article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) that appear directly
applicable to the IFCO fact situation. Two sections of the UCC war-

ranted consideration by the court. The first pertinent section provides
that "(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee
is effective if. . .(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has
supplied him with the name of the payee intending the latter to have no
such interest."'" Under G.S. 25-3-405(l)(c), when a forged indorsement is "effective," the drawer is precluded from denying the authenticity of the indorsement. 42 Applicability of this section to the IFCO
facts turns on whether Clamp could be considered IFCO's "agent".
While "agent," is not defined in the UCC, the term is well defined in
North Carolina case law and generally includes anyone who "undertakes to transact some business or manage some affairs" for the account

of another.

3

A convincing argument could be made that Clamp was

40. The 1FCO court did not expressly state that it was relying upon a theory of estoppel. It
quoted, however, the following dictum from the Modern Homes case as a basis for its holding:
"[I]t
is clear that drawer's conduct in advising and requesting the Bank to make payment...
would have estopped drawer in any subsequent suit against the Bank." 42 N.C. App. at 501, 256
S.E.2d at 826 (quoting Modem Homes Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank & Trust Co., 266 N.C. at 657,
147 S.E.2d at 44). See note 39 supra. For a discussion of the principle of equitable estoppel, see
generally, Hamilton v. Hamilton, 296 N.C. 574, 251 S.E.2d 441 (1979); Boddie v. Bond, 154 N.C.
359, 70 S.E. 824 (1911); 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 59 (1964 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-405(l)(c) (1965).
42. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 16-8, at 632-33 (2d ed. 1980).
When applicable this paragraph contains, in effect, a conclusive presumption that the drawer of a
check was negligent in allowing his agent or employee to provide the name of a fictitious payee.
There is authority for the position that § 3-405(l)(c) does not apply if the forged check is made to
a payee who actually has a bona fide claim against the drawer. Id at 636. See Snug Harbor
Realty Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 105 N.J. Super. 572, 253 A.2d 581, aft'd, 54 N.J. 95, 253 A.2d 545
(1969). In IFCO, however, American States Insurance Company, the payee of the disputed
checks, had no claim against IFCO.
The IFCO case is analagous to an example presented in the UCC's official comments to
illustrate the application of § 3-405(l)(c). That example involves an employee who pads the payroll of his employer by adding the name of P, an actual person. The employee, who never intended P to have an interest in the check, forges P's indorsement and deposits the check in his own
account. The indorsement "in the name of P is effective and the loss falls on the [employerj."
U.C.C. § 3-405, Official Comment 4(b).
43. SNML Corp. v. Bank of North Carolina, 41 N.C. App. 28, 36, 254 S.E.2d 274, 279, cert.
denied, 298 N.C. 204 (1979):
An agent is one who, by the authority of another, undertakes to transact some business
or manage some affairs on account of such other, and to render an account of it. He is a
substitute, or deputy, appointed by his principal primarily to bring about business relations between the latter and third persons.
2A C.J.S. Agency § 4 (1972).
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indeed IFCO's agent, at least while pursuing the duties that gave rise to
this suit.' If so, the second requirement of G.S. 25-3-405(l)(c)-that
the agent did not intend the payee to have an interest in the instrument-is obviously met. It appears, therefore, that the IFCO court
could have relied on G.S. 25-3-405(l)(c), to render the indorsement effective and conclusively prohibit IFCO from collecting from defendant
bank. Perhaps owing to the complexity of the issue involved, or to the
difficulty of dealing with the status of Clamp, the court chose not to
rely upon this Code provision.
A second UCC provision pertinent to the IFCO decision is G.S.
25-3-406:
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a
material alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of
authority against a holder in due course or against a drawee or other
payor who pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance with
the reasonable
commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's busi45
ness.
Application of this provision to the IFCO facts would have required a showing that IFCO was negligent in giving pre-signed checks
to Clamp and that its negligence "substantially contributed" to a material alteration or an unauthorized signature. Important factual inquiries would have included examination of IFCO's past experience with
Clamp, whether IFCO acted "reasonably" in trusting him with a large
number of presigned checks, and whether its practice of delivering
blank checks to a person in Clamp's position was common in insurance
premium financing. It would be difficult for a drawee bank to convince
a court that IFCO's practice was negligent. The check-inspection
scheme set up by IFCO was to avoid forgeries. Thus, delivery of presigned checks to Clamp was arguably a reasonable business practice. A
related issue under section 3-406 is whether IFCO was negligent in failing to detect the forged indorsements. The drawee bank could argue
that once IFCO undertook the responsibility of inspecting and approving checks prior to authorizing payment, it had a duty to inspect each
one thoroughly. 6 A mere cursory examination may not be sufficient.
44. See note 35 supra.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-406 (1965).
46. "[A] party who sets up procedural safeguards and then fails to follow them may be in
more hot water than one who has no procedures at all." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 42,

at 628. See also Thompson Maple Prods., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 211 Pa. Super. Ct. 42, 234
A.2d 32 (1967). The circumstances surrounding IFCO's failure to detect the fraudulent check are
unclear from the court's opinion. Daily visits to Southern National Bank apparently were made
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But even had the court found the company negligent in its failure to
detect the fraudulent check, that the inspection came after the falsification by Clamp raises the question whether such negligence could have
"substantially contributed" to the forgery.47 The applicability of sec-

tion 3-406 to this issue is tenuous.
Any attempt to explain the IFCO court's failure to address perti-

nent U.C.C. sections is purely speculative. The court apparently felt
that the case was resolvable on general principles of common law estoppel, thus avoiding a thorough Code analysis that would have raised

several interpretation problems. The ambiguous nature of many provisions in articles 3 and 4 of the Code, howeverj calls for judicial inter-

pretation in situations of questionable application, The court of
appeals may well have reached the correct decision in this case, but its

opinion offers no guidance for a future court attempting to apply UCC
provisions in a case involving forged indorsements.
In a second forged indorsement case of 1979 the North Carolina
Supreme Court, in North CarolinaNationalBank v. Hammond,4" defined the term "good title" as used in G.S. 25-4-207,4 9 the general war-

ranty section of article 4. Hammond signed a $30,000 promissory note
and received a check drawn on the lender, North Carolina National
Bank (NCNB)." ° The check was deposited by Hammond's associate,
Daniels, in an Alabama bank indorsed "to order of Energon, Inc., M.

T. (Bill) Hammond, P.A." and "for deposit only Energon, Inc. by
Charlie T. Daniels.""1 After negotiation through a series of collecting
banks, defendant Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond presented the
by an IFCO representative to examine checks presented for payment on the IFCO account. Record at 69. A cursory examination of the checks arguably would not have fulfilled IFCO's responsibility to determine the authenticity of the items before authorizing payment by the drawee bank.
See Gresham State Bank v. 0. & K. Constr. Co., 231 Or. 106, 370 P.2d 726 (1962) (company's
cursory comparison of its accounts receivable with receipts, resulting in failure to discover diversion of company funds, held to be negligence).
The question of negligence is one for the court or jury, based on the particular facts. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-3-406, Official Comment 7 (1965).
47. While § 3-406 apparently only contemplates negligent acts that precede a forgery or alteration, that conclusion is not absolutely clear. See id., Official Comment 4. An argument could be
made that § 3-406 should also cover a situation in which IFCO's negligence in failing to discover a
forged indorsement substantially contributed to the payment of the check by drawee bank.
48. 298 N.C. 703, 260 S.E.2d 617 (1979).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-207 (1965). The court's definition of "good title" applies equally
to id. § 25-3-417.
50. 298 N.C. at 703, 260 S.E.2d at 619. NCNB was both the drawer and drawee of the check
in question.
S1. id
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check to NCNB and received payment.5 2 Hammond failed to repay
the note, and, upon suit by NCNB, alleged that his indorsement on the
check was neither genuine nor authorized. 5 3 NCNB then demanded
reimbursement from the Federal Reserve Bank,54 the last collecting
bank, alleging that if the check was forged the collecting bank did not
have "good title" to it, and had breached the warranty of good title
contemplated by G.S. 25-4-207(l)(a).5 5 The Federal Reserve Bank refused payment, and NCNB included it as a defendant.56
Plaintiff NCNB argued that the definition of "good title" contemplated by G.S. 25-4-207(l)(a) is the same as the property law concept of
title free from any "cloud" or "reasonable doubt.""7 The trial court
accepted this definition, holding that plaintiff's mere allegation of a
forged indorsement "'meant that [the Federal Reserve Bank] did not
have a marketable title, which was free from reasonable doubt.""8 Because the claim of forged indorsement was found to breach the section
4-207(l)(a) warranty, the court granted summary judgment for plain60
tiff.59 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' affirmation of

the trial court's judgment, holding that the property law definition of
"good title" is unsuited to the purposes for which section 4-207 was

52. Id
53. Id at 704, 260 S.E.2d at 619. The Federal Reserve Bank presented evidence that Hammond had joined with one Robbins to set up a mining operation called Energon, Inc. The NCNB
loan was obtained by Hammond in his own name for Energon. The Federal Reserve Bank argued that Hammond turned the check over to Robbins with express permission to indorse it and
to deposit it to Energon's account. Robbins stated that he indorsed the check as instructed, then
gave it to Daniels who also indorsed and deposited it. Hammond alleged that he had not given
Robbins permission to indorse the check, and that he had never received the $30,000. 1d at 70405, 260 S.E.2d at 619-20.
54. Id at 704, 260 S.E.2d at 619.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-207(I)(a) (1965). Section 4-207 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Each customer or collecting bank who obtains payment or acceptance of an item
and each prior customer and collecting bank warrants to the payor bank or other
payor who in good faith pays or accepts the item that
(a) he has good title to the item or is authorized to obtain payment or acceptance
on behalf of one who has a good title ....
Plaintiff NCNB mistakenly based its claim on subsection (2) of § 4-207, but could only recover
under subsection (1) because the warranties of subsection (2) do not run to payor banks from
previous customers or collecting banks. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 42, § 15-5, at
599 (citing Comment 4 to § 4-207). The court considered plaintiffs error "technical" and reviewed its claim under subsection (1). Under subsection (1)(a) a collecting bank breaches its warranty of "good title" to the payor bank by presenting an item bearing a forged indorsement that
breaks the chain of title. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 42, at 598.
56. 298 N.C. at 704, 260 S.E.2d at 619.
57. Id at 706, 260 S.E.2d at 620. See generally 21 C.J.S. Covenants § 110 (1940).
58. 298 N.C. at 705, 260 S.E.2d at 620.
59. Id.
60. 40 N.C. App. 34, 37, 252 S.E.2d 104, 106.
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designed. The court concluded that the warranty of good title under

section 4-207 "means only that a collecting bank is warranting that it is

presenting a check whose indorsements appear to be genuine." 6' Only
62
an adjudicated or uncontested forgery should trigger the warranty.
The Hammond court properly recognized that the rule announced
by the court of appeals could lead to a series of lawsuits up the collec-

tion chain whenever a forged indorsement was alleged.63 Ultimately,
the depository bank could be held liable for payment of a check with a

valid indorsement. 64 Although the depository bank could recover from

the drawee or drawer if the indorsement was ultimately found to be

valid,65 the effect of granting summary judgment on an unproven alle61. 298 N.C. at 710, 260 S.E.2d at 623. The supreme court agreed with other jurisdictions
that this specialized construction of "good title" under § 4-207 will "speed up the collection and
transfer of checks and. . . take the burden off each bank to meticulously check the indorsements
of each item transferred." Id at 711, 260 S.E.2d at 623, (citing FDIC v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 303 F.
Supp. 401, 403 (M.D. Fla. 1969), at'd,431 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1970); Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United
Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 685, 582 P.2d 920, 930 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339 (1978).
62. 298 N.C. at 708, 713, 260 S.E.2d 621, 624. The official comments to G.S. 25-4-207 refers
the reader to the comments under § 3-417, a section containing warranties nearly identical to those
in § 4-207. The commentary to § 3-417 states that: "[The warranty section] retains the generally
accepted rule that the party who accepts or pays does not 'admit' the genuineness of indorsements,
and may recover from the person presenting the instrument when they turn out to be forged."
G.S. 25-3-417, Official Comment 3. A collecting bank is not admitting strict liability but is only
warranting that the indorsements appear to be genuine. If the indorsement does prove to be
forged the collecting bank must pay the drawee bank, but can in turn sue its transferor on the
forged indorsement. 298 N.C. at 710-11, 260 S.E.2d at 623 (and cases cited therein).
63. Id at 711, 260 S.E.2d at 623. The string of suits would begin if the drawer was granted
summary judgment in a suit against its drawee on the basis of an unproven allegation of a forged
indorsement. The defendant drawee would seek reimbursement from its transferor, who would
then sue the next collecting bank down the chain, relying on § 4-207(2), and so on. The court
noted, however, that the string of suits could be avoided in the majority of jurisdictions by allowing the drawer of the check-NCNB in this case--to sue the depository bank directly. Id. at
712 n.2, 260 S.E.2d at 624 n.2 (citing Comment, Drawer v. CollectingBankfor Payment of Checks
on ForgedIndorsements-DirectSuit Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 45 Temple L.Q. 102
(1971); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 637 (1965). The court may be implying that it would allow such a
direct suit if the issue arose.
64. The last lawsuit would involve an adjudication of the validity of the controverted indorsements. The depository bank could find itself having paid the amount of the check in a summary
judgment on a previous lawsuit and then having the indorsement determined to be valid. It then
would have no right of recovery against the indorsers because the indorsement was in fact not
forged. See 298 N.C. at 711-12, 260 S.E.2d at 623-24. In Hammond the check was actually endorsed twice before deposit, first by Robbins and then by Daniels. Under those circumstances, it
would seem that the depository bank could recover from Daniels for breach of his warranty that
Robbins' signature was not forged. The warranty under § 4-207(2) runs from "each customer and
" and is not limited to collecting banks.
collecting bank who transfers an item ...
65. A determination of the indorsement's validity would presumably allow the depository
bank to renegotiate the check back through the collection chain. The court said such an attempt
may not have been successful in Hammond, owing to NCNB's stormy experience with the check
and the loan and its probable reluctance to honor the check. The conclusion that NCNB, as
drawee, could refuse to accept the check is apparently based on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-409(1)
(1965), which provides that a drawee, absent special agreement, is not liable on the instrument
until he accepts it. J. WroTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 42, § 13-9, at 410. Even an arbitrary
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gation of forgery would be an entangling snare of lawsuits and a misuse
of judicial time and resources. Thus, the court properly determined
that "unproven and contested allegations of forged endorsement are
insufficient as a matter of law to breach a warranty of good title under
G.S. 25-4-207."66
2.

Secured Transactions

In Hassell v. First Pennsylvania Bank,67 the court of appeals was
faced with a dispute between two secured creditors, each claiming a
priority interest in the debtor's property.

Seacrest Marine Corporation purchased machinery from the
Koehring Company. Koehring agreed to finance part of the purchase
price in exchange for a security interest in the machinery. 6 Koehring

perfected its interest by filing a financing statement on January 21,
1971.69 Approximately seven months later, on August 25, 1972,
Seacrest executed two notes to defendant bank, also secured by a secu-

rity interest in the machinery. 70 Defendant bank filed financing statements on the two notes in March of 1972 and January of 1973.71 In

April of 1975, Koehring obtained a judgment against Seacrest after it
failed to pay for the financed machinery. 72 The judgment was paid by
plaintiff Home Indemnity Company as surety for Seacrest and Koeh-

ring assigned its rights in the judgment and the security interest to
Home Indemnity. 73 Koehring's 1971 financing statement, perfecting
the security interest assigned to Home Indemnity lapsed on January 21,
dishonor normally creates no cause of action in the payee or the holder against the drawee. Id
The Hammondsituation,however, is unusual in that NCNB was both the drawee andthe drawer
of the check. As drawer, NCNB would be required, upon any necessary notice of dishonor or
protest, to pay the amount of the draft to the holder or any indorser who takes it up. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-3-413(2)(1965). NCNB, therefore, could not refuse to pay the amount of the check to
the depository bank. The court apparently overlooked NCNB's status as drawer.
66. 298 N.C. at 713, 260 S.E.2d at 624.
67. 41 N.C. App. 296, 254 S.E.2d 768 (1979).
68. Id at 296, 254 S.E.2d at 769. The sales contract was a purchase money security agreement. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-107 (1965).
69. 41 N.C. App. at 297, 254 S.E.2d at 769. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-9-302(l) (1965), which
provides that in most situations a financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest.
Id. § 25-9-402 sets out the necessary elements of a financing statement.
70. 41 N.C. App. at 297, 254 S.E.2d at 769. The notes totalled $1,915,000. Id
71. Id Financing statements were filed in Raleigh at the secretary of state's office in March
of 1972 and at the Beaufort County Register of Deeds' office in January of 1973. Record at 6. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-401(l) (1965).
72. 41 N.C. at 297, 254 S.E.2d at 769. The judgment was docketed on September 9, 1976. Id
73. Id
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1976, and no continuation statement7 4 was filed as required by G.S. 25-

9-403(2). 75 In November, 1976, defendant bank filed a continuation
statement extending the life of its financing statement for an additional
five years.76
In September, 1977, after Seacrest defaulted on its notes,77 defendant bank exercised its rights under its security agreement with Seacrest

and gave notice of a proposed public sale of the machinery and equipment. The sale took place on September 27, 1977,78 with defendant the
high bidder at $400,000. 79 Home Indemnity subsequently levied on the

machinery pursuant to its assigned interest in Koehring's 1975 judgment against Seacrest.8"

Plaintiff Home Indemnity Company appealed the trial court's dismissal of its suit to enjoin the sale of the encumbered property by defendant bank,"' arguing that it retained a priority interest in the
property despite its failure to file the continuation statement.8z Home
Indemnity contended that the action by Koehring against Seacrest,
which culminated in the April, 1975 judgment, occurred within the
valid period of the financing statement and made a continuation state-

ment unnecessary because the judgment itself provided continuing notice of Koehring's security interest.8 3 The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision, however, agreeing with defendant bank that mere

institution of a suit against Seacrest did not automatically extend
perfection of Koehring's security interest.

Plaintiffs lien on the

Seacrest machinery under Koehring's 1975 judgment did not attach until the October 1977 execution and levy8 4 more than two weeks after
74. See N.C. GCN. STAT. § 25-9-403(3) (1965) for the formal requisites of a continuation
statement.
75. Id § 25-9-403(2). Section 403(2) provides generally that a financing statement expires
after a period of five years unless a continuation statement is filed prior to the lapse.
76. 41 N.C. App. at 297, 254 S.E.2d at 769.
77. Brief for Defendant at 2.
78. 41 N.C. App. at 297, 254 S.E.2d at 769. Home Indemnity successfully obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining the sale, but was denied both a permanent injunction and a priority interest in the proceeds from the sale. Record at 3, 68-9.
79. 41 N.C. App. at 297, 254 S.E.2d at 769.
80. Id.
81. Id at 296, 254 S.E.2d at 768.
82. Id at 298, 254 S.E.2d at 769. Plaintiff argued that, as assignee of Koehring's secured
claim, it had no interest in the security agreement until October of 1976, and therefore could not
have filed a continuation statement prior to that time. Brief for Plaintiff at 5. The court found this
factor nondeterminative, stating the rule that an assignee has no greater rights than his assignor.
41 N.C. App. at 298, 254 S.E.2d at 769.
83. 41 N.C. App. at 298, 254 S.E.2d at 769.
84. Id at 299, 254 S.E.2d at 770. The Hassell court pointed out that in North Carolina a
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Seacrest's interest in the machinery was extinguished by the public
sale.8 5
The court of appeals contrasted this situation with one that arose
in Chrysler Credit Corporation v. United States,8 6 a 1978 case decided
by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

In that case plaintiff Chrysler already held a perfected security interest
in its debtor's property when a tax lien was filed by the United States
against the same property." Pending completion of a suit brought by
Chrysler against the United States to determine priority interest in the
debtor's assets, Chrysler's financing statement lapsed.88 Tke court held
that, as between Chrysler and the United States, the filing of the action
gave notice sufficient to abrogate the need for a continuation statement.89 The Hassell court distinguished Chrysler by noting that the

very purpose of the litigation that resulted in the tolling of Cl~rysler's
obligation to file another continuation statement was to estallish the
priority of the parties involved to the debtor's assets, and that the obligation was abrogated only in respect to the defendant United States;

whereas in Hassell plaintiff sought to maintain priority through a judgment against the debtor and not through a judgment against defendant

bank.9" Defendant bank justifiably relied on the recorded UCC financing statements in evaluating its security position. 9'

Hassell reaffirms the rule that a levy upon personal property must
judicial lien attaches to personal property only when there is levy on an execution, and not by
mere docketing of a judgment. Id at 299, 254 S.E.2d at 769.
85. Id at 299, 254 S.E.2d at 770.
86. 24 U.C.C. Rep. 794 (D.C. Va. 1978).
87. Id at 795.
88. Id
89. Id at 796. The purpose of publicly recorded financing statements is to provide notice to
other creditors of an adverse interest in the subject property. Id
See Rodi Boat Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 236 F. Supp. 935 (D.C. Pa.),
ajf'd, 339 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1964); 79 CJ.S. Secured Transaclioans§ 28 (1974).
90. 41 N.C. App. at 298, 254 S.E.2d at 769.
91. Plaintiff argued that defendant bank had actual knowledge of the litigation between
Koehring and Seacrest, and that actual knowledge is sufficient to prevent a secured creditor from
gaining priority over an unperfected security interest. Brief for Plaintiff at 7. Several courts in
other jurisdictions have accepted this "subjective notice" rule, holding that a party can be on
"notice" of another creditor's security interest that has not been properly perfected. See Gray v,
Raper, 115 Ga. App. 600, 155 S.E.2d 670 (1967); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Patchogue, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. 1272 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); Cash Loan Co. v. Boser, 34 Wis.2d 410, 149 N.W.2d 605 (1967).
While the subjective notice view can be supported, the court of appeals apparently rejected plaintiff's argument. It thus appears that creditors in North Carolina are allowed absolute reliance on
the record, regardless of their subjective knowledge.
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take place within the valid period of perfection.9 2 An action by a secured creditor against his debtor will not automatically extend the effective period against a creditor not a party to the suit. The rule in the
Chrysler case, while not expressly adopted by the Hassell court, is a
sound one. When two secured creditors are involved in an ongoing
judicial dispute concerning priority, the outcome of that suit should not
be affected when one of the parties' financing statement lapses before
the suit is resolved. As the Hassell case indicates, however, such judicial action will not give notice of security interests to other creditors or
subsequent purchasers. Those parties should be able to rely on the
U.C.C. record in establishing their priority.93
C. Antitrust
In its 1979 legislative sessioif the General Assembly amended the
North Carolina antitrust statutes9 4 by adding G.S. 75-16.2, 95 which
provides a four year statute of limitations for causes of action accruing
under chapter 75.96 The bill settled the general confusion over the applicable limitation period for treble damages actions under chapter 7597
and superceded an October 1979 ruling by the court of appeals98 that
applied a three year period of limitations to a treble damages action
arising under G.S. 75-1.1."9
Much of the confusion over the applicable period of limitations
has arisen in cases under G.S. 75-1.1,100 the Unfair Trade Practices section of chapter 75. Adapted from section 5 of the Federal Trade Com92. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-501(5) (1965); Stearns Mfg. Co. v. National Bank & Trust
Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 189 (Pa. C.P. York County 1972).
93. See 79 C.J.S. Secured Transactions§ 59 (1974) (and cases cited at n.96).
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 to -56 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
95. Law of March 21, 1979, ch. 169, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 112 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-16.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
96. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.2 reads in pertinent part: "Limitation of actions.-Any civil action brought under this Chapter to enforce the provisions thereof shall be barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues." The section also provides that the
commencement of any civil or criminal action under chapter 75 by the Attorney General or a
district attorney will, in certain cases, suspend the statute of limitations with respect to a private
action. Id
97. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1975).
98. Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, 43 N.C. App. 229, 259 S.E.2d 1,cert. denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261
S.E.2d 919 (1979). The Holley case, awaiting final decision by the court of appeals when the
legislature amended the statute, was not affected by the statute because the legislature exempted
pending civil actions. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1975).
100. Id
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mission Act,I°' the Unfair Trade Practices Act, added to chapter 75 in

1969, was aimed at encouraging enforcement of the antitrust laws and
included a treble damage provision for private actions under the act. 102
As originally enacted, the act contained no limitation period for actions, giving rise to a conflict over which of two general statutory limitation sections should apply. G.S. 1-54(2) sets a one year period 0of3
limitations for actions "upon a statute, for a penalty, or forfeiture."'1
and G.S. 1-52(2) provides a three year period for actions "upon a liability created by statute.' 1 4
Prior to 1979,105 only the state's three federal district courts had

addressed the issue, and each had adopted the one year limitation period that applies to penalties or forfeitures."0 6 The federal district
courts relied on the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in North CarolinaTheatres, Inc. v. Thompson, 10 a
1960 case in which the court held that under North Carolina law a civil

antitrust action for treble damages is an action for a "penalty or a forfeiture" and therefore the one year limitation period of G.S. 1-54(2)

governed. 08 The question, however, reached the state's appellate
courts in 1979 in Holley . Coggin Pontiac.109 The Holley court, perhaps influenced, although not bound, by the General Assembly's adop-

tion of a four-year limitation period earlier in 1979,' ' held that the
three year period of G.S. 1-52(2) was applicable."'

The passage of G.S. 75-16.2 eliminates the confusion over which
limitation period should be applied in chapter 75 actions. Expansion of
the period of liability for a violation of the antitrust statutes to four
101. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976). See generally, Aycock, 4nitrust and Unfair Trade Practice
Law in North Carolina-FederalLaw Compared, 50 N.C.L. REv. (1972); Comment, Consumer
Protection and Unfair Competition in North Carolina-The1969 Legislation,48 N.C.L. Rev. 896
(1970).
102. See State ex rel Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 320, 233 S.E.2d 895, 901
(1977).
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54(2) (1969).

104. Id § 1-52(2).
105. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
106. See Harris v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 469 F. Supp. 759, 763 (E.D.N.C. 1978); C.F. Indus.
v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline, 448 F. Supp. 475, 486 (W.D.N.C. 1978); Thomas v. Petro-Wash,
Inc., 429 F. Supp. 808, 813 (M.D.N.C. 1977). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54(2) (1969).
107. 277 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1960).
108. Id at 676. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54(2) (1969). The North Carolina Theatres court
applied the North Carolina statute of limitations to the federal antitrust laws. 277 F.2d at 674.
See generally Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
109. 43 N.C. App. 229, 259 S.E.2d 1 (1979).
110. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
111. 43 N.C. App. at 240, 259 S.E.2d at 8.
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years also furthers the goal of the Unfair Trade Practices Act to "main-

tain ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business,
and between persons engaged in business and the consuming public
within this State.""12
D.

13
ProductsLiability

1. Express Warranty Actions
Since the inception of the privity doctrine in the case of Winterbottom v. Wright,It4 the notion that a party breaching a contract owes no
duty to those with whom he is not in "privity" has often led to inequitable results," 5 and accordingly has drawn criticism from courts" 6 and

legal scholars." 7 While North Carolina has abandoned the privity re112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1975) (amended and phrase deleted, Law of June 27, 1977,
ch. 747, § 2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 984).
113. In Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, 40 N.C. App. 476, 253 S.E.2d 344, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 612,
257 S.E.2d 219 (1979), the court of appeals held that a duty to warn consumers of the dangerous
propensities of a product is a part of the implied warranty of merchantibility provided by N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-2-314 (1965). Plaintiff in Reid applied aerosol deodorant purchased from
defendant Eckerd Drugs to his underarms and neck, crossed the room to light a cigarette and,
when he struck a match, burst into flames. 40 N.C. App. at 478, 253 S.E.2d at 346. He suffered
severe burns to his upper torso in the areas where deoderant had been applied. Id As a result of
these burns plaintiff required hospitalization, lost five work weeks and developed scar tissue in the
burned areas. Id
Plaintiff's complaint alleged both negligence and breach of warranty against Eckerds, the
retailer, and J.P. Williams Co., the manufacturer of the deoderant. The trial court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts. Id at 478-79, 253 S.E.2d at 347.
Plaintiff elected to proceed on appeal solely on his breach of warranty claim against Eckerds and
convinced the court of appeals to remand for a new trial on that issue.
Eckerds contended that no warranties had been breached because plaintiff had failed to
allege or prove any defect in the deoderant itself. The court rejected this contention, concluding
that "a failure to adequately warn of all [dangerous] propensities may . .. render a product
unmerchantible . . . and provide grounds for an action to recover damages for breach of the
implied warranty of merchantibility embodied in G.S. § 25-2-314(1)." Id at 482, 253 S.E.2d at
348-49.
The court's conclusion that the implied warranty of merchantibility includes a duty to warn
of dangerous propensities is a sound one and has since received statutory support in G.S. 99B1(3). This new statute provides a "product liability action" for, inter alia, injury resulting from
products marketed with inadequate warnings or labeling. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1(3) (1979); see
note 159 infra.
114. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
115. In Winterbottom, plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger in a mail coach that
collapsed. The court held that he had no cause of action against the person who was contractually
obligated to maintain the coach because the plaintiff was not a party to the contract. See also
Brendle v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 304 F. Supp. 1262 (M.D.N.C. 1969), aft'd, 505 F.2d 243
(4th Cir. 1974).
116. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See
also Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wash. 2d 760, 767, 289 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1955) ("a realistic, judicial
analysis and reappraisal of the privity rule would be quite appropriate").
117. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 622-23 (4th ed. 1971). See also Spruill, Privity of
Contract as a Requisitefor Recoveryfor Warranty, 19 N.C.L. REv. 551, 565-66 (1941).
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quirement for claims sounding innegligence,"t8 the doctrine has not
been eliminated completely incases based on the breach of an express

or implied warranty,"9 probably because of the jurisdiction's view that
a warranty isbasically contractual innature.120 InKinlaw P.Long Mfg.
N.C.Inc.,2' the North Carolina Supreme Court took a further step
toward abandoning the doctrine by removing the requirement of privity of contract from all actions based on breach of an express warranty.
Plaintiff in Kinlaw sought damages for the economic losses he allegedly incurred as a result of the breach of an express warranty on a
new "Long 900" farm tractor that he had purchased from Sessions
Farm Machinery, Inc., an authorized dealer of defendant-manufacturer.122 Contained in the Owners Manual was a warranty, providing
in part that
Long Mfg. N.C. Inc., warrants that ... each new farm or agricultural tractor sold by it and its authorized dealers will be free from
defects in material and workmanship under normal use and service
for a period of one year or one thousand (1,000) hours
of operation;
l2 3
whichever occurs first from the date of purchase.
Plaintiff alleged: (1) that immediately after the tractor was delivered
118. See, e.g., Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Corp., 271 N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967), in which
Chief Justice Parker noted that "the exceptions to the general rule of non-liability of a manufac-

turer for negligence because of lack of privity of contract have so swallowed up the general rule of
non-liability that such a general rule for all practical purposes has ceased to exist." Id at 497, 157
S.E.2d at 106.
119. See, e.g., Byrd v. Star Rubber Co., 11N.C. App. 297, 181 S.E.2d 227 (1971) (plaintiff had
no claim for breach of warranty against manufacturer of defective tire sold his employer). See
text accompanying notes 130-35 infra. Byrdmight be resolved differently today, however, because
G.S. 99B-2(b), effective October 1, 1979, eliminates the privity requirement for certain claims
based on breach of an implied warranty. See notes 163-81 and accompanying text infra.
120. In Wyatt v. North Carolina Equip. Co., 253 N.C. 355, 117 S.E.2d 21 (1960), the North
Carolina Supreme Court noted that "[a] warranty, express or implied, is contractual in nature.
Whether considered collateral thereto or an integral part thereof, a warranty is an element of a
contract of sale ...." Id at 358, 117 S.E.2d at 24. This view is not unique to North Carolina; a
warranty has historically been viewed as a "curious hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort
and contract, unique in the law." W. PROSSER, supra note 117, at 634. Even to the present day,
"fuinderlying the requirement of privity is the erroneous idea that a warranty is, and always has
been, a contractual concept." 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY § 16.03, at

3A-51 (1979). In Winterbottom, it was the fear of unlimited liability for the contracting parties
that led the court to formulate the privity doctrine, concluding that "[u]nless we confine the operation of such contracts as these to the parties who enter into them, the most absurd consequences, to
which I see no limit, would ensue," 152 Eng. Rep. at 404.
121. 298 N.C. 494, 259 S.E.2d 552 (1979).
122. Id at 495, 259 S.E.2d at 553.
123. Id at 495 n.1, 259 S.E.2d at 553 n.l. The warranty also stated that
Long's obligation under this warranty is limited to repairing or replacing at its option in
an authorized Long Tractor Dealer's place of business any part or parts that, which
within the applicable period perviously stated, are returned to its factory in Tarboro,
North Carolina, or one of its distributing branches. ...
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and put to farm use it began "breaking down,"' 2 4 (2) "that various
parts of the tractor were defective, inoperative, or missing; (3) that the
defective parts were duly returned to defendant's Tarboro factory for

repair or replacement; and (4) that defendant failed or refused to repair
or replace the parts."'12 5 Plaintiff further alleged that the tractor was

useless and that he lost a portion of his crops as a result of the breach of
warranty by defendant. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs claim and

the court of appeals affirmed, 12 6 concluding that privity of contract was
a necessary predicate, with limited exceptions,

27

to the maintenance of

a suit based on a breach of an express warranty. The supreme court
reversed, holding "that a manufacturer can extend a warranty beyond
to induce a
the bounds of privity if he makes representations 'designed
ultimate purchaser."' 2 8

purchase and directed to the

This decision is in line with the trend of authority throughout the
country 29 and clarifies North Carolina law with respect to claims
based on breach of an express warranty. Prior to Kinlaw, the supreme
court apparently abandoned the privity requirement in an express war-

only to resurrect the
ranty action, in Simpson v. American Oil Co. ,t30
13 1
cases.
subsequent
in
partially,
least
at
concept,
124. Id at 495, 259 S.E.2d at 553.
125, Id
126. 40 N.C. App. 641, 253 S.E.2d 629, rev'd, 298 N.C. 494, 259 S.E.2d 552 (1979).
127. See notes 130-34 and accompanying text infra. The court of appeals did not believe that
previously recognized exceptions to the privity requirement for breach of warranty actions extended to mechanical devices. 40 N.C. App. at 645, 253 S.E.2d at 631.
128. 298 N.C. at 499, 259 S.E.2d at 556. The court noted that:
Plaintiff here purchased both goods and a promise. He bought a new tractor, the performance of which was expressly guaranteed within the limits and upon the terms specified in the warranty contained in the owner's manual. Plaintiff would reasonably expect
the author of the warranty to stand by its promise. He may base a claim upon its alleged
breach. We find no 'sensible or sound reason' requiring us to hold otherwise.
Id at 501, 259 S.E.2d at 557.
129. The court cites a number of jurisdictions that have abandoned the privity requirement
either totally or partially. Id at 497 nA,500 n.8, 259 S.E.2d at 554 n.4, 557 n.8. The status of the
privity doctrine is unclear in many states because of the various approaches taken in limiting its
application. Some states have statutorily eliminated the privity defense, see, e.g., ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 85-2.318.1 (Supp. 1977), while others have judicially abolished the privity requirement in
actions based on either express or implied warranties, see, e.g., Scheuler v. Aamco Transmissions,
Inc., I Kan. App. 2d 525, 571 P.2d 48 (1977) (express warranty); Iacono v. Anderson Concrete
Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975) (implied warranty). Still other states have
adopted the strict liability in tort approach. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). For an attempt to track the developments in
this area see 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY § 2 (1979). See also Hodge,
ProductsLiability: The State of the Law in North Carolina, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 481 (1972);
Prosser, The Fall ofthe Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966);
Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liabilit to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
130. 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
131. See text accompanying notes 134-38 supra.
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In Simpson the supreme court held for the first time that express
assurances addressed by the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer
could support a breach of warranty action against the manufacturer
notwithstanding lack of privity. 3 2 The express warranty in Simipson
was found in directions on a can of insecticide asserting that the chemical was harmless to humans. 33 The requirement of privity in express
warranty situations was revitalized, however, in Perfecting Service Co.
v. ProductDevelopment & Sales Co. 3 4 when Justice Moore specifically
limited the Simpson exception to "cases involving sales of goods, intended for human consumption, in sealed packages prepared by the
manufacturer and having labels with representations to consumers in-

scribed thereon."1 35 Later cases applied Simpson as restricted by
Perfecting Service with the result that the privity doctrine in express

warranty actions approached its pre-Simpson dimensions.

36

Kinlaw,

however, removes the distinction between expressly warranted prod-

ucts intended for human consumption and products intended for other
uses by eliminating the privity37requirement in all actions where an express warranty is established.'
Following Kinlaw, a plaintiff suing on a breach of express warranty theory will be able to maintain his action, notwithstanding lack
132. 217 N.C. at 546, 8 S.E.2d at 815-16.
133. Id at 543, 8 S.E.2d at 814. Plaintiff suffered severe skin reactions after using the insecticide. Id Referring to the fact that the product's label indicated that it was harmless to humans,
the court concluded:
We know of no reason why the original manufacturer and distributor should not, for his
own benefit and that, of course, of the ultimate consumer, make such assurances, nor
why they should not be relied upon in good faith, nor why they should not constitute a
warranty on the part of the original seller and distributor running with the product into
the hands of the consumer, for whom it was intended.
Id at 546, 8 S.E.2d at 816.
134. 261 N.C. 660, 136 S.E.2d 56 (1964).
135. fd at 668, 136 S.E.2d at 62-63.
136. See Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964); Byrd v. Star
Rubber Co., II N.C. App. 297, 181 S.E.2d 227 (1971). But see Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co.,
263 N.C. 1, 11, 138 S.E.2d 753, 759 (1964) (Sharp, J., concurring). Justice, later Chief Justice,
Sharp apparently did not believe that PerfectingService restricted the holding in Simpson, concluding that "North Carolina holds a manufacturer to his express warranty on the label without
privity." Id
For a complete history of Simpson and its progeny, see Hodge, supra note 129.
137. The court stated that
[t]he privity bound procedure whereby the purchaser claims against the retailer, the retailer against the distributor, and the distributor, in turn, against the manufacturer. . . is
unnecessarily expensive and wasteful. We find no reason to inflict this drain on the
court's time and the litigants' resources when there is an express warranty directed by its
terms to none other than the plaintiff purchaser.
298 N.C. at 500-01, 259 S.E.2d at 557 (emphasis added).
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of privity, if he establishes that the warranty runs directly to him.138
While the Kinlaw court did not offer specific guidelines for determining
when an express warranty "runs" to a claimant, 39 it did note that a
manufacturer can extend a warranty beyond the bounds of privity by
making representations to the ultimate consumer "designed to induce a
purchase". 4 The Court also acknowledged that other jurisdictions focus on whether the claimant "relied" on a seller's representations in
making his purchase decision.14 1 In essence, it appears that a claimant
will be allowed to proceed against the seller or manufacturer if he can
establish that the express warranty allegedly breached was an important factor in his purchase decision. 4
Although the claimant is unable to bring himself within the
138. The court quoted with approval an Ohio case, Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167
Ohio St. 244, 147 S.E.2d 612 (1958), which recognized that under modem merchandizing practices
advertisements function as warranties aimed at the consumer. 298 N.C. at 501, 259 S.E.2d at 557.
This language indicates that the manufacturer will be liable for his express warranty whether it is
included in a writing accompanying the product as in Kinlaw, or made orally through the mass
media. See generally Fowler v. General Elec. Co., 40 N.C. App. 301, 252 S.E.2d 862 (1979);
McKinney Drilling Co. v. NelloTeer Co., 38 N.C. App. 472, 248 S.E.2d 444 (1978).
The court also recognized that few modem express warranties are the product of direct negotiation between the buyer and seller. Justice Exum noted that
"[tjhe Winterbottom rationale [requiring privity of contract] is justified in warranty cases
. . . only to the extent that the warranty sued on is inherently an element of a true
contract. Regarding the tort aspects of a false warranty claim, the rule of privity has
itself produced absurd consequences and has no real application."
298 N.C. at 497, 259 S.E.2d at 554.
139. The court looked to the particular facts giving rise to plaintiffs expectations and noted
that
[pilaintiff's posture here is stronger than that of the purchaser whose tastes are shaped by
inducements of mass media advertising ... or whose expectations arise in response to
assurances on the product's label. . . . Plaintiff here purchased both goods and a promise. He bought a new tractor, the performance of which was expressly guaranteed within
the limits and upon the terms specified in the warranty contained in the owner's manual.
Plaintiff could reasonably expect the author of the warranty to stand by its promise. He
may base a claim upon its alleged breach.
298 N.C. at 501, 259 S.E.2d at 557.
140. Id at 499, 259 S.E.2d at 556.
141. Id at 500 n.7, 259 S.E. 2d at 557, n.7.
142. It may be inferred that lessees, as well as buyers, should be allowed to bring breach of
warranty claims under the Kinlaw doctrine. The lessee who acquires a product expecting it to
perform as warranted should have the same rights as a claimant who relied on an express warranty when purchasing the product. The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Hawkins Constr.
Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973), illustrates this point. In Hawkins
plaintiff rented scaffolding from a manufacturer's authorized dealer in reliance on express representations made in an advertising brochure prepared by the manufacturer. The scaffolding collapsed, resulting in extensive property damage, and plaintiff brought suit against both the dealer
and manufacturer alleging breach of an express warranty. The court upheld plaintiffs claim
against both defendants without discussing plaintiffs lessee status.
See notes 175-77 and accompanying text infra (discussing the lessee's potential inability to
recover for breach of an implied warranty under G.S. 99B-2(b)).
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Kinlaw vertical privity exception by showing that an express warranty
runs directly to him, 4 3 he may be able to establish that he is a third
party beneficiary of the seller's or manufacturer's warranty under G.S.
25-2-318."" 4 This statute extends the warranty to several persons in
horizontal privity to the purchaser; 45 however, the extension is limited
in several ways. First, the coverage of G.S. 25-2-318 restricts recovery
to family members and household guests of the buyer. Thus, an employee injured by a defective product purchased by his employer is not
considered a third party beneficiary of his employer's breach of warranty claim.' 46 Second, the statute limits recovery to "personal injuries" suffered by the plaintiff. Finally, the statute only puts the third
party claimant in the shoes of his principal. Unless it can be established that the seller's warranty "ran" to the principal, the third party
action will not be allowed. Thus, although Kinlaw eliminates the privity requirement in express warranty actions when the warranty runs
directly to the plaintiff, the narrow extension afforded by G.S. 25-2-318
forseeable "users"
still denies recovery to worthy claimants who were
147
buyers.
actual
the
not
but
product,
of a defective
2. G.S. Chapter 99B-"Products Liability"
Beginning with Justice Cardozo's landmark opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. ,148 products liability concepts have expanded to
143. Vertical privity refers to the relationship between parties in the direct chain of distribution. For example, the manufacturer is in vertical privity with the wholesaler and the wholesaler
is in vertical privity with the retailer. See R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES 2828-83 (1970). In the
Kinlaw case plaintiffpurchased from an intermediary distributor and, therefore, was not in privity
with defendant-manufacturer.
144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-318 (1965) provides that
[a] seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is
in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to
expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
in person by breach of the warranty ....
145. Horizontal privity refers to the relationship between a member of the vertical distribution
chain and one who comes in contact with the product while it is in the hands of the vertical
member. For example, an employee who uses a product purchased by his employer is in horizontal privity with his employer, but is not a part of the chain of vertical privity. See R. NORDSTROM,
supra note 143, at 282-83.
146. See Brendle v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 304 F. Supp. 1262 (M.D.N.C. 1969), a/'d,
505 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff injured as result of defective tire sold employer); Wyatt v.
North Carolina Equip. Co., 253 N.C. 355, 117 S.E,2d 21 (1960) (plaintiff injured by defective
loader sold to employer); Byrd v. Star Rubber Co., 11 N.C. App. 297, 181 S.E.2d 227 (1971)
(plaintiff's decedent killed as result of defective tire sold employer). In each of these pre-Kin/aw
cases the defendant prevailed with a "lack of privity" defense.
147. Compare G.S. 25-2-3 18 with the more liberal application of horizontal privity in implied
warranty actions of G.S. 99B-2(b), discussed in notes 179-81 and accompanying text infra.
148. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). InMacPherson,the court held a manufacturer liable
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provide remedies for injured plaintiffs notwithstanding lack of privity
of contract 14 9 with, or fault on the part of, the manufacturer of a defec-

tive product.' 50 The expansion of consumer-oriented products liability
law has not been without its critics, however, and in 1976 the Defense

Research Institute published a position paper alleging that this trend
had precipitated a products liability insurance crisis.' 5 1 The thrust of

the report was that the unavailability or prohibitive expense of products liability insurance was forcing many small manufacturers out of
business. Despite a government study reaching a contrary conclusion, 152 a number of states have responded to the Institute's allegations
by enacting statutes intended to limit the liability of manufacturers and
sellers.153 In 1979, the North Carolina General Assembly joined the
attempt to resolve this supposed insurance crisis by enacting chapter

99B,154 entitled "Products Liability," and amending several statute of

for negligence in failing to discover a defective wheel it had installed on plaintiffs car, notwithstanding lack of privity of contract between the parties. Defendant-manufacturer had sold the car
to a dealer who, in turn, sold it to plaintiff. The defective wheel collapsed, injuring plaintiff, who
brought suit alleging that defendant had been negligent in failing to discover the defect. Defendant asserted lack of privity as a defense. The court rejected this contention, holding that when
inherently dangerous products are involved, privity of contract is no longer a necessary predicate
to liability.
149. See Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Corp., 271 N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967); Tedder v.
Pepsi Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337 (1967); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
150. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963). See also Prosser, The Fallof the Citadel (Strict Liabilityto the Consumer, 50 MINN. L.
REy. 791 (1966); Prosser, Assault Upon the Citacel(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099 (1960).
North Carolina courts have consistently refused to adopt the doctrine of strict liability. See,
e.g., Wilson v. Lowe's Asheboro Hardware, Inc., 259 N.C. 660, 131 S.E.2d 501 (1963); Gore v.
George J. Ball, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 310, 178 S.E.2d 237, mod#Fed, 279 N.C. 192, 182 S.E.2d 389
(1971). The distinction between strict liability and liability for breach of warranty without privity,
however, is often blurred. See Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 3-13, 138 S.E.2d
753, 754-61 (1964) (Sharp, J., concurring); Hodge, supra note 129, at 505.
151.

DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC., PRODUCTS LIABILITY POSITION PAPER, reprintedin

5 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY app.I (1979). The Defense Research Institute is a private, nonprofit organization primarily concerned with civil litigation defense techniques.
152. See U.S. DEPT'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY
(1978), reprintedin 5 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY app.G (1979). This
report asserts that while products liability insurance premiums have risen significantly in recent
years, there is no direct correlation between consumer-initiated products liability actions and the
rise in insurance rates. In essence, the study concludes that there is no products liability insurance
crisis.

153. The following states have enacted products liability legislation since 1976: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah. The various statutes are collected and reprinted in 5 L. FRUMER &
M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY app.H

154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B (1979).

(1979).
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limitations provisions of G.S. 1. 55
Section 99B-2(a) of the new chapter provides several absolute defenses for a seller'i 6 in actions based on the alleged breach of an implied warranty.'5 7 Under this section, a claimant1 58 cannot maintain a
product liability action 159 against a seller if the allegedly defective item
acquired and sold by the seller was enclosed in a sealed container or if

the seller was not afforded reasonable opportunity to inspect the product.' 60 These defenses are inapplicable, however, if (1) the seller mishandled or damaged the product while it was in his possession; (2) the
manufacturer' 6 1 has been judicially declared insolvent, or; (3) the man62
ufacturer is not subject to the jurisdiction of North Carolina courts.'
The intent of this section is to insulate a seller from liability when he is
merely a conduit for the product of a solvent manufacturer who can be
brought before the courts of North Carolina.
In section 99B-2(b) the legislature addresses the privity of contract
requirement, a concept that has often troubled North Carolina appel155. See notes 189-91 and accompanying text infra.
156. G.S. 99B-1 provides the following definition for the term "seller":
"Seller" includes a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor, and means any individual or entity engaged in the business of selling a product, whether such sale is for resale or for use
or consumption. "Seller" also includes a lessor or bailor engaged in the business of
leasing or bailment of a product.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1(4) (1979).
157. The seller's defenses in G.S. 99B-2(a) are expressly limited to product liability actions
based on the breach of an implied warranty. Id § 99B-2(a).
158. A "claimant" is "a person or other entity asserting a claim and, if said claim is asserted
on behalf of an estate, an incompetent or a minor, 'claimant' includes plaintiff's decedent, guardian, or guardian ad litem." Id § 99B-1(1).
159. A "product liability action," as defined in G.S. 99B-1(3), "includes any action brought for
or on account of personal injury, death or property damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formulation, development of standards, preparation, processing, assembly, testing, listing, certifying, warning, instructing, marketing, selling, advertising, packaging
or labeling of any product." Id § 99B-1(3).
160. Id § 99B-2(a). Unfortunately, the term "sealed container" is not defined by the statute.
While there are obvious examples, such as packaged foods and chemicals, see, e.g., Corprew v.
Geigy Chemical Corp., 271 N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967), other items will require judicial interpretation. For example, a retailer may assert that it is not responsible for a television set's
mechanical problems that could have been discovered by letting the set play for several hours
before sale because the body of the set is a sealed container. A broad reading of the term "sealed
container" would include virtually every product currently offered for sale. It seems unlikely that
the legislature intended to provide the seller with a defense of such breadth.
161. "Manufacturer" means a person or entity who designs, assembles, fabricates, pro.
duces, constructs, or otherwise prepares a product or component part of a product prior
to its sale to a user or consumer, including a seller owned in whole or significant part by
the manufacturer or a seller owning the manufacturer in whole or in significant part.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1(2) (1979).
162. Id § 99B-2(a).
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late courts,' 63 by identifying those claimants who will be allowed to
bring a suit directly against the manufacturer of a product, notwithstanding the lack of privity.' 64 According to this section, which is also

limited to claims based on implied warranties, a direct product liability
action

65

may be brought by a "buyer", as defined by the Uniform

Commercial Code, 166 a member of the buyer's family, a guest of the
of the buyer not covered by workbuyer or his family, or an employee
67
men's compensation insurance.'

The enactment of G.S. 99B-2(b) represents another step in North
Carolina's slow movement away from strict common law rules requir-

ing privity in negligence and warranty actions.161 Judicial statements
169
pertaining to privity are numerous and often needlessly confusing;

however, the basic rule for implied warranty actions was stated in Tedder v. Pepsi-ColaBottling Co.7 ' The North Carolina Supreme Court
held in Tedder that the buyer of a product intended for human consumption could bring a direct action against the manufacturer for
breach of an implied warranty of fitness created by advertisements directed at ultimate consumers.' 7 1 Subsequent attempts to extend Tedder
beyond the area of consumable products were unsuccessful.' 72 Section

99B-2(b), however, is not limited to items intended for human consumption and thus expands the vertical privity 173 exception set out in
74
Tedder.1
163. See notes 168-74 and accompanying text infra.
164. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2(b) (1979).
165. See note 159 supra.
166. The U.C.C., as adopted in North Carolina, provides that "'[b]uyer' means a person who
buys or contracts to buy goods." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-103 (1)(a) (1965).
167. Id § 99B-2(b).
168. The privity requirement for negligence actions was eliminated in 1967 in Corprew v.
Geigy Chemical Corp., 271 N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967). See note 118 supra. For a history of
the privity doctrine in North Carolina, see generally, Hodge, supra note 129.
169. See Hodge, supra note 129, at 484-97; note 172 infra.
170. 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337 (1967).
171. Id. at 306, 154 S.E.2d at 340.
172. See, e.g., Fowler v. General Elec. Co., 40 N.C. App. 301, 252 S.E.2d 862 (1979); Byrd v.
Star Rubber Co., 11 N.C. App. 297, 181 S.E.2d 227 (1971); Hodge, supra note 129, at 491-94. The
cases addressing the privity doctrine often deal imprecisely with the issue, usually obscuring the
distinction between vertical and horizontal privity and frequently citing prior decisions incorrectly. For example, the Tedder decision is often referred to as an express warranty case despite
the court's specific statement to the contrary. Although it was possible to find an express warranty
on the Tedder facts, the court sent the evidence "to the jury on the theory of implied warranty."
Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 306, 154 S.E.2d 337, 340 (1967).
173. See note 143 supra.
174. For a discussion of the current rules pertaining to vertical and horizontal privity in express warranty actions, see notes 122-47 and accompanying text supra,discussing the North Caro-
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A significant limitation on application of the G.S. 99B-2(b) vertical privity exception is its restriction to actions brought by a "buyer" as
defined in the Uniform Commercial Code.'7 5 Unfortunately, the
UCC's definition of buyer includes only those who buy or contract to
buy goods, ignoring potentially meritorious claims of a lessee not in
privity with the manufacturer of a defective product. This omission
was probably inadvertent given that a claimant has a reasonable expectation that a product will perform as warranted whether the transaction
is a sale or a lease.' 76 Another indication that the omission of lessees
from G.S. 99B-2(b) was unintentional is that the definition of "seller"
in G.S. 99B-1(4) includes "a lessor. . . engaged in the business of leasing. . . a product."' 77
It is also important to note that prior to the adoption of G.S. 99B2(b), section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code controlled horizontal privity 178 questions in all warranty actions. Under G.S. 25-2318:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a
guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. ....179
The effect of this section is to place the qualifying nonbuyer in the
shoes of the buyer; if a warranty action is available to the buyer, G.S.
25-2-318 extends the right of action to the buyer's family members or
guests injured by a breach of that warranty.8 0 G.S. 99B-2(b) expands
the horizontal privity exceptions created in G.S. 25-2-318 by: (1) extending recovery to property damage as well as personal injury; (2) removing the requirement that guests of the buyer be injured while in his
home in order to recover; (3) eliminating the reasonable expectation of
use, consumption or affect test by specifically identifying those who are
forseeable claimants; and (4) extending coverage to employees of the
buyer not covered by workmen's compensation insurance.'"'
lina Supreme Court's recent decision in Kinlaw v. Long Mfg. Inc., 298 N.C. 494, 259 S.E.2d 552
(1979).
175. See note 166 supra.
176. See note 142 supra for a discussion of a lessee's rights upon breach of an express warranty.
177. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1(4) (1979).
178. See note 145 supra.
179. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-3 18 (1965).
180. See notes 144-47 and accompanying text supra.
181. See notes 165-67 and accompanying text supra. Limiting product liability actions to employees not covered by workers' compensation insurance could result in a seriously injured party
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In addition to the seller's defenses provided in G.S. 99B-2(a), section 99B-3(a) provides a defense for a seller or a manufacturer in any
product liability action 8 2 -either implied or express-where the product was altered or modified after it left the control of the seller or manufacturer. 83 Essentially, under G.S. 99B-3(a) any alteration or
modification made without the express consent of the manufacturer or
seller or in contravention of the instructions or specifications of the
manufacturer or seller precludes liability whenever the alteration or
modification is a proximate cause of the claimant's injury.' 8 4 G.S. 99B3(b) defines alteration or modification to include changes in "design,
formula, function, or use of the product from that. . . intended by the
manufacturer." 85 The basis of this limitation is not the plaintiff's contributory fault, but simply his use of the product in a way not intended
by the manufacturer or seller. Although this rule probably will yield
an equitable result in most product liability disputes, it serves no good
purpose if the alteration or modification was not unreasonable or was
foreseeable by the manufacturer or seller.
G.S. 99B-4, which also applies to product liability actions in general, codifies several existing case law defenses to product liability
claims. It provides that a manufacturer or seller may defend against a
product liability claim with proof that the claimant used the product
contrary to express and adequate warnings or instructions, used the
product after discovering a defect or unreasonably dangerous condition, or failed to exercise reasonable care when using the product.' 86
As Chief Justice Sharp stated in her much quoted concurring opinion
in Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co.,87 "An unreasonable use of the
product or the use of it when its defect should have been apparent
[should] preclude recovery."' 8
receiving an inadequate award under North Carolina's miserly workers' compensation formulas.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (1979). An employee with an identical injury, but not covered by
workers' compensation, is made whole by recovering from the responsible manufacturer or seller.
A better solution would be to extend standing to all employees and subrogate the workmen's
compensation insurer to the claim against the seller or manufacturer. This change would allocate
the cost of the injury to the party best able to prevent its occurrence.
182. See note 159 supra.
183. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-3(a) (1979).
184. See id.
185. Id § 99B-3(b).
186. Id. § 99B-4.
187. 263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964).
188. Id at 9, 138 S.E.2d at 758 (Sharp, J.,concurring); accord,Performance Motors, Inc. v.
Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972); Douglas v. W.C. Mallison & Son, 265 N.C. 362, 144
S.E.2d 138 (1965); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Don Allen Chevrolet Co., 253 N.C. 243, 116
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The legislature also made several additions to the statute of limitations provisions of G.S. 1, as a result, creating a three-pronged approach to products liability actions. First, G.S. 1-52(16) was added, 89
providing that causes of action for personal injury or property damage

are barred if not brought within three years following the discovery of
the bodily injury or property damage giving rise to the claim. Second,
G.S. 1-52(16) also provides that "no cause of action shall accrue more
than 10 years from the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise
to the cause of action."'

°

To illustrate the effect of G.S. 1-52(16), as-

sume a claimant purchases on January 1, 1986 a defective product that
was manufactured on January 1, 1980. If the claimant suffers an injury
proximately caused by the defective product on January 1, 1988, he

must bring his suit before January 1, 1991. If the injury occurs on January 2, 1990, the claimant will have no cause of action against the man-

ufacturer because ten years will have elapsed since the manufacturer's
last act or omission giving rise to the claim. The claimant may, however, still be able to pursue a claim against the seller whose "last act or
omission" was within the ten year period.

Third, new section 1-50(6) bars claims for "personal injury, death
or damage to property based upon. . . any alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product [if] . . . brought more than six years after

the date of initial purchase for use or consumption."' 9 ' Using a variation of the previous example, assume that the defective product is
purchased by the claimant on January 1, 1981. If an injury occurs on
January 1, 1985, the claimant must bring his suit before January 1,
S.E.2d 780 (1960); Driver v. Snow, 245 N.C. 223, 95 S.E.2d 519 (1956); Burkhimer v. W. B. Lindsey Furniture Co., 12 N.C. App. 254, 182 S.E.2d 834 (1971).
While some jurisdictions maintain that contributory negligence is not a defense to a breach of
warranty claim, see, e.g., Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962), few courts require a
manufacturer to act as an absolute insurer of his product. When the plaintiff's use of the product
is unreasonably dangerous or outrageous, most courts recognize contributory negligence as a defense, though perhaps under a different name. See Murphy v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 444
F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1971) (allegation that plaintiffs conduct was sole cause of accident adequate
defense even though contributory negligence not recognized as defense to breach of warranty
claim). Cf. Preston v. Up-Right, Inc., 243 Cal. App.2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966) (contributory
negligence no defense to strict liability claim, but plaintiff must prove that he used product in
intended way).
189. Law of May 28, 1979, ch. 654, § 3(c), 1979 N.C. Sess Laws 687 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-52 (16) (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (16) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). G.S. 1-53(4), which
bars wrongful death actions if not brought within two years of date of death, also provides "that
whenever the decedent would have been barred, had he lived, from bringing an action for bodily
harm because of the provisions of. . . G.S. 1-52(16), no action for his death may be brought." Id
§ 1-53(4) (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
191. Id § 1-50(6) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
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1987 or his claim against any manufacturer or seller will be barred by
G.S. 1-50(6).

The three-pronged approach provides that failure to bring an ac-

tion within any one of the limitations periods bars the claim. 19 2 From

the plaintiff's viewpoint, unjust results are possible under both the ten
and six year prongs of the three-pronged approach because neither is

tied to the date of the claimant's bodily injury or property damage.
This may cause even the most diligent plaintiff to be barred from recovering on a meritorious claim.

Finally, the legislature amended the pleading procedures, providing that in product liability actions, where the amount in controversy

exceeds $10,000.00, the plaintiffs damages must be expressed as "in
excess of $10,000.00" and no larger figure may be fixed. 193 This change
appears to be aimed at encouraging smaller damage awards by elimi-

nating any psychological effect large ad damnum clauses may have on
juries.

Viewed as a package, G.S.99B and the complementary amendments to G.S. 1 bring about potentially far-reaching changes in North
Carolina products liability law. Both established rules and emerging
trends in the case law must be reexamined in light of the new statutory
scheme. Undoubtedly, the effects of these statutory changes will be the
192. Interpreting the proper interaction of the three statute of limitations periods may prove
troublesome for the courts. The introductory clause of G.S. 1-52(16) states that the three and 10
year limitation periods apply "[u]nless otherwise provided by statute." It is arguable that this
conditional phrase means that only the six year limitation period of G.S. 1-50(6) should be applied
in product liability actions because G.S. 1-50(6) specifically refers to personal injury or property
damage arising out of an "alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product," while G.S. 152(16) contains no reference to "products." This result, however, apparently was not intended by
the drafters of the new products liability legislation. The original version of the eventually enacted G.S. 99B contained a statute of limitation section, later deleted, stating that:
No product liability action may be commenced following the expiration of any one
of the following periods:
(a) Three years from the date when the injury, death or damage was first sustained,
discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered; or
(b) Six years after the initial purchase of the product for use or consumption; or
(c) Ten years after the product was manufactured.
S. 189, N.C. Gen. Ass'y, Ist Sess. 1979 (first draft) (copy on file in office of N.C.L. REv.). It is
obvious, therefore, that a three-pronged approach was intended.
A more logical interpretation of the G.S. 1-52(16) introductory clause is that it refers to G.S.
25-2-725, the Uniform Commercial Code statute of limitations provision covering breach of warranty claims. That statute, which provides that an action on a contract must be brought "within
four years after the cause of action has accrued," appears to be inconsistent with the three-pronged
approach of G.S. 1-50(6) and G.S. 1-52(16). The apparent conflict will have to be resolved by the
courts or by legislative amendment.
193. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1, Rule 8(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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dominant concern in this jurisdiction's products liability litigation for
the foreseeable future.
E.

FiduciaryDuty of CorporateInsider

In Lazenby v. Godwin, 194 the Court of Appeals held that under
"special circumstances" a corporate insider stands in a fiduciary relationship to a shareholder in the acquisition of the shareholder's stock
and therefore has a duty to disclose any information pertinent to the
value of the stock.'
The court further defined "special circumstances"
9
in Stone v. McClam,' 6 finding that no fiduciary relationship, and thus
no duty to disclose, exists between shareholders and insiders possessing

substantially equal access to pertinent business information.

97

The claim in Lazenby involved the purchase by a majority shareholder of outstanding interests in a family held corporation.' 9 8 Defendant was both majority shareholder and president-manager of the
corporation.' 9 9 In a letter to plaintiffs, he suggested that "if something
were to happen to me. . . you could wind up with nothing" and "if
you would like to sell [your stock] let me know.
... 0 At a subse-

quent informal shareholders' meeting defendant informed the other
owners that he was in ill health and would be interested in purchasing
20
their stock, although a sale of the corporate assets was not possible. '

194. 40 N.C. App. 487, 253 S.E.2d 489 (1979).
195. Id at 494-95, 253 S.E.2d at 492-93.
196. 42 N.C. App. 393, 257 S.E.2d 78, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 572, 261 S.E.2d 128 (1979).
197. Id at 403, 257 S.E.2d at 84-85.
198. Prior to the transactions in question the stock of the corporation, Fayetteville Wholesale
Building Supply, Inc., was owned as follows:
Defendant, Derwood H. Godwin:
42.05%
Larry Godwin:
12.04%
Margret Godwin Caviness:
11.3%
Linda Godwin Furr:
11.3%
Plaintiff, Jean G. Lazenby:
11.3%
Plaintiff, Glenn Lazenby:
9.86%
O.W. Godwin Estate:
2.15%
40 N.C. App. at 489, 253 S.E.2d at 490. All stockholders listed above were children of 0. W.
Godwin, deceased, except for Glenn Lazenby, who was the husband of the deceased's daughter.
Id Defendant became the majority shareholder after his acquisition of Larry Godwin's interest
in February 1973. Id
199. Plaintiffs were nominally directors of the corporation, but the evidence tended to show
that regular directors' meetings were not held; defendant had effective control of all corporate
business. Id at 495, 253 S.E.2d at 493.
200. Id at 489, 253 S.E.2d at 490.
201. Defendant offered each shareholder $60,000.00 for his interest in the corporation. This
amount was less than the stock's book value. Id
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and two weeks later learned that

defendant was selling the corporate assets at a price representing a per
share value greatly in excess of what they had received.2 °3 Defendant

actually had engaged in negotiating the sale of the assets prior to the
time he offered to buy plaintiffs' stock, yet failed to disclose the exist-

ence of these negotiations. 2°

The trial court awarded plaintiffs damages on the basis of a jury

finding of constructive fraud.20 5 Plaintiff moved for a partial new trial
on the grounds that the damages awarded were inadequate and against
the weight of the evidence."0 6 The trial court granted a new trial on all
issues raised by the pleadings and defendant appealed, alleging that no
fiduciary relationship existed between the parties and that the court

erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict in defendant's favor on the
constructive fraud issue.20 7
202. Plaintiffs initially rejected defendant's offer at the informal meeting, held March 11, 1973,
but reconsidered and decided to accept two days later. Id
203. On March 27, 1973, plaintiffs learned from shareholder Linda Furr (who had refused to
sell to defendant) that Ms. Furr had consented to a sale of the corporate assets to Valley Forge
Corporation for $2,600,000. This price represented a gain to defendant of about $180,000 over
what he had paid plaintiffs for their stock. Id at 489-90, 253 S.E.2d at 490.
204. Plaintiffs' evidence tended to show that Valley Forge Corporation had approached defendant regarding a sale of the assets in December 1972 and that in January 1973 defendant
traveled to Houston, Texas to discuss the sale with Valley Forge's president. Valley Forge submitted a written offer to purchase on March 4, 1973, one week before the shareholder's meeting at
which defendant offered to purchase each plaintiff's block of stock for $60,000. Id at 490, 253
S.E.2d at 490.
205. The trial court submitted the following interrogatories to the jury:
1. At the time of the sale of the 236 shares of stock of Fayetteville Wholesale by the
plaintiffs to the defendant on March 16, 1973, did a relationship of trust and confidence
exist between the plaintiffs and the defendant?
ANSWER: Yes.
2. If so, was the sale of stock on that date an open, fair, and honest transaction?
ANSWER: No.
3. Did the defendant, by actual fraud and deceit, obtain the 236 shares of stock of
Fayetteville Wholesale from the plaintiffs on March 16, 1973?
ANSWER: No.
4. Did the plaintiffs affirm and ratify the sale of stock as alleged in the answer?
ANSWER: No

5. In what amount, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled to recover of the defendant for.
(a) Principal
(b), Interest

$10,000.00?
0
?

Id at 490-91, 253 S.E.2d at 490-91.
206. Plaintiffs' evidence indicated that defendant received approximately $300,000 for the
stock he had purchased from plaintiffs for $120,000 10 days earlier. The jury, however, awarded
damages of only $10,000. Id at 489-91, 253 S.E.2d at 490-91.

207. Id at 491,253 S.E.2d at 491. In North Carolina there can be no constructive fraud unless
a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties. See Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 698
(1971), dicussed in text accompanying notes 86-89 infra; Priddy v. Kernersville Lumber Co., 258
N.C. 653, 129 S.E.2d 256 (1963); 6 STRONG's NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 3D Fraud § 7 (1977).
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The Lazenby opinion, noting that North Carolina courts had not

directly addressed the question whether a fiduciary relationship exists
when a corporate insider negotiates the purchase of a shareholder's
stock, examined three views on this issue recognized in other jurisdictions.2"' The majority view is that a corporate insider never owes a
fiduciary duty to a shareholder and thus is never under an obligation to
disclose material inside information prior to engaging in stock transactions with a shareholder.20 9 At the other extreme is the minority rule
that an insider, because of his position in the corporation, must disclose

all material information regarding a stock transaction. 210 The third
view is that a corporate insider stands in a fiduciary relationship to a
shareholder with whom he trades only under "special circumstances. 21
Turning to the North Carolina case law, the court found that the
supreme court decision in Link v. Link21 2 presented a situation closely
analogous to Lazenby.2 1 3 In Link a wife transferred corporate securi-

ties to her husband as part of a separation agreement. Subsequently,
she alleged that her husband, president and manager of the corporation, had fraudulently concealed the value of the stock.214 The court
found a fiduciary duty on the part of the husband because of the family
relationship, the wife's inexperience in the business world, the emo208. 40 N.C. App. at 492-94, 253 S.E.2d at 491-92.
209. Id at 492, 253 S.E.2d at 491. See Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 500, 504 (1966); 19 AM. JUR. 2d
Corporations§ 1328 (1965). See also Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 215 Ill.
444, 74 N.E. 445
(1905); Shaw v. Cole Mfg. Co., 132 Tenn. 210, 177 S.W. 479 (1915).
210. 40 N.C. App. at 492, 253 S.E.2d at 491. See Annot., 7 A.L.R. 3d 500, 105 (Supp. 1979);
19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 1328 (1965). See also King Mfg. Co. v. Clay, 216 Ga. 581, 118
S.E.2d 581 (1961); Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916); Stewart
v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904).
211. 40 N.C. App. at 492, 253 S.E.2d at 491-92. See Annot., 7 A.L.R. 3d 500, 507 (1966); 19
AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1329 (1965); H. HENN.HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 239 (2d ed. 1970). See also Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 15 Ariz.
424, 139 P. 879 (1913); Llewellyn v. Queen City Dairy, Inc., 187 Md. 49, 48 A.2d 322 (1946);
Lightner v. W.H. Hill Co., 258 Mich. 50, 242 N.W. 218 (1932). The special circumstances exception to the majority rule was first announced by the United States Supreme Court in Strong v.
Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). In that case defendant-majority shareholder was negotiating the sale
of corporate lands to the Philippine Government. Without informing plaintiff of the negotiations,
defendant bought her stock through the use of an undisclosed agent. Id at 426. The Court held
that the defendant was under a legal obligation to disclose to the plaintiff both the substance of the
negotiations with the Philippine Government and his interest in the transaction prior to his acquisition of her stock. Id at 434.
212. 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971).
213. The court also discussed two other cases, but found neither to be controlling: Abbitt v.
Gregory, 201 N.C. 577, 160 S.E. 896 (1931) (defendant-director misrepresented sale price of plaintiff's stock and kept proceeds); Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 209 S.E.2d 494 (1974) (once
vendor assumes to speak he is under duty to make full and fair disclosure).
214. 278 N.C. at 187-91, 179 S.E.2d at 700-03.
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tional strain on the wife and the stock's unlisted status. 215- While the
Link decision did not make clear which of the enumerated factors was
controlling, the Lazenby court adopted the "special circumstances" approach,"1 6 concluding that under circumstances such as those presented
in Link, the corporate insider stands in a fiduciary relationship to a
shareholder in the acquisition of the shareholder's stock. z 7 On the
facts of Lazenby, the court found that special circumstances giving rise
to a fiduciary obligation existed at the time defendant purchased plaintiffs' stock. Although plaintiffs were technically directors of the corporation, they did not take part in the management of the operation, but
placed their trust in the business skills and judgment of defendant. Additionally, defendant initiated the stock sale by sending a letter to
plaintiffs informing them that he was in ill-health and advising them to
consider selling their interest.2 18 Therefore, defendant's failure to inform plaintiffs that he was involved in an attempt to sell the corporate
assets represented a breach of his fiduciary duty. 1 9
The limits to which the court would be willing to extend the Lazenby special circumstances rule were soon tested in Stone v. McClam."' Concentrating its analysis on plaintiffs' and defendants'
equal access to information, the court refused to find that a fiduciary
directors
relationship existed between shareholders and corporate
22
where both were businessmen dealing at arm's length. 1
In Stone, plaintiffs were the sole shareholders in a turkey raising
and processing business, Stone Bros., Inc. 2 ' Defendant, FCX, Inc.,
supplied Stone Bros. with feed and other supplies for its turkey operation. 2 3 Over a period of years, Stone Bros. became indebted to FCX
and gave a number of mortgages and deeds of trust to secure its debt
obligations. 224 Eventually FCX obtained liens on virtually all of Stone
Bros.'s assets.2 2 5 In addition, on March 4, 1969, the individual plaintiffs, D. Lindwood Stone and J.A. Stone, guaranteed Stone Bros.' payment on a demand note and a bond executed in favor of FCX having a
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id at 193, 179 S.E.2d at 704.
See note 211 and accompanying text supra.
40 N.C. App. at 494, 253 S.E.2d at 492.
Id. at 494, 253 S.E.2d at 493.
Id at 494-95, 253 S.E.2d at 493.
42 N.C. App. 393, 257 S.E.2d 78, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 572, 261 S.E.2d 128 (1979).
Id.
Id at 394, 257 S.E.2d at 80.
Id
Id
Id
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total value of $720,353.63.226 To secure these guarantees, plaintiffs executed a stock pledge agreement under which they transferred their
Stone Bros. stock to FCX's attorney as trustee, giving him the power to
sell the stock in the event of a default by plaintiffs on the promissory
note. Plaintiffs also appointed the trustee as their attorney-in-fact with
power to vote the stock at all meetings of Stone Bros. stockholders.227
Following a sharp drop in the price of turkeys in 1974 and a corresponding rise in the price of feed,228 it became clear that extension of
further credit to Stone Bros. was inadvisable and FCX notified plaintiffs that their account was being closed.22 9 Subsequently, plaintiffs defaulted on their outstanding debt to FCX23° and, in accordance with
power granted him under the March 4, 1969, stock pledge agreement,
the trustee voted to remove the Stones as directors of Stone Bros. and to
replace them with directors approved by FCX. 23I The new directors'
efforts to continue Stone Bros. as a going concern were unsuccessful,
however, and liquidation of assets was necessary to repay the FCX
loans. 232 Among Stone Bros.'s assets was a twenty-five percent interest
in the common stock of Raeford Turkey Farms, Inc., a turkey processing and selling operation.233 Plaintiffs were directors of Raeford and
remained so even after their removal as directors of Stone Bros.234
As the liquidation proceeded there were indications that the liabilities of Stone Bros. would far exceed the value of its assets. Facing
these grim financial realities, plaintiffs signed an "Agreement and Release" transferring their Stone Bros. stock to FCX in exchange for
FCX's agreement to release plaintiffs from all personal liability on the
Stone Bros. debt.235 Plaintiffs, no longer holding an interest in Raeford
226. Id
227. Id at 394-95, 257 S.E.2d at 80.
228. Id at 395, 257 S.E.2d at 80.
229. Stone Bros.'s financial statements showed a net operating loss for the II month period
ending October 31, 1974 of $942,591.68 and total debt outstanding to FCX of $3.1 million. Id
230. Representatives of FCX met with the Stones in Lumberton, N.C. on November 20. 1974
and demanded payment on the demand note executed on March 4, 1969. Plaintiffs responded that
they were without funds to pay the indebtedness, thus defaulting on the note. Id at 396, 257
S.E.2d at 81.
231. Id The new directors installed themselves as officers of Stone Bros. and retained plaintiff
D. Lindwood Stone as an employee. Id Plaintiffs, however, remained the beneficial owners of
Stone Bros. stock.
232. Id at 398, 257 S.E.2d at 82.

233. Stone Bros. acquired its 25% interest in Raeford for an initial investment of $30,000. id
at 394, 257 S.E.2d at 80.
234. Id at 397, 257 S.E.2d at 81.
235. Id
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Turkey Farms, resigned as directors of that corporation.2 3 6 Shortly after plaintiffs relinquished their Stone Bros. stock and resigned from
Raeford's board of directors, Raeford's assets were transferred to a

newly formed cooperative at a sale price of $6.8 milion.237 After collecting 25% of the proceeds from the sale of Raeford, Stone Bros.' balance sheet showed a net worth of $394,312.00.238
Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the individual defendants, as
directors of Stone Bros., committed actual and constructive fraud when

239
negotiating the release agreement signed by plaintiff-shareholders.

The crux of plaintiffs' argument was that defendants breached a fidu-

ciary duty owed plaintiffs by failing to disclose pertinent information
concerning the Raeford reorganization. The court of appeals reversed
the trial court's finding of constructive fraud,24° holding that the evi-

dence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that a fiduciary relationship existed between plaintiffs and defendants at the time the

parties executed the release agreement. 241
The Stone court carefully distinguished its earlier decision in
Lazenby. Unlike plaintiffs in Lazenby, the Stones had actively man236. Id at 397, 257 S.E.2d at 82.
237. Id at 398, 257 S.E.2d at 82.
238. Stone Bros.'s 25% share from the sale of Raeford's assets totaled $2,159,919, represented
by $250,000 in cash, a note of the new cooperative for $1,522,419 and a revolving fund certificate
for $387,500. Id The Stone court pointed out, however, that despite the favorable balance sheet
position after the sale of Raeford, at the time of trial FCX had not actually realized a profit from
its dealings with Stone Bros. Any eventual profit on the Raeford note and the revolving fund
certificate depended on many years of profitable operations by the newly formed cooperative,
House of Raeford. Id at 403, 257 S.E.2d at 85.
239. Id at 393, 257 S.E.2d at 79.
240. The trial court submitted the following interrogatories to the jury:
1. Did the defendants procure the execution of the Agreement and Release of
March 5, 1975 by means of false and fraudulent representations?
ANSWER: No

2.

3.

Did a fiduciary relationship between plaintiffs and defendants exist with respect
to the transaction between them of March 5, 1975?
ANSWER: Yes
If so, did the defendants exercise good faith and refrain from obtaining any
advantage to themselves at the expense of the plaintiffs in connection with said
transaction?
ANSWER: No

4.

What amount of actual damages are plaintiffs entitled to recover of defendants,
if any?
ANSWER: $394,312.00

What amount of punitive damages, if any, are plaintiffs entitled to recover of:
(a) Defendant, FCX, Inc.?
ANSWER: $368,312.00
Id at 398-99, 257 S.E.2d at 82.
241. Id at 400, 257 S.E.2d at 83.
5.
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aged Stone Bros. since its formation. 242 Focusing on the Stone Bros.'
interest in Raeford, the court noted that plaintiff Linwood Stone was
on the Raeford board of directors when the release agreement was
signed. 24 3 He had attended a Raeford board meeting and discussed

several reorganization alternatives for Raeford the week before the release to FCX was signed. 2" The court concluded that plaintiffs "had
equal or better access than did defendants to all information pertinent
to determining the fair value of their shares."2'45 Therefore, there was

no evidence of "special circumstances" that would give rise to placing
defendants in a fiduciary relationship with plaintiffs in connection with
the transfer of their stock in Stone Bros .

. 246

The conclusion of the court of appeals that a corporate insider
owes a fiduciary duty to a shareholder in the acquisition of stock only
under special circumstances is in accord with the modem trend in this
area of the law.2 47 In both Lazenby and Stone, the court focused on the

plaintiffs' access to material information pertinent to the decision to
sell.2 48 The factual settings of these cases represent the extreme ends of

the spectrum of knowledge found among stock traders. In Lazenby,
family members operated a business more closely resembling a limited
partnership than a corporation, at least from the perspective of the

shareholders. The court acknowledged, sub silentio, this aspect of the
situation by disregarding plaintiffs' nominal status as directors and
finding a fiduciary relationship similar to that recognized among partners.24 9 This is appropriate because it is probable that many closely
held businesses function internally as partnerships. At the other extreme, plaintiffs in Stone were experienced businessmen dealing at
arm's length with defendants in a typical debtor-creditor situation.

Their access to material information was equal to that of defendants,
242. id at 402-03, 257 S.E.2d at 84. Plaintiff Linwood Stone was retained as an employee by
the new Stone Bros. directors and was active in the daily management of the corporation on
March 5, 1975 when the release agreement was signed. Id. at 403, 257 S.E.2d at 84.
243. Id at 403, 257 S.E.2d at 84-85.
244. Id at 403, 257 S.E.2d at 85.
245. Id
246. Id
247. See Annot., 7 A.L.R. 3d 500 (1966); 19 AM. JrJR. 2D Corporalions §§ 1328-29 (1965); H.
HENN, supra note 211, § 239.
248. Cf.SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (access to information key element in
determining whether certain employees needed protection stock registration provided).
249. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) (Judge Cardozo held partner
not to a standard of mere honesty, but to "the punctillio of an honor most sensitive"); Casey .
Grantham, 239 N.C. 121, 79 S.E.2d 735 (1954). See also 60 AM. JUR. 2D Partnershi § 123 (1972).
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and the court properly refused to interfere with the contested transaction.
These cases provide valuable guidance to the practitioner advising
a corporate insider with respect to the acquisition of stock from a shareholder. Clearly, the shareholder must have access to or be made aware
of information material to his decision to trade. While future litigation
may ensue concerning the definition of "material,"2 50 the prudent at-

torney will advise corporate insiders to avoid this pitfall by making a
good faith disclosure to the prospective seller of all arguably "material"

information.25 '
CHARLES LEE CAIN
JAMES P. MURRAY

250. The definition of materiality has been the subject of considerable judicial comment. See,
e.g., TSC Indust. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375 (1970); Chris-Craft Indust., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied,404
U.S. 1005 (1971).
251. In Morgan v. McLeod, 40 N.C. App. 467, 253 S.E.2d 339, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 611, 257
S.E.2d 436 (1979), the court of appeals held that a shareholder has an absolute right, pursuant
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-37 (1975), to receive upon request a true copy of the financial statement of
his corporation. The defendant corporation argued that the G.S. 53-58 proviso of G.S. 55-38 that
a shareholder may not examine books, records of account, the record of shareholders or minutes
unless the requested information is for a "proper purpose", also applied to G.S. 55-37. See Outland v. Cooke, 265 N.C. 601, 144 S.E.2d 835 (1965). Rejecting this argument, the court reasoned
that the financial statement information made available by G.S. 55-37 is so basic that every shareholder is entitled to a copy upon request. Additionally, the burden on the corporation of supplying a copy of the financial statement is minimal because sound business operations include
preparation of such information annually. 40 N.C. App. at 473, 253 S.E.2d at 342. Conversely,
the burden to the corporation is significant if it must allow an inspection of its minutes, records of
accounts, and other voluminous records pursuant to G.S. 55-38, therefore, the legislature wisely
limited inspection rights under G.S. 55-38 to those who can show a "proper purpose". Cf.Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 191 N.W. 2d 406 (1971) (desire to oppose Vietnam War
not proper purpose necessary to compel examination of shareholder lists and records of munitions
productions).
A further distinction supporting the court's holding is that the information available under
G.S. 55-37 is of marginal value to business competitors, while the information obtainable under
G.S. 55-38 could have significant commercial value. The result reached by the court is sound and
is in accord with the anticipated interpretation of G.S. 55-37. See R. RoBINSON, N.C. CORPoRATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 8-2 (2d ed. 1974).

IV.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Commerce Clause

The North Carolina Court of Appeals resolved an issue arising
under the Commerce Clause in In re Arcadia DairyFarms,Inc. I Arcadia Dairy Farms distributes reconstituted milk made with fluids and
out-of-state milk powder. In 1976 Arcadia challenged the constitutionality of equalization payments it was then required to pay by order of
the North Carolina Milk Commission, 2 which was allegedly acting pursuant to statutory authorization. 3 The amount of the equalization payments was the difference between the price Arcadia's competitors
received from distributors for the milk they produced, and the price
they would have received if Arcadia had purchased their milk rather
than buying out-of-state powder and reconstituting it.4 The purpose of
the payments was "to assure an adequate supply of fluid milk in North
Carolina markets by providing for producers of natural fluid milk the
same gross revenues they would have received had the distributor of
the 'reconstituted' milk purchased from such producers natural, fluid
milk and distributed it instead of the 'reconstituted' milk."5
The Supreme Court said that a judicial construction authorizing
equalization payments might make the statute unconstitutional because
the payments would interfere substantially with the flow of out-of-state
powder into North Carolina.6 Therefore, the court construed the statute as not authorizing the Commission to impose equalization payments.7 Subsequently, the general assembly enacted an amendment to
the statute expressly granting the Commission the authority to impose
equalization payments.' Arcadia was again required to make equalization payments, and in 1979 it brought an action to challenge the
amended statute's constitutionality. In In re ArcadiaDairyFarms,Inc.
the court of appeals held that the amendment to the statute granting
express authority to the Commission was unconstitutional, being in vi1. 43 N.C. App. 459, 259 S.E.2d 368 (1979).
2. In re Arcadia Dairy Farms, Inc., 289 N.C. 456, 223 S.E.2d 323 (1976).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.8 (1978) enumerates the powers granted to the Commission.
4. 289 N.C. at 470-71, 223 S.E.2d at 332.
5. Id at 465, 223 S.E.2d at 328.
6. Id at 469, 223 S.E.2d at 331. The court relied on Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v.
Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964); Lehigh Valley Coop. Farmers, Inc., v. United States, 370 U.S. 76
(1962); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Hood v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525
(1949); and Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
7. 289 N.C. at 469, 223 S.E.2d at 332.
8. Law of May 23, 1977, ch. 426, § 2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 98.
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olation of the Commerce Clause, for the same reasons given by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in the 1976 decision.9
B. FirstAmendment-Freedom of Religion
The court of appeals decided two cases in 1979 involving the constitutional authority of the state to license activities of religious organizations. In Heritage Village Church, Inc. v. State' ° the court struck
down three provisions of the Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act" be-

cause those provisions unconstitutionally restricted the freedom of religious organizations to lawfully solicit funds within the state. 2 The

statutory provisions that charitable organizations must obtain a license
before soliciting within the state,' 3 and that the licensing officer "shall
revoke, suspend or deny issuance of a license"' 4 if he finds that "[ain

unreasonable percentage" of solicited contributions are not applied to a
charitable purpose' 5 combined to effect a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. 6
The statutory exemption from licensing for a religious organization established for "religious purposes" and carrying on religious

functions through a particular denomination

7

constituted an establish-

ment of religion in violation of the first amendment because the statute,
9. 43 N.C. App. at 467, 259 S.E.2d at 373.
10. 40 N.C. App. 429, 253 S.E.2d 473 (1979). Plaintiffs were Heritage Village Church and
Missionary Fellowship, a nondenominational Christian religious organization receiving most of
its funding through contributions from viewers of religious radio and television programs it produces, and Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of the World, a Christian church receiving
more than 80% of its funding through solicited contributions from nonmembers. Plaintiffs sought
to enjoin enforcement of the licensing requirement of the Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act and
to have it declared unconstitutional as violating the first and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution and corresponding provisions of the state constitution, N.C. CONsT. art. I,

§§ 1, 13, 14, 19.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-75.1 to .25 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
12. The solicitation of funds by religious organizations is recognized to be a religious activity
protected by the first amendment. 40 N.C. App. at 436-37, 253 S.E.2d at 484. "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court held the free exercise clause applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The establishment clause was held applicable to the states in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-75.6 (1978). A license to solicit must be applied for if the organization itself intends to solicit or it plans to have solicitation performed on its behalf.
14. Id § 108-75.18. The Secretary of the Department of Human Resources is the officer
responsible for issuing licenses.
15. Id § 108-75.18(4). A "charitable purpose" includes a religious purpose. Id § 10875.3(2).
16. 40 N.C. App. at 442, 253 S.E.2d at 481.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-75.7(a)(1) (1978). "Religious purposes" are defined as "maintaining or propagating religion or supporting public religious services, according to the rites of a
particular denomination " Id § 108-75.3(17) (emphasis added).
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irrespective of legislative intent, tended to advance or inhibit particular
religious sects.' 8 Furthermore, the religious organization exemption, as
well as exemptions for fraternal beneficiary societies, 19 nonprofit civic
groups,20 and organizations soliciting only by and from their members,2 ' violated the equal protection clause because they were arbitrary
and irrational, and because they favored secular organizations while
restricting the first amendment rights22 of nondenominational religious
groups.23
In State v. Fayetteville Street Christian School 24 the court of appeals considered whether the state could require the licensing of church
operated day-care centers, pursuant to the Day-Care Facilities Act of
1977,25 without violation of the first amendment right to free exercise of
religion. 26 The state claimed that the licensing standards impose only
"minimum standards of health and safety and do not interfere with any
religious practice or contain any educational requirements for staff or
children. '2 7 Defendants 28 refused to comply arguing that "the activi18. 40 N.C. App. at 446, 253 S.E.2d at 483. In other words, because only nondenominational
churches must be licensed to solicit, the effect of the statute is to advance denominational religious
groups.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-75.7(a)(7) (1978). Also included in this exemption are veterans'
organizations and volunteer fireman's associations. Groups in this subsection are exempt only if
all solicitation is by uncompensated members.
20. id § 108-75.7(a)(8). These groups are exempt only if they comply with specified restrictions on the size, age, and use of funds.
21. Id § 108-75.7(a)(5).
22. Restrictions on solicitation by religious groups infringe on religious freedoms protected
by the first amendment, and these rights have a preferred status. "Restrictions upon First Amendment rights must be narrowly tailored to achieve legitimate State objectives ... and where less
intrusive means are available, they must be used." 40 N.C. App. at 448-49, 253 S.E.2d at 484-85.
23. Id The court also held unconstitutional three statutory provisions that do not relate
exclusively to solicitation by religious groups: (I) A mandatory revocation of license upon a finding by the issuing officer that the solicitor is engaged in fraud, or that an unreasonable percentage
of solicited funds will not be used for charitable purposes, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-75.18(2)-(4)
(1978), was held an impermissible delegation of legislative powers under the state constitution,
N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 6 & art. II, § 1, because the officer was given unfettered discretion in determining when to revoke. 40 N.C. App. at 442-44, 253 S.E.2d at 482; (2) The prohibition of solicitation within the state by one previously prohibited from soliciting in any jurisdiction without a
prior opportunity to offer evidence of present fitness to solicit, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-75.20(h)(2)
(1978), was held to be an irrebuttable presumption in denial of due process. 40 N.C. App. at 45253, 253 S.E.2d at 487; (3) A licensing exemption for religious and other organizations that solicit
primarily from their own members, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-75.7(a)(1), (5) (1978), was held void
for vagueness because it failed to define "members." 40 N.C. App. at 453, 253 S.E.2d at 487.
24. 42 N.C. App. 665, 258 S.E.2d 459, cert. granted, 298 N.C. 302, 259 S.E.2d 303 (1979).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-85 to -104 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
26. See note 12 supra.
27. 42 N.C. App. at 667, 258 S.E.2d at 461.
28. Several church-operated day-care centers and their directors were defendants in this action brought by the state to obtain a declaratory judgment that the Child Day-Care Licensing
Commission of the Department of Administration has the statutory authority to require defend-
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ties of the centers are not compartmentalized into religious and secular
components, and that to require licensing by the State would seriously
violate defendants' religious liberty."2 9 The court held that the licensing requirement did not in any way affect the defendants' religious acof the
tivities or beliefs, 30 but only related to the physical condition
31
centers, and that the statute is therefore constitutional.

Heritage Church and Fayetteville School reveal the inevitable tensions between freedom of religion and the state's interest in protecting
all of its citizens from harm. Analysis should begin with a fundamental

distinction: the first amendment "embraces two concepts-freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of

things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation
for the protection of society." 3 z The next step is to determine to what
extent the protection of society justifies regulation of the free exercise of
religion. The Supreme Court has developed a balancing test to provide
guidance in this determination: If a statute is to withstand a constitu-

tional challenge, "it must appear either that the State does not deny the
free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a

state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming
protection under the Free Exercise Clause.'

33

However, the statutory

infringement will in any case be invalid if "the State may accomplish
ants to be licensed in the same manner as nonreligiously affiliated day-care centers. Id at 666,
258 S.E.2d at 460.
29. Id at 667, 258 S.E.2d at 461.
30. Defendants did not claim that the act of being licensed was in itself contrary to their
religious beliefs. Id at 671, 258 S.E.2d at 463.
31. Id at 672, 258 S.E.2d at 464.
32. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). The court in Heritage Church relied heavily on Cantwell because it too involved a licensing solicitation statute under which an
officer had total discretion to determine whether a cause was religious and, if it was determined
not to be, to deny licensing.
33. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (holding that the Amish must be exempted
on religious grounds from a statutory requirement of compulsory education). The same test,
stated in less concise form, was applied in Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (unconstitutional to deny state unemployment benefits to woman who would not work on Saturday for
religious reasons), and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (plurality opinion upholding
Sunday closing laws despite economic burden created for Sabbatarians). Yoder, Sherbert and
Braunfeld are the leading cases in which this test was developed.
This test was applied in FayettevilleSchool. In HeritageChurch the court set forth its own list
of three factors, derived from Cantwell and from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(holding that the state could forbid a minor from publicly distributing religious literature under a
statute to protect the welfare of minors). The Heritage Church court said a state may regulate a
religious activity so long as "the regulation does not: (1) involve a religious test; (2) unreasonably
burden or delay the religious activity ... ; or (3) discriminate against one because he is engaged in
an activity for a religious purpose.' 40 N.C. App. at 437, 253 S.E.2d at 478. After expressing an
intention to review the statute under these principles, the court failed to do so in a methodical
fashion. See text accompanying notes 36-40 infra.
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The Heritage Church court engaged in a rather fragmented approach to the statutory provisions, applying a bewildering variety of
legal precedent3 5 without a clearly expressed underlying theory. A

straightforward analysis using the Supreme Court's balancing test
would have arrived at the same end by a less arduous route, as well as

providing more definite guidance for future decisions.
It is evident that the court found plaintiffs' free exercise of religious belief was infringed by the statute. 36 Absent a holding that the

statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, this finding triggers the application of the Supreme Court's balancing test: is there a "state interest of
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection?" The

court found, almost incidentally, that the purpose of the Solicitation of
Charitable Funds Act is "to protect the public from fraudulent practices in solicitation. ' 37 There was no discussion of the significance of

this goal or of what weight it should properly be given when balanced
against first amendment rights, but merely a conclusion, with respect to
each challenged statutory section, that the infringement was constitu-

tionally impermissible. 38 Although the purpose of protection against
fraud is certainly legitimate, whether this purpose would ever justify
restricting free exercise of religion is not expressly addressed in Heritage Church.3 9 However, given its finding that less restrictive means
34. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
35. See note 33 supra.
36. See, e.g., notes 13-16 & 19-23 and accompanying text supra.
37. 40 N.C. App. at 449, 253 S.E.2d at 485.
38. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
39. An interesting issue related to the question whether protection against fraud may justify
restricting the free exercise of religion was considered in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944), affd on rehearing, 152 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). Defendants in Ballard had solicited funds by mail for a religious movement by representing themselves as "divine
messengers" with supernatural curative powers and were indicted under federal mail fraud statutes. The Court held that the jury could not consider the truth of defendants' religious beliefs, for
"[m]en may believe what they cannot prove." Id at 86. The question submitted to the jury at
defendants' original trial was whether they in good faith believed their religious claims, Id at 81.
Although a dissenting justice in the first Ballard decision argued that an inquiry into the good
faith of religious beliefs would be unconstitutional, id at 92-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting), the court
never directly faced this issue. A fraudulent representation of religious beliefs, in which a person
does not believe his own representations, for the purpose of soliciting funds might not be subject
to constitutional regulation by a state if Ballard means that good faith of the solicitor's religious
beliefs cannot be tried. However, at least one Justice reads Ballard to favor inquiry into good
faith: "We are told that an official inquiry into the good faith with which religious beliefs are
held might be itself unconstitutional. But this court indicated otherwise in United States v. Ballard .
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 615 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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could be employed to protect against fraud,40 the court could have
properly concluded that the restrictions were invalid even if the state's
purpose were of "sufficient magnitude." Thus, the court arrived at a
proper conclusion in its holdings concerning the free exercise of religion, although its reasoning is unclear.
The court in Fayetteville School, on the other hand, applied the
proper balancing test in an orderly fashion. The purpose of the DayCare Facilities Act of 1977 is stated to be the protection of the "'physical safety and moral environment'" of children attending the centers.4'
The court found this purpose to be both constitutional and compelling.42 "[R]eligious bodies may not endanger the peace, good order,
and morals of society." 43 Thus, regulation for purposes of health and
safety could constitutionally restrict, at least to some extent, the free
exercise of religion. 44 However, since there was no evidence that the
religious beliefs or actions of the defendants were in any way affected, 45
let alone infringed upon, no balancing of interests was necessary to
support the court's conclusion.
The Heritage Church court's analysis of the violation of the establishment of religion clause,46 like its analysis of the free exercise clause,
does not accurately reflect the test in current use by the Supreme Court:
"[i]n order to pass muster, a statute must have a secular legislative purpose, must have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion." 47 The protection of society from fraudulent solicitations is undeniably a secular purpose, but the effect of the
exemption for denominational religious groups as recognized by the
40. 40 N.C. App. at 449, 253 S.E.2d at 485. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
41. 42 N.C. App. at 672, 258 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-85(2) (1978)).
42. Id
43. Id at 665, 258 S.E.2d at 464.
44. The court's reasoning here is supported by substantial precedent. The state has generally
been held to have the authority to protect the health of i child, even over religious protests by the
child or his parents. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S.
890 (1962) (state authority to protect child whose parents neglected his health for religious reasons
by refusing consent to blood transfusions).
45. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
46. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
47. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1977). The test applied by the Heritage Church
court to determine whether the establishment clause is violated was the following: if either the
purpose or the primary effect of the statute "is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution" 40 N.C.
App. at 446, 253 S.E.2d at 483 (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963)).
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court4 8 is clearly to advance religions of particular denominations.
Furthermore, the issuing officer's wide discretion in the revocation, denial, and suspension of licenses on the basis of his finding that an "un49
reasonable" percentage of funds was used for noncharitable purposes
may well be "an excessive entanglement with religion." Any one of the
three factors in the test will invalidate a statute. The advancement or

inhibition of religion appears to be the most critical factor in this case.
Although the HeritageChurch court relied on this factor in its decision,
it failed to consider the "excessive entanglement" factor and gave only
brief recognition to the existence of the "secular purpose" factor. Once
again, -the court arrived at the proper conclusion but employed incomplete legal analysis along the way.
C. FourthAmendment-Administrative Searches
North Carolina courts had two opportunities to consider the constitutionality of administrative searches, both with and without warrants, authorized by the Occupational Safety & Health Act (OSHA) of
North Carolina. 0 Section 95-136(a)5 1of the Act authorizes warrantless
administrative searches by OSHA inspectors. The wording of the section is nearly identical to a federal OSHA statutory section invalidated
by the Supreme Court in Marshallv. Barlow's,Inc. 52 as violative of the
fourth amendment. The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Gooden .
Brooks,5 3 therefore, adopted the Barlow's reasoning and declared sec48. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra; note 23 supra.
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-126 to -155 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
51. (a) In order to carry out the purposes of this Article, the Commissioner or Director,
or their duly authorized agents, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner,
operator, or agent in charge, are authorized:
(1) To enter without delay, and at any reasonable time, any factory, plant,
establishment, construction site, or other area, work place or environment where
work is being performed by an employee of an employer; and (2) To inspect and
investigate during regular working hours, and at other reasonable times, and within
reasonable limits, and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment and
all pertinent conditions, processes, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner,
operator, agent or employee.
Id § 95-136(a).
52. 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (invalidating Occupational Health & Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-596, § 8(a), 84 Stat. 1590). See generally Note, Constitutional Law.- Adminisirative Searches.Marshallv. Barlow's, Inc.: OSH4 Needs a Warrant, 57 N.C.L. REv. 320 (1979).
53. 39 N.C. App. 519, 251 S.E.2d 698 (1979). Plaintiffs were engaged in wood products businesses and brought this action to enjoin the Commissioner of Labor from conducting warrantless
inspections of nonpublic areas of their business establishments, as well as to have warrantless
inspections declared unconstitutional. Only plaintiff Ward Lumber Company, fined for refusing
to allow inspections, was found to have standing to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The rights
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tion 95-136(a) unconstitutional. 54 The Barlow's Court held that, while
warrantless administrative searches may be reasonable in certain businesses,55 they usually cannot be justified in an ordinary business because the proprietor has a reasonable expectation of privacy, 56 and the
requirement of a warrant will not "impose serious burdens on the in57
spection system" or make enforcement of the statute ineffective.
Plaintiff in Gooden also challenged the constitutionality of the statutory criteria governing the decision whether to issue a warrant by
claiming that the criteria do not meet the requirements set forth in Barlow's.5 8 Section 15-27.2(c)(1) of the statute provides that a warrant
shall be issued when it is established that the property is to be
"searched or inspected as part of a legally authorized program of inspection which naturally includes that property, or that there is probable cause for believing" such a condition exists as to justify
inspection. 9 The Court established in Barlow's that probable cause for
an administrative search need not meet criminal law standards but may
be based on either "specific evidence of an existing violation" or "a
showing that 'reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an ...inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
[establishment].'"60 Specifically, the Court stated that due process
would be satisfied when an OSHA warrant showed that a particular
business was selected for inspection "on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral
sources."61
The Gooden court held that section 15-27.2(c)(1) does comply with
the Barlow's standard by interpreting the section to require "a showing
..that the general administrative plan for enforcement is based upon
of other plaintiffs were not immediately threatened, and the action was dismissed with respect to
them. Id at 520-22, 251 S.E.2d at 701.
54. Id at 523, 251 S.E.2d at 701.
55. Such businesses include the liquor and firearms industries. 'The element that distinguishes these enterprises from ordinary businesses is a long tradition of close government supervi-

sion, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must already be aware." 436 U.S.
at 313.
56. The right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion on one's private premises
applies not only to residence dwellings, but also to nonpublic areas of commercial property. Id at
312.
57. Id at 316.
58. 39 N.C. App. at 523, 251 S.E.2d at 702.
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27.2(c)(1) (1978).

60. 436 U.S. at 320-21 (the latter alternative is quoted from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).
61. Id at 321.
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'reasonable legislative or administrative standards,'" and by finding
that the section's provision for a "legally authorized program of inspection" satisfies the Barlow's requirement that the general plan be "'derived from neutral sources.' "62

Plaintiff Gooden also contended that OSHA warrants authorized
by the statute were "general warrants" of the kind prohibited by the
North Carolina Constitution.6 3 The court did not reach this issue be-

cause it found that the specific warrant in question was invalid in that
the affidavit did not contain information from which the issuing magistrate could determine (1) the existence of a legally authorized inspec-

tion program naturally including the property, (2) that the general
administrative enforcement plan was based on reasonable standards,
64
and (3) that the standards were being neutrally applied to plaintiff.

The "general warrant" theory was asserted again in Brooks v. Taylor Tobacco Enterprises,Inc. ,65 and again the issue was avoided by a
finding, based on a fine technical point, that the warrant in question did
not comply with statutory requirements. The warrant did not on its
face specify the conditions expected to be found, as required by statute.
However, the underlying affidavit, which was attached to the warrant,
did specify such conditions.6 6 A warrant may be upheld if it incorporates by reference an attached affidavit containing the required showings. The warrant in question did refer to the affidavit for required
statements of the property to be inspected, but failed to make specific
reference to the affidavit's inclusion of statements regarding the conditions expected to be found.6 7 The supreme court held the warrant inva62. 39 N.C. App. at 524, 251 S.E.2d at 702 (quoting 436 U.S. at 320-21).
63. "General warrants whereby an officer or other person may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of the act committed, or to seize any person or persons not named,
whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty
and shall not be granted." N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 20.
64. 39 N.C. App. at 529, 251 S.E.2d at 704-05. The court noted that these requirements for
the affidavits would impose a minimal administrative burden since the Department of Labor currently maintains neutral criteria which it uses to determine whether potential objects of administrative searches should in fact be inspected. Id at 526-528, 251 S.E.2d at 703-04.
65. 298 N.C. 759, 260 S.E.2d 419 (1979). Plaintiffs also alleged that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1527.2(c)(1) (1978) is void for vagueness in its criteria for issuance of warrants. Id at 760-61, 260
S.E.2d at 421. See text accompanying note 59 supra for the challenged language.
66. The supreme court opinion is unclear as to the presence of the required statements in the
affidavit, but the court of appeals opinion reveals that the affidavit stated in great detail the objects
and conditions that the "'inspection [was] intended to check or reveal.'" 39 N.C. App. 529, 538,
251 S.E.2d 656, 661 (1979) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27.2(d)(3) (1978)).
67. The court of appeals read the affidavit and warrant together and found them sufficient.
Id It also held that administrative search warrants are not the type of general warrants proscribed by the state constitution. Id at 534, 251 S.E.2d at 658. See note 63 and accompanying
text spra.
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lid even though it did incorporate the attached affidavit (in which all
required showings were made), merely because it failed to explicitly
incorporate the affidavit statements in the affidavit describing the conditions expected to be found.68

While it is an accepted principle of construction that a court will
not address the constitutionality of a statute when the case may be settled on alternative grounds,6 9 it seems the court in Taylor Tobacco went
to extreme lengths to find the warrant invalid. Had it wished to do so,
the court could have addressed the general warrant question. By forestalling consideration of this issue, the court has needlessly invited fur-

ther litigation and engendered uncertainty in the law.
.

FourteenthAmendment-Equal Protection7"

The court of appeals rejected an attack on the constitutionality of
the "crime against nature" statute in State v. Poe.71 The statute simply

prohibits committing "the crime against nature, with mankind or
beast,"7 2 without any elaboration on the specific kinds of acts included.
The adult male defendant was convicted of "the crime against nature"
for engaging in fellatio with the prosecuting witness, an adult female.7"
Defendant introduced evidence that the fellatio was performed in private by mutual consent.74 On appeal he argued that prosecution for
heterosexual fellatio between consenting adults violated a constitutional right to privacy.7 5
Defendant sought to extend the right to privacy to include recogni-

tion of a constitutional right to engage in specific sexual acts in private
by mutual consent. A prohibition on the use of contraceptives by mar68. 298 N.C. at 764, 260 S.E.2d at 423.
69. Id at 761, 260 S.E.2d at 421.
70. The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the state's intestacy
statute against an equal protection attack in Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762
(1979). For a discussion of this case, see this Survey, Property.
71. 40 N.C. App. 385, 252 S.E.2d 843 (1979).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1969).
73. Defendant was also charged with rape, but that charge was dismissed after the State had
presented its evidence. 40 N.C. App. at 386, 252 S.E.2d at 843.
74. The trial judge refused a request to charge the jury that defendant would not be guilty if
the act occurred between two consenting adults in private. Id
75. Id at 387, 252 S.E.2d at 844. Defendant also argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The court found, however, that judicial decisions clarified the statute and "persons of
ordinary intelligence would conclude a fellatio between a man and a woman would be classified
as a crime against nature and forbidden by G.S. 14-177." Id at 389, 252 S.E.2d at 845. See
Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973), in which a defendant convicted for a voluntary sexual
act under a sodomy statute claimed the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The Court held it
was not vague in the context of interpretive decisions.
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ried couples was held violative of a constitutional right to privacy in
Griswold v. Connecticut.7 6 In Eisenstadt v. Baird" the Supreme Court

struck down a similar prohibition on contraceptive use by unmarried
persons as a violation of equal protection, recognizing that single per-

sons also must be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion in
their choice whether to bear children.7" Defendant in Poe argued that

the state cannot prohibit "crimes against nature" between married persons without violating their Griswold right to privacy7 9 and that, under
Eisenstadt, the same logic applies to single persons. The court of ap-

peals rejected this line of reasoning by distinguishing the right to use
contraceptives while engaged in sexual conduct, as addressed in Gris-

wold and Eisenstadt, and the right to engage in the sexual conduct itself.80 The court's reasoning is clearly consistent with the current
position of the Supreme Court, which has never recognized the free-

dom to perform specific sexual acts as a fundamental interest invoking
constitutional protections.81
The Poe court went further, however, and suggested that even if

the state could not prosecute married couples for performing fellatio in
76. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
77. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
78. In its equal protection analysis, the majority of the Court in Eisenstadt did not rely on a
fundamental right versus compelling justification analysis, see note 84 infra, but it did recognize a
right to privacy in unmarried persons analagous to the privacy right of married persons recognized in Griswold:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Id at 453 (emphasis in original).
79. Defendant's argument is not without precedential support. Several courts have held that
the Griswold right to privacy of married persons overrules the state's right to impose criminal
penalties on married couples who engage in consensual "crimes against nature." As a result, these
courts have held sodomy statutes unconstitutional as applied to married persons. Eg., Buchanan
v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (D.C. Tex.), vacated, 401 U.S. 989 (1970); Hughes v. State, 14 Md.
App. 497, 287 A.2d 299, cert.denied,409 U.S. 1025 (1972); State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A,2d 748
(1973). The Supreme Court, however, has never directly addressed the issue.
80. 40 N.C. App. at 398, 252 S.E.2d at 845.
81. For example, in Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), several restrictions
on the marketing of nonprescription contraceptives were invalidated. The Court was divided in
its opinion, but several justices indicated the importance of distinguishing the right to control
contraceptives and the right to control sexual behavior, particularly with respect to minors. The
legitimacy of a state purpose of discouraging sexual behavior among minors was not denied, but
only the reasonableness of the means proposed to discourage such behavior. In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), af'dmrem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976), the Court
affirmed a dismissal of an attack by male homosexuals on the constitutionality of a state sodomy
statute.
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private, it could treat single persons differently without a violation of
the equal protection clause.82 The court noted that restrictions on
certain sexual acts that are performed only by certain classes of persons
have not been held unconstitutional-fornication and adultery, for example.83
The court's logic is unsound. At the very least, a restriction a~plicable only to single persons must survive a rational relationship test. 84
Under that test a prohibition of heterosexual fellatio between unmarried consenting couples in private can be constitutional only if (1) the
prohibition of fellatio is a constitutionally permissible objective, and
(2) the creation of a class of unmarried persons is rationally related to
the achievement of the elimination of acts of fellatio. There are strong
arguments against the constitutionality of prohibitions against such
"victimless crimes" as private sexual acts between consenting adults, 85
but the present body of legal precedent does not demand a retreat from
these traditional prohibitions.8 6
Assuming the state's goal of restricting fellatio is legitimate, it is
necessary to understand the reason for the restriction in order to evaluate the strength of the connection between the statute and the state's
82. 40 N.C. App. at 388, 252 S.E.2d at 845.
A few courts have taken the opposite view and held that sodomy statutes are also unconstitutional as applied to acts between consenting unmarried adults in private. In State v. Pilcher, 242
N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976), the majority, in a 5-4 decision, held a sodomy statute unconstitutional
"as an invasion of fundamental rights, such as the personal right of privacy, to the extent it attempts to regulate through use of criminal penalty consensual sodomitical practices performed in
private by adult persons of the opposite sex." Id at 359. The court relied on Eisenstadt for the
proposition that "[glovernmental intrusion into 'fundamental matters' cannot be distinguished on
the basis of marital status." Id at 358. See note 78 supra. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial

Court held a sodomy statute constitutionally inapplicable to acts between consenting adults in
private, irrespective of marital status, in Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 318 N.E.2d
478 (1974).
83. 40 N.C. App. at 388-89, 252 S.E. at 845.
84. The rational relationship test was the original equal protection standard and still applies
to economic and social regulations, classifications that are not "suspect," and rights that are not
"fundamental." See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). If unmarried persons were deemed to be a
"suspect class," or if the right to freedom in sexual acts were deemed "fundamental," then strict
scrutiny would be applied and the statute could be upheld only if it were necessary to achieve a
"compelling" state purpose. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (944).
85. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 15-13 (1978); Richards, Sexual
Autonomy and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy: .4Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979).

86. Among such victimless crimes is fornification, or unlawful sexual intercourse between
unmarried persons. Since fornification statutes appear at this time to be within the constitutional
powers of the state, the legislature could logically prohibit fellatio between unmarried adults as an
act of fornification, rather than as a "crime against nature."
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purpose. Fellatio is prohibited as a "crime against nature,'8 7 which appears to include virtually all sexual acts that, given the physiological

construction of man and beast, could never result in pregnancy. 8 For

this fundamental reason the prohibited acts seem to be viewed as un-

natural, immoral, or both. Because it is something intrinsic in the acts
themselves that makes them objectionable, it is not logical that they

should be more or less objectionable according to the marital status of
the actors. Of course, the legislature may take a piecemeal approach 9
to eradicating evil, beginning with single persons, but the premise of
the court's analysis is that a prohibition on married couples would be
an unconstitutional infringement of their right to privacy. When the

state forbids adultery, the discriminatory nature of the prohibition is
not only a reasonable but an indispensable part of the scheme-the
crime is definable only by reference to the marital status of the actors.
"Crimes against nature," on the other hand, maintain their "unnatural"
character irrespective of marital status, and if the Constitution de-

mands that married couples not be forbidden these "unnatural" acts, it
can only be in deference to an overriding right to privacy as first recognized in Griswold. In view of the Court's statements in Eisenstadt,

there is probably no constitutionally permissible basis for denying extension of the same rights to single persons. Thus, if it were true that a
prohibition on "crimes against nature" would be unconstitutional when

applied to married persons, then it is unlikely that there could be a
constitutionally rational relationship between the state's purpose and a
prohibition applicable only to single persons.
In State v. Tanner90 defendant was a convicted felon whose parole
period had ended a year before the offense at issue, resulting in restora-

tion of all his rights, except his right to "purchase, own, possess, or have
in his custody, care, or control any handgun."'" Anyone convicted of
certain enumerated felonies9 2 who is found to possess a handgun within
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1969).
88. The statute has been construed to include unnatural acts with animals, acts between
humans per anum and per os, sodomy, buggery, and various other unnamed acts of a bestial
character. See, e.g., State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 66, 243 S.E.2d 367, 374 (1978); State v. Wright,
27 N.C. App. 263, 265, 218 S.E.2d 511, 513, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 733, 220 S.E.2d 622 (1975).
89. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955): "The legislature may
select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others."
90. 39 N.C. App. 668, 251 S.E.2d 705, appeal dismissed, 297 N.C. 303, 254 SE.2d 924 (1979).
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
92. The applicable crimes are felonious convictions under Articles 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15,
17, 30, 33, 36, 36A, 52A, and 53 of Chapter 14 of the general statutes, and Article 5 of Chapter 90.
Id § 14-415.1(b)(1). These include, for example, felonious convictions for placing a burning cross
on another's property, rebellion against the state, first and second degree murder, rape, malicious
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five years after the end of his punishment 93 is guilty of a felony under
section 14-415.1 of the general statutes. Defendant owned a gun given
to him by a relative and was convicted under section 14-415.1 after the
gun was found in an automobile he was driving.'
On appeal defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute
as a denial of equal protection because (1) it prohibits possession not by
all felons, but only by those convicted of specified felonies;9" and (2) it
further discriminates among the specified group of felons by making
the length of the prohibition depend on the length and type of punishment imposed for the original felony.9 6
The court, in a very brief opinion, responded to defendant's arguments with the following holdings. First, the purpose of the statute is
the protection of citizens from violent acts. The defendant is a member
of a class of persons convicted of violent crimes and there is a reasonable relationship between this classification and the statutory purpose.97 Second, there is nothing discriminatory in further defining the
class as those whose particular punishment is still continuing or was
terminated within the last five years, especially when the same standard
is applied to all. 98 This latter comment does not meet defendant's challenge, because equal treatment of all members of a class is not proof of
the reasonableness of the class itself.9 9 The boundaries of the class itself may be challenged on the ground that the enumerated felonies inlude some that are only "violent" in the broadest sense-for example,
offenses against public safety, obstructing justice, at least some incidents of escape from prison, and the illegal sale of weapons.Il ° Furcastration, assault, kidnapping, burglary, arson, obstructing justice, escape from prison, offenses
against public safety, rioting and certain sales of weapons.
93. The end of punishment may be the date of conviction, discharge from a correctional
institute or termination of probation, parole or a suspended sentence, whichever is later. Id § 14-

415. 1(a).
94. 39 N.C. App. at 669, 251 S.E.2d at 705. Defendant did not deny his possession of the
handgun, but in fact called the gun to the attention of the arresting officer. Id.
95. Id at 670, 251 S.E.2d at 706.
96. Id See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
97. 39 N.C. App. at 669, 251 S.E.2d at 706. The rational relationship test is appropriate here
because no fundamental right or suspect class is involved. See note 84 supra.
98. 39 N.C. App. at 671, 251 S.E.2d at 706.
99. The Supreme Court established this point in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), in
which a miscegenation statute was declared unconstitutional. The State had argued that there was
no denial of equal protection because both white and black marriage partners were punished
equally. The Court rejected "the notion that mere equal application of a statute containing racial
classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations." Id at 8. Although Loving involved a suspect class,
and hence strict scrutiny, the same logic should apply under a rational relationship test.
100. See note 92 supra.
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thermore, it is true that the length of the period of prohibition may vary
greatly depending on the individual punishment imposed, which may
be only tenuously related to a tendency toward future armed violence,
thereby creating somewhat arbitrary results.
The question whether the connection between means and end is
rational is also subject to the argument that the probability that an individual felon will repeat violent acts may be too uncertain to justify subjecting the entire group to special treatment. Finally, it may be argued
that once his punishment is complete, the felon has paid his debt to
society and is entitled to be treated as if totally rehabilitated, so that all
his rights should be fully restored.
Despite the policy arguments that may be raised against the statute, the court appears to have been correct in upholding its constitutionality. These arguments may well have been appropriate
considerations for the legislature before the statute was enacted, but the
legislature has spoken and the fact remains that classifications in state
criminal statutes, barring a suspect class or fundamental right,' 0 ' are
merely subject to the rational relationship test. 102 The challenged classification need only be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest," 10 3 and the "rational distinctions may be made with substantially
less than mathematical exactitude."'10
Common sense reveals some rational connection between persons
convicted of the enumerated felonies and the commission of violent
crimes within a reasonable period following punishment. Furthermore,
the statute is drawn so as to preserve the felon's right to a handgun in
situations where he would be likely to use it in self-defense: "[n]othing
101. Note that there is not a fundamental right involved here, despite the provision of the
second amendment that "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
"This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that
instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but
this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one
of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government." United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
102. See note 84 supra.
103. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Dukes overruled Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457 (1957), "the only case in the last half century to invalidate a wholly economic regulation
solely on equal protection grounds." 427 U.S. at 306. Social legislation not involving a suspect
classification or fundamental right has been treated with comparable liberality. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-7 (1978). Clearly a state legislature has very wide latitude in these
areas and the judiciary will show great deference to legislative judgment,
104. New Orleans v. Dukes; 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Furthermore, "the judiciary may not sit
as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made
in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines." Id
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in this subsection would prohibit the right of any person to have posses-

sion of a firearm within his own home or on his lawful place of business." 0 5 By allowing possession in situations where criminal acts of
violence against the state's citizens are least probable, the statute avoids
sweeping too broadly.' 0 6 Precedent dictates that the equal protection

clause is not violated when a nonsuspect classification is reasonably
well-suited to achieving a legitimate end, and section 14-415.1 easily
conforms to these minimal requirements.

The court of appeals held that a statute authorizing greater penalties for males convicted of assaulting females than for males assaulting
other males, or for females convicted of assaulting adults of either sex
under similar circumstances was not a constitutionally impermissible
gender classification in violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal

protection clause.' 0 7 Defendant in State v. Gurganust08 was convicted
of a misdemeanor assault on his wife under section 14-33(b)(2) of the

general statutes, which provides a greater maximum punishment for an
assault by a male over the age of eighteen when the only aggravating

factor is that his victim is a female.' 0 9 On appeal defendant alleged
that the gender-based difference in severity of punishment denies males
equal protection of the laws.

The court analyzed the statute by applying the "middle-tier" scrutiny test for gender classifications set forth by the United States
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Defendant offered substantial testimony to show that he was moving his possessions to a new home on the day of his arrest. 39 N.C.
App. at 669, 251 S.E.2d at 705. In addition to his equal protection challenges, defendant asserted
on appeal that the statute is unconstitutional because it allows no way for a felon to transport a
gun to his home or place of business, where he may legally possess it. ld at 670, 251 S.E.2d at
706. The court dismissed this objection as frivolous. Id at 671, 251 S.E.2d at 706. The statute
does put the felon in an awkward position, but imposes only a minor inconvenience--the felon
should simply have someone else transport the gun for him. A similar conflict occurs between his
right to possess a gun in his home or place of business and his inability to purchase a gun lawfully.
Defendant may, as in this case, be given a gun, or he may have someone else purchase it on his
behalf.
106. A statute may be invalidated if it prohibits activities that are constitutionally protected.
However, because the state is not constitutionally required to allow unrestricted possession of
firearms by citizens in good standing, see note 11 supra, the felon's right to possess a firearm
probably is not constitutionally protected under any circumstances.
107. State v. Gurganus, 39 N.C. App. 395, 250 S.E.2d 668 (1979).
108. Id
109. The statute provides that a simple assault by anyone against anyone is punishable by a
maximum fine of $50.00 and not more than 30 days imprisonment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1979). The maximum punishment, however, is two years imprisonment, a fine, or
both, when (1) serious injury is actually inflicted or intended, or (2) a male over 18 assaults a
female, or (3) a child under 12 years old is assaulted, or (4) a law officer is assaulted while discharging his official duties. Id § 14-33(b).
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Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren:"10 "To withstand constitutional
challenge, ...

classifications by gender must serve important govern-

mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.""' The court found that the purpose of the statute-

the prevention of "bodily injury to the citizens of the State arising from
assaults"'lE---is "not only an important governmental objective," but

also "the most important and fundamental objective of government."'1 3 Turning to the question whether section 14-33(b)(2) is substantially related to achievement of this objective, the court answered
in the affirmative, saying: "We base our decision... upon the demonstrable and observablefact that the averageadult male is taller, heavier
4 Thereandpossessesgreaterbody strength than the averagefemale." 11
fore, an assault by a male upon a female logically carries a greater
probability of serious injury, justifying greater punishment." 5 The

court reasoned that these "virtually immutable facts of nature" have

that the general assembly is
not been altered by the Constitution and
6
permitted to take them into account."

110. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). "Middle-tier" scrutiny is so called because it is more rigorous than
the rational relationship test, but less demanding than strict scrutiny. See note 84 supra.
S111.429 U.S at 197. The Court added that prior decisions had "rejected administrative ease
and convenience as sufficiently important objectives to justify gender-based classifications." Id at
198.
112. 39 N.C. App. at 400, 250 S.E.2d at 672.
113. Id (emphasis in original). "Without such protection there can be neither government
nor civilization." d
114. Id at 401, 250 S.E.2d at 672 (emphasis in original). The court noted that, in view of its
decision, it was not necessary to rely on data indicating that men assault women more often and
more violently than women assault men. Id Had the court based its decision on that ground, it
could have produced disturbing implications. For example, assume statistics show that poor people are significantly more likely to engage in certain crimes than other economic groups. Would
not such logic justify more severe penalties for poor criminals, especially since wealth has not been
held a suspect class, see, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 1829 (1973), so that only a rational relationship between the statutory penalty and the prevention of
crime would have to be established? Even if strict scrutiny were applied, "Ihe most important"
governmental objective would clearly provide a compelling purpose. This line of reasoning probably would not withstand scrutiny precisely because of such logical extensions. See notes 124 &
128 and accompanying text infra.
115. The court acknowledged that classifications based on average physical differences could
be unconstitutional in some contexts, such as equal employment opportunities and sports participation, but found they were justified when used to distinguish criminal acts of violence with no
productive purposes. 39 N.C. App. at 401 250 S.E.2d at 673.
116. Id at 402, 250 S.E.2d at 673. Rejecting a request by defendant that it consider the potential impact of the pending Equal Rights Amendment in its decision, the court said that such issues

will be addressed only after the amendment becomes part of the Constitution. Id Proponents of
ERA have said that under the amendment gender classifications can survive only if they work to

protect a right to personal privacy, or if they are based on physical characteristics unique to one
sex. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 618-19 (1978).
Because the Gurganus decision is not based on unique characteristics attributable only to one sex,
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No one would deny that the protection of the physical integrity of
its citizens is at least an important governmental objective, and that a
well-established means toward achieving that end is the imposition of
greater degrees of punishment for crimes that result, or are intended to
result, in greater physical harm." 7 The court's defense of the statute
suggests the following underlying rationale: when the aggressor in an
assault is significantly stronger than the victim, the punishment should
be correspondingly more severe. Although this principle could be applied on a case-by-case basis, the effect of section 14-33(b)(2) is to irrebuttably presume, before the crime occurs, 1) that each male attacker
is stronger than his female victim, and 2) that an assault upon a female
by a male will result in greater physical harm than will an assault on
another male, or a female's assault on an adult" 8 of either sex. 1 9
Assuming that the physical superiority of the attacker over the victim is a valid basis for augmented punishment, it is nevertheless clear
that not every male is stronger than every female. In Craigv. Boren the
Court invalidated a statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, while allowing sales to
females in that age group.' 20 The State offered statistics showing that
the class of males affected was more likely to become drunk and to
drive while under the influence.'
The Court rejected the statistical
disparity as insufficiently substantial to "form the basis for employment
of a gender line as a classifying device,"' 2 2 and noted that it had "consistently rejected the use of sex as a decisionmaking factor even though
the statutes in question certainly rested on far more predictive empirical relationships" than the Craig v. Boren data.' 2 3 It is not clear what
degree of correlation, if any, would be viewed by the Court as sufficient
"if maleness is to serve as a proxy for' 24 a prohibited behavior such as
but rather on the average occurrence of certain common characteristics, it is unlikely that the
statute could be upheld on this ground under the suggested view of ERA.
117. Section 14-33(b) expressly takes into account the concept of greater punishment for
greater intended harm. See note 109 supra.
118. The statute also provides greater punishment for an assault on a child under 12 by a
person of either sex. See note 109 supra.
119. It may be argued that the sentencing procedures allow some discretion to take into account relative body strengths for assaults in these other gender combinations. If this is so, then
there is even less need for the presumptions embodied in § 14-33(b)(2).
120. 429 U.S. at 192.
121. The statistics were claimed to be .18% of females compared to 2.0% of males. Id at 201.
122. Id
123. Id at 202.
124. "Certainly if maleness is to serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2%
must be considered an unduly tenuous fit." Id at 201-02.
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assault on a female but the Gurganus court might have attempted to set
a standard for such a correlation. 25 The court expressly refused to rest
its decision on the statistical likelihood that males will assault females
more often than females will assault males, 26 resting it instead on the
even more dubious ground that when a male does assault a female, the
physical harm is likely to be greater than in other cases. The court's
proposed justification for the statute means that a male who assaults a
female is punished more severely based on a statistical prediction of his
relative strength and size-nonbehavioral factors that are totally beyond his control and that are not integral to the crime itself. 127 The
court is, in effect, making maleness a proxy for strength.' 2 Strength is
not a crime, but at most only a characteristic of a person who might
commit a crime. Moreover, a person with greater physical strength will
not necessarily use it; assuming two defendants who cause equal injury,
it is not rational to mete out greater punishment to one merely because
he is stronger than his victim. The questionable nature of this reasoning is clearly seen when one considers substituting a racial group that is
statistically of larger or smaller average stature for the male or female
categories in the statute. The Court in Craig v. Boren warned against
the dangers of allowing "statistics ... to govern the permissibility of
state... regulation without regard to the Equal Protection Clause as a
limiting principle."' 2 9
125. If the propensity of males to assault females were proved, the greater punishment for that
particular crime arguably would have deterrent effect.
126. 39 N.C. App. at 401, 250 S.E.2d at 672. See note 114 supra.
127. Compare State v. Wilson, 296 N.C. 298, 250 S.E.2d 621 (1979), in which defendant was
convicted of forcibly raping a "female child under the age of 12 years" in violation of Law of
March 11, 1949, cl. 299, § 4, 1949 N.C. Sess. Laws 262 (repealed 1979) (formerly codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-21), and alleged on appeal that the statute was "a gender based criminal law
violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," Id at 311, 250 S.E.2d at
629. The court properly held that the statute did not deny equal protection. Clearly the crime of
rape, unlike assault, cannot be defined other than by reference to specific sexual characteristics,
and human physiology justifies finding that the need to protect .males from physical harm by
female rapists is minimal. Note also that the physical characteristics relied on in a gender classification used in a rape statute are unique to each sex and are not merely sexual averages. This fact
makes it likely that § 14-21 could withstand attack even under the ERA. See note 116 supra.
128. It has been held that a sex difference alone cannot justify different sentences for the same
crime committed under the same circumstances. E.g., United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 987
(4th Cir. 1974). The court in Gurganus tried to remove this infirmity from the statute by grading
punishment according to gender in the guise of relative physical strength. The end result, however, was the imposition of greater punishment solely due to the gender of the parties involved.
This would be suspect even if physical superiority were precisely identified with maleness; it is
even less justified when averages are relied on. "[Tihe principles embodied in the Equal Protection Clause are not to be rendered inapplicable by statistically measured but loose-fitting generalities." 429 U.S. at 208-09.
129. 429 U.S. at 208 n.22. The Court said: "[Slocial science studies that have uncovered
quantifiable differences in drinking tendencies dividing along both racial and ethnic lines strongly
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The Gurganus court may be correct in asserting that the average

greater body size of males is an "immutable fact of nature," but this
immutability does not necessarily result in a "substantial" or even a

rational relationship to a scheme of punishment designed to serve an
important governmental objective.
E. Fourteenth Amendment-ProceduralDue Process
In In re Lassiter131 the court of appeals considered whether a parent has a constitutional right to assistance of counsel in a proceeding to
terminate parental rights. 3 ' The Lassiter child had been adjudicated a
neglected child and placed in foster care.' 32 A year later the child's
unwed mother 33 was convicted of second degree murder and was serving a sentence for that conviction at the time she was notified of the
hearing on termination of her parental rights. The indigent mother was
not represented by counsel at the hearing and apparently did not request counsel at that time. 134 The court terminated her rights, and she
appealed, claiming the trial court committed reversible error in failing
to appoint counsel to represent her.
The Lassiter court summarily concluded that procedural due process was satisfied because the mother had notice of the hearing, was persuggest the need for application of the Equal Protection Clause in preventing discriminatory treatment that almost certainly would be perceived as invidious." Id at 208. The Court noted that
some states had incorporated their concepts of the drinking behavior of entire groups into their
alcohol-control statutes, and that the "repeal of most of these laws signals society's perception of
the unfairness and questionable constitutionality of singling out groups to bear the brunt of alcohol regulation." Id at 208 n.22.
130. 43 N.C. App. 525, 259 S.E.2d 336 (1979).
131. Termination of parental rights in North Carolina is governed by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A289.22 to .34 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The stated purpose of termination is to make possible a "permanent plan of care at the earliest possible age" for a child whose "parents have demonstrated that
they will not provide the degree of care which promotes the healthy and orderly physical and
emotional well-being of the child." Id § 7A-289.22(l), (2). The effect of a termination order is to
"completely and permanently" terminate "all rights and obligations of the parent to the child and
of the child to the parent ...." Id § 7A-289.33.
132. A "neglected child" is one "who does not receive proper care or supervision or discipline
from his parent.., or who has been abandoned, or who is not provided necessary medical care or
other remedial care recognized under State law, or who lives in an environment injurious to his
welfare, or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law .. " Id § 7A-278(4)
(1969). For general procedural provisions governing neglect adjudications, see id §§ 7A-277 to
-289 (1969).
133. The putative father had not participated in support of the child or offered to legitimate
him. 43 N.C. App. at 526, 259 S.E.2d at 337.
134. The child's mother was "notified of the hearing in this matter by registered mail and had
opportunity to seek counsel .... but did not do so. She took no action to obtain counsel, and
appeared at the hearing only because counsel for petitioner caused her to be brought to Durham
for the hearing." Id
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sonally present, and was permitted to testify and cross-examine
witnesses. t35 The court then held that substantive due process was not

violated because (1) state intervention on behalf of neglected children
is a reasonable exercise of the state's police power, 3 6 (2) there was no
evidence that appellant was treated unreasonably, particularly since
she showed a continuing pattern of neglect, 137 and (3) no criminal sanc-

tions accompany the termination of parental rights.' 38 The court concluded that state intervention "does invade a protected area of
individual privacy," but "the invasion is not so serious or unreasonable
as to compel us to hold that appointment of counsel for indigent parents is constitutionally mandated."'' 39 The court finally added that it
would require appointment of counsel only if clearly directed to do so
by the legislature.' 4 °
Appellant in Lassiter did not challenge the power of the state to

intervene to protect children from unfit parents, but only questioned
the failure to appoint counsel, thereby raising an issue of procedural
due process. 14 Thus, the court's discussion of substantive due process
135. Id
136. Id at 527, 259 S.E.2d at 337.
137. Id
138. Id
139. Id
140. Id at 527, 259 S.E.2d at 338. The court noted that the legislature has recently provided
for appointment of counsel in neglect proceedings. See note 132 supra. The 1979 General Assembly enacted the following provision, effective January 1, 1980: "In cases where the juvenile petition alleges that a juvenile is abused, neglected or dependent, the parent has the right to counsel
and to appointed counsel in cases ofindigency unless the parent waives the right." Law of June 7,
1979, ch. 815, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 401 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT, § 7A-587 (Cum. Supp.
1979)). It perhaps gives too little credit to the legislature to presume that counsel was provided in
neglect proceedings and intentionally denied in the far more drastic proceeding for termination of
parental rights.
141. Although the fourteenth amendment literally protects only against deprivation by the
state of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, the
Supreme Court has recognized that procedural due process requirements must be met in child
custody cases. Eg., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (children were summarily removed from unwed father after mother's death, on presumption of parental unfitness; held, convenience of proof is insufficient, under the due process clause, "to justify refusing a father a
hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family"). Recently the North Carolina Court of Appeals expressly confirmed this requirement of procedural due process in In re
Yow, 40 N.C. App. 688, 253 S.E.2d 647 (1979), in which a parent whose location was unknown
when a neglect proceeding was initiated alleged denial of due process because she was not notified
of the hearing. The court held, in a case of first impression, that under the particular facts appellant was not arbitrarily deprived of custody, and that therefore her due process rights were not
violated. An important factor relied on was that the deprivation was not irrevocable, but subject
to review at specified intervals. A "dependent child" is one who needs placement, special care or
treatment because his parent or guardian cannot provide such care, or because he has no parent or
guardian. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(3) (1969). See id §§ 7A-278 to -287 (procedures for declaring a child dependent). § 7A-286 provides that the court may, upon motion, review a court order
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does not address the issue raised, and the summary conclusion that procedural due process was satisfied appears to be based on the unsupof counsel is not a constitutionally
ported assumption that appointment
142
safeguard.
procedural
required
The United States Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge,143 constructed a balancing test requiring consideration of the following three
factors to determine whether procedural due process has been satisfied:
(1) the type of private interest that is affected; (2) the risk of erroneous

deprivation of the private interest through the procedures currently
used and the probable value (if any) of alternative or additional safeguards; (3) the nature of the governmental function involved and the
potential financial and administrative burdens of substitute or additional procedures.'" The test is a flexible one 14 5 and likely to generate
inconsistent results; 4 6 nevertheless, it does delineate the important
areas of concern. The court of appeals in Lassiter did not refer to the
Mathews test, although it did touch upon each factor to some degree in
the context of substantive due process.
The Lassiter court characterized the private interest involved as

"family integrity" and acknowledged it as a fundamental right; 147 yet

the court implied that termination of parental rights is not a very serious interference with this fundamental right.148 It is hard to imagine an
intervention more destructive of family integrity than the irrevocable
severance of the legal parent-child relationship. The absence of crimideclaring a child dependent to determine whether changes in circumstances of the child dictate
that the order should be vacated or modified in the best interests of the child.
142. Several state and lower federal courts have held that indigent parents have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in original proceedings to terminate parental rights. E.., Davis
v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977); State ex rel Lemaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W.
Va. 1974).
143. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (considering whether procedures for the termination of Social Security disability payments are procedurally fair). The test was applied more recently in Memphis
Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17 (1978).
144. 424 U.S. at 335.
145. This flexibility is consistent with the Court's understanding of procedural due process:
"'[d]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." Id at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
146. It has been suggested that the test overemphasizes the fairness of techniques of trial procedure and that a more systematic, value-oriented approach is preferable. See Mashaw, The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 28 (1976).
147. The court cited Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) for this proposition. 43 N.C.
App. at 526, 259 S.E.2d at 337. The Court in Quilloin emphasized the importance of family life,
but did not describe these interests as "fundamental rights."
148. Specifically, the court said that termination was not "so serious or unreasonable" as to
create a constitutional right to counsel. 43 N.C. App. at 527, 259 S.E.2d at 337.
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nal penalties against the parent does not conclusively demonstrate lack
of seriousness. Deprivation of liberty, even when accompanied by
some degree of social disapprobation, is not inevitably more severe
than permanent separation from a child.
The court did not consider the extent of the risk of erroneous termination of parental rights occasioned by present procedures, except to
indicate that the termination was not erroneous in this case, t4 9 nor did
it consider the probable value of appointed counsel in reducing the risk
of erroneous termination. The statutory procedures for termination of
parental rights are relatively uncomplicated, 50 and it may well be that
the presence of counsel would provide little additional protection. On
the other hand, the guidance of someone familiar with the grounds for
parental termination could help focus an indigent parent's defenses and
protect against the potential for confusion and manipulation that may
be created by the often fine line between poverty and undereducation
and neglect.
The third factor in the Mathews test, the nature of the governmental function, was mentioned only once, again in the context of substantive due process: "It certainly is not an unreasonable or arbitrary
exercise of the police power for the State to intervene between parent
and child where that child is helpless and defenseless and is endangered by parental neglect, inattention, or abuse."' 5 Clearly the protection of children from harmful parenting is a very important
governmental function, but the court did not consider the possibility
that financial and administrative burdens created by requiring appointment of counsel for indigents might be insubstantial.
The procedural due process issue raised by appellant is not without merit, and a truly responsive court would have given it greater con149. "Certainly no unreasonableness or arbitrariness appears on the instant record where the
evidence brought forward ...demonstrated a pattern of neglect of her child by respondent substantially predating her present incarceration, and no evidence of any rehabilitation of respondent
or amelioration of her attitude towards her child was adduced." Id Statements such as this indicate that the court was more influenced in its decision by the particularly egregious conduct of the
appellant than by the constitutional principles involved.
150. A summons is served on the parent, if known, and certain other interested parties. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.27 (Cum. Supp. 1979). If respondents fail to answer in writing within a
specified period, a termination order may be issued after a hearing on the petition. Id § 7A289.28. If the respondents answer, an adjudicatory hearing is conducted at which the judge takes
evidence and determines whether any of certain statutory conditions exist so as to provide grounds
for termination. Id §§ 7A-289.30, .32. If any one factor is found to exist, the judge then has
discretionary authority to order termination or, in the best interests of the child, to deny termination. Id § 7A-289.31. Any party to the hearing may appeal the disposition by the district court.
Id § 7A-289.34.
151. 43 N.C. App. at 527, 259 S.E.2d at 337.
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sideration. The intent of the legislature should not be determinative of
the constitutional right to due process, but is only useful as an indication of the importance of the governmental function and the potential
burdens caused by the proposed safeguard.
DESTIN SHANN TRAcY

V.

A4.

CRIMINAL LAW

Mental Capacity1

In State v. Potts' the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered
the type of hearing required to satisfy G. S. 15A-1002(b)(3), which provides that a court must hold a hearing to determine the defendant's
mental capacity to stand trial when his capacity is questioned "by the
prosecutor, the defendant, the defense counsel, or the court."3 G. S.
15A-1002(b)(1) and (2) further provide that the court in its discretion
may either appoint an impartial medical expert to examine the defendant or commit the defendant to a state mental health facility for observation and treatment when a motion questioning the defendant's
capacity to proceed is made.' Although the appellate courts of North
Carolina have considered whether a hearing on a motion to direct a
third-party examination of the defendant's capacity pursuant to G. S.

15A-1002(b)(1) and (2) implicitly satisfies G. S. 15A-1002(b)(3), 5 prior
to Potts the courts had not addressed the sufficiency of a mandatory
hearing.
Defendant in Potts was indicted for uttering a forged check.
While the jury was being selected, defendant's attorney moved that defendant be declared mentally incompetent to stand trial and that the
1. In 1979 the North Carolina General Assembly amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-56
(1974), effective July 1, 1979, to allow the voluntary admission of an inmate who is in the custody
of the Department of Correction to one of the regional mental health facilities. Law of May I1,
1979, ch. 547, § 1, 1979 Sess. Laws 564 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-56.10 (Cum, Supp.
1979)). Voluntary admission under this provision may be sought by any inmate who believes he
needs treatment for mental illness or inebriety. It will only be allowed, however, when both the
Secretary of Human Resources and the Secretary of Correction or their designees jointly agree to
the inmate's request. To minimize the potential hazards of this procedure, the legislature directed
the Department of Correction to assume responsibility for "the security and costs of transporting
inmates to and from regional psychiatric facilities." Existing statutory procedures for voluntary
admissions into treatment facilities, set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-56.3 (1974), also apply to
inmates, except that the Department of Correction retains custody of the inmate upon his
discharge from the treatment facility if his "term of incarceration has not been completed."
For analysis of the 1979 statutes on involuntary admission, see this Survey: Adminislrati/e
Law at text accompanying notes 234-43.
2. 42 N.C. App. 357, 256 S.E.2d 497 (1979).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-I002 (1978). A motion questioning defendant's capacity to proceed may be raised at any time. The motion, however, must "detail the specific conduct that leads
the moving party to question the defendant's capacity." Id.
4. Id. § 1002(b)(1) & (2) (1978).
5. See State v. Woods, 293 N.C. 58, 235 S.E.2d 47 (1977) (motion for commitment and
psychiatric examination); State v. Williams, 38 N.C. App. 183, 247 S.E.2d 620 (1978) (motion for
continuance to allow for psychiatric examination). These cases indicated that the requirement of
a hearing in G.S. 15A-1002(b)(3) is satisfied when the court hears any evidence on capacity that
the defendant is prepared to present and makes a judgment accordingly. See 293 N.C. at 62-64,
235 S.E.2d at 49-50; 38 N.C. App. at 188-89, 247 S.E.2d at 623.
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court "inquire into the basis of the motion." 6 Defense counsel offered
no medical evidence to support the motion, but stated that defendant
was unable to concentrate during jury selection, was hearing voices,
was schizophrenic and was receiving Social Security payments for
mental disability. Defense counsel admitted, however, that defendant
had cooperated with him and in his opinion understood the nature of
the circumstances surrounding the charge.7 The trial court denied this
motion, but allowed defendant to put on evidence in support of the
8
motion after the state had rested its case. After hearing the evidence,
the court concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to prison.9
On review, defendant contended that the trial court had failed to
hold the hearing on his capacity to proceed that is required by G.S.
15A-1002(b)(3). With little discussion, the court of appeals held that
the trial court had complied with the statute by entertaining defense
counsel's statement, which, taken as a whole, supported the court's denial of the motion. In affirming the conviction, the court of appeals
noted that any error there may have been was cured when the trial
court subsequently allowed evidence on the motion.' 0
The court of appeals' holding that the consideration of defendant's
motion by the trial court satisfied the requirements of the mandatory
hearing statute is sound. The court heard all the evidence on the motion defendant was prepared to present, both at the time the motion
was made and when the state rested its case. Furthermore, defense
counsel's statement in support of the motion and the subsequent evidence supported the trial court's denial of the motion. Mental incapacity is defined by statute as a defendant's inability "to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings. . . , comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or . . . assist in his defense in a
rational or reasonable manner."'" Defense counsel in Potts provided
evidence to support each of these elements when he stated that defendant understood the nature of the circumstances surrounding the charge
6. 42 N.C. App. at 358, 256 S.E.2d at 498.
7. Id.
8. Defendant's mother testified that he was "mentally sick" and had "been in mental institutions several times." A former instructor of defendant's testified that defendant had passed all
tests the instructor had given while defendant was in his class. Id.
9. Id. at 358, 256 S.E.2d at 499.
10. Id. at 359-60, 256 S.E.2d at 499.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001(a) (1978). Cf. State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 565, 213
S.E.2d 305, 316 (1975) (common-law definition). See generally Smith, Review of the Presentence
Diagnostic Study Procedure in North Carolina, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 17 (1976).
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and had cooperated with him. Therefore, any hearing, no matter how
informal, that elicits evidence on which to base a judgment on defendant's competence to stand trial should satisfy G.S. 15A-1002(b)(3).
B.

12

Homicide

The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Scott 3 clarified the
distinction between sufficient and insufficient evidence to withstand a
motion for nonsuit when the only evidence connecting defendant with
a crime is his fingerprints. Defendant in Scott was tried and convicted
of first degree murder in the Superior Court of Cabarrus County. The
victim's body had been found by his niece when she returned home
from work. The house had been ransacked, and a small metal box containing personal papers had been moved from its storage place onto a
desk. The box was used only by "immediate family members" who
opened it about once every three months. The only evidence connecting defendant with the murder was his partial thumbprint on this
box.

14

The prosecution attempted to establish by circumstantial evidence
that defendant's fingerprints could have been impressed only at the
time the murder was committed. The victim's niece testified that she
lived in the house, that she had never seen defendant, and that he had
never visited the house to her knowledge. She also testified that she
had been working in Charlotte five days a week for about a year before
her uncle's death and that she did not ordinarily see her uncle between
seven a.m. and six p.m.'I At the close of the state's evidence defendant
moved for a nonsuit. The trial court denied this motion, and defendant
behalf.16 The jury found
rested without offering evidence in his own
7
defendant guilty of first-degree murder.'
12. In 1979, the General Assembly amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e), effective May
14, 1979, to add that an aggravating circumstance that a judge may consider in a capital case when

determining the appropriate sentence is whether "[tihe murder for which the defendant stands
convicted was part of a course of conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the
commission by the defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or persons." Law
of May 14, 1979, ch. 565, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 596 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A2000(e)(l 1) (Cum. Supp. 1979)). A second amendment to the section, effective January 1, 1980,
allows a concurrent sexual offense to be considered an aggravating circumstance. Law of May 29,
1979, ch. 682, § 9, 1979 Sess. Laws 725 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(5) (Cum,
Supp. 1979)).
13. 296 N.C. 519, 251 S.E.2d 414 (1979).
14. Id. at 520-21, 251 S.E.2d at 415-16.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 521, 251 S.E.2d at 416.
17. Id. The jury also found defendant guilty of attempted armed robbery.
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On appeal of right, the North Carolina Supreme Court, holding
that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law 8 to withstand defendant's motion for nonsuit, reversed the conviction and remanded
the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment of nonsuit.19 In so
holding, the court followed
the rule that testimony by a qualified expert that fingerprints found
at the scene of the crime correspond with the fingerprints of the ac-

cused, when accompanied by substantial evidence of circumstances
from which the jury canfind that thefingerprintscould only have been
impressed at the time the crime was committed, is sufficient to with-

stand motion for nonsuit and carry the case to the jury.20
Applying the rule, the court found that deceased's niece could not have
known who visited her uncle when she was at work and that it was
therefore reasonable to infer that defendant's fingerprint might have
been impressed prior to the homicide."' The court concluded that the
evidence was "'suffiCient to raise a strong suspicion of the defendant's
guilt22 but not sufficient to remove the issue from the realm of suspicion
and conjecture.' "23
In its decision, the supreme court distinguished several previous
cases in which it had upheld convictions on similar facts. In State v.
Tew, 24 the closest case on point, the defendant was convicted of break-

ing and entering and larceny because his fingerprints were found on a
broken window pane through which the perpetrator had gained access

to a gas station. In addition to this evidence, the proprietor of the gas
station testified that she alone operated the station and was always
there when it was open, except when she went into town,2 5 and that she
18. Id. at 523, 251 S.E.2d at 417. "'What constitutes substantial evidence is a question of law
for the court. What the evidence proves or fails to prove is a question of fact for the jury.'" Id.
(quoting State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 93 S.E.2d 431 (1956)).
19. 296 N.C. at 526-27, 251 S.E.2d at 419.
20. State v. Miller, 289 N.C. 1,4, 220 S.E.2d 572, 574 (emphasis added). "[Sluch evidence
logically tends to show that the accused was present at and participated in the commission of the
crime." Id.
21. 296 N.C. at 526, 251 S.E.2d at 418.
22. Id. The court's suspicion of defendant's guilt was enhanced by a "letter of confession"
written by a then inmate in a South Carolina prison in which the inmate had confessed to the
murder of the victim in this case, stating that he had "committed" the murder with the use of
defendant Scott's truck. See State v. Vaughn, 296 N.C. 167, 170, 250 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 935 (1979) (affirming defendant Vaughn's conviction for first degree murder of
the victim in Scott).
23. 296 N.C. at 526, 251 S.E.2d at 419 (quoting State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 383, 156 S.E.2d
679, 682 (1967)). See also State v. Smith, 274 N.C. 159, 161 S.E.2d 449 (1968); State v. Minton,
228 N.C. 518, 46 S.E.2d 296 (1948). But see State v. Helms, 218 N.C. 592, 12 S.E.2d 243 (1940).
24. 234 N.C. 612, 68 S.E.2d 291 (1951). Justice Sharp, who wrote the Scott opinion, sat as a
Special Judge at the trial of the Tew case in superior court.
25. The reported decision does not indicate the frequency or duration of the proprietor's trips
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had never seen defendant before. The defendant offered no evidence
and moved for nonsuit. The trial court denied this request and found

defendant guilty as charged. The supreme court affirmed the conviction, holding the evidence sufficient to withstand the motion for nonsuit.2 6 The court in Scott distinguished Tew on the strength of the

proprietor's testimony, reasoning that the victim's niece in Scott was
not in a position to know who visited the deceased during the day,

whereas the proprietor in Tew could testify of her own knowledge that
defendant had never visited the station. 7
The Scott court distinguished two other similar cases, State P.
Miller"8 and State v. Foster,2 9 on the basis of the defendants' testimo-

nies therein. As in Scott and Tew, fingerprints of the defendants in
30

Miller and Foster were found at the scenes of their alleged crimes.
Unlike Scott and Tew, the defendants in Miller and Foster took the

stand and denied ever having been on the premises where their fingerprints were found. Neither defendant could explain the presence of his

fingerprints at these premises, and both were subsequently convicted. 3 1
On appeal, the supreme court in both cases held the evidence sufficient
to warrant submission of the cases to the juries. 32 The supreme court in
Scott explained its holdings in Miller and Foster, stating that a defend-

ant's "inability to offer a plausible explanation for the presence of his
fingerprints is some evidence of guilt," which, coupled with evidence of
33
defendant's fingerprints, may be sufficient to send the case to the jury.

But neither the court nor the jury can infer from a defendant's decision
not to testify that his fingerprints could have been impressed only while
committing the alleged crime.3 ' Thus, because the deceased's niece in
Scott was not in a position to know everyone who visited the deceased
to town. It states simply that the proprietor would get someone to stay at the station when she
went to town. Id. at 613, 68 S.E.2d at 292.
26. Id. at 617, 68 S.E.2d at 295.
27. 296 N.C. at 525-26, 251 S.E.2d at 418. The weight to be attributed to this testimony was
for the jury to decide. 1d.
28. 289 N.C. 1, 220 S.E.2d 572 (1975).
29. 282 N.C. 189, 192 S.E.2d 320 (1972).
30. Defendant in Miller was convicted of breaking and entering a local laundry; officers
"lifted" defendant's fingerprint from the padlock on the door of the laundry. 289 N.C. at 2-3. 220
S.E.2d at 573. Defendant in Foster was convicted of first-degree burglary; officers took his fingerprint from a flower pot on the violated premises. 282 N.C. at 191-92, 192 S.E.2d at 322.
31. 289 N.C. at 3, 220 S.E.2d at 573; 282 N.C. at 193-94, 192 S.E.2d at 323-24.
32. The Miller court upheld the conviction, 289 N.C. at 6, 220 S.E.2d at 575, and the Foster
court granted a new trial on other grounds, 282 N.C. at 198-200, 192 S.E.2d at 326-27.
33. 296 N.C. at 524, 251 S.E.2d at 417.
34. Id.
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during the day and no inference could be drawn from defendant's refusal to testify, the Scott court ruled that defendant's motion for nonsuit should have been granted.
The supreme court's distinction in Scott of its prior decision in
Tew indicates that before the court will find sufficient evidence to send
the case to the jury fingerprint evidence must be accompanied by testimony from a witness who states that he has never seen defendant
before, but would have seen defendant if he were ever lawfully on the
premises where the fingerprints were found. The Scott decision also
teaches a lesson in tactics: in a case in which the only evidence connecting defendant with the crime is his fingerprints at the scene, unless
strong corroborating evidence that defendant could not have been at
the scene at any other time exists, defendant's best defense may be no
defense at all. By not testifying, defendant can avoid the pitfall of
Miller and Foster.
In another homicide case, State v. Holsclaw,35 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals found that the discontinuance of extraordinary
means to prolong a person's life once brain death has occurred, provided for in G.S. 90-322,36 is not to be considered the proximate cause
of death. 37 The court in HoIsclaw held that the lower court had erred
in instructing the jury on brain death and the physician's act of terminating the life support systems in the context of the proximate cause of
death. The court stated that G.S. 90-322 did not apply to the case,
noting that the purpose of the statute is to protect physicians who terminate life support systems from civil and criminal liability. 8
C. Defenses
1. Self-Defense
Numerous cases in 1979 dealt with challenges to trial court instructions on defenses to charges of assault or homicide. In these cases,
35. 42 N.C. App. 696, 257 S.E.2d 650, appealdismissed,298 N.C. 571,261 S.E.2d 126 (1979).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute sets forth a procedure for
physicians to follow in terminating life support systems when no brain function is evident. If this
procedure is followed, the physician is protected from civil or criminal liability. See Comment,
North Carolina's Natural Death Act: Confronting Death With Dignity, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
771, 784-85 (1978).
37. 42 N.C. App. at 699, 257 S.E.2d at 652. Defendant in HoIsclawshot his next-door neighbor, who had to be put on a kidney dialysis machine and a. respirator and be given continuous
injections to keep his heart beating because of the gunshot wounds. Several days after the victim
was admitted to the hospital, attending physicians agreed that brain death had occurred and accordingly terminated the victim's life support systems.
38. Id.
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the appellate courts clarified the law in North Carolina on the proper

instructions for self-defense, defense of an arrestee, and defense of the
home.
In State v. Clay,39 the North Carolina Supreme Court declared

that the use of a deadly weapon in self-defense is justified only when a
person is threatened with "deadly force." 4 In setting forth this rule,
4
the court noted that two prior supreme court cases, State v. Anderson 1
and State v. Fletcher,42 "may [have left] the impression that a defend-

ant may assault another with a deadly weapon if it reasonably appears
that such assault is necessary to protect [himselfl from bodily injury or
offensive physical contact." 43 In both Anderson and Fletcher the

supreme court had held that a jury instruction implying that defendant
could not lawfully use force in self-defense unless threatened with
death or great bodily harm was prejudicial error.4" The Clay court
pointed out that these cases hold only that nondeadly force may be

used to resist a nonfelonious assault and are clearly consistent with the
principle recognized by North Carolina courts that one may use only
such force as is reasonably necessary to protect oneself from bodily injury or offensive physical contact. 45 The Clay decision reiterates this
principle, making it clear that the use of deadly force is justified only

when it reasonably appears necessary to prevent death or great bodily
harm.4 6 The reasonableness of defendant's apprehension is to be deter-

mined by the jury's consideration of all the facts and circumstances as
they appeared to the defendant at the time of the assault.47 This rule of

law conforms with that of the majority of jurisdictions."
39. 297 N.C. 555, 256 S.E.2d 176 (1979).
40. Id. at 563, 256 S.E.2d at 182. The court defined deadly force as "force likely to cause
death or great bodily harm." Id.
41. 230 N.C. 54, 51 S.E.2d 895 (1949).
42. 268 N.C. 140, 150 S.E.2d 54 (1966).
43. 297 N.C. at 562, 256 S.E.2d at 182.

44. 268 N.C. at 142, 150 S.E.2d at 56; 230 N.C. at 56, 51 S.E.2d at 897.
45. See, e.g., State v. Ellerbe, 223 N.C. 770, 774, 28 S.E.2d 519, 522 (1944).
46. To make this rule explicit, the Clay court prescribed a change in the pattern jury instructions on self-defense. In cases involving a deadly weapon per se, the instruction will no longer
include a reference to "bodily injury or offensive physical contact." In cases in which no deadly
weapon per se is used, the instruction should state that if the jury finds
that defendant assaulted the victim but doles] notfind that he useda deadly weapon, that
assault [should] be excused as being in self defense if the circumstances at the time he
acted were such as would create in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness a reasonable belief that such action was necessary to protect himself from "bodily injury or offensive physical contact."
297 N.C. at 565-66, 256 S.E.2d at 183-84 (emphasis in original).
47. State v. Ellerbe, 223 N.C. at 774, 28 S.E.2d at 522.
48. "One cannot carry his right of self-defense to the extent of using a deadly weapon upon
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In a second self-defense case considered by the North Carolina
Supreme Court, State v. Spaulding,4 9 the court reversed for erroneous
failure to instruct on self-defense. Defendant Spaulding was charged
with the first-degree murder of a fellow inmate. At trial, defendant
offered evidence showing that the victim had threatened defendant
while both were in the cell block and that defendant believed the victim
meant to stab him when they went into the recreation yard. Before
going into the yard, defendant armed himself with a homemade knife
and placed it in his pocket. In the yard, defendant told the victim that
he wanted no trouble with him. The victim approached defendant with
his hand "jammed" into his pocket in such a way that led defendant to
believe he had a knife. The victim backed defendant up to a fence,
whereupon defendant stabbed him. The victim had not in fact been
armed and never made a show of deadly force. At trial the judge refused defendant's request to instruct the jury on self-defense; defendant
was convicted of first-degree murder and subsequently sentenced to
death.5 0
On appeal of right, the supreme court reversed and remanded for
failure to instruct on self-defense, distinguishing two prior cases5 1 that
the court had affirmed in which no instructions on self-defense had
been given. Defendants in both of the previous cases had feared an
attack from their victims. Unlike defendant Spaulding, however, they
had aggressively sought out their victims and provoked the assault.-2
Thus, because Spaulding was not the aggressor, the court held that
Spaulding was entitled to an instruction on self-defense according to
the principle of apparent necessity. 3 The court explained that if
Spaulding reasonably believed himself to be in imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm, then a show of deadly force by the aggreshis assailant, except where, to his apprehension as a reasonable man, such extreme measures are
2
necessary to save himself from death or great bodily harm." 40 AM. JUR. D Homicide § 139
(1968) (emphasis added). See also State v. Smith, 127 Iowa 534, 103 N.W. 944 (1905); Farley v.
-Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 536, 145 S.W.2d 100 (1940).
49. 298 N.C. 149, 257 S.E.2d 391 (1979).
50. Id. at 153-55, 257 S.E.2d at 394-95.
51. State v. Watkins, 283 N.C. 504, 196 S.E.2d 750 (1973); State v. Brooks, 37 N.C. App. 206,
245 S.E.2d 564 (1978).
52. 298 N.C. at 155, 257 S.E.2d at 395.
53. Id. at 156, 257 S.E.2d at 395-96. "[A] person may kill even though to kill is not actually
necessary to avoid death or great bodily harm if he believes it to be necessary and has a reasonable
ground for that belief." Id. (quoting State v. Gladden, 279 N.C. 566, 572, 184 S.E.2d 249, 253
(1971)). The reasonableness of defendant's belief is a question for the jury to be determined from
the facts and circumstances as they appeared to defendant at the time of the killing. See State v.
Kirby, 273 N.C. 306, 313, 160 S.E.2d 24, 29 (1968).
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sor was not necessary to invoke the self-defense privilege. 54
2.

Defense of an Arrestee

In cases of assault on a police officer, the privilege of defense of an
arrestee has troubled many courts. In State v. Anderson5 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals prescribed a rule of law concerning the right
of a bystander to come to the defense of an arrestee when it appears
that an arresting officer is using excessive force in making a lawful56
arrest. The court balanced the desire to prevent serious and unprovoked injury to citizens caused by overzealous police officers in conducting arrests against the need to protect officers and bystanders from
injury as a result of a potentially escalated confrontation caused by the
intervention of a bystander.57 The court determined that both needs
would best be met by adherence to the following rule of law: "[O]ne
who comes to the aid of an arrestee must do so at his own peril and
should be excused only when the individual would himself be justified
in defending himself from the conduct of the arresting officers."58
Defendant in Anderson fought with a police officer who was attempting to handcuff defendant's girlfriend pursuant to her arrest for
disorderly conduct. According to the State's evidence, the arresting officer had forced the arrestee's face to the ground when he tried to
handcuff her, and defendant came to her aid. Although the evidence is
in substantial conflict, it is clear that a fight developed between defendant and the arresting officer, and two officers had to aid the arresting
officer in subduing defendant and his girlfriend. Defendant was
charged and convicted of assault on a police officer, but the trial court
gave no instruction on the privilege of defense of an arrestee. 59
On review, defendant sought to have the court of appeals adopt
the rule of reasonable appearance in defense of another and to reverse
54. 298 N.C. at 157, 257 S.E.2d at 396. See State v. Goode, 249 N.C. 632, 107 S.E.2d 70
(1959); State v. Ellerbe, 223 N.C. 770, 28 S.E.2d 519 (1944); State v. Barrett, 132 N.C. 1005, 1008,
43 S.E. 832, 833 (1903). See also State v. Finch, 177 N.C. 599, 608, 99 S.E. 409, 411-12 (1914)
(requiring instruction on self-defense when victim acted as if he were reaching for weapon).
55. 40 N.C. App. 318, 253 S.E.2d 48 (1979).
56. This right should be distinguished from the right to resist an unlawful arrest. Because
defendants who resist an unlawful arrest do not resist an officer acting within the scope of his
duties, they cannot be convicted of resisting arrest. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-223 (1969). See State v.
Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970); State v. Bradley, 32 N.C. App. 666, 233 S.E.2d 603
(1977); State v. Jeffries, 17 N.C. App. 195, 193 S.E.2d 388 (1972), cert. denied,282 N.C. 673, 194
S.E.2d 153 (1973); State v. Allen, 14 N.C. App. 485, 185 S.E.2d 568 (1972).
57. 40 N.C. App. at 323, 253 S.E.2d at 51.
58. Id. at 324, 253 S.E.2d at 52.

59. Id. at 319-21, 253 S.E.2d at 49-50.
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for failure to give such an instruction. This rule is typically employed
by North Carolina courts in assault cases involving a purported defense
of a third party. The rule allows a person to interfere with an assault
when he has a well-grounded belief or apprehension that one party is
attempting to kill or do great bodily harm to another.60 The court rejected this rule for arrest situations, however, for the same reasons that
California courts had previously rejected it, stating that in arrest situations, "lack of knowledge and understanding of the facts and law by
such person would unduly interfere with the vital public interest surrounding law enforcement. . . . [Pjublic policy discourages forceful
intervention in arrests by third party bystanders because . . . the

probabilities are that such intervention would only exacerbate the situation.""
Instead of the rule of reasonable appearance, the court prescribed
that one who comes to the aid of an arrestee will be privileged only
when the arrestee himself would be justified in using self-defense
against the arresting officers.6 2 Applying this rule to the facts of Anderson, the court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial for failure to instruct on defense of an arrestee, holding that the evidence
presented by defendant could reasonably be considered by the jury as
justifying defendant in coming to the aid of the arrestee,63 and thus
impliedly finding that the evidence could reasonably be construed to
authorize the arrestee to defend herself.
The rule announced by the court accords with that applied by the
majority of jurisdictions in both arrest and nonarrest situations;6" but in
nonarrest situations, however, the trend appears to favor the rule of
reasonable appearance that is used by North Carolina courts. 65 The
rule prescribed by the Anderson court, however, does not comport with
60. State v. Moses, 17 N.C. App. 115, 116, 193 S.E.2d 288, 289 (1972); State v. Fields, 268
N.C. 456, 459, 150 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1966).
In another 1979 case, the court of appeals reaffirmed that only persons in a family relation or

that of master and servant have the right to come to the defense of one who is faced with simple
assault; the relationship of boyfriend and girlfriend does not invoke this reciprocal right. Therefore, unless a family or master-servant relationship is involved, one only has the right to interfere
with an assault if he reasonably believes that death or serious bodily injury is imminent. State v.
Bullock, No. 793SC630 (N.C. App., filed Dec. 18, 1979).
61. 40 N.C. App. at 324-25, 253 S.E.2d at 52 (quoting People v. Booher, 18 Cal. App. 3d 331,
335, 95 Cal. Rptr. 857, 859 (1971)).
62. Id. at 324, 253 S.E.2d at 52.
63. Id. at 325, 253 S.E.2d at 52-53.
64. See 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery § 93 (1975).
65. See United States v. Grimes, 413 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1969); State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J.
Super. 479, 174 A.2d 506 (1961); State v. Penn, 89 Wash. 2d 63, 568 P.2d 797 (1977) (overruling
prior law); 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 63 (1963 & Cum. Supp. 1979). See also State v.
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the manner in which a reasonable person would react to an arrest situation when it appears to him that the officer is using excessive force.
One reacts to situations according to his own perceptions and not those
of the victim. Some courts, however, impose even stricter requirements
than the Anderson court. Courts have held that a bystander is only
justified in interfering with an arrest involving excessive force if the
arrestee was in fact about to be seriously injured,6 6 that the use of force
against a known police officer is always unjustified even if the arrest is
unlawful,67 and that the good faith use of force on one who is not
known to be a police officer is unjustified.6" Such results reflect the
special problem that arises from third-party interference in arrests. To
apply the normal rule of reasonable appearance to such situations
would severely hamper orderly law enforcement because it would put
the intervenor's judgment on the same level as that of the arresting
officer who has the authority to enforce the law. On the other hand, to
severely restrict citizens' rights to come to the aid of an arrestee when
an officer is using excessive force would punish those who protect arrestees against serious and wanton injury from police misconduct. Although the rule of the Anderson court will not protect those who
mistakenly but in good faith intervene in arrests, it will excuse those
who first make certain that such intervention is warranted. The rule
creates the reasonable presumption that an arresting officer's use of
force is legitimate.
3.

Defense of the Home

In 1979, the courts narrowed and clarified the circumstances in
which instructions on the right to defend one's home are appropriate.
In State v. McCombs6 9 the North Carolina Supreme Court held for the
first time that the privilege of defense of habitation ceases once an assailant has gained entry into the home; after entry, the rules of selfdefense apply with the exception that there is no duty to retreat. 70
Defendant McCombs shot and killed a plain clothes police officer
who had gained entry to defendant's apartment by breaking down a
Mensch, 34 N.C. App. 572, 293 S.E.2d 297 (1977), cert. denied, 294 N.C. 443, 241 S.E.2d 845
(1978). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 281 (1977).
66. State v. Westlund, 13 Wash. App. 460, 536 P.2d 20 (1975).
67. See generally 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery § 93, at 485 (1975). See also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i).
68. People v. Young, 11 N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d 319, 229 N.Y.S.2d I (1962).
69. 297 N.C. 151, 253 S.E.2d 906 (1979).
70. Id. at 157, 253 S.E.2d at 910, (citing 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 174 (1968)).
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door. Upon hearing a knock at the door, defendant went to the front
window and saw a man whom he did not know at the door. Defendant
went into a bedroom to ask his roommate if he knew the person. He
then heard a banging on the door and obtained his pistol. The officer
had broken the door down when it was not opened promptly and was
proceeding down the hallway when defendant shot him at a distance of
three feet. At trial, the court instructed on self-defense but not on defense of home. Defendant was subsequently convicted of second degree murder as well as several drug offenses. 7
On review, the court of appeals granted a new trial on the ground
that the trial court had erred in its failure to give a full instruction on
defense of home and property." The State petitioned the supreme
court for discretionary review.73 The court granted the petition and
affirmed the trial court's refusal to instruct on defense of habitation,
reversing the court of appeals. The supreme court held that the right to
defense of habitation ceases once an assailant has gained entry. After
entry the usual rules of self-defense apply except for the duty to retreat.7 4 The court stated that previous cases had indicated that "the use
of deadly force in defense of the habitation is justified only to prevent a
forcible entry into the habitation" when the occupant "reasonably apprehends death or great bodily harm to himself or other occupants at
the hands of the
assailant or believes that the assailant intends to com75
mit a felony."
Applying this narrow rule on defense of habitation, the court held
that the trial court did not err in refusing to so instruct. The officer had
entered the apartment, walked across the living room and was within
three feet of defendant when he was killed. Thus, only the rules of selfdefense were applicable.7 6
In announcing this rule on defense of home, the court's reliance on
American Jurisprudence2d,from which it derived the rule, is misplaced
71. Id. at 152-53, 253 S.E.2d at 907-08 (possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,
manufacture of marijuana, and possession of LSD).
72. 38 N.C. App. 214, 247 S.E.2d 660 (1978).
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
74. 297 N.C. at 157, 253 S.E.2d at 910 (citing 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 174 (1968)).
75. Id. at 156-57, 253 S.E.2d at 910. See State v. Miller, 267 N.C. 409, 148 S.E.2d 279 (1966)
(torn screen; jury question whether defendant shot victim to punish or to prevent entry); State v.
Spruill, 225 N.C. 356, 34 S.E.2d 142 (1945) (attempted forcible entry; entitled to instruction on
defense of habitation).
76. 297 N.C. at 158-59, 253 S.E.2d at 911.
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because that source fails to support its narrow statement of the rule."
Nevertheless, the rule is both logical and sound because after one has

entered a home, although illegally, an occupant has no right to kill the
intruder for the act of entry already committed. 78 Further, the rules

governing one's right to defend his home are substantially the same as
those governing the right to defend oneself.79 Finally, the cases have
held that in one's home the right of self-defense is buttressed by the

absence of a duty to retreat."0 Given these three factors, a defendant is
denied little by the lack of an instruction on defense of habitation when

he has assaulted the victim after his entry, so long as the proper instruction on self-defense with no duty to retreat is given.
The McCombs court's rationale for delineating the entry as the

point at which an instruction on defense of home is no longer required
is also persuasive. The major justification for the rule on defense of

habitation is that it allows occupants to protect themselves when they
might not be able to see their assailant or know his purpose. But once
the assailant has gained entry, the occupant is better able to ascertain
what danger the assailant poses8 ' and can use appropriate force to combat the threat. Therefore, requiring the instruction on defense of home

before entry allows the occupants to protect themselves without having
to wait until the would-be assailant enters the home; but once the person gains entry and can be seen, the additional protection of the rule on
defense of habitation is either nonexistent or unnecessary. Thus, the

McCombs court has set out the narrow instances in which instructions
on defense of habitation should be required.
The narrowness of the right to defend one's home is made explicit
by the court of appeals decision in State v. Jones.82 In Jones the victim
77. The only case footnoted in the AM. JUR. 2D citation, supra notes 69 & 73, does not support this proposition. See State v. Brookshire, 368 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. 1963).
78. Horton v. State, 110 Ga. 739, 35 S.E. 659 (1900); State v. Sorrentino, 31 Wyo. 129, 224 P.
420 (1924); 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 109, at 475 (1944). See also State v. Miller, 267 N.C. 409, 410,
148 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1966).
79. State v. Miller, 267 N.C. 409, 411, 148 S.E.2d 279, 282 (1966).
80. State v. Anderson, 222 N.C. 148, 151, 22 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1942); State v. Roddey, 219
N.C. 532, 534, 14 S.E.2d 526, 528 (1941).
81. 297 N.C. at 157, 253 S.E.2d at 910. The court also noted that the privilege of defense of
property is limited by the principle that in the absence of felonious use of force by the aggressor,
human life must not be endangered or great bodily harm inflicted. Id. at 157, 253 S.E.2d at 911.

The court also stated that an occupant may remove a trespasser using only the force that is
reasonably necessary to accomplish that object. Id But see 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 109, at 973
(1944) and cases cited therein (homicide against person who had lawfully entered but committed
conduct justifying expulsion; homicide when he resisted such attempted expulsion deemed justified in defense of home).

82. 41 N.C. App. 465, 255 S.E.2d 232 (1979).
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chased defendant and three other youths and was daring anyone to
fight him. Defendant went into his house, obtained a .22 rifle and came
back outside. The victim ran up to the house and began beating on the
front door. Defendant's mother and three others were inside the house.
Defendant's brother then came around the house with a shovel and hit
the victim three times with it to stop him from beating on the door.
The victim turned menacingly towards defendant's brother, and defendant shot him three times. The man died from the wounds, and
83
defendant was convicted of second-degree murder.
The court of appeals held that the trial court did not err in failing
to instruct on defense of home because the evidence showed that defendant shot only after the victim had turned away from the house and
towards defendant's brother. Thus, the court held that the instruction
on defense of home is only required when the assailant is killed at the
time that he is trying to force his way into the house.84 Judge Webb
dissented from this holding, stating that the deceased did not have to be
in the act of trying to force his way into the house at the very moment
that defendant fired the gun to require the instruction. 5 The instruction does conform to the rationale of the defense of home privilege in
another way, however, because defendant saw the victim and knew his
purpose, thus he could judge what force was necessary.
Jones and McCombs together make explicit the circumstances in
which the instruction on defense of habitation will be required. Jones
requires that the intruder be trying to force his way into the house
when the assault is committed; McCombs requires that the intruder
must not have entered when the assault is committed. Thus an instruction on defense of habitation is appropriate only if the victim was in the
act of trying to force his way into the house at the time of the assault,
but had not yet gained entry, and the occupants reasonably believed
that the intruder intended to commit a felony or cause serious bodily
harm.
83. Id. at 466-68, 255 S.E.2d at 234-35.
84. Id. at 469, 255 S.E.2d at 235.
85. Id. at 472, 255 S.E.2d at 237 (Webb, J., dissenting).

In another part of his dissent, Judge Webb disagreed with the majority's decision that the
defendant was not entitled to a charge in regard to acting in the heat of passion. Id. The court
noted that defendant fired warning shots before the deceased began beating on the house to get
him to leave and that he shot the deceased to protect his brother, indicating that his actions were
reasoned rather than the result of some sudden passion. Id. at 471,253 S.E.2d at 236. But see 40
AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 62 (1968) (authorities agree that the killing or assaultingof a relative will
amount to sufficient provocation to reduce the ensuing killing to a manslaughter).
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Double Jeopardy

The fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.8 6 The most obvious result of the double jeopardy principle is the prohibition of
multiple trials against the same defendant for the same crime. The
clause also prevents a defendant from being convicted twice in the
same trial for essentially the same offense. When the defendant is prosecuted for separate statutory crimes the "same elements test" is employed to determine if the right against double jeopardy is violated; if
each offense contains an essential element that is not included in the
other, then a trial on both offenses ordinarily does not violate the
double jeopardy principle.87 Even when both offenses contain unique
elements and thus satisfy the "same elements test," conviction on both
offenses may be a double jeopardy violation under the "behavioral
test." According to the "behavioral test," if the same facts violate two
statutes a defendant cannot be twice punished without violating the
double jeopardy principle. 88 In other words, if the single act of a defendant violates two similar statutes, to convict the defendant of both
crimes would violate his right against double jeopardy.
Several 1979 cases applied the "same elements" and "behavioral
tests" to determine whether a defendant's protection against double
jeopardy had been violated. Often these cases analyzed the principle of
lesser included offenses. The principle of lesser included offenses is an
application of the "same elements" test. The principle holds that if the
offense contains all of the elements of the other plus one or more additional elements, then the latter is a lesser included offense of the former. Double jeopardy prevents a defendant from being convicted for
both offenses.8 9

In State v. Hardy9 ° the Supreme Court of North Carolina reiterated that resisting arrest 9t and assaulting an officer 92 are separate of86. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
87. State v. Midyette, 270 N.C. 229, 233-34, 154 S.E.2d 66, 70 (1967).
88. State v. Summrell, 282 N.C. 157, 173, 192 S.E.2d 569, 579 (1972); State v. Raynor, 33
N.C. App. 698, 701,236 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1977). See also State v. Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 500-02,
124 S.E.2d 838, 843-45 (1962). The Birckhead and other courts have referred to what is here
called the "same elements test" as the "additional facts" test and to what is here called the "behavioral test" as the "included offenses rule."
89. State v. Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 497-98, 124 S.E.2d 838, 841-42 (1962).
90. 298 N.C. 191, 257 S.E.2d 426 (1979).
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-223 (1969).
92. Id. § 14-33(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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fenses and that the former is not a lesser included offense of the latter. 93
The court did find, however, that the facts of the case fit the "behavioral test" because defendant's act of assault was the same act that constituted his resisting arrest; but the court held that the trial court's
erroneous submission of both charges to the jury as lesser included offenses cured the potential double jeopardy violation because defendant
could not have been convicted of both.9 4
In the case defendant Dennis Hardy intervened when an officer
attempted to arrest his brother, defendant Ernest Hardy, for driving
under the influence. The officer told Dennis that he was under arrest
for obstructing an officer, and Dennis responded by jumping on the
officer's back. A fight ensued between the two defendants and the officer, with the defendants repeatedly threatening to kill the officer. Two
other officers arrived and helped the first officer subdue the two defendants. 95
At trial each defendant was charged and convicted on two counts
of threatening an officer. Defendants were also charged with assault on
the first officer and resisting arrest. Dennis Hardy was further charged
with assault on the other two officers, while Ernest Hardy was charged
with assault on only one of the other officers. Although defendants
were charged with resisting arrest only against the first officer, the trial
judge submitted the charge of resisting arrest as a lesser included offense of each of the five charges of assault on an officer. Defendants
96
were acquitted of the assault charges and convicted of resisting arrest.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgments,97 and the supreme court
granted defendants' petition for discretionary review.9 8
The supreme court first held that the trial court had erred in submitting the assault on an officer and resisting arrest charges as lesser
included offenses. 99 Applying the "same elements test," the court reasoned that violence or direct force is not a necessary element of resisting arrest as it is of assault, and also that the purpose of the offense
of assaulting an officer is to protect the safety of law enforcement officers rather than to preserve order and uphold the dignity of the law,
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

298 N.C. at 197-98, 257 S.E.2d at 431.
Id. at 199-200, 257 S.E.2d at 432.
Id. at 192-95, 257 S.E.2d at 427-29.
Id. at 195, 257 S.E.2d at 429.
33 N.C. App. 722, 236 S.E.2d 709 (1977).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
298 N.C. at 199, 257 S.E.2d at 431.
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which is the purpose of the resisting arrest offense. 1' ° Because the
charges did not contain lesser included offenses, the court reversed the
judgments against the defendants for resisting the two officers who had
aided the first because defendants had been charged only with assault
against those two officers and the court therefore had no jurisdiction to
convict them of resisting arrest.' 0
With regard to the arresting officer, the defendants had been
charged with both assault on an officer and resisting arrest; therefore,
the trial court did have jurisdiction to convict on both offenses. The
supreme court could draw no difference in the facts underlying the two
charges, however, and ruled that they must be treated as one offense
under the "behavioral test." But because the charges were erroneously
submitted to the jury as lesser included offenses, thus preventing defendants from being convicted on both charges, and because defendants were convicted of the "lesser" charge, the 0 2court found no
prejudicial error in the submission of both charges.
Prior to Hardy, the North Carolina courts had held that the charge
of resisting arrest and the charge of assaulting an officer were separate
and distinct offenses and that the failure to merge the two did not subject a defendant to double jeopardy. 03 When no factual distinction
could be drawn between a defendant's resistance of arrest and assault
on an arresting officer, however, the courts had also held that the State
must be required to elect between the two charges at the close of the
State's evidence. 0 4 Conviction of a defendant for both offenses in this
situation violates his constitutional right not to be put in jeopardy twice
for the same offense regardless of whether concurrent sentences are imposed.1°5 Thus Hardy appears consistent with prior case law.
The remedy applied by the North Carolina courts in Hardy and
previous cases is subject to question, however. When the defendant's
right not to be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense has been
violated under the "behavioral test," the remedy applied by the appellate courts has been to arrest the judgment on the assault charge, but to
100. Id. at 197, 257 S.E.2d at 430-31.

101. Id. at 199, 257 S.E.2d at 431. See State v. Guffey, 283 N.C. 94, 194 S.E.2d 827 (1973);
State v.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Bryant, 280 N.C. 407, 411-12, 185 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1972).
298 N.C. at 199-200, 257 S.E.2d at 432.
State v. Kirby, 15 N.C. App. 480, 489, 190 S.E.2d 320, 326 (1972).
State v. Summrel, 282 N.C. 157, 173, 192 S.E.2d 569, 579 (1972),
Id.; State v. Raynor, 33 N.C. App. 698, 701, 236 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1977).
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sustain the conviction on the charge of resisting an officer.'t

6

The

court's failure to require the State to elect between the charges has been

deemed "cured" by this remedy. Hardy adds a new twist to this remedial principle by holding that a jury's forced choice under the erroneous lesser included offense charge cures any double jeopardy violation.
Both "remedies" share the presumption that the prevention of two convictions will cure any harm caused by the double jeopardy.
While theoretically the double jeopardy is eliminated by these
remedies, prejudice could still remain. It has been observed that the
"Double Jeopardy principle provides a sensible way of limiting arbitrary discretion"' t0 7 and that the consistent refusal to remand for a new
trial in cases in which a defendant is convicted of one offense10 8 or

convicted of both offenses prejudices a defendant. Clearly, the greater
psychological weight of the two charges increases the likelihood that a

defendant will be convicted of at least one in a marginal case. Curing
the double jeopardy violation by arresting one of the judgments does

not cure this prejudicial effect. Therefore, if trial courts consistently
repeat this violation of double jeopardy, the North Carolina Supreme
Court might need to reexamine the accepted remedy in this regard and

require new trials for these defendants on grounds of prejudice or
abuse of discretion by the State and the court, if not on the grounds of

double jeopardy alone.
In a second double jeopardy case, State v. Evans, 10 9 the court of
appeals considered double jeopardy in relation to the offenses of communicating a threat" 0 and assault by pointing a gun."' Defendant
106. State v. Summrell, 282 N.C. 157, 174, 192 S.E.2d 569, 579 (1972); State v. Raynor, 33
N.C. App. 698, 701, 236 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1977).
107. Comment, Twice in Jeopardy,75 YALE L. 262, 301-02 (1965).
108. State v. Beach, 283 N.C. 261, 274, 196 S.E.2d 214, 223 (1973).
109. 40 N.C. App. 730, 253 S.E.2d 590, appealdismissed,297 N.C. 456, 256 S.E.2d 809 (1979).
110. Communicatingthreats.-(a) A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if without lawful
authority:
(1) He wilfully threatens to physically injure the person or damage the property of
another,
(2) The threat is communicated to the other person, orally, in writing, or by any
other means;
(3) The threat is made in a manner and under circumstances which would cause a
reasonable person to believe that the threat is likely to be carried out; and
(4) The person threatened believes that the threat will be carried out.
(b) A violation of this section is punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred
dollars ($500.00), imprisonment of not more than six months, or both.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
111. A.ssaulting bypointing gun.-If any person shall point any gun or pistol at any person, either in fun or otherwise, whether such gun or pistol be loaded or not loaded, he
shall be guilty of an assault, and upon conviction of the same shall be punishable by a
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Evans had engaged in an argument with an ambulance driver in a

parking lot. As the argument became heated, defendant pulled out a
gun, pointed it at the ambulance driver, and said, "I'm going to kill
you." Defendant was charged with communicating a threat and assault

by pointing a gun. At trial, defendant moved to require the State to
elect between the two charges as having arisen out of the same act. The

2
motion was denied, and defendant was convicted of both offenses."t
On review by certiorari, the court of appeals found that although

one may communicate a threat "by any.

. .

means" and both offenses

carry the same penalties," 3 the convictions for both charges did not
subject the defendant to double jeopardy." t4 Reasoning that the of-

fenses were separate and distinct, the court stated that the act of pointmng a; gun wasinot a necessary element to the offense of communicating
a threat and that assault by pointing a gun did not require evidence
that the "threat" would be carried out."t5 Thus, neither offense contained all of the elements of the other. The court further found that

evidence showing "bad blood" between defendant and the person
threatened, combined with the presence of the gun, satisfied the ele-

ment that a reasonable person would believe that the threat communicated would likely be carried out." 6 Based on this reasoning, the court

held that there had been no double jeopardy violation.' "7
The court has drawn an extremely fine line. The defendant's oral
threat occurred at the same time that he pointed the gun. Further, an

assault is effectively a threat to do further harm. The question, therefore, should be whether the oral "threat" and the "assault" were sepa-

rate threats or a single threat. This question is not adequately
fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00), imprisonment not to exceed six (6)
months, or both such fine and imprisonment.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14.34 (1969).
112. 40 N.C. App. at 730-32, 253 S.E.2d at 591-92.
113. See notes 110 & III supra.
114. 40 N.C. App. at 734, 253 S.E.2d at 593.
The court also refuted the defendant's contention that the court had erred by instructing the
jury that the threat must be communicated "orally" and refusing to instruct that it could be communicated "by any other means," thus foreclosing the jury's right to decide that only one offense
was committed. d.
115. Id. at 733, 253 S.E.2d at 593. The court based this statement on a case in which defendant was convicted of communicating a threat because she had picked up a rock and threatened, "If
you come any closer, I'll hit you with it." State v. Roberson, 37 N.C. App. 714, 247 S.E.2d 8
(1978). No double jeopardy question was involved in that case, however, since the statutes do not
make it an offense to "point a rock." See generally 4 STRONG's NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 3D
CriminalLaw § 26.5 (1976).
116. 40 N.C. App. at 733, 253 S.E.2d at 593.
117. Id. at 734, 253 S.E.2d at 593.
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answered by applying a mechanical test or by determining that one act
was oral while the other was physical. Had the court applied the "behavioral test," as in Hardy, the case would have been decided differently. It was the pointing of the gun and the oral threat combined that
acted as one powerful threat to kill. There was only one action. The
court's use of the presence of the pointed gun to establish an essential

element of communicating a threat makes this clear. By affirming Evans' convictions on both offenses, the Evans court allowed defendant's

right against double jeopardy to be violated. Evans thus illustrates the
courts' inconsistent application of the "behavioral test" of double jeopardy.
E.

New Crimes

In 1979, the North Carolina General Assembly amended the
state's criminal child abuse statute, G.S. 14-318, to make intentional
child abuse that results in serious injury a felony. 11 Child abuse and
child neglect have been misdemeanors in North Carolina since 1971.119
This amendment leaves the misdemeanor statutes intact; the felony
statute will apply to the more serious child abuse cases. The amendment was introduced to make abuse of a child resulting in serious bodily injury a felony without requiring the presence of a deadly weapon
or an intent to kill.12 0 The statute provides that
(a) Any parent of a child less than 16 years of age, or any other
person providing care to or supervision of the child who intentionally
inflicts any serious physical injury which results in:
118. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 897, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1234 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-318.4 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The law became effective on January 1, 1980, for acts committed
after June 8, 1979. For the child abuse reporting laws enacted at the same time, see this Survey:
Family Law at text accompanying notes 176-82.
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-316.1, -318.2 (Cum. Supp, 1979).
120. Felonious assault charges under which serious child abuse cases could be tried require
one of these two elements. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-28 to -34.2 (1969 & 1979 Cum. Supp.).
The originators of the law stated that in child abuse cases there was frequently no middle
ground between misdemeanor child abuse and homicide. They maintained that many types of
child abuse do not fit the traditional definition of assault, and those that do are difficult if not
impossible to prove. They felt that the felony statute would allow the introduction of broad evidence of separate injuries inflicted at different times to show the cumulative effect of "battered
child syndrome" in order to prove a unified case of child abuse' NORTH CAROLINA POLICE EXECUTIVEs ASSOCIATION & NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, [1979] Legis. Program 5-6 (Jan. 1979) (privately published program available in the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill School of Law Library).
As originally introduced, the bill did not require the element of "intent," and it would have
created a felony if the parent or caretaker passively allowed serious injury to be inflicted, with the

maximum sentence being 10 years imprisonment.
MENT, 36 DAILY LEGrs. BULL. 355 (Feb. 28, 1979).
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(1) Permanent disfigurement, or
(2) Bone fracture, or
(3) Substantial impairment of physical health, or
(4) Substantial impairment of the function of any organ, limb,
or appendage of such child.
is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for a period not to
exceed five years.
(b) The felony of child abuse is an offense additional' to other
civil and criminal provisions and is not2 intended to repeal or preclude any other sanctions or remedies.' 1
Both the misdemeanor and felonious child abuse offenses theoretically could be prosecuted under various assault charges. However, in

light of case history, the specific legislative intent expressed by the child
abuse statutes is essential for effective prosecution of even the most serious child abuse cases. Historically, it has been difficult to convict a
parent or supervisor of assaulting his child. "[B]ecause of the special

privilege or authority accorded by law to a parent, a person in loco
parentis, or a teacher to punish children in their charge, liability is not
imposed in every case where a conviction would be required or sustained in absence of that special relationship."' 22 The legislative intent

to make child abuse a crime, evidenced by the felony and misdemeanor
provisions of G.S. 14-318, accords less weight to this privilege and thus
provides the vehicle for effective prosecution of child abuse cases.
Although the misdemeanor statute has been effective, 23 a second
specific statute was necessary to make serious cases felonious. Serious
child abuse rarely fits the present felonious assault offenses.' 24 For ex-

ample, although a parent's hands and feet can do as much damage to a
child as one adult can do to another with a deadly weapon, 25 in a case
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.4 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
122. Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 396, § 2 (1963). See generally 6 AM. JUR. Assault and Battery § 47
(1963).
123. Several child abuse cases have been appealed under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 since it
was enacted in 1971. See, e.g., State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978); State v.
Heiser, 36 N.C. App. 358, 244 S.E.2d 170 (1978); State v. Fredell, 17 N.C. App, 205, 193 S.E.2d
587 (1972), aj'd, 283 N.C, 242, 195 S.E.2d 300 (1973) (upholding the constitutionality of the statute against a challenge for vagueness). Only two child abuse cases could be found for the period
1903-71. But see State v. Cauley, 244 N.C. 701, 94 S.E.2d 915 (1956) (affirming a conviction of
father for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill a three year old child and the mother
for aiding and abetting when the issue whether a belt with a buckle was a deadly weapon was an
issue for the jury); State v. Atkins, 242 N.C. 294, 87 S.E.2d 507 (1955) (stepmother maliciously
poked out her stepdaughter's eye with her thumb).
124. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-28 to -34.2 (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The closest case in North Carolina is one
upholding the jury's decision that a belt and buckle were a deadly weapon under the circumstances of the case. State v. Cauley, 244 N.C. 701, 94 S.E.2d 915 (1956).

19801

CRIMINAL LA W

of assault with a deadly weapon it is quite difficult to prove that hands
and feet are deadly weapons, especially given the normal parental punishment privilege. Also, for a case of assault with intent to kill, it would
usually be very difficult to prove an intent to kill in even the most serious child abuse cases because of the traditional role of parental punishment. Under the felony child abuse statute it should not be so difficult
to prove the intentional infliction of serious injury on the child. In
states that have enacted felonious child abuse statutes requiring this
element, intent has often been implied from the kind of instrument
used, the extent or nature of the use, or the severity or extent of the
injuries.' 2 6 Thus, the new statute should fill the gap between misdemeanor and homicide.
The felony statute will also aid the prosecution of other child
abuse crimes. When the child's injuries result in death, the statute will
provide a basis for a felony murder charge. 2 ' The law should also
provide an adequate vehicle for misdemeanor child abuse convictions
in serious cases because it will give the prosecutor leverage in plea bargaining.
Whether the new statute will effectively deter the crime of child
abuse is altogether another question. Because child abuse is a crime of
passion, the deterrent effect is likely to be minimal. Also, the most
pressing need is to combat the complex problems that are the source of
It does
child abuse, but this law merely deals with the symptoms.'
not help those who become child abusers because they were abused
children.
The law should do more than provide for its own effective prosecution, however. The law should help to identify child abusers for
counseling and should physically separate the chronically abused children from their abusers.
In 1979, the North Carolina General Assembly also created the
crime of altering court documents or entering unauthorized judgments.' 2 9 The law resulted from "a case involving a lawyer who im126. See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 188 Cal. App. 2d 88, 10 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1961); State v. Evans,
270 S.W. 684 (Mo. 1925). See also State v. Cauley, 244 N.C. at 708, 94 S.E.2d at 921.
127. It has been held that an intentional violation of G.S. 14-318.2 (misdemeanor child abuse)
that proximately but unintentionally causes death can support a conviction for unlawful act involuntary manslaughter. State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 582, 247 S.E.2d 905, 918 (1978).
128. For an analogous view of the child abuse reporting laws, see Thomas, ChildAbuse and
Neglect PartII HistoricalOverview, Legal Matrix and Social Perspectives in North Carolina,54
N.C.L. Rnv. 743 (1976). For discussion of the misdemeanor child abuse and misdemeanor child
neglect statutes, see id. at 773-76.
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-221.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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proved his success ratio by forging court judgments to reflect a

favorable disposition for his clients." 130 That lawyer was tried and convicted on the less specific charge of forgery. 13 1 Under the new law,
anyone convicted will be charged with a felony; however, no sentence
is specified. 32
F

Burglary

The elements of first 133 and second 134 degree burglary are identical
except that a first degree burglary conviction requires proof of actual
occupancy of the premises at the time of the illegal entry.' 35 If the

evidence supports an inference that the premises were unoccupied at
the time of the illegal entry, the trial court must instruct the jury that
is a possible verdict; failure to so instruct is
second degree burglary
136
reversible error.

In the 1979 case of State v. Joly 137 the North Carolina Supreme
Court considered the requirement of actual occupancy of the premises.
Defendant in Jolly forced the complainants into their motel room at
gunpoint, robbed them, tied them up and fled the scene.' 3 8 At defend130. Crowell & Smith, CriminalLaw andProcedure,NORTH CAROLINA LEGIS, 1979 at 61, 69
(1979).
131. State v. Vann, Durham Morning Herald, Feb. 9, 1979, § A, at I (N.C. Super. Feb. 8,
1979) (noting also the suspended sentence given for I I counts of forgery and that two false pretense charges were dropped pursuant to a plea bargaining arrangement).
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-221.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
133. Id. § 14-51 (1969).

The essential elements of the crime of first-degree burglary set forth in G.S. 14-51 can be
summarized as: (1) breaking into, see, e.g., State v. Wilson, 289 N.C. 531, 538-39, 223 S.E.2d 311,
316 (1976) (any force used to enter through usual or unusual place of ingress, whether open or
closed, is a "breaking"); (2) and entering, see, e.g., State v. Gibbs, 297 N.C. 410, 255 S.E.2d 168
(1979) (placing hand through broken window into home is sufficient "entry"); (3)during the night,
see, e.g., State v. Frank, 284 N.C. 137, 145, 200 S.E.2d 169, 175 (1973) ("The law considers it to be
nighttime when it is so dark that a man's face cannot be identified except by artificial light or
moonlight"); see also State v. Cox, 281 N.C. 131, 187 S.E.2d 785 (1972) (burglary conviction reduced to felonious breaking and entering because offenses committed in afternoon); (4) a dwelling
house or sleeping apartment, see, e.g., State v. Surles, 230 N.C. 272, 52 S.E.2d 880 (1949) (purpose
of statute is to protect places where persons sleep); (5) that is then occupied; (6) intending to
commit a felony therein, see, e.g., State v. Wilson, 293 N.C. 47, 235 S.E.2d 219 (1977) (state must
allege and prove specific felony intended).
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51 (1969).

135. See, e.g., State v. Tippett, 270 N.C. 588, 155 S.E.2d 269 (1967).
136. See, e.g., State v. Powell, 297 N.C. 419, 424, 255 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1979).
137. 297 N.C. 121, 254 S.E.2d 1 (1979).
138. Id. Defendant approached the victim as the victim was unlocking his motel room. As
the victim was stepping inside the room, defendant pushed him across the threshold and into the
room. The victim's wife then came to the room, heard scuffling, and entered to find defendant and
his accomplice holding a pistol on her and her husband. The victims were told to lie face down on
the floor where they were tied up. Defendant robbed the victims ofjewelry and other possessions.
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ant's trial for first degree burglary and armed robbery the jury returned
verdicts of guilty on both charges.' 39 The supreme court held that no
substantial evidence existed to support the jury's finding of actual occupancy of the motel room at the time the breaking and entering occurred
and that the trial judge committed reversible error by submitting a
charge of first degree burglary to the jury as a possible verdict. 4 0 Nevertheless the supreme court considered the jury's verdict sufficient to
sustain a conviction of the lesser included offense of second degree burof burglary present
glary because the jury properly found all4 elements
1
except the element of actual occupancy.'
Prior authority makes it clear that first degree burglary is a proper
charge if a person is standing inside the door of his residence when a
burglar forcefully enters. 142 In Jolly, however, the victim was standing
outside the door to his motel room when defendant forced him inside. 143 The victim therefore became an occupant of the motel room
only after defendant exercised the force necessary to perpetrate the illegal entry. The Jolly court thus makes a fine distinction in determining
when premises are "occupied" under the first degree burglary statute.
This distinction, nevertheless, is necessary to maintain the dichotomy
between first and second degree burglary that exists to deter entry into
dwellings likely to be occupied by sleeping persons.
G. Felonious Breaking or Entering

In confirming the view that an owner's consent constitutes a de-

fense to a charge of felonious breaking or entering, 144 the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, in State v. Boone, 145 held that a retail store
could not be feloniously entered during business hours, even if a person
139. Id. at 124, 254 S.E.2d at 3.
140. Id. at 129, 254 S.E.2d at 7.
141. Id. at 130, 254 S.E.2d at 7. See also State v. Cox, 281 N.C. 131, 187 S.E.2d 785 (1975)
(second degree burglary conviction reduced to felonious breaking and entering). Jolly is factually
similar to State v. Rodgers, 216 N.C. 572, 5 S.E.2d 831 (1939), in which the victims were approached by armed robbers while outside their residence, forced to enter their residence, tortured,
robbed and later locked in a smokehouse. The Rodgers court held that there was sufficient evidence of a "breaking" to sustain a conviction for second-degree burglary, id., but did not discuss
whether first-degree burglary would have been appropriate under the circumstances.
142. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 289 N.C. 531, 223 S.E.2d 311 (1976)'(victim opened door
slightly to see who was outside, defendant forced way in).
143. 297 N.C. at 129, 254 S.E.2d at 6-7.
144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54(a) (1969), as amendedby Fair Sentencing Act, ch. 760, § 5, 1979
N.C. SEss. LAWS 850. See, e.g., State v. Rowe, 98 N.C. 629, 4 S.E. 506 (1887) (employee of owner
not empowered to give consent to entry to commit larceny). See N.C. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 214.30 (1976).
145. 297 N.C. 652, 256 S.E.2d 683 (1979), afg 39 N.C. App. 218, 249 S.E.2d 817 (1978).
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enters to steal merchandise, because the owner of -the store impliedly
46
consents to the entry by holding the premises open to the public.'
Defendant in Boone briefly entered a retail clothing store during normal business hours, presumably to survey the store before committing a
crime, and asked a clerk for directions to a nearby town. 4 7 Defendant
soon left the store, but as he waited outside several accomplices entered
and stole a number of expensive sweaters. 48 All the suspects were apprehended in an automobile a short time later.' 4 9 On appeal from his
50
and felonious entry,' 5 '
subsequent conviction of felonious larceny
defendant contended that he could not properly be convicted of felonious entry of a store when he entered the store during normal business
hours through a door open to the public because such an entry is authorized by the owner of the store.' 52 The supreme court agreed, holding as a matter of law that a felonious entry conviction under these

circumstances is improper because the store owner implicitly consents
to the entry.' 53 Although the court overturned defendant's conviction
for felonious entry, it did not remand the case for resentencing because
the charges against defendant had been consolidated for judgment and
his sentence was appropriate for a conviction of felonious larceny, of
may be sustained by an
which he was also convicted.' 54 A sentence
55
circumstances.
such
under
appellate court
146. Id. at 659, 256 S.E.2d at 687. Breaking into or entering a building with the intent to
commit a felony, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54(a) (1969), as amendedby Fair Sentencing Act, ch. 760,
§ 5, 1979 N.C. SEss. LAWS 850, is a lesser included offense within the charge of burglary. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-51 (1969). See, e.g., State v. Bell, 284 N.C. 416, 200 S.E.2d 601 (1973). See also
State v. Fleming, 296 N.C. 559, 251 S.E.2d 430 (1979) (instruction on lesser included offense necessary only when evidence present from which jury could conclude that lesser included offense
committed). An indictment charging burglary may, therefore, sufficiently charge a defendant with
felonious entry. See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 288 N.C. 496, 219 S.E.2d 45 (1975) (first-degree burglary indictment sufficiently alleged misdemeanor breaking and entering). See also State v. Cox,
281 N.C. 131, 187 S.E.2d 785 (1972) (second-degree burglary conviction reduced by court to felonious entry when offense committed during daylight hours). North Carolina courts generally state
that a conviction for felonious entry must be supported by proof that defendant entered a building
with the intent to commit a felony. See, e.g., State v. Vines, 262 N.C. 747, 138 S.E.2d 297 (1965)
(per curiam); State v. Lassiter, 15 N.C. App. 265, 189 S.E.2d 798, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 761, 191
S.E.2d 358 (1972).
147. 297 N.C. at 653, 256 S.E.2d at 684.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
151. See id. § 14-54(a) (1969).
152. 297 N.C. at 655, 256 S.E.2d at 685.
153. Id But see State v. Speller, 44 N.C. App. 59, 259 S.E.2d 784 (1979) (defendant negated
storeowner's consent by concealing himself on premises until after closing hours).
154. Id. at 659, 256 S.E.2d at 687.
155. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1447(e) (1978).
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To support its conclusion that consent to enter a building is a defense to a felonious entry charge, the Boone court engaged in a novel
statutory analysis.156 G.S. 14-54(a) states that a felonious entry occurs
when one "breaks or enters any building with intent to commit any
felony or larceny therein."' 5 7 It is well-settled that this statute is disjunctive so that either breaking 58 or entering'5 9 with the requisite intent violates the statute.160 The statute contains no explicit provision
making consent to enter a defense for an individual charged with entering a building with the requisite criminal intent. Nevertheless, the
Boone court found a statutory basis for this defense by reading G.S.
14-54(a) in conjunction with G.S. 14-54(b),' 6 ' which labels as a misdemeanor "wrongfully" breaking into or entering any building. 62 The
court inserted the qualifying term "wrongfully" found in G.S. 14-54(b),
into G.S. 14-54(a), reasoning that misdemeanor entry is a lesser included offense of felonious entry, lacking only the requisite felonious
intent, 16 3 and that a greater offense must include all elements of a lesser
included offense. 164 The court thereby construed "wrongfully" to modify "breaks or enters" for purposes of the felonious entry offense even
though that term does not appear in the definition of felonious entry. 65
The Boone court concluded that "wrongfully" means "without consent," and that, therefore, the offense of felonious entry is committed
when one "breaks or enters" any building with intent to commit a fel66
ony or larceny and without the consent of the owner of the building. 1
The Boone court also cited precedent 67 to support its conclusion
that a consensual entry is a defense to a charge of felonious entry de169
68
spite criminal intent at the time of the entry.' In State v. Goffney
156. See 297 N.C. at 655-59, 256 S.E.2d at 685-87.
157. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54(a) (1969).
158. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 289 N.C. 531, 539, 223 S.E.2d 311,316 (1976) (any force used to
enter through usual or unusual place of ingress, whether open or closed, is sufficient "breaking").
159. See, e.g., State v. Gibbs, 297 N.C. 410, 255 S.E.2d 168 (1979) (extending hand through
window into dwelling is sufficient entry).
160. See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 287 N.C. 131, 145, 214 S.E.2d 14, 22-23 (1975).
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54(b) (1969).
162. 297 N.C. at 657-8, 256 S.E.2d at 686.
163. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 264 N.C. 134, 141 S.E.2d 27 (1965).
164. See, e.g., State v. Riera, 276 N.C. 361, 172 S.E.2d 535 (1970).
165. 297 N.C. at 658, 256 S.E.2d at 686.
166. Id.
167. State v. Friddle, 223 N.C. 258, 25 S.E.2d 751 (1943); State v. Goffney, 157 N.C. 624, 73
S.E. 162 (1911).
168. 297 N.C. at 656-57, 256 S.E.2d at 686.
169. 157 N.C. 624, 73 S.E. 162 (1911).
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the supreme court overturned a conviction for felonious entry by an
employee suspected of dishonesty because the owner, in an effort to
catch the defendant in the act of stealing, had, through an agent, induced the defendant to burglarize the store. 7 ' The Goffney court held
that the defendant's entry was not criminal because it had been made
'7
"with the consent and at the instance of the owner of the property."' '
In State v. Friddle172 the defendants asserted that the store owner had
participated in the burglary of and theft from his own store under a
prearranged plan to avoid war-time ration allotment problems with
governmental authorities. 173 Because the trial court in Frddle failed to
adequately instruct the jury that the owner's complicity would have negated the defendants'174criminal intent, the supreme court granted defendants a new trial.
To supplement its analysis of the statutes and cases, the Boone
court observed that defendant should be subject only to larceny charges
as a matter of policy. '71 If defendant were subject to multiple charges,
said the court, it would render the felonious entry statute virtually
meaningless because defendants could have charges against them multiplied whenever any crime is committed in any building. 76 The better
approach, noted the court, is to convict defendant only for the principal
crime committed when there is a basis for concluding that defendant
had permission to be on the premises. 177
Many jurisdictions have considered the question whether an owner's consent to enter is a defense to an illegal entry charge despite the
entrant's unlawful intent. 78 When business premises are open to the
170. Id. at 625-26, 73 S.E. at 164. The owner of the store told another employee to persuade

defendant to join the agent in burglarizing the store. On the night of the burglary the owner
watied in hiding with police outside the store.
171. Id. at 628, 73 S.E. at 164. Earlier in its opinion the Goff.ey court had reasoned that it
would be improper to convict defendant because the store owner would thereby be guilty of aiding
and abetting the illegal entry of his own store, which would be a "legal absurdity." Id. at 626, 73
S.E. at 163.
172. 223 N.C. 258, 25 S.E.2d 751 (1943).
173. Id. A clerk employed by the store owner allegedly offered to sell sugar to defendants if
they came in and removed it at night. The clerk told defendants that the store owner had an
excess of sugar that would have to be surrendered to governmental authorities unless ration coupons, which the owner lacked, were surrendered. The clerk stated that if the sugar were reported
as stolen, ration coupons need not be surrendered to the government. Finally, the clerk assured
defendants that the store owner knew of and consented to the plan.
174. Id. at 261, 25 S.E.2d at 753.
175. 297 N.C. at 658-59, 256 S.E.2d at 687.
176. Id. The court listed as examples a witness entering a courthouse to commit perjury or a
man entering his own home or office intending to file a fraudulent tax return. Id.
177. Id.
178. See, eg., People v. Sipult, 234 Cal. App. 2d 862,44 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1965), cert. denied,381
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public, as in Boone, jurisdictions reach conflicting results.' 79 This split
is generally explainable by differences in statutory language in the respective jurisdictions. 8 0 States that deny a defendant the consent defense, under the so-called "California rule,"'' 81 generally have statutes
that prohibit the mere "entry" or "entering" of a building with the intent to commit larceny or any felony, 182 while states that recognize the

consent defense 8 3 typically have statutes that include a qualifying term
modifying "entry" such as "unlawful,"' 184 "without consent,"' 85 or "unauthorized,"'186 thus providing a specific statutory basis for concluding
U.S. 1015 (1966) (consensual entry gained by fraud ineffective). See generally, Annot., 93 A.L.R.
2d 531 (1964).
2d 434, 243 N.E.2d 245 (1968) (no defense because
179. See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 41 Ill.
owner's invitation extends only to those entering for purposes for which invitation extended);
State v. Taylor, 17 Or. App. 499, 522 P.2d 499 (1974) (defense recognized because statute required
that entry be made "unlawfully," defined to exclude persons who enter when premises open to
public). See generally Annot., 93 A.L.R. 2d 531 (1964).
180. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 362 P.2d 1071 (Alas. 1964).
181. See, eg., People v. Barry, 94 Cal. 481, 29 P. 1026 (1892) (implied invitation during business hours is to enter for lawful purposes only). See also State v. Owen, 94 Ariz. 354, 385 P.2d 227
2d 434, 243 N.E.2d 245 (1968); State v. Baker, 183 Neb. 499, 161
(1963); People v. Weaver, 41 IlL.
N.W.2d 864 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 949 (1969); State v. Adams, 581 P.2d 868 (Nev. 1978);
State v. Blair, 273 N.W.2d 187 (S.D. 1979).
182. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West Supp. 1980) ("Every person who enters any...
building... with intent to commit... larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary."). See also
ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-1506 (1978) ("A person commits burglary in the third degree by entering
. . .with the intent to commit any theft or any felony therein."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-533 (1943)
("Whoever willfully and maliciously. . . enters. . . any building with intent to rob or steal...
[is guilty of felonious entry]"); id. § 205.060 (1973) ("Every person who. . . enters any. . . store
. . .with intent to commit... larceny, or any felony, is guilty of burglary."); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 22-32-3 (1979) ("Any person who enters... an occupied structure with intent to
commit any crime ... is guilty of second degree burglary"). But see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 191(a) (Smith-Hurd 1977) ("A person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly enters
or without authority remains within a building . . . with intent to commit therein a felony or
theft.").
183. See, e.g., People v. Carstensen, 161 Colo. 249, 420 P.2d 820 (1966); State v. Rogers, 83
N.M. 676, 496 P.2d 169 (1972); People v. Jones, 50 App. Div. 2d 750, 376 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1975);
State v. Taylor, 17 Or. App. 499, 522 P.2d 499 (1974), overruledon othergrounds, State v. Washington, 273 Or. 829, 838 n.3, 543 P.2d 1058, 1062 n.3 (1975); Champlin v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 621,
267 N.W.2d 295 (1978).
184. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 164.215(1) (1979) ("A person commits the crime of burglary
in the second degree if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime
therein."); id. § 164.205(3)(a) (definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" specifically excludes persons who enter when the premises are open to the public). See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.20
(McKinney 1975) ("A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when he knowingly enters or
remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein."); id. § 140.00(5) (definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" specifically excludes "[a] person who, regardless of his intent,
enters or remains in or upon premises ... open to the public").
185. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.10(1) (1958) ("Whoever intentionally enters any [building] without the consent of the person in lawful possession and with intent to steal or commit a
felony [is guilty of burglary]."); id. § 943.10(3) ("[Elntry into a place during the time when it is
open to the general public is with consent.").
186. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-3 (1978) ("Burglary consists of the unauthorized en-
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that consent is a defense. 8 7

The North Carolina statute, G.S. 14-54(a), appears to fall within
the category of statutes that have generally been interpreted to deny the

consent defense because it fails to include a term qualifying "breaks or
enters" in the definition of felonious entry.188 The Boone court, however, placed the North Carolina statute within the category of statutes

that have been interpreted to grant a defendant the consent defense by
reading "wrongfully" in 14-54(b) as a qualifier of "breaks or enters" in
14-54(a). 189

Although the Boone court's reading of "wrongfully" into the felonious entry definition is a reasonable construction of the statute, its
analysis is questionable because: first, an entry with criminal intent
should be recognized as "wrongful" in itself; second, factual differences
make the court's reliance on Goffney and Frddle uncompelling; and
third, the court's policy considerations operate to deprive the prosecu-

tor of a measure of charging discretion in the absence of any proof that
such discretion is abused. Underlying the Boone court's novel statutory
analysis is its assumption that "wrongfully" means "without consent."' 19° The legislature, however, may have intended "wrongfully" to
refer only to a criminal purpose on the part of a defendant' 9 ' that does
not rise to the level of felonious intent under G.S. 14-54(b).192 The

Boone court dismissed this possibility in its reliance on Goffney and
Friddle,which the court stated supported the proposition that an entry
with consent could not be punished despite the entrant's felonious intry of any. . . structure. . . with the intent to commit any felony or theft therein."); id. § 30-1620(c) (creates crime of shoplifting and states that one charged with shoplifting shall not be charged
with a separate or additional offense arising out of the same transaction). But see ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 18, § 19-1 (Smith-Hurd 1977) ("A person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly or without authority remains within a building. . with intent to commit therein a felony or

theft); People v. Weaver, 69 Ill.
App. 2d 434, 243 N.E.2d 245 (1968) (entry to commit larceny or
other felony is "without authority" despite fact premises open to public).
187. See authorities cited in notes 183-86 supra. But see CoLo. Rev. STAT. § 18-4-203 (1973)
("A person commits second degree burglary, if he knowingly breaks an entrance into, or enters, or
remains unlawfully in a building. . . with intent to commit therein a crime against a person or
property"); People v. Carstensen, 161 Colo. 249, 420 P.2d 820 (1966) (entry of premises open to
public raises a defense based on consent).
188. See text accompanying notes 178-82 supra.
189. See text accompanying notes 183-87 supra.
190. 297 N.C. at 658, 256 S.E.2d at 686.
191. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 183 Neb. 499, 161 N.W.2d 864 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 949
(1969) (defendant's intent to commit crime makes entry unlawful even though defendant had key
to premises and was authorized to do custodial work there)..
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54(b) (1969). See, e.g., State v. Jones, 264 N.C. 134, 141 S.E.2d 27
(1965) (misdemeanor entry a lesser included offense of felonious entry, lacking only requisite felonious intent).
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tent. 9 3 The Boone court's reliance on Goffney and Friddle as binding
precedent is questionable because, unlike the storeowner in Goffney
and allegedly in Friddle,194 the storeowner in Boone lacked knowledge
of and offered no encouragement to defendant's theft of the owner's
merchandise. This circumstance renders Goffney and Friddle inapposite to Boone because the owner's consent to an illegal purpose in
Goffney and Friddle negated the defendant's criminal intent. 9 5 In
Boone, the storeowner's consent could not negate defendant's criminal
intent, in the absence of any knowledge of defendant's illegal purpose 19 6 because a storeowner's implicit
consent to enter is reasonably
19 7
extended for lawful purposes only.
This distinction between Goffney, Friddle and Boone did not
trouble the Boone court because it believed that defendant, as a matter
of policy, should be subject only to larceny charges. 9 The court observed that otherwise the prosecutor could multiply charges against one
who enters a building to commit a crime, regardless of the nature of the
crime, thus rendering the statute meaningless. ' 99 This determination is
questionable, however, because the statute clearly seeks to deter persons from entering buildings to commit crimes by unequivocally forbidding entry of "any building" with the intent to commit "any felony
or larceny."2 ' Bringing multiple charges against defendants who commit separable crimes arising out of a particular criminal act is ordinarily a matter of prosecutorial discretion."' Although the Boone court's
misgivings about the prosecutor's ability to bring multiple charges
against defendant under relatively innocuous circumstances may be
193. 297 N.C. at 657, 256 S.E.2d at 686.
194. See text accompanying notes 167-74 supra.
195. 157 N.C. at 626, 73 S.E. at 164. See State v. Burnette, 242 N.C. 164, 171, 87 S.E.2d 191,
196 (1955). State v. Friddle, 223 N.C. 258, 25 S.E.2d 751 (1943), emphasized that the owner's
complicity tended to negate the defendant's criminal intent. See also State v. Nelson, 232 N.C.
602, 61 S.E.2d 626 (1950) (if crime requires lack of consent then act done with consent cannot be

crime).
196. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 581 P.2d 868 (Nev. 1978) (no consent defense when defendant
entered food store to steal during business hours).
197. See, e.g., People v. Barry, 94 Cal. 481, 29 P. 1026 (1892) (one who commits larceny not
considered part of invited public).
198. 297 N.C. at 658-59, 256 S.E.2d at 687.
199. Id See text accompanying notes 175-77 supra.
200. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54(a) (1969).
201. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (if probable cause exists to believe
defendant committed offense defined by statute, decision to charge is within prosecutor's discretion). See also State v. Rudolph, 39 N.C. App. 293, 250 S.E.2d 318, appeal dismissed, 297 N.C.
179, 254 S.E.2d 40 (1979).
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justified under the facts in Boone,2 °2 depriving the prosecutor of this
discretion, in the absence of constitutional violations, may be unwise.
A prosecutor might believe it necessary to multiply charges for a
number of valid reasons. 20 3 For example, the prosecutor may bring
multiple charges to secure a plea bargain agreement, 204 to provide a
basis for obtaining a harsher sentence against a repeat offender, 20 5 or to
ensure that a particularly egregious crime is adequately punished.2 °6
The supreme court's decision in Boone that criminal intent is irrelevant to the existence of consent 20 7 may produce the undesirable consequence in future cases of allowing persons who enter a building not
open to the public to raise the consent defense. The Boone court ignored defendant's misrepresentation of himself as a member of the
buying public, to whom a storeowner's implicit invitation to enter extends,20 when it determined that defendant's criminal intent was irrelevant to the efficacy of the storeowner's consent. It is therefore possible
that one who secures consent to enter any building, whether open to the
public or not, by whatever means, may have a defense to a felonious
entry charge regardless of the crimes intended and actually committed.20 9 The recent case of State v. Joyner2 t ° illustrates why the court's
202. The Boone decision nevertheless operates to deprive the prosecutor of the ability to bring
multiple charges against defendants who commit violent crimes, such as armed robbery, in stores
that are open to the public. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87 (Cum. Supp. 1979), as amended by Fair

Sentencing Act, ch. 760, § 5, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850.
203. Cf. State v. Rudolph, 39 N.C. App. 293, 250 S.E.2d 318, appeal dismissed, 297 N.C. 179,
254 S.E.2d 40 (1979) (prosecutor's policy of vigorously pursuing "career criminals" not improper
in absence of constitutionally impermissible motives).
204. See e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (not improper for prosecutor to
add recidivist charge to charge of check forgery after defendant refused to plead guilty to check
forgery).
205. See, e.g., State v. Rudolph, 39 N.C. App. 293, 250 S.E.2d 318, appealdismissed,297 N.C.
179, 254 S.E.2d 40 (1979) (vigorous prosecution policy against "career criminals" proper).
206. See, e.g., id. Certain facts in Boone may have convinced the prosecutor that multiple
charges were warranted. Unlike the typical shoplifter, defendant in Boone acted in concert with a
group of individuals under a prearranged plan to steal from the store. See text accompanying
notes 15-17 supra. Evidence also indicated that defendant and his accomplices were professional
shoplifters because they had in their possession a device for concealing stolen merchandise commonly used by professional shoplifters. 297 N.C. at 653-55, 256 S.E.2d at 684-85.
207. 297 N.C. at 659, 256 S.E.2d at 686. See, e.g., State v. Blair, 273 N.W.2d 187 (S.D. 1979)
(implied consent rendered ineffective by defendant's illegal purposes for entry).
208. See, e.g., People v. Barry, 94 Cal. 481, 29 P. 1026 (1892) (thief not one of public invited
inside).
209. Such consent, however, would have to be given by an individual empowered to give
consent, generally the owner of the premises. See, e.g., State v. Friddle, 223 N.C. 258, 25 S.E.2d
751 (1943) (employee may be agent of owner); State v. Rowe, 98 N.C. 629, 4 S.E. 506 (1887); State
v. Tolley, 30 N.C. App. 213, 226 S.E.2d 672 (1975), cert. denied, 291 N.C. 178, 229 S.E,2d 691
(1976) (defendant could not have believed in good faith that child had authority to consent to
entry of home to steal parent's property).
210. 297 N.C. 349, 255 S.E.2d 390 (1979).
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disregard of defendant's criminal intent should not be applied to situa-

tions that do not involve premises open to the public. Defendant in
Joyner, accompanied by four companions, went to a woman's home
and asked to use her telephone."' The woman refused but defendant
and his friends forced their way into her home where they committed

savage sexual acts upon her and robbed her at gunpoint. The prosecutor enhanced charges of first degree rape and armed robbery with other
charges, including felonious entry.21 2 If the facts of Joyner were

changed slightly so that the woman consented to defendant's entry, defendant could possibly argue successfully that the victim's consent negated the criminal aspect of the entry, thereby depriving the prosecutor
of the opportunity to add felonious entry to the principal charges
against defendant. Other jurisdictions have characterized apparent
consent as ineffective because it was either gained by fraudulent misrepresentation2 1 3 or was of a limited scope and did not extend to criminal activity." 4 Although the Boone court could have used either of
these theories to render the storeowner's implicit consent to enter ineffective,2" 5 it failed to do so. The court, however, should not extend
Boone to include situations like those presented in the hypothetical
based on Joyner.
H.

Possession of Burglary Tools

Possession of an "implement of housebreaking" without lawful excuse2 16 is itself a criminal offense and is often added to a charge of
burglary 1 7 or felonious entry.2 8 In defining what a prohibited bur211. Id. at 351, 255 S.E.2d at 392.

212. Id. at 351-53, 255 S.E.2d at 392-93. Defendant was indicted for first degree rape, armed
robbery, felonious entry, crime against nature and assault inflicting serious injury. Id. at 350, 255
S.E.2d at 391-92.
Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree rape and armed robbery
convictions which were consolidated for judgment. The felonious entry and crime against nature
convictions were also consolidated for judgment, for which defendant received an additional 10
year sentence, which was to begin after the life sentence expired. Defendant received another two
year sentence for his conviction for assault inflicting serious injury. Id.
213. See, e.g., People v. Sipult, 234 Cal. App. 2d 862, 44 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1965).
214. See, e.g., State v. McKinney, 21 Or. App. 560, 535 P.2d 1392 (1975). Cf. State v. Speller,
44 N.C. App. 59, 259 S.E.2d 784 (1979) (defendant's concealment of self on business premises
until after closing hours negated owner's consent).
215. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 581 P.2d 868 (Nev. 1978) (entry with intent to steal is without
owner's consent).
216. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-55 (1969), as amended by Fair Sentencing Act, ch. 760, § 5, 1979
N.C. Sess Laws 850.
217. Id. § 14-51.
218. Id. § 14-54(a). See, e.g., State v. Brown, 25 N.C. App. 10, 212 S.E.2d 187 (1975) (evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for felonious entry and possession of burglary tools).
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glary tool is, North Carolina courts have proceeded on a case-by-case
basis, resulting in occasionally inconsistent results.21 9 Contrary to prior
decisions by the North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
the recent decision of the court of appeals in State v. Bagley22° established that an automobile tire iron may in some circumstances be considered a burglary tool. In Bagley the court followed the analysis of the
North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Boyd 2 and emphasized
that the Boyd test should be utilized as a rule of law whenever an item
is alleged to be a prohibited burglary tool.222
In Boyd, the supreme court, relying primarily on a Connecticut
case, 223 distinguished items specifically designed for 24 and items sometimes used for housebreaking.2 25 To fall within the latter classification
the item must be reasonably adaptable for use as a burglary tool and
must either be intended for use as a burglary tool or actually used during a burglary. 226 Prior courts utilizing the Boyd test have determined
that prohibited "other implements of housebreaking" under the burglary tool statute227 include a crowbar, 2 8 a big screwdriver, 29
chisels,2 3° and bolt-cutters. 23 ' Despite the similarity of an automobile
tire iron to the preceding items, the supreme court and the court of
appeals have both refused in the past to find that a tire iron is a prohib219. Compare State v. Morgan, 268 N.C. 214, 150 S.E.2d 377 (1966) (crowbar a prohibited
burglary tool) with State v. Garrett, 263 N.C. 773, 140 S.E.2d 315 (1965) (tire iron not a prohibited
burglary tool).
220. 43 N.C. App. 171, 258 S.E.2d 427 (1979).
221. 223 N.C. 79, 25 S.E.2d 456 (1943).
222. 43 N.C. App. at 175-76, 258 S.E.2d at 430-31.
223. State v. Ferrone, 97 Conn. 258, 116 A. 336 (1922).
224. Items specifically designed include those enumerated in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-55 (1969),
which lists a picklock, key and bit. See, e.g., State v. Craddock, 272 N.C. 160, 158 S.E.2d 25
(1967) (defendant possessed a prohibited picklock); State v. Styles, 3 N.C. App. 204, 164 S.E,2d
412 (1968) (lock picks, skeleton key, tension bars).
225. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-55 (1969) also prohibits the possession of "other implements of
housebreaking." This broad statutory delineation makes the second classification necessary because many items that can be used to effect an illegal break-in also have legitimate uses. State v.
Morgan, 268 N.C. 214, 150 S.E.2d 377 (1966). See, eg., State v. Garrett, 263 N.C. 773, 140 S.E.2d
315 (1965) (automobile tire iron); State v. McCall, 245 N.C. 146, 95 S.E.2d 564 (1956) (mechanic's
or carpenter's tools).
226. State v. Boyd, 223 N.C. at 84, 25 S.E.2d at 459.
227. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-55 (1969), as amended by Fair Sentencing Act, ch. 760, § 5, 1979
N.C. Sess. Laws 850.
228. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 268 N.C. 214, 150 S.E.2d 377 (1966).
229. See, e.g., id.

230. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 272 N.C. 469, 158 S.E.2d 630 (1968).
231. State v. Shore, 10 N.C. App. 75, 178 S.E.2d 22 (1970), cert. denied, 278 N.C. 105, 179
S.E.2d 453 (1971).
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ited burglary tool within the second classification.23 2 In State v. Garrett233 the supreme court so held despite the arrest of defendant with a
tire iron in his hand twelve feet from a door obviously damaged by a
tire iron.2 34 The Garrettcourt characterized a tire tool as "a part of the
repair kit" included with all automobiles and thus possessed with lawful excuse by virtually every motorist. 235 The court of appeals followed
this rationale in State v. Godwin,2 36 even though it was "reasonably
used to effect the break-in for
clear" that the seized tire irons were
237
charged.
were
defendants
the
which
Under substantially similar facts, the Bagley court, however, questioned and declined to follow the Garrett and Godwin decisions.238 Defendant in Bagley was arrested as he left a burglarized store.239 Police
discovered a tire iron inside the store.24 0 At defendant's trial for felonious entry and possession of burglary tools, the jury was allowed to decide whether the tire iron was a prohibited "implement of
housebreaking" 2 4 Defendant subsequently argued to the court of appeals that this was error under Garrett and Godwin.242 The Bagley
court rejected defendant's contention, however, on the ground that Garrett and Godwin were inconsistent with the "preponderant and betterreasoned authority."2 4 3 In essence, the Bagley court could find no distinguishing factor that would justify immunizing tire irons from the
Boyd analysis because tire irons are items with common and legitimate
uses that can also be used in housebreaking under particular circumstances. 244 The court noted that crowbars, screwdrivers and chisels
have common and legitimate uses but have been condemned as prohibited burglary tools under the Boyd analysis in appropriate circumstances and reasoned that tire irons should likewise be subjected to the
232. State v. Morgan, 268 N.C. 214, 150 S.E.2d 377 (1966); State v. Garrett, 263 N.C. 773, 140
S.E.2d 315 (1965); accord, State v. Godwin, 3 N.C. App. 55, 164 S.E.2d 86 (1968).
233. 263 N.C. 773, 140 S.E.2d 315 (1965).
234. Id. at 774, 140 S.E.2d at 316.
235. Id. at 775-76, 140 S.E.2d at 317.
236. 3 N.C. App. 55, 164 S.E.2d 86 (1968).
237. Id. at 56-58, 164 S.E.2d at 88. One defendant was arrested as he exited from a burglarized building with a tire tool in his hand. A second tire tool was discovered near a safe inside the
building. The court stated that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the tire tools
were utilized to force open the front door to the building. Id.
238. 43 N.C. App. at 176, 258 S.E.2d at 431.
239. Id. at 173-74, 258 S.E.2d at 429.
240. Id.
241.. Id. at 174, 258 S.E.2d at 430.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 176, 258 S.E.2d at 431. See generaly Annot., 33 A.L.R. 3d 798 (1970).
244. 43 N.C. App. at 175-76, 258 S.E.2d at 430-31.
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Boyd analysis when they are alleged to be a prohibited burglary
tool.245 The Bagley court thus upheld the jury's finding that the tire
prohibited by the statute 246

iron was an "implement of housebreaking"
because it was reasonably adaptable for use as a burglary tool and was
apparently utilized without lawful excuse to facilitate the break-in. 247
Z Robbery

248

In State v. Thompson149 the Supreme Court of North Carolina criticized and overruled the rule250 that a judge must instruct a jury on
common law robbery25 1 when the victim expresses uncertainty on the
245. Id. at 176-77, 258 S.E.2d at 431.
246. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-55 (1969), as amendedby Fair Sentencing Act, ch. 760,

§

5, 1979

N.C. Sess. Laws 850.
247. 43 N.C. App. at 176-77, 258 S.E.2d at 431.
In State v. Puckett, 43 N.C. App. 596, 259 S.E.2d 310 (1979), decided subsequent to Bagley,
the court of appeals implied that it would use the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis, ("of the
same kind, class or nature," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (5th ed. 1979); see, e.g., State v,
Garrett, 263 N.C. 773, 140 S.E.2d 315 (1965)), in applying the Boyd analysis. In Puckett, defendant used a three-foot stepladder and an acetylene torch to remove a heavy mesh screen from the
window of a building. The Puckett court concluded that neither the stepladder nor the acetylene
torch was "reasonably adaptable" for use in housebreaking and that the actual use of those items
to facilitate defendant's break-in therefore did not make the items prohibited burglary tools. 43
N.C. App. at 598-99, 259 S.E.2d at 311-12.
248. State v. Cronin, 299 N.C. 229, 262 S.E.2d 277 (1980), is the first case to construe the
General Assembly's 1975 amendments to the statutory definition of the crime of obtaining
property by false pretenses, Act of June 24, 1975, ch. 783, § 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1109 (effective
Oct. 1, 1975) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-100 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The supreme
court held that the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses required only an "intent to
deceive" rather than an "intent to cheat or defraud." The supreme court defined the crime as:
"(I) a false representation of a subsisting fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which is
calculated and intended to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) by which one person
obtains or attempts to obtain value from another." 299 N.C. at 240-42, 262 S.E.2d at 285-86. The
supreme court's formulation represents little change from pre-1975 precedent. See, e.g., State v.
Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 42 S.E.2d 686 (1947); State v. Houston, 4 N.C. App. 484, 166 S.E.2d 881
(1969). The supreme court in Cronin also made clear that a defendant can be convicted of
obtaining property by false pretenses despite the victim's receipt of compensation. 299 N.C. at
238-40, 262 S.E.2d at 283-84.
249. 297 N.C. 285, 254 S.E.2d 526, rev'g 39 N.C. App. 375, 250 S.E.2d 710 (1979).
250. This rule is an extension of the established principle that if a robbery victim cannot testify
from his own knowledge whether a defendant charged with armed robbery actually carried a
firearm or other dangerous weapon, although defendant acted as if he were carrying one, defendant is entitled to an instruction to the jury on common-law robbery. See, e.g., State v. Keller, 214
N.C. 447, 199 S.E. 620 (1938) (weapon not seen); State v. Jackson, 27 N.C. App. 675, 219 S.E.2d
816 (1975) (item thought to be shotgun obscured by towel).
251. The crime of common-law robbery is not defined by statute, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1487.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979), but case law indicates that it is considered to be an aggravated form of
larceny, see, e.g., State v. Lawrence, 262 N.C. 162, 136 S.E.2d 595 (1964), and comprises these
elements: (I) a felonious taking, see, e.g., State v. Lunsford, 229 N.C. 229, 49 S.E.2d 410 (1948)
(occurs when taker intends to deprive owner of his property and convert it permanently to use of
taker); (2) of money or goods of any value from or in the presence of a person, see, e.g., State v.
Jacobs, 25 N.C. App. 500, 214 S.E.2d 254, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 666, 216 S.E.2d 909 (1975) (rob-
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witness stand about whether the firearm carried by the robber was real
or only a toy. 5 2 The Thompson court reasoned that a victim could
positively identify an apparently real weapon as real only if the robber
2 53
fired a shot, a circumstance the court did not want to encourage.
In Thompson a robbery victim testified positively that the firearms
used by defendants to commit the robbery for which defendants were
charged appeared to be real.2 5 4 On cross-examination, however, the
victim admitted that she could not be positive whether the weapons
used were real or fake.25 5 The trial court refused to submit an instruction to the jury on common law robbery based on the victim's uncertainty, and the jury subsequently found defendants guilty of armed
robbery. 6 On appeal, defendants argued that the victim's uncertainty

concerning the nature of the firearms required a common law robbery
instruction under the authority of State v. Bailey, 5 7 which held that a
judge must instruct on common law robbery when the victim cannot
testify with certainty whether an apparently real weapon is, in fact, a
bery cannot be committed over the telephone); (3) against his will either by violence, see, e.g.,
State v. Sawyer, 224 N.C. 61, 29 S.E.2d 34 (1944) (degree of force immaterial so long as sufficient
to compel victim to part with property), or by putting him in fear, see, e.g., State v. Moore, 279
N.C. 455, 183 S.E.2d 546 (1971) ("fear" not confined to fear of death).
Armed robbery, which is defined by statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979),
as amendedby Fair Sentencing Act, ch. 760, § 5, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850, differs from commonlaw robbery in two ways: an attempted, as opposed to an actual, taking is sufficient, see, e.g., State
v. Rogers, 273 N.C. 208, 159 S.E.2d 525 (1968); see also State v. Price, 280 N.C. 154, 184 S.E.2d
866 (1971) (attempted armed robbery occurs when defendant commits overt act intended to bring
about robbery, thereby endangering or threatening person's life with weapon); see generally Annot., 76 A.L.R.3d 842 (1977), and, most importantly, armed robbery is committed by the use or
threatened use of "any firearm or other dangerous weapon" that threatens or endangers the life of
a person, while common-law robbery can be committed without the use of a weapon. See, e.g.,
State v. Moore, 279 N.C. 455, 183 S.E.2d 546 (1971); State v. Bailey, 278 N.C. 80, 87, 178 S.E;2d
809, 813 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972) ("critical and essential" difference between
armed robbery and common-law robbery is threat with dangerous weapon). See also State v.
Swaney, 277 N.C. 602, 178 S.E.2d 399, appealdismissed,402 U.S. 1006 (1971) (victim's testimony
that he was "scared" sufficient to show fear); State v. Moore, 279 N.C. 455, 183 S.E.2d 546 (1971)
(objective standard of fear arising from actual use of weapon sufficient when victim not in fear of
life).
252. The rule is set forth in State v. Bailey, 278 N.C. 80, 178 S.E.2d 809 (1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 948 (1972). An earlier decision by the court of appeals is consistent with Bailey. See
State v. Faulkner, 5 N.C. App. 113, 168 S.E.2d 9 (1969). The Bailey court, however, inexplicably
failed to recognize Faulkner,Faulkner is strikingly similar to Bailey on the facts, and Faulkner
reaches the same result as Bailey.
253. 297 N.C. at 288-89, 254 S.E.2d at 528.
254. Id.
255. Id. Of the three victims in Thompson, one did not waiver on cross-examination and the
other two stated that, although the weapons appeared to be real, they did not know whether the
weapons were real, fake or toys. Id.
256. Id. at 287, 254 S.E.2d at 527.
257. 278 N.C. 80, 178 S.E.2d 809 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
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"real or toy pistol. '2' 8 The Thompson court expressly overruled Bailey
and held that a defendant is not entitled to a common law robbery
instruction only on the strength of a victim's uncertainty on cross-examination about the nature of a firearm that appeared to be real.25 9
The Thompson court stated,
When a person perpetrates a robbery by brandishing an instrument which appears to be a firearm, or other dangerous weapon, in
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the law will presume the
instrument to be what his conduct represents it to be-a firearm or
other dangerous weapon. 60
The court's decision in Thompson has the practical effect of significantly restricting defense counsel's ability to challenge a witness' perception of a weapon. There is scant case authority in North Carolina to
aid in rebutting the Thompson presumption that an apparently real
weapon, brandished in full view of the victim during a robbery, is
real.2 6 ' Defense attorneys may look to other jurisdictions, 2 62 however,
which have held that armed robbery cannot be committed with an apparently real "starter's pistol" capable of firing only blanks2 63 or a "toy
pistol" incapable of firing any projectiles. 2"
J

Kidnapping

The recent cases of State v. Wilson2 65 and State v. Silhan266 illustrate the situations in which, under the rationale of the significant 1978
26 8
decision in State v. Fulcher,267 North Carolina's kidnapping statute
258. Id. See note 252 supra.
259. 297 N.C. at 288-89, 254 S.E.2d at 528.
260. Id. at 289, 254 S.E.2d at 528.
261. See, e.g., State v. Keller, 214 N.C. 447, 199 S.E. 620 (1938) (finger used to simulate
weapon); State v. Jackson, 27 N.C. App. 675, 219 S.E.2d 816 (1975) (alleged weapon covered with

towel).
262. See generally Annot., 81 A.L.R.3d 1006 (1977).
263. E.g., State v. Luckey, 69 Ohio Op. 111, 322 N.E.2d 354 (1974) (armed robbery conviction

reversed). Cf.People v. Ratliff, 22 Ill.
App. 3d 106, 317 N.E.2d 63 (1974) (armed robbery conviction upheld because of gun's potential use as bludgeon).
264. E.g., Cooper v. State, 201 Tenn. 149, 297 S.W.2d 75 (1956) (toy pistol not "deadly
weapon"; armed robbery conviction reduced to unarmed robbery). Contra, Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 212 Pa. Super. 1, 239 A.2d 861 (1968) (toy pistol an "offensive weapon" within terms of
armed robbery statute); People v. Coleman, 53 Cal. App. 2d 18, 127 P.2d 309 (1942) (toy pistol a
"dangerous weapon" because it can be used as club).
The overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions hold that armed robbery can be committed with
an unloaded weapon. See, e.g., United States v. Shelton, 465 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1972). Seegenerally Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1412, 1426 (1961 & 1979 Supp.).
265. 296 N.C. 298, 250 S.E.2d 621 (1979).
266. 297 N.C. 660, 256 S.E.2d 702 (1979).
267. 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
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does not permit a defendant to be convicted more than once for the

same offense in 269
violation of the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy.

In Fulcher27 0 the North Carolina Supreme Court considered

whether G.S. 14-39(a)(2), which provides that one who unlawfully restrains, removes, or confines another for the purpose of facilitating a
felony is guilty of kidnapping,"' violates the prohibition against
double jeopardy. The Fulcher court acknowledged that certain felonies
cannot be committed without some confinement, restraint, or removal
and stated that when the action allegedly constituting the kidnapping is

an "inherent, inevitable feature" of the underlying felony, punishment
for both offenses would violate the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy.2 7 2 To avoid such violation, the court construed the
statute to require that the action constituting the kidnapping be "sepa27 3
rate, complete. . . . independent and apart from the other felony."
268. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides:
(a) Any person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain or remove from one place to
another, any other person 16 years of age or over without the consent of such person, or
any other person under the age of 16 years without the consent of a parent or legal
custodian of such person, shall be guilty of kidnapping if such confinement, restraint or
removal is for the purpose of:
(1) Holding such other person for ransom or as a hostage or using such other person as a shield; or
(2) Facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating flight of any person
following the commission of a felony; or
(3) Doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the person so confined, restrained
or removed or any person.
(b) Any person convicted of kidnapping shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 25 years nor more than life. If the person kidnapped, as defined in subsection (a), was released by the defendant in a safe place and
had not been sexually assaulted or seriously injured, the person so convicted shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than 25 years, or by a fine of not more than ten
thousand dollars ($10,000), or both, in the discretion of the court.
269. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The North Carolina Constitution does not contain an express
prohibition against double jeopardy; the state courts invoke this prohibition as part of its common
law. See State v. Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 80 S.E.2d 243 (1954).
Basically, the doctrine of double jeopardy prohibits multiple punishments for a single criminal act. See generally Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965).
270. See Survey of Developments in North CarolinaLaw, 57 N.C.L. REv. 825, 977-81 (1979).
271. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979), quoted at note 268 supra.
272. 294 N.C. at 523, 243 S.E.2d at 351.
273. Id. at 524, 243 S.E.2d at 352. In its holding the court referred only to restraint. In Silhan,
however, the supreme court acknowledged that its holding in Fulcherapplied to confinement and
removal as well as restraint. 297 N.C. at 673, 256 S.E.2d at 710.
The supreme court in Fulcher rejected the approach of the court of appeals. The court of
appeals read the common-law requirement that the confinement, restraint or removal be substantial before kidnapping could occur, see State v. Roberts, 286 N.C. 265, 210 S.E.2d 396 (1974);
State v. Dix, 282 N.C. 490, 193 S.E.2d 897 (1973), into G.S. 14-39, the kidnapping statute. 34 N.C.
App. 233, 240, 237 S.E.2d 909, 914 (1977). The supreme court rejected this interpretation on the
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The court concluded that this requirement eliminated
the possibility of
274
multiple punishments for the same offense.

Defendant in Fulcherhad forced his way into a hotel room, bound
the hands of the two women in the room and, by threatened use of a
deadly weapon, forced each to perform oral sex. Defendant was con-

victed on two counts of committing a crime against nature and two
counts of kidnapping for restraining his victims. 275 Applying its requirement that the acts constituting the kidnapping and the underlying
felony be separate and independent, the court found that "[tlhe restraint of each of the women was separate and apart from, and not an

inherent incident of the commission upon her of the crime against nature. .... ,,276 Defendant's conviction on all four counts,
therefore, did
2 77
not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.
In Wilson and Sihan the supreme court was forced to delineate

conduct it considered separate and apart from an underlying felony.
Defendants in both Wilson and Silhan were convicted of kidnapping
and the felony allegedly facilitated by the kidnapping. 278 Both claimed

that the action found to constitute the kidnapping was an inherent, inevitable feature of the underlying felony and that under the Fulcher
analysis they could not be punished for both offenses.27 9

In Wilson, defendant tricked a female pedestrian into entering his
car and drove her approximately six blocks to a public school ground

where, by force and threatened use of a knife, he raped her. The court
held, without discussion, that "[t]he restraint accompanying the rape
was not an inherent, inevitable feature of the kidnapping" and that the
kidnapping was a separate, complete act, independent of the later comground that G.S. 14-39 had been enacted to overrule prior case law requiring substantiality as an

element of kidnapping.
274. Because the double jeopardy prohibition is against multiple punishments for the same
offense, the crucial determination is what constitutes the "same offense." Various tests have been
developed by the courts in making this determination. These tests can be grouped into two basic
categories, evidentiary and behavioral. The evidentiary approach focuses on the elements of the
crime while the behavioral approach focuses on the criminal conduct. The theory behind the
latter approach is that "multiple punishment will be barred if the defendant's conduct constituted
a single act or transaction." Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 276 (1965).
275. The Fulcher court adopted a behavioral approach to the double jeopardy problem
presented by North Carolina's kidnapping statute. Fulcher focused on the alleged criminal conduct and whether the conduct allegedly constituting the kidnapping and the conduct allegedly
constituting the underlying felony were only "a single act or transaction."
276. 294 N.C. at 505-08, 243 S.E.2d at 341-42.
277. Id. at 524, 243 S.E.2d at 352.
278. 296 N.C. at 300, 309, 250 S.E.2d at 623, 628.
279. 297 N.C. at 662, 672, 256 S.E.2d at 705, 710.
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mitted rape. 2 80
Defendant in Silhan, by threatened use of a gun, forced a husband
and wife who had been fishing in a deserted locale and were returning
to their car into his van, drove a short distance away, blindfolded,
gagged and bound the hands of the husband, and forced the wife to
perform oral sex. The supreme court found, again without discussion,
that the confinement, restraint and asportation of both husband and
" '
wife were separate from the sexual assault on the wife.28
While Wilson and Silhan emphasize the supreme court's continued adherence to Fulcher,the conclusory approach taken by the court
does little to illumine the line between activities that are separate from
underlying felonies and those that are inherent in the felony. The decision may even have frustrated the ultimate intention of the Fulcher
holding. In apparently limiting findings of inherency and inevitability
to those situations in which the defendant confines, restrains or
removes his victim only insofar as is absolutely necessary for the commission of the underlying felony, the supreme court has rendered
Fulcher's purported protection of defendants from double jeopardy
minimal.

280. 296 N.C. at 310, 250 S.E.2d at 628.
281. 297 N.C. at 673, 256 S.E.2d at 710.
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282

Narcotics

G.S. 90-95(a)(1)2 8 3 provides that it is unlawful to "manufacture,
sell or deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver a
controlled substance." "Manufacture" is defined in G.S. 90-87(15) as
the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion,
or processing of a controlled substance by any means, whether directly or indirectly, artificially or naturally, or by extraction from
substances of a natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis; and 'manufacture' further includes any packaging or repackaging
of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container except that
this term does not include the preparationor compounding
of a con4
trolledsubstance b, an individualforhis own use.2

In State v. Childers"' the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that
the excepting proviso of G.S. 90-87(15) modifies only "preparation"

and "compounding" and does not modify the other manufacturing activities listed in the definition.

struction 8 7

6

The holding overruled a prior con-

of G.S. 90-87(15) under which the proviso modified all the

manufacturing activities. The effect of the prior construction was to
require the state to prove the manufacturer's intent to distribute the
282. In State v. Mendez, 42 N.C. App. 141, 256 S.E.2d 405 (1979), the court of appeals
considered the question whether the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
sell that substance, set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(a)(1) (1975), required knowledge of the
specific type of controlled substance possessed when the alleged offender knew that the substance
was illegal. In rejecting defendant's argument that because he thought the substance he possessed
was "chocolate mescaline" when it was actually "lysergic acid diethylanide," he did not have the
requisite knowledge and, thus, could not be convicted of violating G.S. 90-95(a)(1), the court of
appeals held that knowledge of "the scientific name or the actual chemical composition of the
controlled substance" is not necessary. 42 N.C. App. at 147-48, 256 S.E.2d at 409.
The court's holding did not produce an unjust result. The controlled substance the defendant
thought he possessed and the substance he actually did possess were both Schedule I controlled
substances and carried the same penalties. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-89 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979)

(penalties for possession of controUed substances vary according to the schedule to which the
substance belongs. Id. § 90-95 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979)).
Application of Mendez to the situation in which the penalty for the substance the defendant
thinks he possesses is less severe than the penalty for the substance he actually possesses raises
some interesting questions. In support of limiting Mendez to its facts is the unfairness of
subjecting the defendant to the harsher penalty since he knowingly incurred ony the risk of the
lesser penalty. On the other hand, the defendant who knowingly possesses an illegal substance
arguably assumes the risk of the harsher penalty. Furthermore, application of Mendez to this
situation is necessary to prevent defendant from avoiding a deservedly harsh penalty by falsely
describing his knowledge as to the identity of the substance.
283. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(a)(1) (1975).
284. Id. § 90-87(15) (emphasis added).
285. 41 N.C. App. 729, 255 S.E.2d 654, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 602, 254 S.E.2d 916 (1979).
286. Id. at 732, 255 S.E.2d at 656.
287. State v. Whitted, 21 N.C. App. 649, 205 S.E.2d 611, cert. denied,285 N.C. 669, 207 S.E.2d
761 (1974); State v. Baxter, 21 N.C. App. 81, 203 S.E.2d 93 (1974).
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manufactured substance to establish aprimafacieviolation of G.S. 9095(a)(1). By limiting the scope of the proviso Childers greatly reduces
the state's burden in establishing that a defendant is guilty of manufacturing a controlled substance. Under Childers, only when the defendant's manufacturing activity consists of preparation or compounding is
the state required to prove his intent to distribute.
Childers is the fifth in a line of cases in which the court of appeals
has considered whether G.S. 90-95(a)(1) requires proof of an intent to
distribute the manufactured substance. 288 The defendants in all of
these cases had been convicted under G.S. 90-95(a)(1) for manufacturing controlled substances. In State v. Elam,289 the first in the line, the
court construed G.S. 90-95(a)(1)2 9° and, specifically addressing the
question whether the clause "intent to distribute" qualified the word
"manufacture" as well as "possess,"2 9 ' concluded that the manufacture
of controlled substances was a felony regardless of the defendant's intent.2 92
In State v. Baxter 93 and State v. Whited,294 both decided in 1974,
the court shifted its focus from G.S. 90-95(a)(1) to G.S. 90-87(15). In
these cases the court stated that G.S. 90-87(15) defined "manufacture"

in such a way that it [could] only mean manufacture with the intent to
distribute as opposed to manufacturing for one's own use."2 95 In overturning the defendants convictions for manufacturing controlled sub288. The four cases preceding Childers were State v. Wiggins, 33 N.C. App. 291, 235 S.E.2d
265, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 592, 241 S.E.2d 513 (1977); State v. Whitted, 21 N.C. App. 649, 205
S.E.2d 611, cert. denied,285 N.C. 669, 207 S.E.2d 761 (1974); State v. Baxter, 21 N.C. App. 81,203
S.E.2d 93 (1974); State v. Elam, 19 N.C. App. 451, 199 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied,284 N.C. 256, 200
S.E.2d 656 (1973).
Despite the inconsistent holdings in this line of cases, see notes 282-81 and accompanying text
infra, the North Carolina Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to grant certiorari and resolve
the inconsistency.
289. 19 N.C. App. 451, 199 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 284 N.C. 256, 200 S.E.2d 656 (1973). In
Elam, growing of marijuana by defendant was found to constitute manufacturing a controlled
substance.
290. The Elam court did not consider G.S. 90-87(15), the statute specifically construed in
Childers.
291. The real question was whether the phrase "intent to distribute" applied to "manufacture," "distribute," "dispense" and "possess," or only to "possess."
292. 19 N.C. App. at 455, 199 S.E.2d at 48.
293. 21 N.C. App. 81, 203 S.E.2d 93, rev'd on other grounds, 285 N.C. 735, 208 S.E.2d 696
(1974).
294. 21 N.C. App. 649, 205 S.E.2d 611, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 669, 207 S.E.2d 761 (1974).
295. Id. at 654, 205 S.E.2d at 614 (citing State v. Baxter, 21 N.C. App. 81, 203 S.E.2d 93, rev'd
on othergrounds, 285 N.C. 735, 208 S.E.2d 696 (1974)).
In both cases the court stated that there was evidence that the defendants had been manufacturing controlled substances by packaging them. The evidence introduced at trial was that police
had searched defendants' residences and in Baxter discovered marijuana, plastic bags containing
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stances, the court implicitly based its holdings on the absence of any
proof of the alleged offenders' intent.
In State v. W'iggins,296 the fourth case in this group, defendant's
manufacturing activity consisted of growing marijuana. The court of
appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction under G.S. 90-95(a)(1)
even though the state had not offered any evidence of the defendant's
intent to distribute. Stating "[t]hat portion of G.S. 90-87(15) which allows 'preparation or compounding of a controlled substance' for one's
own use in certain instances has no application to the facts of this
case," 297 the court retreated from the former broad interpretation of the

excepting proviso of G.S. 90-87(15)
and restricted the proviso's scope to
29
"preparation or compounding. 1
In Childers the court of appeals clarified its holding in Wiggins,
analyzed the definition of "manufacture" in G.S. 90-87(15) and eliminated the inconsistencies in this line of cases. Defendant in Childers
had, admittedly, grown marijuana for her "personal use."' 2 9 9 Citing
Baxter and Whit/ed, defendant argued on appeal that because the state
had failed to prove her intent to distribute, her conviction could not be

sustained. Relying on the established rule of statutory construction
that the plain meaning of the language of a statute governs its interpretation,300 the court stated that the only manufacturing activities modi-

30 2
30 1
fied by the excepting proviso were preparation and compounding.
marijuana seeds, cigarette papers, small brown envelopes and tape; and in Whitted discovered
packaged heroin, items used in cutting heroin and glassine bags.
296. 33 N.C. App. 291, 235 S.E.2d 265, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 592, 241 S.E.2d 513 (1977).
297. Id. at 295, 235 S.E.2d at 269.
298. Id. The court attempted to minimize its change of position rather than to acknowledge it,
declaring that its Baxter-Whifted "statements" did not apply to the facts of Wiggins because of
distinctions between the cases. The manufacturing activity of defendant in Wiggins consisted of
growing marijuana, as in Elam, while in Baxter and Whired the defendants had been "packaging" controlled substances. Without explanation, the court found the activities of the Wiggins
defendant to be neither preparation nor compounding while the activities of the Baxter and hitted defendants were within the ambit of these terms. Even under Wiggins' restrictive constriction
of the excepting proviso, therefore, the state would have to prove intent to distribute to establish
that the defendants in Baxter and Whitled had violated G.S. 90-95(a)(1).
299. 41 N.C. App. 729, 730, 255 S.E.2d 654, 655 (1979).
300. See, e.g., State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 153, 158 S.E.2d 37, 42, cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1028 (1967).
301. The court looked to WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1959) as a

definitional source:
"Preparation" is defined by Webster's ... as being "the action or process of making
something ready for use or service." The same source provides, in addition, definitions
for the following terms: (1) propagation: causing to continue or increase by natural
reproduction; (2) compounding: the putting together of elements, ingredients or parts to
form a whole; (3) conversion: changing [of a substance] from one form, state or charac-

ter into another, (4) processing: to subject [something] to a particular method, system or
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Preparing or compounding a controlled substance "by an individual
for his own use" is excepted from the statutory definition of manufacture and cannot, therefore, support a charge that a defendant has been
30 3
manufacturing controlled substances in violation of G.S. 90-95(a)(1).
The court then addressed its Baxter-Whirted construction of G.S. 9095(a)(1) and suggested that it was not inconsistent with its Wiggins-

Childers construction because the facts of Baxter and Whitted are distinguishable from those of Wiggins and Childers.3°4 To the extent that
the Wiggins-Childers interpretation of G.S. 90-87(15) conflicts with the
Baxter-Whited construction, the court in Childers expressly overruled
Baxter and Whitted.3 °5
The court's construction of G.S. 90-87(15) in Childers accords
more with the plain meaning of the language of the statute than the
Baxter-Whitted construction. If the excepting proviso were intended to
apply to all the specified manufacturing activities, the proviso should
have used the term "manufacture" or should have listed all the manu-

facturing activities to which it applied. Instead, the proviso uses only
the terms "preparation" and "compounding" to identify the manufac-

turing activities it covers.
In addition to complying more with statutory language than Baxter or Whitted, the Childers construction of "manufacture" is a better
reflection of legislative intent. As the Childers court recognized, the
legislature "has chosen, in its wisdom, to impose a higher penalty for
manufacturing even small quantities of controlled substances than for
merely possessing them. '' 3°6 Under Childers, the excepting proviso intechnique of preparation, handling or other treatment designed to effect a particular resuit.
Id. at 731-32, 255 S.E.2d at 656.
The court noted that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87(15) (1975) defines "production" as the "manufacture, planting, cultivating, growing or harvesting of a controlled substance."
The court did not acknowledge "packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or
relabeling of its container" as manufacturing activities although the language of the statute clearly
designates it as such. See text accompanying notes 284 supra. This is particularly curious as the
court in Baxter and Whitted specifically found the defendants' "packaging" to be evidence of
manufacturing.
302. The court noted that Elam and Wiggins foreshadowed its interpretation of G.S. 90-87(15)
in Childers. 41 N.C. App. at 733, 255 S.E.2d at 657.
303. Md.at 732, 255 S.E.2d at 656.
304. Id. at 733, 255 S.E.2d at 657. The defendants' manufacturing activities in Baxter and
Whitted, originally described as "packaging," fit within the Childer? definition of "preparation"
and "compounding," while the activities in Wiggins and Childers do not. Even under Wiggins
and Childers, therefore, the type of manufacturing activity engaged in by the defendants in Baxter
and Whirred would require that the state prove intent to distribute. See note 298 supra.
305. 41 N.C. App. at 733, 255 S.E.2d at 657.
306. Id.
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creases the likelihood that those guilty of manufacturing controlled
30 v and G.S. 90-87(15)30 will
substances in violation of G.S. 90-95(a)(1)
be subjected to a higher penalty, while those guilty only of possession
will be subjected to a lesser one.
Finally the Childers construction arguably achieves more equitable results than the Baxter-Whitted construction. Manufacturing activ-

ities which contemplate a lesser degree of activity involving a
controlled substance should arguably be punished less severely than
those contemplating a higher degree of such activity. Childers distinguishes the less involved activities listed in G.S. 90-87(15) from the

more involved activities listed therein in terms of proof the state must
marshal. This distinction makes it more likely that those offenders who
have had less involvement with the controlled substance will be subject
only to a pQssession penalty while those who have been more involved
will be subject to the manufacturing penalty.
L.

Rape

The 1979 North Carolina General Assembly enacted a new rape
and sex offenses statute, effective January 1, 1980.309 The new statute

differs significantly from its predecessor in a number of respects: It
prohibits more kinds of sexual conduct 3t0 and groups this conduct into
two categories; provides that males as well as females can be victims of
307. The Baxter-Whitted construction placed an additional burden on the state of proving
defendant's intent to distribute in establishing "manufacture." Absent proof of intent to distribute, defendant could only be convicted of a possession offense. Wiggins and Childers eliminate this burden of proof in all cases in which the defendant has been charged under G.S. 9095(a)(1) except those in which the manufacturing activity consists of preparation or compounding.
The burden will, of course be upon the State to prove the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that, in cases where the defendant is charged with the manufacture of a controlled
substance and the activity constituting the manufacture is preparation or compounding,
that the defendant intended to distribute the controlled substance. . . . In those cases
where production, propagation, conversion or processing of a controlled substance are
involved, the intent of the defendant either to distribute or consume personally, will be
irrelevant and does not form an element of the offense.
Id. at 732, 255 S.E.2d at 656-57.
308. In G.S. 90-87(15) the legislature broadly defined the term "manufacture" to include every
conceivable type of activity, short of actual use, that can be taken with respect to controlled substances. The definition will often encompass the activities of a person already in possession of a
controlled substance in making the substance ready for his use. The Wiggins-Childersinterpretation of the statute shields a mere possessor from the higher manufacturing penalty by requiring
the state to establish his intent to distribute.
309. Law of May 29, 1979, ch. 682, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 725. (codified at N.C. GE-N. STAT.
§§ 14-27.1 to. 10 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). For an excellent analysis of the new law see Crowell, The
New Rape and Sex Offenses Law, J. AD. MEMORANDA (Dec. 1979).
310. See text accompanying notes 344-46 infra.
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this prohibited sexual conduct; 31 ' removes the minimum age requirement for first degree offenders;3" 2 lightens the burden of establishing
the aggravating factors that make prohibited sexual conduct a first degree offense;313 replaces the crime of assault with attempt to commit
rape with the crime of attempted rape;314 specifically designates sexual
conduct between certain persons as illegal;31 5 sets forth limited circumstances in which husbands and wives may be prosecuted for rape or
sexual act against each other; 316 and eliminates the offense of carnally
knowing a virtuous female between the ages of twelve and sixteen
years.31 7 The new statute also includes a definitional section explaining
new terminology. 318
The act classifies prohibited sexual conduct into first degree rape,
§ 14-27.2 and second degree rape, § 14-27.3. Unlike the old act, the
only gender requirement imposed under the new provisions is defined
by the nature of the prohibited sexual conduct.3 1 9 Parties must be of
opposite sexes to engage in the requisite vaginal intercourse, but either
a male or female may be prosecuted for rape. Former law specified
that the victim be female. The new act also removes the minimum age
requirement of an assailant for prosecution of first degree rape. Previously, an assailant was required to be "more than 16 years of age"
before he could be prosecuted.32° In addition to these general changes,
the new act is significantly different from the former act in a number of
specific respects. An examination of the various sections of the new act
provides a basis for noting these distinctions.
1. First Degree
Section 14-27.2 of the new act establishes two categories of the
crime of first degree rape andd sets out the elements of each. In the first
category, a person is guilty of first degree rape if that person engages in
311. Law of May 29, 1979, ch. 682, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 725.
312. Law of April 8, 1974, ch. 1201, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323 (formerly codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-21(a)(1) & (2) (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
313. See text accompanying notes 326-33 infra.
314. See text accompanying notes 347-50 infra.
315. See text accompanying notes 351-55 infra.
316. See text accompanying notes 354-55 infra.
317. This offense prohibited a male person from carnally knowing or abusing "any female
child, over twelve and under sixteen years of age, who has never before had sexual intercourse
with any person." Law of March 3, 1923, ch. 140, 1923 N.C. Sess. Laws 430.
318. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
319. Law of April 8, 1974, ch. 1201, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323. The same categorization
existed under the former statute.
320. Id.
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forced 32 1 vaginal intercourse 322 and
a. Employs or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon or an article
which the other person reasonably believes to be a dangerous or
deadly weapon; or
b. Inflicts serious personal injury upon the victim or another person; or
c. The person commits323the offense aided and abetted by one or
more other persons.

The new law enumerates three aggravating factors, one of which
must be present before the forced vaginal intercourse is deemed first

degree rape. 324 The first of these factors is the assailant's employment
or display of "a dangerous or deadly weapon or an article which the
other person reasonably believes to be a dangerous or deadly
weapon. ' 325 The comparable provision under the former act required
the assailant's "use" of a deadly weapon to overcome the rape victim's
321. Under both the old statute, Law of April 8, 1974, ch. 1201, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323
and the new one, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979), the assailant must engage in

the prohibited sexual conduct "by force and against the will" of the victim. The new act makes no
attempt to define this phrase. Presumably, therefore, the content given to this element under the
prior rape law will apply to § 14-27.2. See Home Security Life Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 277 N.C,
283, 177 S.E.2d 291 (1970). Prior case law established that "the mere threatof serious bodily harm
which reasonably induces fear thereof constitutes the requisite force." Actual physical force is not
required. State v. Roberts, 293 N.C. 1, 13, 235 S.E.2d 203, 211 (1977) (emphasis in original).
While consent is a perfect defense to a charge of rape, no legal consent exists when the consent is
induced by violence or threats of violence. See, eg., State v. Hall, 293 N.C. 559, 238 S.E.2d 473
(1977).
In the recent case of State v. Way, 297 N.C. 293, 254 S.E.2d 760 (1979), the North Carolina
Supreme Court stated that while consent, initially given, can be withdrawn, the concept of consent
ordinarily applies "to those situations in which there is evidence of more than one act of intercourse between the prosecutrix and the accused." When only one act of sexual intercourse to
which the complaining witness initially consented occurs, consent cannot be legally withdrawn in
the middle of the act. "If the actual penetration is accomplished with the woman's consent, the
accused is not guilty of rape." Id. at 296-97, 254 S.E.2d at 761-62.
322. First degree rape under the 1979 legislation requires "vaginal intercourse," N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-27(2)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979), whereas the prior statute required the "carnal knowledge
of a female." Law of April 8, 1974, ch. 1201, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323. Section 14-27.10
states that "[p]enetration, however slight, is vaginal intercourse;" proof of actual emission of semen is not necessary in order to constitute the offense. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.10 (Cum. Supp.
1979). This definition corresponds to the statutory, see Law of February 22, 1861, ch. 30, 1860-61
N.C. Sess. Laws 61, and judicial definition of "carnal knowledge." State v. Murry, 277 N.C. 197,
203, 176 S.E.2d 738, 742 (1970).
323. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The corresponding offense under
the former statute was:
Every person who ravishes and carnally knows any female of the age of twelve years or
more by force and against her will [shall be guilty of first degree rape if the assailant] is
more than sixteen years of age, and the rape victim had her resistance overcome or her
submission procured by the use of a deadly weapon, or by the infliction of serious bodily
injury to her.

. ..

Law of April 8, 1974, ch. 1201, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323,
324. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
325. Id.
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resistance or to procure her submission.326 "Employ," the term
adopted by the new act to describe the assailant's exercise of control of

the weapon, operates synonymously with the prior statute's "use." The
addition of the word "display" by the new law, however, clearly minimizes the action the assailant must take with respect to the weapon.
For example, proof that the assailant had a "dangerous or deadly

weapon" visibly on his person or in his car appears to satisfy section
14-27.2's first requirement for first degree rape, while under former law
the state would have had to demonstrate either that the weapon procured the victim's submission or overcame the victim's resistance.

The 1979 legislation further provides that the weapon employed or
displayed must be "dangerous or deadly" or the victim must reasonably believe it to be dangerous or deadly.3 27 The former law characterized the weapon only as "deadly" and made no allowances for the

victim's reasonable yet mistaken beliefs regarding the nature of the
weapon.32 8 The new act does not define the term "dangerous or
deadly." Courts will presumably examine judicial interpretations of
similar terms in other statutes as an aid in applying 14-27.2.329 By
modifying "weapon" with "dangerous" in addition to "deadly," the
legislature has apparently included33 in the first aggravating circumstance weapons previously omitted.
326. Law of April 8, 1974, ch. 1201, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323. The North Carolina
Supreme Court recently explained that the victim's resistance need not completely cease in order
to be overcome. State v. Roberts, 293 N.C. 1, 235 S.E.2d 203 (1977).
327. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
328. First degree rape could be committed by an assailant carrying a toy pistol if that toy
pistol looked like a real gun or the circumstances of its use kept the victim from discerning that it
was not real, or by an assailant with no weapon at all if the circumstances made it reasonable for
the victim to conclude that the assailant carried a concealed weapon.
The further easing of the burden of establishing this aggravating factor may result in the state
prevailing on a nonmeritorious first degree rape charge. Even if the victim did not actually believe the assailant to possess a weapon, if, under the circumstances, such a belief would be reasonable, it will be difficult for the assailant to disprove the victim's assertion that she had this belief.
Thus, this aggravating factor could be established when the assailant did not possess a weapon
and the victim did not believe him to possess one.
329. The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently relied upon its definition of "serious
injury" under the assault statute to define "serious bodily injury" under the prior rape statute.
State v. Roberts, 293 N.C. 1, 13-15, 235 S.E.2d 203, 211-13 (1977).
330. The assault statute, for example, defines "deadly weapon" as "'[any instrument which is
likely to produce death or great bodily harm, under the circumstances of its use. . . . The deadly
character of the weapon depends sometimes more upon the manner of its use and the condition of
the person assaulted, than upon the intrinsic character of the weapon itself....' State v.
Parker, 7 N.C. App. 191, 195, 171 S.E.2d 665, 667 (1970) (quoting State v. Smith, 187 N.C. 469,
121 S.E.2d 737 (1924)). This statute, however, does not define "dangerous weapon" and it is
neither defined nor used in any other statute. See Crowell, supra note 309, at 3. The North
Carolina Supreme Court has indicated that the two terms are not synonymous, and that a weapon
which is not sufficiently lethal to qualify as "deadly" might qualify as "dangerous." State v. Perry,
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Forced vaginal intercourse is also a first degree offense if the assailant inflicts "serious personal injury upon the victim or another person." 33 ' The equivalent factor under the prior statute was the
assailant's "infliction of serious bodily injury" to the rape victim that
had the effect of overcoming her resistance or procuring her submission.332 Under the new act the state will be able to establish this aggravating factor in a greater number of cases than was previously possible.
Prior law demanded that the serious injury be "bodily." Section 1427.2 provides that this injury must be "personal." The Legislature's
change arguably supports a finding by the courts that "serious bodily
injury" includes a mental as well as bodily injury.
Unlike its predecessor, section 14-27.2 requires no proof that the
injury occurred while resisting the assailant and thusprior to the forced
sexual act for a charge of first degree rape. Under the wording of the
new statute, if infliction of serious personal injury accompanies forced
vaginal intercourse the assailant can be charged with first degree rape
even if the injury is inflicted after the intercourse. In addition, the person injured need not be the person raped. Prior law required the injured person to be the rape victim.
The third aggravating factor, "one or more persons aiding and
abetting the assailant in committing the prohibited sexual conduct,"
has no counterpart in the former statute. The established common law
will be relied upon in deterdefinition of aiding and abetting probably
333
mining the establishment of this factor.
The second category of first degree rape states that a person is
guilty of the offense if that person "engages in vaginal intercourse
[w]ith a victim who is a child of the age of 12 years or less and the
291 N.C. 586, 593, 231 S.E.2d 262, 266 (1977) (indictment charging use of "dangerous" but not
"deadly" weapon not charge of first degree rape).
331. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979). "Serious personal injury" is not
defined in the new act. The courts will, therefore, presumably look for guidance in construing this
term to prior relevant judicial interpretation. See note 330 supra. The North Carolina Supreme

Court recently declined an opportunity to detail the substance of the phrase "serious bodily injury," noting that" [w]hether such serious injury has been inflicted must be determined according
to the facts of each case." State v. Roberts, 293 N.C. 1, 13-14, 235 S.E.2d 203, 211 (1977) (quoting
State v. Jones, 258 N.C. 89, 126 S.E.2d 1 (1962)).
332. Law of April 8, 1974, ch. 1201, § 2(a)(2), 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323.
333. Crowell, supra note 309, at 4.
'A person aids when, being present at the time and place, he does some act to render aid
to the actual perpetrator of the crime though he takes no direct share in its commission;
and an abettor is one who gives aid and comfort, or either commands, advises, instigates
or encourages another to commit a crime.'
State v. Hargett, 255 N.C. 412, 415, 121 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1961) (citations omitted).
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defendant is four or more years older than the victim. ' 334 Several of
the differences between this category of first degree rape and its counterpart under former law parallel the differences between the first category of first degree rape and its predecessor: "Vaginal intercourse" as
opposed to "carnal knowledge" is the prohibited sexual conduct, the

only gender requirement imposed upon the assailant and the victim is
that they be of opposite sexes, and no minimum age is required of the

assailant.
Aside from these differences, section 14-27.2 makes other changes
in the elements of this aggravating factor. The virginity of the rape

victim is not in issue under the new law. The language of the prior
335

statute made the victim's virginity an essential element of the crime.
Also, the legislature's change in the wording 9 f the age requirement for
this offense from "under 12 years of age" "12 years or less" clouds the
previously settled position that the victim could not have passed her
twelfth birthday. The legislature's rewording of this phrase seems to
indicate a child is 12 years or less until the child reaches his thirteenth
birthday. Under this argument, the new statute would extend by a year
the age of the victim with whom vaginal intercourse is first degree
rape.

3 36

While the assailant need no longer be more than 16 years of age,
he must be four or more years older than the victim.3 37 If this age
difference is not met, the elements of first degree rape cannot be established and no lesser offense is applicable. This situation is arguably a
334. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The corresponding category under
the prior statute provided that any person "more than 16 years of age" who carnally knows and
abuses "a virtuous female child under the age of 12 years" shall be guilty of first degree rape. Law
of April 8, 1974, ch. 1201, § 2(a)(l), 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323.
335. No case decided under the prior statute specified that the State must establish, inter alia,
the victim's virginity in order to establish a prima facie case of first degree rape. (The requirement
that the victim be virtuous was added to the statute in 1973.) A case construing former G.S. 14-26
did, however, make such a specification. This statute prohibited the carnal knowledge of "any
female child, over 12 and under 16 years of age, who has never before had sexual intercourse with
any person." The North Carolina Supreme Court held that under this statute the victim's "former
chastity is a material part of the crime and must be proved." State v. Barefoot, 241 N.C. 650, 654,
86 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1955). Because the victim's virginity need not be proved under the new law,
the State's burden in establishing this category of first degree rape may be carried more easily.
336. One commentator notes that, while there is no relevant North Carolina case law on this
issue, in those states that have decided the issue, "of the age of 12 years or less" means until the
twelfth birthday is reached. Crowell, supra note 309, at 5.
337. Although it is not specified in the statute, presumably this difference will be measured
from the birthdays of the assailant and the victim.
Under the former statute a four year minimum age difference was also required. The assailant had to be more than 16 years of age and the victim had to be under the age of 12. Law of
April 8, 1973, ch. 1201, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323.
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deficiency in the new law. Under the former statute a person who engaged in sexual intercourse with a female under 12 years of age was
guilty of second degree rape if the first degree elements could not be
established. 338 Now, many of those assailants cannot be prosecuted.
2.

Second Degree

Section 14-27.3 sets forth the elements of second degree rape. A
person is guilty of second degree rape if that person "engages in vaginal
intercourse with another person [b]y force and against the will of the
other person; or [w]ho is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or
physically helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should
reasonably know" of the other person's condition.339
Second degree rape, like first degree rape, may now be committed
by either a male or female upon a person of the opposite sex. The new
statute prohibits, as did its predecessor, forced intercourse for which the
aggravating factors of first degree rape are not present. Omitted from
the 1979 legislation is the formerly included offense of sexual intercourse with a child under 12 when the first degree elements are not
satisfied. 34 0 The new statute provides additional grounds, though, for
charging an assailant with second degree rape. Intercourse with a person who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless is now second degree rape 341 provided342the assailant knows or
has reason to know of the person's condition.
343
3. First and Second Degree Sexual Offenses

The 1979 legislation creates a new category of prohibited sexual
338. Id.

339. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Under the prior law a person was guilty
of second degree rape if he carnally knew "any female of the age of 12 years or more by force and
against her will," or carnally knew "any female child under the age of 12 years." Law of April 8,
1973, ch. 1201, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323.
340. See text accompanying note 338 supra.
341. An assailant can defend a charge under G.S. 14-27.3 on the ground that he did not "rea-

sonably know the other person [to be] mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically
helpless." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3 (Cum.Supp. 1979).
342. Id. § 14-27.1. These terms include victims who are incapable of resisting or communicating their resistance to the assailant's conduct. .d.
One commentator argues that this new provision makes no substantive additions to the law
because "any intercourse with someone incapable of giving consent is against that person's will"
and is, therefore, rape. Crowell, supra note 309, at 4-5 (citations omitted).
343. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.4 & .5 (Cum.Supp. 1979). While the pre-1979 rape statute did
not prohibit the sexual conduct treated as a sexual offense under the new act, such conduct was
prohibited as crime against nature. Id. § 14-177 (1969). See generally STRONG's NORTH
CAROLINA INDEX 3D, CrimeAgainst Nature (1976).
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conduct-"sexual offense." The elements of first and second degree
sexual offenses are set forth in sections 14-27.4 and .5 respectively.
These offenses differ from first and second degree rape only with respect to the prohibited sexual conduct."4 For rape, the prohibited sex-

ual conduct is vaginal intercourse; for sexual offense, the assailant must
commit a "sexual act."'3 45 "Sexual act" is defined in section 14-27.1 as

"cunnilingus, fellation, analingus or anal intercourse," and includes

"the penetration, however slight, by any object into the genital or anal
opening of another person's body" without their consent.34 6
4. Attempted Rape

Section 14-27.6 replaces the former crime of assault with intent to
rape and prohibits attempted rape or attempted sexual offense. 34 7 An
attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements: an intent to com-

preparation to commit
mit that crime and an act that goes beyond 3mere
48

it, but falls short of its actual commission.
Under both the old and new statutes the assailant's intent to commit the prohibited sexual conduct is an essential element of the offense.

The 1979 legislation, however, requires only an intent to commit the
crime and does not, as did its predecessor, additionally require that this
intent be present at "all events, and notwithstanding any resistance" by
the victim. 349 Thus intent which would not have satisfied the intent
344. The only gender requirement imposed upon the assailant and the victim is that imposed
by the nature of the sexual act.
345. Engaging in a "sexual act" as defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979)
is also a crime against nature. If the "sexual act" is by force and against the will of the victim, the
assailant can be charged with either first or second degree sexual offense depending on whether
the aggravating factors which make the crime first degree can be established. If the assailant
commits the sexual act with the consent of the victim and the victim is more than 12 years old, first
degree sexual offense cannot be charged. The assailant can, however, be charged with crime
against nature because consent is no defense to that crime. Law of May 29, 1979, ch. 682, § 1,
1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 725 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.1 to -27.10 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
346. In defining "sexual act" § 14-27.1(4) provides a "defense that penetration was for accepted medical purposes." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
347. Law of May 29, 1979, ch. 682, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 725 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-27.6 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
348. State v. Hoover, 14 N.C. App. 154, 156, 187 S.E.2d 453, 454 (1972) (citing State v. Surles,
230 N.C. 272, 52 S.E.2d 880 (1949)).
Prior law required the state to establish (1) an assault and (2) the assailant's intent to gratify
his passion on his victim "at all events, and notwithstanding any resistance on her part." State v.
Hudson, 280 N.C. 74, 77, 185 S.E.2d 189, 191 (1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1160 (1974).
349. 280 N.C. at 77, 185 S.E.2d at 191. The courts alleviated the burden placed on the prosecution in establishing this degree of intent by finding the intent if the assailant at any time during
the assault had an intent to gratify his passion, notwithstanding any resistance on the victim's part.
State v. Dais, 22 N.C. App. 379, 206 S.E.2d 759, appeal dismissed,285 N.C. 664, 207 S.E.2d 758
(1974). Despite this reduction of the prosecution's burden of proof, it was still possible that the
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requirement under the prior law will now be sufficient. In addition, the
new act removes the burdensome requirement of demonstrating an "assault." To be guilty of assault a defendant must have offered or attempted by force or violence to injure another person. 35 0 The crime of
attempt requires only an act which goes beyond mere preparation toward the commission of a crime. Clearly conduct that falls short of an
assault will constitute "beyond mere preparation," and expand the
scope of prohibited conduct.
5. Sexual Conduct by a Substitute Parent
Section 14-27.7 provides that "[ilf a defendant who has assumed
the position of a parent in the home of a minor victim engages in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with a victim who is a minor residing in
the home. . . the person is guilty of a felony."35 ' This sexual conduct
was not prohibited under prior law. The statute prohibits both vaginal
intercourse and sexual acts. It does not require that the vaginal intercourse or sexual act be forced upon the victim and specifically states
that consent is not a defense. Like rape and sexual offense, no gender
requirements are imposed upon the victim or the assailant. Section 1427.7 does, however, impose other requirements upon the parties involved. It provides that the assailant must have assumed the position of
a parent, but does not detail what action constitutes such an assumption. It is not clear, therefore, whether such assumption must be a "legal" one such as a court-appointed guardian, or whether an actual
parent's live-in mate would satisfy this requirement. Because the statute requires that the parent position be assumed, presumably an actual
parent could not be prosecuted under this section.
6. Sexual Conduct by a Custodian
Section 14-27.7 creates another new category of prohibited sexual
conduct. Under this category "a person having custody of a victim of
any age or a person who is an agent or employee of any person, or
institution, whether such institution is private, charitable, or governmental, having custody of a victim of any age [who] engages in vaginal
352
intercourse or sexual act with such victim" is guilty of a felony.
assailant would claim that his intent to rape his victim was not "at all events and notwithstanding
any resistance" by the victim. The new act eliminates this possibility.
350. State v. Thompson, 27 N.C. App. 576, 219 S.E.2d 566 (1975) (citations omitted),
351. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
352. Id.
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Rape and sexual offense are both prohibited. Force is not an essential
element and the victim's consent does not provide an assailant a defense. No age or gender requirements are imposed upon the victim or
assailant. The crucial element of this offense is that the victim be in the
35 3
custody of the assailant, the assailant's principal or his employer.
The meaning of "custody" is not explained. The extent and type of
control which the assailant, his principal or his employer must exercise
over the victim before the victim is in their custody is left to judicial
definition.
7.

Prosecution of a Spouse

Section 14-27.8 provides an exception to the general rule that a
victim's spouse may not be prosecuted for otherwise illegal sexual conduct. This section states that when the victim and the victim's spouse
are living separate and apart pursuant to a written agreement or a judicial decree the spouse may be prosecuted for rape or sexual offense.
Previously, a spouse could be prosecuted only under a theory of aiding
3 54
and abetting and not as a result of the spouse's own sexual conduct.
The new law sets forth no requirements with respect to the written
agreement such as that it be court-approved or notarized. Apparently,
an agreement executed and signed by the husband and wife will be
sufficient.3 5 5 If the husband and wife are living separate and apart, but
there is neither a written agreement nor a court order, vaginal intercourse or a sexual act between them will be legal.
BENJAMIN H. FLOWE, JR.
LAWRENCE K. RYNNING
ELIZABETH GARLAND SARN

353. Id. § 14-27.8.
354. A husband who counsels, aids, abets assists or forces another person to have sexual intercourse with his wife, or forces her to submit to sexual intercourse with another is guilty of rape.
State v. Martin, 17 N.C. App. 317, 318-20, 194 S.E.2d 60, 61-62, cert. denied,283 N.C. 259, 195
S.E.2d 691 (1973). Presumably, the aiding and abetting approach will be available under the new
law as a means of prosecuting a person for rape or sexual offense when the victim is his spouse.
355. Crowell, supra note 309, at 2.

VI.

A.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Inventory Searches

In State v. Nelson' the North Carolina Supreme Court considered
constitutionality
of an inventory search of defendants' military bilthe
lets, conducted pursuant to standard military procedure while defendants were not on the military base but were in custody of civilian
authorities. 2 Applying the rationale of South Dakota v. Opperman,3 the
court held that the search did not violate defendants' fourth amend-

ment rights.4
Six days after the rape and robbery involved in Nelson, defendants

were arrested and jailed in Cumberland County in connection with another crime.5 Pursuant to regulations,6 military personnel took an inventory of their belongings located in their military billets and then
secured them. Upon reading accounts of the rape and robbery in a
newspaper, defendants' Battery Commanders7 viewed the secured

property and found that it fit the newspaper descriptions of the items
allegedly stolen from the victims. After reporting the similarities to
their superiors, the officers turned over the items to civilian authorities.8
The court held that the initial inventory search was justified, because the circumstances of this case were analogous to those of South

Dakota v. Opperman. Although the court recognized that an "initial
permissible intrusion into a constitutionally protected zone does notper
se validate a subsequent intrusion," 9 it found that the comparison of
defendants' secured property with the newspaper description of stolen
items was not a second intrusion, but merely a "second look at items
already discovered."' 10
1. 298 N.C. 573, 260 S.E.2d 629 (1979).
2. Id. at 578-79, 260 S.E.2d 635.
3. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). In Opperman,police conducted an inventory search of defendant's

automobile when it was impounded after receiving two parking tickets. The search was initiated
pursuant to standard police procedures after a number of valuables were viewed on the seat of
defendant's car. Id. at 365-66. See text accompanying notes 11-13 infra.
4. 298 N.C. at 580, 260 S.E.2d at 636.
5. See State v. Jolly, 297 N.C. 121, 254 S.E.2d 1 (1979).
6. See UNITED STATES ARMY, U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-1, LEGAL GUIDE FOR COM2:9(c), 10:6, 10:7 (1974), quoledin 298 N.C. at 578 n.2, 260 S.E.2d at 635 n.2.
MANDERS
7. The initial inventory was not conducted by either of the Battery Commanders, but by
other military personnel. 298 N.C. at 579, 260 S.E.2d at 635.
8. Id. at 578-80, 260 S.E.2d at 635-36.
9. Id. at 583, 260 S.E.2d at 637. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1968).
10. 298 N.C. at 583, 260 S.E.2d at 638. See notes 25-29 & accompanying text infra.
The court also found no merit in defendants' claim that error had been committed when their
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In Opperman the United States Supreme Court held that the conduct of police, who, following standard police procedures, inventoried
the contents of an impounded automobile, was not unreasonable under
the fourth amendment." In making its decision the Court observed:
(1) that there exists a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile; (2) that inventories of impounded automobiles, conducted pursuant to standard police procedures and without investigative motives,
have become increasingly routine; and (3) that inventories protect police from possible danger and potential civil liability for property loss,
while also protecting the owner from property loss.12 According to Opperman, a valid inventory search is a neutral, noninvestigatory, admincarried out in accordance with standard police
istrative activity
3
procedures.1
In drawing its analogy to Opperman, the Nelson court pointed out
that while a soldier may have a greater expectation of privacy in his
billet than in an automobile, his expectation is not absolute and must
trials were consolidated. Defendants based their claim on two grounds: (I) they possessed antagonistic defenses, 298 N.C. at 586-87, 260 S.E.2d at 640, and (2) evidence admissible against only
one defendant had been permitted to be considered against both. Id. at 588-89, 260 S.E.2d at 641.
The court held that the mere existence of antagonistic defenses does not, per se, warrant
severance. Rather, the test is whether the "defendants were denied a fair trial." Id. at 587, 260
S.E.2d at 640. To be avoided is an evidentiary contest between the two defendants rather than
between the defendants and the state. Id. Deciding that this was not a case "where the state
simply stood by and relied on the testimony of the respective defendants to convict them," the
court held that the existence of antagonistic defenses did not alone constitute a basis for severance.
Id. at 588, 260 S.E.2d at 641. Rejecting defendants' second argument, the court noted that they
had not made timely objections to the introduction of the evidence or asked for limiting instructions when the judge charged the jury. Id. at 589, 260 S.E.2d at 641.
Defendant Jolly also argued that the consolidation of trials allowed his former attorney to
cross-examine him on behalf of his codefendant. Nelson's attorney had previously represented
both defendants as a public defender. After the court found a conflict of interest, Jolly was appointed a new attorney. Nelson, however, retained the original attorney, who at trial cross-examined Jolly in an attempt to discredit his testimony and argued to the jury that Jolly, not Nelson,
was guilty. Unwilling to adopt a per se rule that under such circumstances a new trial must be
granted, the court held that Jolly was required to show actual prejudice resulting from his former
attorney's representation of his codefendant. Id. at 591-92, 260 S.E.2d at 643. Actual prejudice
would be shown if the attorney had taken "advantage of the former [attorey-client] relation in
some way at the subsequent trial or if the former relation put the attorney in a better position to
inflict the damage than he otherwise would have been." Id. at 592, 260 S.E.2d at 643. Here no
such prejudice was shown.
11. 428 U.S. at 376.
12. Id. at 367-69.
13. 428 U.S. at 375-76. In State v. Phifer, 297 N.C. 216, 254 S.E.2d 586 (1979), the North
Carolina Supreme Court refused to apply the inventory search rationale of Opperman because the
officers had not acted pursuant to authorized police procedures and the court recognized a clear
investigatory motive on their part. Id. at 224, 254 S.E.2d at 590. In State v. Francum, 39 N.C.
App. 429, 250 S.E.2d 705 (1979), the court of appeals upheld a non-inventory search of defendant's automobile because there was no apparent motive ulterior to that of safeguarding the property. Id. at 433-34; 250 S.E.2d at 708.
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necessarily yield to certain governmental interests.' 4 Furthermore,
noninvestigatory searches pursuant to standard military procedures
have been justified for the same protective purposes stated in Opperman.15 For these reasons, the court found little difference between the
inventory search conducted in Opperman and the one conducted in the
present case and, consequently, held that the initial search and seizure
were constitutionally reasonable.' 6
The court's analogy is a good one. While a soldier may have a
greater expectation of privacy in his military billet than the Supreme
Court has found justifiable in an automobile, this expectation is arguably not as great as one's expectation of privacy in his home.' 7 It would
also seem logical that the protective purposes discussed in Opperman
are just as relevant in the context of an inventory search of a military
billet as in a similar search of an abandoned automobile.
In addition to the three general observations listed above, which
are applicable to all inventory searches, the United States Supreme
Court listed five specific factors that contributed to the reasonableness
of the Opperman search. First, the Court noted that the caretaking
search had been conducted while the automobile was legally impounded.' 8 In Nelson, since the billets were located on a military base,
military personnel had a legitimate interest in seeing that defendants'
property was properly accounted for in their absence. Moreover, an
inventory was required by military regulations. 9 Second, in Opperman
defendant's car had been impounded only after multiple traffic violations.20 In Nelson defendants' billets were searched only after defendants had been jailed and were, consequently, absent from the base for
two days. 2 ' Third, in Opperman the owner was not present to make
arrangements for the safekeeping of his belongings at the time the automobile was impounded. 2 Similarly, in Nelson defendants were jailed
14. 298 N.C. at 582, 260 S.E.2d at 637.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 5 M.J. 916, 919 (A.C.M.R. 1978).
16. 298 N.C. at 582, 260 S.E.2d at 637.
17. See United States v. Hines, 5 M.J. 916, 919 (A.C.M.R. 1978). Indeed, soldiers would
seem to have more notice of the possibility of a protective search than would automobile drivers

because they would be more familiar with military regulations than drivers are with police procedures. Therefore, soldiers would appear to have less of an expectation of privacy in their billets
than drivers do in their automobiles.
18. 428 U.S. at 375.
19.

See UNITED STATES ARMY, U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-1, LEGAL GUIDE FOR COM-

2:9(c), 10:6, 10:7 (1974), quotedin 298 N.C. at 578 n.2, 260 S.E.2d at 635 n.2.
20. 428 U.S. at 375.
21. 298 N.C. at 578-79, 260 S.E.2d at 635.
22. 428 U.S. at 375. In Opperman defendant's car was ticketed twice between 2 A.M. and 10
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and, therefore, unable to properly secure their own property. Fourth,
in Opperman the officers' observation of certain valuables in plain
view, prompted them to take the precaution of conducting the inventory search of defendant's automobile.2 3 In Nelson defendants' absence, which was bound to be noticed by other soldiers on the base,
created the risk that their personal property might be stolen or damaged. Finally, in Opperman the Court noted the absence of an investigatory police motive.24 There is no indication in Nelson of any motive
other than a desire to safeguard defendants' property and to protect the
military against liability for lost items. Thus, the United States
Supreme Court's rationale for constitutionally upholding the validity of
certain inventory searches seems as well fitted to the fact situation in
Nelson as it does to that of Opperman.
In support of its holding that a second look at items already seized
is constitutional, the court cited several cases, including UnitedStates v.
Edwards. 5 In that case, the United States Supreme Court found nothing unreasonable about the warrantless laboratory examination of
clothing that was in police custody pursuant to the lawful arrest of the
defendant and seizure of his clothing.2 6 The North Carolina court admitted, however, that the holding in Edwards must be read in light of
UnitedStates v. Chadwick,2 7 in which the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution required police to obtain a search warrant before opening
and searching a lawfully seized footlocker. 28 Nevertheless, the two
cases are distinguishable, the court observed, because in Edwards the
second examination was of "items already once legitimately seen,"
while, in Chadwick the contents of the footlocker had not yet been examined.2 9 The distinction seems to have merit. Once items have been
examined, the defendant has little continued expectation of privacy. In
Chadwick, however, there remained an expectation of privacy in the
contents of the footlocker, and there was no reason to extend the search
beyond the limits justified by the exigencies of the circumstances.30
A.M. and then impounded. Defendant retrieved his automobile late that afternoon. There was no
indication in the opinion of where defendant was at the time his car was impounded or of the
exact time when he discovered that it had been impounded.
23. Id. at 375-76.
24. Id. at 376.
25. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
26. Id. at 806.
27. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
28. Id. at 15-16.
29. 298 N.C. at 584, 260 S.E.2d at 639.
30. The footlocker in Chadwick was seized pursuant to the automobile exception to the
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WarrantlessEntry into Buildings

The North Carolina Supreme Court decided two cases concerning
warrantless entries into buildings. The first, State v. Aliison,3 1 dealt
with a warrantless entry into a mobile home for the purpose of making
an arrest. State v. Taylor32 involved exigent circumstances that made a
limited, warrantless search of a "shot house," incident to a lawful arrest, reasonable under the United States Constitution.
In Allison, police arrived at the scene of a slaying to find the victim
lying in her front yard. The victim's son informed a policeman that
defendant had shot the victim and indicated that defendant was in his
trailer, located approximately 150 to 200 feet away. He failed to inform
the policeman that he had heard a car door slam and an engine crank
or that he had already been to the trailer looking for the suspect. The
first policeman to arrive at the scene then instructed a second officer to
investigate the trailer and the area near the trailer, from which the fatal
shot had been fired. The second officer proceeded to the trailer,
knocked on the door, and, receiving no response, tested it and found it
unlocked. He then entered the trailer and immediately found and
seized a rifle. The officer then announced both his presence and authority and proceeded to search the trailer for the suspect. Failing to
locate him, the officer left the premises.3 3
In considering whether the warrantless entry of defendant's trailer
violated his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, the court noted that the United States Supreme
Court had not yet decided what limitations are constitutionally imposed on an officer making such an entry for the purpose of arresting a
suspect.34 Citing dicta in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,3 however, the
court suggested that "the Supreme Court will eventually hold that the
Fourth Amendment imposes upon a warrantless entry for the purpose
search warrant requirement. Once the footlocker was seized, however, its mobility was eliminated
and consequently there was no basis for searching inside. Further, a person has a greater expectation of privacy in luggage than in an automobile. 433 U.S. at 13.
31. 298 N.C. 135, 257 S.E.2d 417 (1979).
32. 298 N.C. 405, 259 S.E.2d 502 (1979).
33. 298 N.C. at 137-38, 257 S.E.2d at 419.
34. Id. at 140, 257 S.E.2d at 420.
The North Carolina Supreme Court could have upheld the search in Allison based on the
"hot pursuit" doctrine which was set forth in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). In Warden,
as in Allison, police had been informed that the suspect was in the residence and entered it to
make an arrest shortly after the crime had been committed. For a discussion of the "hot pursuit"
doctrine and Warden v. Hayden, see note 58 infra.
35. 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971).
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of making an arrest limitations comparable to the strictures on residential searches and seizures."36 The ultimate limitation on warrantless
searches, observed the court, is that they be reasonable under the circumstances.3 7 A warrantless search is constitutionally reasonable if
probable cause to search exists and if the situation presents exigent circumstances that make it imperative that the search be conducted without a warrant.3 8
Having recognized that the Supreme Court has adopted no stan-

dards for determining the validity of a warrantless entry to make an
arrest, the court adopted the analysis set out in Dorman v. United
States.3 9 In that case the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit listed seven factors that should be weighed in order to determine whether a warrantless entry to make an arrest was reasonable
under the circumstances:
(1) [T~he gravity and violent character of the offense; (2) the reasonableness of the belief the suspect is armed; (3) the degree of probable
cause to believe the suspect committed the crime involved; (4)
36. 298 N.C. at 140, 257 S.E.2d at 420-21. In fact, the Supreme Court has subsequently
equated entry of a residence to make an arrest with entry to search. See Payton v. New York, 100
S. Ct. 1371 (1980). Payton involved the consolidated cases of two defendants who objected to the
introduction of evidence found when police entered their homes without a warrant for the purpose
of making an arrest. Two days after the murder of a gas station manager, police obtained probable cause to believe that Payton had committed the crime. The next day, officers went to his
apartment without a warrant with the intent of arresting him. Receiving no response to their
knock, they requested assistance, and thirty minutes later broke open the door with crowbars.
Payton was not home, but the officers found and seized a 30-caliber shell casing which was later
admitted into evidence. Id. at 1375-78.
Defendant Riddick was arrested in March of 1974 for a crime that had been committed in
1971. He had been identified in 1973 and police had learned his address by January of 1974.
Following their knock, officers were admitted to Riddick's house by his son. Riddick was placed
under arrest, but because he needed to dress, the officers opened his chest of drawers and discovered narcotics. Both entries had been made during the daytime. Id.
The Court distinguished warrantless arrests made in public, invalid under United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), from those made in a residence: "In terms that apply equally to
seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a line at the
entrance to the house." Id. at 1382. The Court then held that absent exigent circumstances, the
fourth amendment prohibits police from making a warrantless entry of a suspect's home to make a
routine felony arrest. Id. Noting that an arrest warrant carries an implied limited authority to
enter a home when there is reason to believe that the suspect is there, the Court held that a search
warrant was not also required to make an arrest in a home. Id. at 1388.
37. 298 N.C. at 141, 257 S.E.2d at 421.
38. Id.
39. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Dorman, police went to defendant's home at 10:20
p.m., four and a half hours after an armed robbery had occurred. After knocking and announcing
their identity, the officers were greeted by defendant's mother who informed them that her son
had just left and that if they did not believe her, they should look for themselves. The officers then
heard a noise in the house, whereupon they entered and searched for the defendant. Although the
officers did not find defendant, they did find some of the stolen property. Id. at 387-88. The court
found the officers' conduct to be reasonable. Id. at 394.
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whether reason to believe the suspect is in the premises entered ex-

isted; (5) the likelihood of escape if not swiftly apprehended; (6) the
amount of force used to effect the unconsented entry; and (7) whether
the entry was at day or night. 4

The court in Allison held that the facts of the case satisfied each of these
factors and that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry of
defendant's trailer.4 ' Accordingly, the court found that the trial judge
did not err in admitting the seized rifle into evidence.42

In its holding in Allison, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
articulated a viable standard for determining the constitutionality of a
warrantless entry of a dwelling for the purpose of arresting a suspect.

A consideration of the factors enumerated in Allison requires a balancing of the severity of the crime involved and the necessity of a warrant-

less entry against the degree of governmental intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area of personal liberty. The constitutionality of the standard set forth in Allison is, of course, subject to the
Supreme Court's holding in Payton v. New York.4

In State v. Taylor,' defendant, who was wanted for robbery and

maiming in Virginia and for murder in North Carolina, was arrested in
40. 298 N.C. at 141, 257 S.E.2d at 421 (citing 435 F.2d at 392-93).
41. Id. at 142-43, 257 S.E.2d at 422. Allison also claimed that the entry of his trailer was
made in violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(e)(l) (1978):
A law-enforcement officer may enter private premises or a vehicle to effect an arrest
when:
a. The officer has in his possession a warrant or order for the arrest of a person or
is authorized to arrest a person without a warrant or order having been issued,
b. The officer has reasonable cause to believe the person to be arrested is present,
and
c. The officer has given, or made reasonable effort to give, notice of his authority
and purpose to an occupant thereof, unless there is reasonable cause to believe that the
giving of such notice would present a clear danger to human life.
Defendant conceded, for the purposes of this argument, that the requirement of subsection (a) had
been met, but argued that those of (b) and (c) had not been satisfied. The court found no merit in
the subsection (b) claim. Addressing defendant's argument under subsection (c), the court determined that the officer could reasonably have feared that giving notice of his authority and purpose
would present a clear danger to his life. Furthermore, the officer's entry was judged reasonable
under the circumstances, and the court held that if the officer had committed error in entering
before announcing his authority and purpose, it was not a substantial violation of the statute, 298
N.C. at 143-44, 257 S.E.2d at 422-23.
Additionally, the court pointed out that even if the search of the trailer and seizure of the
weapon had been unconstitutional, it would have been immaterial to the outcome of the case. The
State was unable to prove that the seized rifle was in fact the murder weapon and therefore did not
benefit from its admission into evidence. Id. at 143, 257 S.E.2d at 422. The constitutionality of
this statute is in doubt, however, after the Supreme Court's holding in Payton v. New York, See
note 36 supra.
42. 298 N.C. at 142-43, 257 S.E.2d at 422.
43. 100 S. Ct. 1731 (1980). See note 36 supra.
44. 298 N.C. 405, 259 S.E.2d 502 (1979).
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Hampton, Virginia two days after the commission of the North Carolina crime. 45 After receiving information that defendant was in a "shot
house, ' 46 approximately twenty-five policemen surrounded the building in the early evening and advised the suspect that he should come
out. Defendant did so and identified himself as Norris Taylor, the man
whom the police were seeking. After frisking defendant and discovering that he was not armed, the arresting officer asked defendant where
his weapon was located. Defendant stated that it was in the house, and
the officer asked to be led to it. At trial, the officer testified that he did
not know if anyone was left in the house, or even whether the suspect
was in fact who he claimed to be. Defendant then led the officer into a
small room in the house and located his pistol for the officer.4 7
On appeal from his conviction defendant argued that the search of
the house and seizure of the pistol violated his fourth amendment
rights and, therefore, that the trial judge improperly admitted the pistol
into evidence.4 8 The court concluded that the Hampton police "were
justified by exigent circumstances in making a limited, warrantless
search of the shot house and in seizing the pistol. ' 49 In support of this
decision, the court noted that when the circumstances surrounding an
arrest made outside a dwelling provide officers with a reasonable belief
that their safety is seriously threatened, or when there exists a "high
potentiality for danger," a warrantless entry into the dwelling for the
purpose of making a limited safety check is reasonable under the constitutional standard for searches and seizures.5" Such a cursory check is
justified by the "immediate need to ensure that no one remains in the
dwelling preparing to fire a yet unfound weapon at the arresting officer
as he leaves the scene of the arrest."'" Among the factors that, according to the court, contributed to a justifiable apprehension of danger on
the part of the officers and to the fear that they may not have been able
to withdraw without being fired on were the lateness of the hour, the
place of arrest and the dangerousness of the defendant, an armed sus45. It is not clear from the opinion when the crime giving rise to the Virginia charges had
been committed. See id. at 414, 259 S.E.2d at 507. It is possible that a basis for the search of the
house could be found hithese facts.
46. A "shot house" is a place where liquor by the drink is illegally sold. Id. at 414 n.l, 259
S.E.2d at 507 n.l.
47. Id. at 414, 259 S.E.2d at 507-508.
48. Id. at 414, 259 S.E.2d at 507.
49. Id. at 416, 259 S.E.2d at 509.
50. Id. at 416-17, 259 S.E.2d at 509.
51. Id. at 417, 259 S.E.2d at 509.
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pect wanted for murder. 2 The court added:
Once defendant had been arrested, the officers had good reason to
fear for their safety. In the first place, the officers "did not know if
there was anyone else in the house, or if, in fact, this was Norris
Taylor or exactly what." Additionally, defendant's weapon had not
been accounted for. Given the strong possibility of an ambush or
"set up," it was eminently reasonable for the police to make a limited
protective sweep of the premises in order to recover defendant's
weapons and to ensure there was no one in the house who could fire
on them while they withdrew with defendant. 3

In addition, the court determined that there was no reason to believe
that the search was a pretext for uncovering evidence or that it was

greater in scope than the circumstances demanded. Consequently, the
reasonableness of the search was supported by exigent circumstances,
54
and the trial court had not erred by admitting the pistol into evidence.
The United States Supreme Court considered the constitutional
scope of a search incident to arrest in Chime? v. Calfornia.: In that
case, in which defendant was arrested in his home pursuant to a valid
arrest warrant, the Court ruled that while a search of the area within

the arrestee's "immediate control" including his person was justified, a
search of other areas of the house was not justified.

6

In Vale v. Louisi-

ana5 7

the Court held that a search will be considered incident to an
arrest only if it is made "substantially contemporaneous" with and in
the "immediate vicinity" of the arrest. In particular, for a search of a

house to be upheld, the arrest must actually take place inside the
house.5 8
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 417-18, 259 S.E.2d at 509-510. It is not clear whether the court's decision actually
turns on its holding on the search and seizure issue, because the court also held as a preliminary
matter that defendant had no standing to object to the search. Id. at 416, 259 S.E.2d at 508-09.
The court observed that the record failed to show that defendant had a privacy interest in the

room that was searched. Id. While it does indicate that defendant was present at the "shot house"
and that his weapon was found there, the record does not show that he either owned the house,
leased or occupied the room as a guest, or had permission to store personal property there. Md.
Because the court had already disposed of the assignment of error on the ground that defendant
lacked standing, it is arguable that the court's consideration of the constitutionality of the search
and seizure is mere dictum.
55. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
56. Id. at 763.
57. 399 U.S. 30 (1970). In Vale, officers with a warrant for Vale's arrest observed him and
another individual engaged in an apparent drug transaction. Defendant was arrested on the front
step of his home. Id. at 32.
58. Id. at 33-34.
Chimel and Vale, however, did not overrule the "hot pursuit" doctrine, which the Court
outlined in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). In that case, police knew that an armed
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The court in Taylor based its holding on exigent circumstances
which, in the court's judgment, made it unsafe for the officers to retreat
without first making a cursory search of the house. Although the
Supreme Court has never adopted this exception to the warrant requirement, six cases were cited by the North Carolina court in support
of this rationale. The factual situations of all six can be distinguished
from that of Taylor in critical ways. In McGeehan v. Wainwright 59 police investigating an armed robbery that had occurred the same night
surrounded a home and ordered the occupants to come out. The police
did not have positive identification of the three perpetrators of the
crime, but knew that they were armed. The court held that when no
weapons were recovered from the four individuals who exited, the officers were justified in entering an open door and making a brief protective search of the house.6" In Taylor police were seeking one man
who had already exited the house, and there was no reason to believe
that he had any accomplices. Further, that defendant had had a
weapon in his possession two days before the arrest was not as strong
an indication that he had retained that weapon as the indication in
McGeehan in which it was known that the arrestees had been armed
just hours earlier.6 ' In United States v. Looney6 2 the arrest was made
inside the house and the suspect was known to have a propensity to use
confederates. 63 The need to conduct a search in order to ensure a safe
retreat was not as great in Taylor, because the arrest was made outside
the house. United States v. Smith' was a case in which police had
information that the suspect was armed and accompanied by another
individual. The court held that, when the suspect eventually exited the
robbery had just occurred and were informed that the suspect had entered a house five minutes
prior to their arrival. The Court held that, given the exigent circumstances present in the case, a
search of the house for someone fitting the description of the suspect and for weapons used in the
robbery was justified and that the scope of the search may be as broad as necessary to prevent the
suspect's escape. Id. at 298-99. The facts in Taylor, however, do not fit under this exception to the
warrant requirement, because the crime had been committed two days prior to the arrest. See
notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
59. 526 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
60. Id. at 398-99.
6 1. If the defendant's known possession of a weapon two days before his arrest presents such
a threat of danger that the arresting officer is justified in making a search of the arrestee's house,
then searches of houses incident to arrests on the street could be justified in other situations that
are clearly unconstitutional. For instance, if an arrest is made of an individual who has been
arrested two days earlier for carrying a concealed weapon, the need for a cursory search of the
arrestee's house may be as compelling as that in Taylor.
62. 481 F.2d 31 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1070 (1973).
63. Id. at 31-32.
64. 515 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976).
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house fifteen minutes after being ordered to give himself up, police
were justified in entering the house to determine the whereabouts of his
supposed accomplice and to secure his weapon.65 In Taylor defendant
exited immediately upon being told to do so, and the police had no
reason to believe that he had accomplices.
While investigating a robbery that had occurred earlier that day,
police in Hopkins v. Alabama66 were fired on from the building in
which the suspect was located. The suspect exited without his weapon
only after tear gas had been used to force him out.6 7 In Hopkins, unlike Taylor, there was not just a possibility of danger, but an actual
physical threat to the policemen's safety. When the officers were fired
upon and the weapon was not recovered during the subsequent arrest,
the police were justified in making a brief protective search of the
house. Banks v. State6" presented a situation in which police were investigating a kidnapping that had occurred a few minutes earlier.
Armed individuals were seen inside the apartment, and police did not
have positive identification of the four suspects. The court held that
after seven unarmed individuals exited the building, the police were
justified in making a protective search of the apartment.69 In Taylor,
the crime had been committed two days earlier, and at no time did the
officers observe weapons at the scene of the arrest.7" Police investigating a domestic disturbance in People v. Olajos7 ' observed two persons
in a house, one of whom shot a rifle at the officers. The police entered
the building after one of the individuals surrendered, and after a shotgun he was carrying was seized. Again, unlike those in Taylor, the
police were in actual peril, and when the rifle was not recovered and it
seemed that one suspect remained in the house, a cursory inspection of
the building was justified.72
The exigent circumstances that existed in Taylor are simply not as
compelling as those in the cases cited by the Taylor court. Taylor's
arrest took place peacefully two days after the crime with which he was
charged took place. The officers had not been fired on, nor did they
have reason to believe that the suspect had accomplices waiting in the
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1031.
524 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 474.
94 Nev. 90, 575 P.2d 592 (1978).
Id. at 93, 575 P.2d at 594.
See 298 N.C. at 407, 414, 259 S.E.2d at 503, 507.
397 Mich. 629, 246 N.W.2d 828 (1976).
Id. at 631-33, 246 N.W.2d at 829.
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house who would fire on them as they attempted to withdraw. In es-

sence, the ruling in Taylor supports the proposition that whenever a
dangerous suspect is arrested and there is reason to believe that he may
have left a weapon in the building from which he has just exited, police
may justifiably search the building as an incident to his arrest. This

proposition is not compatible with the United States Supreme Court's
holdings in Chimel and Vale. 3
In addition, the danger-minimizing rationale of Taylor does not
stand up to close analysis. If the police had wished to minimize the
danger facing them once the arrest had been made, the safest procedure
would have been to retreat from the scene, rather than to send a single
officer into the house with the purpose of flushing out any accomplice

that may have been there. If there was reason to believe that accomplices remained in the house or that the defendant had left a weapon
behind, the officers could have secured the arrest scene while a search

warrant was obtained.
74

C. Electronic Tracking Devices

In State v. Hendricks7 5 a North Carolina court considered for the
first time whether the installation and subsequent monitoring of an

electronic tracking device planted in the container of a lawfully owned
substance, known to be used as a precursor chemical in the illegal manufacture of a controlled substance, constituted a "search" under the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.76 The North
73. See notes 55-58 & accompanying text supra.
74. An electronic tracking device does not record conversations, but transmits a signal that
can be monitored and utilized in determining the device's location. See generally Carr, Electronic
Beepers,SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP., April, 1977, at 1; 86 YALE L.J. 1461 (1977); 22 VILL L. REv.
1067 (1977).
75. 43 N.C. App. 245, 258 S.E.2d 872 (1979).
76. The North Carolina Court of Appeals also ruled that the use of a dog in an attempt to
sniff out heroin supposedly located in a safe deposit box did not constitute a search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. State v. Rogers, 43 N.C. App. 475, 479-80, 259 S.E.2d 572,
575-76 (1979). In support of its holding, the Rogers court noted that the use of the dog's sense of
smell was merely a monitoring of the air in an area that was open to the public and in which
defendant had no expectation of privacy. The court cited only United States v. Sois, 536 F.2d 880
(9th Cir. 1976) (use of dogs to sniff air outside trailer was not an unreasonable search under the
fourteenth amendment), in support of this proposition. Id See United States v. Venema, 563
F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977) (use of dog to detect marijuana in rented locker not a search); United
States v. Race, 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976) (court found no constitutional issue in use of dog for
purposes of checking freight in airport warehouse); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976) (use of dog to detect marijuana in luggage at airport
not a search); United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (use of dog to sniff marijuana
in footlocker at bus terminal not a search). But see People v. Williams, 51 Cal. App. 3d 346, 124
Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975) (carrying marijuana sniffing dog into airline baggage room without probable
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Carolina Court of Appeals held in Hendricks that a "search" occurred
upon each of these occasions: (1) an accomplice purchased a lawful
substance in which officers had installed an electronic tracking device,
or "beeper"; (2) the "beeper" was utilized to monitor the movements of
the accomplice as he drove from Connecticut to North Carolina; (3) the
accomplice subsequently carried the container and the "beeper" into
defendant's home; and (4) the "beeper" was continuously monitored
while located within defendant's curtilage. 77 Since, however, a federal
magistrate had approved the initial warrant for installation of the
"beeper," the search was deemed reasonable under the fourth amend78

ment.

The application for the initial warrant was based on an informant's statement that William Douglas Johnson and James Guy Parks
were operating a clandestine drug laboratory in which methamphetamine was being illegally manufactured. In addition, the authorities had information that Parks, doing business as Southeastern
Tank and Steel Service of Chapel Hill, had ordered chemicals from
Pflatz and Bauer Chemical Company of Stamford, Connecticut and intended to pick up those orders on May 31, 1978. On May 30 the authorities presented to a federal magistrate an affidavit requesting
authorization to install a radio-tracking device in a container of
phenyl-2-proponone that was to be picked up by Parks. The federal
magistrate issued the warrant. On May 31 Parks picked up his order
and, under surveillance, drove from Connecticut to the Raleigh/Chapel Hill area and, eventually, on June 6, to defendant's
home. On June 7 the surveilling agents determined that the substance
had been placed either in defendant's residence or in an outbuilding.
Based on these observations and other facts concerning the clandestine
operation, 79 a search warrant for defendant's home was obtained. A
search was carried out on June 12 and controlled substances were
cause is a trespass); State v. Elkins, 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 354 N.E.2d 716 (1976) (use of dog to
sniff out marijuana around packages is a search, but is reasonable under the circumstances). See
generally Annot., 31 A.L.R. Fed. 931 (1977).
77. 43 N.C. App. at 253, 258 S.E.2d at 878.
78. Id. at 258-59, 258 S.E.2d at 881. See notes 93-95 and accompanying text infra.
79. The search warrant was also based on evidence that Parks had purchased chemicals and
supplies from Fisher Scientific Chemical Company of Raleigh and statements by experts that the
chemicals and supplies purchased by Parks could not be used in the cleaning and painting of steel
tanks (the business in which defendants were purportedly engaged), but could be used only for

manufacturing the controlled substance amphetamine. Additionally, agents had observed an individual wearing a chemist's smock in defendant's house. Finally, there was evidence that Park's
behavior while travelling from Connecticut to North Carolina was suspicious and erratic. 43 N.C.
App. at 248-250, 258 S.E.2d at 875-77.
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seized. Following a guilty plea, defendant was convicted of possession
of hashish and possession of marijuana. He appealed the denial of his
motion to suppress evidence obtained. in the searchY0
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals expressed concern
regarding the ramifications of the increased use of electronic tracking
devices in governmental surveillance. First, the court noted that
"beepers" fall outside the scope of the federal wiretap statute,8 because
they technically do not "intercept" the contents of a wire or aural communication. 82 Hence, there would be no restriction on governmental
use of "beepers" and other monitoring devices of this type if the installation and use of such devices did not constitute a "search" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.83 Second, as pointed out in United
States v. Bobisink, 4 "beepers" monitor not only the movements of
those individuals intended to be observed, but also those of anyone else
who happens to enter an automobile or other form of transportation in
which a "beeper" has been installed.8 5 Third, the court was wary of the
consequences of technological advances in the use of "beepers," observing that they could easily be attached to such things as clothing or
personal property.8 6 Finally, the court emphasized that the presence of
a "beeper" is not a "minimal intrusion" nor "mere technical trespass,
but an extended physical intrusion" that "piercefs] one's privacy of location and movement, as well as one's right to protection of property
against physical invasion," and "in effect, transforms private property
into an instrument of surveillance, a surrogate police presence, a use
unintended by the original owner."87
After distinguishing certain federal cases whose factual situations
did not correspond to that of the present case,8 8 the Hendricks court
80. Id. at 246-51, 258 S.E.2d at 875-77.
81. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
82. See id. § 2510(4).
83. 43 N.C. App. at 252, 258 S.E.2d at 878.
84. 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 n.6 (1976), vacated,sub norm. United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d
106 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978).
85. 43 N.C. App. at 252, 258 S.E.2d at 878.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 253, 258 S.E.2d at 878.
88. The court distinguished several cases on the ground that they involved the installation of
"beepers" in contraband rather than lawfully owned substances. Id. E.g., United States v.
Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied,429 U.S. 846 (1976). The court also distinguished cases involving installation of "beepers"
in airplanes. 43 N.C. App. at 254, 258 S.E.2d at 879. E.g., United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d
1190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 94 (1979); United States v. Abel, 548 F.2d 591 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977). Finally, other cases were distinguished because they did not
turn on the issue of whether a search had occurred. In those cases, probable cause supported the
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considered those federal court decisions that had actually reached the
issue of whether the installation or monitoring of an electronic tracking

device in an automobile or in the container of a lawfully owned substance constituted a "search" under fourth amendment standards. One

circuit court of appeals 89 has found such an installation or monitoring
to be a search while two circuit courts 90 apparently have found other-

wise. Concluding that "[i]n a free and democratic society in which the
rights of privacy are cherished, it is reasonable for an individual to expect that he may purchase a lawful good without having that good con-

taminated with surreptitiously installed governmental surveillance
devices,"'" the court held that a search had been conducted at all stages
of the surveillance operation.92

Except to assert generally that his fourth amendment rights had
been violated, defendant had not challenged the validity of the initial
warrant authorizing the installation of the "beeper." The court found
that the intervention of a neutral and detached magistrate, who had
decided that a search could properly be made, had afforded the requisite protection mandated by the fourth amendment.93 The court did go
further, however, and asserted that the issuance of a warrant for the use

of "beepers" should be grounded on a showing of particularity and
probable cause. In particular, certain facts should be shown: (1) that a

crime is being, is about to be, or in fact has been committed; (2) that
evidence of the crime or the whereabouts of the criminals is likely to
result from the tracking of the individuals or items specified in the warrant application; (3) that the individuals or property to be tracked are
directly involved in the crime; (4) that the tracking is necessary because
other methods of investigation would be burdensome or ineffective; (5)
use of a "beeper," and exigent circumstances justified warrantless surveillance. 43 N.C. App. at
254, 258 S.E.2d at 879. E.g., United States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979).
89. United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926
(1978) (installation of "beeper" in lawful substance constituted a search).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has considered whether the installation and use of a
"beeper" to monitor the movements of a van was a search subject to the fourth amendment.
Sitting en banc, an equally divided court affirmed a district court decision holding that the installation and monitoring of a "beeper" was a search. United States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d 227 (1976),
a)'g United States v. Holmes, Crim. No. 73-27 (N.D. Fla. April 25, 1974).
90. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33-34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,429 U.S. 1002 (1976)
(monitoring of "beeper" in drum of caffeine did not constitute a search); United States v.
Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 351 (10th Cir. 1978) (installation of "beeper" in can of ether not a "per
se" fourth amendment violation).
91. 43 N.C. App. at 255, 258 S.E.2d at 879.
92. Id. at 253, 258 S.E.2d at 878.
93. Id. at 258-59, 258 S.E.2d at 881.
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that failure to give notice of the search is justified by existing exigent
circumstances; and (6) that the persons or property to be traced are
sufficiently identified.94 To insure that the search is as unintrusive as
possible, the magistrate's order should: (1) narrowly define the purpose
of the search; (2) identify the object on which and method by which the
beeper is to be attached; (3) limit the time period during which the
search may be conducted; (4) state conditions that, if met, will require
termination of the search in advance of the specified time limit; (5) require that a report of search activities be returned; and (6) require that
subsequent notice to the parties searched be provided.95
The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether the
installation or monitoring of an electronic tracking device constitutes a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The Circuit
Courts of Appeal that have considered this issue have reached varying
results, some of which rest upon a narrow interpretation of the facts.
While all the Circuit Courts of Appeal that have decided the issue have
agreed that the monitoring of contraband or unlawfully possessed
goods does not constitute a search, 96 the decisions have not been as
uniform under other fact situations. Three Circuit Courts of Appeal
have considered the constitutionality of the use of electronic tracking
devices to monitor airplanes. The Courts of Appeal for the Eighth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have ruled that the monitoring of an airplane does not constitute a search, although neither has decided
whether the installation of a monitoring device is a search.97 On the
other hand, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an owner's
valid consent to the installation of a tracking device is sufficient to justify governmental surveillance, without deciding whether such moni94. Id. at 258, 258 S.E.2d at 881.
95. id.
96. See United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944
(1979); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Pringle, 576
F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v.
Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976).
For lower courts in agreement, see United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800 (W.D. Okla.
1976); United States v. Carpenter, 403 F. Supp. 361 (D. Mass. 1975). The rationale most commonly expressed by the courts is that an individual has no expectation of privacy in illegal substances or contraband.
97. See United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,100 S. Ct. 94 (1979);
United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,439 U.S. 896 (1978). In Bruneau
defendant was unable to document his ownership of the plane, and the court held that he lacked
standing to object to the installation. Further, the installation had been made before the alleged
sale of the plane to defendant. 594 F.2d at 1193. In Miroyan defendant had rented the plane, and
the installation of the tracking device was made pursuant to the owner's consent and prior to the
time that defendant took possession. 577 F.2d at 491.
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toring of an aircraft's movements actually amounts to a search within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. 98
Three Circuit Courts of Appeal have decided cases that involved
the use of "beepers" to monitor the movements of an automobile. The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did not rule on whether the
monitoring of an automobile was a search in United States v. Frazier,99
but found probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying the government's action whether or not it constituted a search. I°° Without deciding whether the installation of a tracking device amounts to a
search, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the monitoring of
a "beeper" does not constitute a search when the device is planted in a
lawfully owned substance and transported in an automobile.' 0 ' Finally, in a decision dividing its members equally, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court decision expressly holding
the monitoring of a motor vehicle a search.' 02
In United States v. Clayborne"3 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the installation and monitoring of a tracking device in a
container of ether do not constitute a search. In that case, the container
was eventually transported to a commercial laboratory." 4 The court
distinguished the expectation of privacy in a laboratory from the expectation of privacy in a home and apparently held that the monitoring of
a "beeper" inside a commercial laboratory is either a reasonable search
or not a search at all.' 0 5
The case whose facts are most closely related to those of Hendricks
and the one on which the North Carolina Court of Appeals based its
98. United States v. Cheshire, 569 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,437 U.S. 907 (1978). In
Cheshirethe court did not decide whether a search had been made, but held that the consent of
the owner was sufficient to allow monitoring of an airplane while it was being flown by defendant.
Id. at 889.
99. 538 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1046 (1977).
100. Id. at 1324-25.
101. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976). In
Hufford, installation of a "beeper" in a drum of caffeine was made pursuant to the consent of the
company that sold the drum to defendant. Id. at 34.
102. United States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d 227 (1976), aj'g United States v. Holmes, Crim. No,
73-27 (N.D. Fla. April 25, 1974).
103. 584 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1978).
104. Id. at 347.
105. The court's language is equivocal: "Under these special facts, we must hold that the
... Id. at 351. A holdslight intrusion was not per se in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
ing based on the reasonableness of the search is supported by a finding of probable cause. Id. at
350. The nonsearch rationale is suggested by the court's emphasis on the lack of a reasonable
expectation of privacy and the insignificance of the intrusion. See id. at 351.
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decision is United States v. Moore.' °6 In Moore the First Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the installation of a "beeper" in a lawfully owned
substance is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 07
Furthermore, while there may be a reduced expectation of privacy in
an automobile, the monitoring of a motor vehicle still constitutes a
search, and probable cause is required for it to be constitutionally reasonable. 0 8 The court also held that the continued monitoring of a substance defendant carried into a residence amounted to a search of the
residence that could be justified only by a warrant. 0 9
The North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision in Hendricks very
closely follows the First Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis in Moore.
The Hendricks decision ably extends fourth amendment analysis to
cover an increasingly important modem police practice. The court's
explicit statement of factors to be considered in the issuance of a warrant for the installation and monitoring of electronic tracking devices
provides much needed guidance in this developing area of the law.
D.

Right to Speedy Trial

In State v. Branch' 0 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held
that a twenty-three month delay between defendant's arrest and trial
was not a denial of his right to a speedy trial, despite lack of explanation for the delay by the prosecution and the unavailability of an alibi
witness due to a stroke suffered two weeks prior to trial. The decision
of the court of appeals and the subsequent dismissal by the supreme
court of defendant's appeal for lack of a constitutional questionI" may
be read as a retreat from the holding in State v. McKoy." 2 In McKoy
the North Carolina Supreme Court held only a year ago that a twentytwo month delay between arrest and trial in a voluntary manslaughter
case was an impermissible delay in the absence of reasonable explanation from the prosecution. The McKoy decision was surprising because
little prejudice to defendant had been shown." 3 The opposite result
106. 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978).
107. Id. at 111-12.
108. Id. at 111-13.
109. Id. at 113-14.
110. 41 N.C. App. 80, 254 S.E.2d 255, appealdismissed,297 N.C. 612, 257 S.E.2d 220 (1979)
(lack of a substantial constitutional question).
111. 297 N.C. 612, 257 S.E.2d 220 (1979).
112. 294 N.C. 134, 240 S.E.2d 383 (1978).
113. See text accompanying note 128 infra. For a more complete analysis of State v. McKoy
see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1978, 57 N.C.L. REv. 827, 1027 (1979).
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was reached in Branch, however, in which defendant more clearly
demonstrated that the delay prejudiced his ability to present a defense.

Defendant in Branch was charged with felonious conspiracy to
steal a tractor-trailer and the tobacco it contained on August 19,

1976.114 He was arrested August 25, 1976, but was not indicted until
October 10, 1977, despite a motion for speedy trial made January 25,
1977. A motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial was denied November 7, 1977; 11 however, the court ordered that trial be held during
the December 12, 1977, term of court unless continued by mutual
agreement of the state and defendant. 1 6 Defendant was brought to

trial July 31, 1978, prior to which the court denied a second motion to
dismiss on grounds of denial of his right to a speedy trial. The court
held defendant was not prejudiced by the delay because defendant had
adequate opportunity to prepare his defense and had been released on
bond.1 7 The court rejected defendant's claim that his case was dam-

aged by the stroke of his father, an alibi witness, only two weeks before
trial. 8 Defendant was found guilty of felonious conspiracy and sentenced to four to ten years imprisonment.
The court of appeals weighed four factors delineated by the
United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo"I9 to determine
whether the accused's right to a speedy trial had been breached.'2 0 The
factors include the length of the delay, the cause of the delay, waiver of
the right by the defendant and prejudice to the defendant.'' The
Branch court's evaluation of the first three factors weighed in favor of
defendant. The twenty-three month delay between arrest and trial was
recognized as unusual; when such a delay is shown by the defendant to

be due to the wilfulness or neglect of the prosecution, the burden shifts
114. 41 N.C. App. at 80, 254 S.E.2d at 256.
115. Id. at 83, 254 S.E.2d at 258. Defendant brought his motion for a speedy trial under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-954 (1978).
116. Defendant moved for a special prosecutor on November 15, 1977, and this motion was
granted November 18, 1977. 41 N.C. App. at 84, 254 S.E.2d at 258.
117. Id.
118. Id. The court denied the motion because defendant failed to make any effort to preserve
his father's testimony. Defendant was allowed to testify before the jury that his father was unable
to testify because of his critical illness.
119. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The Court held in this habeas corpus action that defendant Barker
waived his right to a speedy trial by failing to object to the first 11 of 16 continuances received by
the prosecution. The Court held that Barker was not denied his speedy trial right because he was
released on bond for all but 10 months of the more than five years between his arrest and trial, he
did not actively assert his speedy trial rights, and prejudice to his defense was minimal. Id. at 536.
120. 41 N.C. App. at 85, 254 S.E.2d at 259.
121. 407 U.S. at 530.
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to the prosecution to explain the reasons for the delay.1 2 2 No explanation was offered, a factor which had been determinative in State v.
McKoy. 123 The court further found that defendant had not waived his
right to a speedy trial, although he had made no effort to spur the prosecution in the last nine months before trial.'2 4 In McKoy, defendant
had made repeated demands .of the prosecution, both orally and by
formal motion, to bring the case to trial, while in Branch only two motions had been made prior to the trial.
The final factor evaluated by the court was that of prejudice to the
defendant. The Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo suggested three
bases for a finding of prejudice--oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety caused by the pending charges and impairment of ability to defend.' 2 Defendant in Branch was free on bond after his arrest;
however, he lost his job due to publicity accompanying his arrest. His
claim of prejudice was primarily based on the loss of his father as his
sole alibi witness due to a debilitating stroke suffered two weeks prior
to trial. The court rejected the claim that the loss of this witness was
prejudicial because no effort had been made by defendant to preserve
his father's testimony or to show how it would support a defense to the
conspiracy charge. 26 Thus the court, in applying the approach of
Barker v. Wingo, put little weight on one aspect of defendant's ability
to present a defense that the United States Supreme Court had considered important. The Court held in Barker that there was no denial of
Barker's right to a speedy trial, in part because "there is no claim that
any of Barker's witnesses died or otherwise became unavailable owing
to the delay."'2 7
The McKoy record, in comparison, did reveal evidence relating to
the prospective testimony of a missing witness. That testimony would
have raised the issue of self-defense. The court held, however, that
prejudice to McKoy was minimal because it was highly unlikely that
122. See State v. McKoy, 294 N.C. 134, 143, 240 S.E.2d 383, 390 (1978); State v. Johnson, 275
N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274 (1969). The Branch court cited State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244
S.E.2d 414 (1978), for the separate proposition that the defendant has the burden of showing that
the delay prejudiced him. A long delay, standing alone, will not give rise to a presumption of
prejudice to the case, although it will shift the burden to the prosecution to explain the delay. 41
N.C. App. at 86-87, 254 S.E.2d at 260.
123. 294 N.C. at 143, 240 S.E.2d at 389-90.
124. 41 N.C. App. at 86, 254 S.F_2d at 259.
125. 407 U.S. at 532.
126. 41 N.C. App. at 86, 254 S.E.2d at 259-60.
127. 407 U.S. at 534.
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the testimony would have changed the result. 128 The McKoy court was
able nonetheless to find that the defendant's right to a speedy trial had
been violated in spite of the lack of demonstrable prejudice to the defendant. In balancing the four factors articulated in Barker, the court
apparently attributed greatest weight to the prosecution's failure to justify ten months of the delay.
State v. Branch is significant because it signals a retreat from State
v. McKoy. In Branch, even with the additional element of a witness
incapacitated by illness shortly before trial, the court found no denial
of the right to a speedy trial by an unexplained twenty-three month
delay in prosecution. The Branch court considered the determinative
factor in the balancing process to be demonstrable prejudice to defendant, rather than the presence of a lengthy, unexplained delay by the
prosecution which was emphasized by the McKoy court. Thus, the
court was willing to find no denial of Branch's right to a speedy trial
even though the prosecution had failed to explain the twenty-three
month delay, defendant had not waived his right to a speedy trial and
had asserted the claim that an important witness was unavailable because of the delay. This conclusion is even more surprising because
McKoy was convicted of the more egregious offense of voluntary manslaughter, while Branch was convicted of felonious conspiracy to steal.
By its dismissal of Branch's appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court
indicates its dissatisfaction with the McKoy holding.
29

. Sentencing 1

30
1. Sentencing Changes in DUI Laws1

The 1979 North Carolina General Assembly amended several sections of the motor vehicles law in order to strengthen the penalties imposed upon conviction of driving under the influence of intoxicants. 3 '
128. 294 N.C. at 142-43, 240 S.E.2d at 389-90.
129. Two other significant developments in criminal procedure will be treated in subsequent
issues of the North CarolinaLaw Review. The death penalty was challenged in several cases in
1979. The North Carolina General Assembly enacted the controversial Fair Sentencing Act, Law
of June 4, 1979, ch. 760, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 155 (codified in scattered sections of N.C. GEN.
STAT. chs. 14, 15A, 18A, 20, 53, 90, 130, 148, 162), which was amended once, Law of June 25,
1980, ch. 1316, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1066 (codified in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. chs.
14, 15A, 20, 21, 105, 108, 148, 163), and is being considered for further revision.
130. For a more detailed discussion of the 1979 DUI amendments, see Drennan, 1979
Amendments to DUI Laws, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE MEMORANDA No. 79/15 (Oct. 1979).
131. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 903, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1247 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 20-19, -23.2, -26, -27, -140, -179, -179.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The effective date of these amendments is January 1, 1980. In additional action the legislature made numerous technical amend-

1980]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1425

The most significant revision is of G.S. 20-179(b),1 32 which authorizes

the trial judge, within his discretion, to limit the driving privileges of
any person convicted for the first time of driving under the influence of
liquor or drugs that impair the faculties. 3 3 The trial judge's discretion

to grant the limited driving privileges is subject to two new conditions
in the amended statute. The person convicted must enroll in and suc-

cessfully complete a program of instruction at an Alcohol and Drug
Education Traffic School and must be allowed to drive to and from the
required classes. 13 a The judge may authorize limited driving privileges

without the condition of attending a DUI program if one of three situations is present: 1) there is no Alcohol and Drug Education school

within a reasonable distance of the defendant's home, 2) the defendant
is unlikely to benefit from the program because of a history of alcohol
or drug abuse, or 3) there are other extenuating circumstances that
35
make it unlikely that the defendant will benefit from the program.'
The judge must make and enter into the record specific findings of the

reasons why the defendant is not likely to benefit from a DUI program.
Also revised was the length of time in which a prior offense will be
considered for purposes of determining whether the conviction is a first
conviction. This period was reduced from ten to seven years.' 36 No

person may be granted limited driving privileges if his license is revoked for failure to submit to a breathalyzer test.137 If the judge grants

limited driving privileges conditioned upon successful completion of a
DUI program, the initial revocation period is six months. If no such
ments to the motor vehicles law, effective January 1, 1981. Law of May 29, 1979, ch. 667, 1979
N.C. Sess. Laws 709 (codified in scattered sections of chapter 20, N.C. GEN. STAT.).
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
133. Id. G.S. 20-138 and 20-139 establish the illegality of operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or other drugs which impair the faculties. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 20-138, -139 (1978). Pursuant to G.S. 179(a), a first offender may also be sentenced to
imprisonment up to six months and fined not less than $100 nor more than $500. Law of June 8,
1979, ch. 903, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1247 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179(a) (Cum. Supp.
1979)).
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The North Carolina Supreme Court
in In re Greene, 297 N.C. 305, 255 S.E.2d 142 (1979), upheld another statutory limitation on a
trial judge's authority to suspend a sentence imposed due to a DUI conviction. G.S. 20-179(a)
states that the first three days of imprisonment imposed for conviction of a second or subsequent
offense "shall not be subject to suspension or parole" unless defendant is allowed to participate in
a DUI rehabilitation program. The court rejected the argument that judges have the inherent
authority to suspend a sentence despite a contrary mandate by the General Assembly.
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
136. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 903, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1247 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-179(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179(b)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Under G.S. 20-16.2(c), revocation of
a driver's license occurs automatically if a person willfully refuses to submit to a breathalyzer test.
Id. § 20-16.2(c) (1978).
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condition attaches, the license is revoked for one year. 13 8 Privileges
may be modified pursuant to G.S. 20-179(b)(4).13 9 Failure to complete
the DUI program does not constitute the offense of driving with a revoked license; it is grounds for revocation of the driving privilege, how-

ever. 140
Other provisions of the amending act concern the collection of
fees, establishment and maintenance of schools by the Department of
Human Resources and restoration of a license before the revocation
period has run. 14 ' The 1979 amendments illustrate continuing efforts
to deal more effectively with the problem of the
by the legislature
142
driver.
drinking
2.

Miscellaneous

In State v. Mc Cuire,143 a case of first impression, the supreme
court addressed the problem of a disruptive defendant at a joint trial.
The court adopted the approach taken by several federal jurisdictions"4 in holding that the decision whether a passive defendant is
prejudiced by the behavior of a codefendant is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. The judge must rule on a motion for severance or mistrial in light of the circumstances of the particular case. The
trial judge's decision to deny such a motion will be upheld as long as it
appears that he provided sufficient protection for the rights of the passive defendant.
In McGuire the trial judge removed the disruptive codefendant
from the courtroom, instructed the jury to disregard the improper behavior in making its decision, and ascertained that the jury unanimously believed it would be able to disregard the codefendant's
behavior in considering charges against the passive defendant. 45 The
a motion
supreme court held, therefore, that the trial court's denial of
46
for severance and mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.1
138. Id. § 20-179(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
139. Id. § 20-179(bX4).
140. Id. § 20-179(b)(5).
141. Id. §§ 20-179.2, -19.

142.
143.
144.
(1972);
145.
146.

Drennan, supra note 130, at 1.
297 N.C. 69, 254 S.E.2d 165 (1979).
See United States v. Bamberger, 456 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969
United States v. Marshall, 458 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1972).
297 N.C. at 77, 254 S.E.2d at 170.
Id.
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In State v. Smith 147 the court of appeals clarified the test of the
amount and type of evidence that the state must offer with regard to
each element of the offense charged in order to withstand a defendant's

motion to dismiss. Two formulations of the test had evolved in recent
years--one required that there be "substantial evidence," and the other

articulated the test as "more than a scintilla of evidence" on each element.' 4 1 In Smith the court held that the two designations are inter-

changeable because both require that the evidence "be existing and
real, not just seeming or imaginary."' 149 The court then applied what it
chose to call "the substantial evidence test" to the instant case and up-

held defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter. The court also
labeled as dicta portions of two previous cases, State v. Langlois,150 and

State v. Coffey, 5 ' which said that the state's evidence must exclude
of innocence in order to overcome a deevery reasonable hypothesis 52
to dismiss.'

fendant's motion
F

Proposed Client Perjury

Many defense attorneys have confronted the dilemma of the criminal defendant who, before trial, proposes perjury. Considerable professional debate has resulted from differing views on the best method of
handling the problem." 3 No clear guidelines have been developed,
however, to aid trial judges and attorneys in resolving the problem.

The confusion engendered by the lack of guidelines was evident in two
recent North Carolina cases.
In In re Palmer' the supreme court reviewed a judicial disciplinary proceeding against attorney Palmer for failing to withdraw as
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

40 N.C. App.
Id. at 77, 252
Id. at 78, 252
258 N.C. 491,
228 N.C. 119,

72, 252 S.E.2d 535 (1979).
S.E.2d at 539.
S.E.2d at 539.
128 S.E.2d 803 (1963).
44 S.E.2d 886 (1947).

152. 40 N.C. App. at 84, 252 S.E.2d at 543. This view had also previously been rejected by the
supreme court in State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 93 S.E.2d 431 (1956).
153. See e.g., Burger, Standardsof ConductforProsecution and Defense Personnel: A Judge's
Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11 (1966); Dash, The Emerging Role and Function of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer, 47 N.C.L. REv.598 (1969); Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three HardestQuestions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966); Lefstein, The Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinking the Defense Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 665 (1978); Polster, The Dilemma of the PerjuriousDefendant: Resolution, Not Avoidance, 28
CASE W. Res. L. REv. 3 (1977); Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S.CAL. L. REv. 809 (1977); Rotunda,

Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REv. 622 (1976).
154. 296 N.C. 638, 252 S.E.2d 784 (1979). The issue of the authority of appellate courts to
review a judicial disciplinary proceeding is discussed in Survey of Developments in North Carolina
Law, 1978, 57 N.C.L. REv. 827, 864 (1979).

1428

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

counsel for a criminal defendant who intended to participate in per-

jury. Palmer was informed prior to trial that his client had been the
driver in an accident that gave rise to charges of involuntary manslaughter and the felony of leaving the scene of an accident.' t5 Pursuant to an agreement with Palmer's client, however, a codefendant
intended to testify that he had been the driver because Palmer's client
had previously been convicted of driving under the influence."5 6

Palmer unsuccessfully attempted to persuade his client to tell the truth,
but subsequently continued to represent him.' 57 After the trial had begun, the codefendant informed his own counsel of his false admission
of guilt. The codefendant's counsel informed the judge of the fraudu-

lent plan, and the codefendant testified truthfully pursuant to a plea
bargain. The jury trial of Palmer's client continued. Palmer's client
presented no evidence, did not testify, and was found guilty of both
charges.
Following a hearing, the trial judge in the original action determined that Palmer had violated the North Carolina State Bar Code of

Professional Responsibility' 58 by failing to move to withdraw from the

case. Palmer was suspended from practicing law in North Carolina for
an indefinite time. Palmer appealed to the court of appeals which concluded he had not been afforded due process and remanded for a new
hearing.' 5 9 In the subsequent hearing, charges were dismissed because

the trial judge "is not satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that
Palmer willfully and intentionally violated Disciplinary Rule 7-102." 160
The court of appeals disallowed the state's petition for certiorari after
155. 296 N.C. at 639, 252 S.E.2d at 785.
156. A second conviction of driving under the influence carries a higher minimum fine and
imprisonment than does a first offense. Furthermore, limited driving privileges may only be
granted for a first conviction. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179 (1978). Penalties have since been stiffened for second offenses in amendments effective January 1,1980, under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20179 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
157. Palmer was retained counsel, and not representing an indigent defendant. 296 N.C. at
640, 252 S.E.2d at 785. A court-appointed attorney may have greater difficulty in withdrawing
from the case than privately retained counsel. Freedman, supra note 153, at 1476.
158. 283 N.C. 783 (1973). The applicable rules are DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6) (general misconduct provisions) and DR 7-102(A)(5) and (A)(7) (prohibiting "knowingly making a false statement of law or fact" and assisting a "client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent"). Also, DR 7-102(B) requires that a lawyer who becomes aware of a misrepresentation by his client attempt to convince the client to rectify the situation and, if unable to do so,
move to withdraw from litigation "without necessarily revealing his reason for wishing to withdraw." 283 N.C. 783, 786-87, 835-36 (1973). The trial judge held that Palmer "had intentionally
and willfully violated the North Carolina State Bar Code of Professional Responsibility," but the
particular provisions are not reiterated by the supreme court. 296 N.C. at 639, 252 S.E.2d at 785,
159. 32 N.C. App. 449, 232 S.E.2d 497 (1977).
160. 37 N.C. App. 220, 220, 245 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1978).
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concluding the state had no right to appeal in a disbarment proceeding.' 6 The supreme court held that the state did have the right to peti-

tion for review of a judicial disciplinary hearing,' 6 2 that the clear and
convincing evidence rule was the appropriate standard of proof, 6 3 and
that Palmer had violated Disciplinary Rule 7-102.11 In so ruling, the
court stated that Palmer's error was in not moving to withdraw after his
client refused to tell the truth. 65 It did not reach the question of what

conduct when an attorney's request to withdraw
constitutes appropriate
66
is refused.'

In State v. Simms 16 7 the court of appeals did address the problem
of a trial judge's refusal to allow counsel to withdraw when he believed

his client was going to perjure himself at trial. Defendant presented an
entirely new alibi shortly before trial, causing his counsel to believe
161. Id. at 220, 245 S.E.2d at 791 (1978). The court of appeals cited In re Stiers, 204 N.C. 48,
167 S.E. 382 (1933), for the proposition that the state has no right to appeal a trial court decision in
a judicial disbarment proceeding. 37 N.C. App. at 221,245 S.E.2d at 792. Additionally, the state's
express right to appeal from a statutory disbarment proceeding had been deleted in the last
amendment of the applicable statute. Law of June 13, 1975, ch. 582, § 5, N.C. Sess. Laws 656
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-28 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). To allow certiorari in this situation would "allow by indirect means that which is forbidden by direct means." 37 N.C. App. at
222, 245 S.E.2d at 793.
162. The court reasoned that the appellate courts have an interest in ensuring the integrity of
the license to practice law in North Carolina because it permits licensed attorneys to practice in all
state courts. The North Carolina constitution authorizes the supreme court to use remedial writs
to supervise the courts, N.C. CONST. art. 4, § 12, and the court of appeals has similar authority
over the trial courts. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-32(c) (1969). Thus, the appellate courts may review,
not by direct appeal but by certiorari-judicial disbarment proceedings "whether the attorney or
the state has prevailed." 296 N.C. at 646, 252 S.E.2d at 789.
163. The question of the appropriate standard of proof in a disbarment proceeding was one of
first impression in North Carolina. The court chose to adopt the "clear and convincing' standard
used in the majority of states, rather than the "preponderance of the evidence" rule used by the
North Carolina State Bar Association in statutory proceedings. Although a disbarment proceeding is "essentially civil in nature," the potential consequences are serious enough to require "a
greater quantum of proof than is ordinarily required in a civil action, ie., a preponderance of the
evidence, but less than that called for to sustain a criminal conviction, iLe., proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." 296 N.C. at 648, 252 S.E.2d at 790 (quoting In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 177
A.2d 721, 730 (1962).
164. Id. at 649, 252 S.E.2d at 790. The court exercised its inherent authority to censure
Palmer.
165. Justice Exum concurred in the result but disagreed with the court's reasoning in reaching
that result. According to the trial court's factual findings, neither Palmer's client nor Palmer intended to offer a perjurious witness. The client did not testify falsely, but pleaded not guilty as he
had the right to do. The client had, however, lied prior to retaining Palmer. When Palmer advised his client that he could admit he was the driver without incriminating himself once his case
was dismissed, he effectively assisted his client in his fraudulent conduct. It was this transgression,
not the failure to withdraw, that should have resulted in censure. Id. at 651-52, 252 S.E.2d at 79192 (Exum, J., concurring in result).
166. This issue was addressed in State v. Robinson; 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976), discussed at text accompanying notes 179-80 infra.
167. 41 N.C. App. 451, 255 S.E.2d 282 (1979).
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defendant was planning to perjure himself.16 8 Indicating to the judge
that defendant had related a new set of facts to him that morning,
counsel moved to withdraw from the case. 169 The judge devised a

novel solution, denying counsel's motion to withdraw, but appointing a
second attorney to aid in presentation of the case to the jury.170 The

judge denied the second attorney's motion for a continuance, giving
him only ninety minutes to prepare for trial.17' Upholding this solution, the court of appeals reasoned that "[diefendant had the benefit of
two lawyers"-the first, "totally familiar with all aspects of the case"
and the second, "unencumbered by the conflicting statements of defendant." '
These two cases illustrate the ethical and practical problems defense counsel confronts when his client proposes perjury. 73 These

problems are compounded by competing professional responsibilities
and the absence of any clear guidelines for resolving the conflict. On
74
one hand, counsel owes his client a high degree of confidentiality.1
But the attorney also has a duty as an officer of the court not to know-

168. Id. at 452, 255 S.E.2d at 284.
169. The propriety of informing the trial judge of a defendant's proposed perjury is a particularly controversial point. Under NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSIaILITY [hereinafter N.C.C.P.R.] DR 4-101, 283 N.C. at 811-12, a lawyer is prohibited from
knowingly revealing "a confidence or secret of his client," absent permission from his client. In
N.C.C.P.R., Formal Opinions No. 92 (1976), the view was taken that DR 7-102(B)(1) requires a
lawyer to withdraw if his client insists on misrepresentation before the court; the lawyer is not,
however, required to state his reason for seeking to withdraw.
The obvious difficulty is that a motion to withdraw, without explanation, will most likely be
denied. See State v. Lowery, III Ariz. 26, 523 P.2d 54 (1974); Lessenberry v. Adkisson, 255 Ark.
285, 499 S.W.2d 835 (1973); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1024 (1976). For a discussion of this problem, see text accompanying notes 177-80 infra.
170. 41 N.C. App. at 452, 255 S.E.2d at 284.
171. The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is a matter within the discretion
of the trial court. N.C.R. Civ. P. 40(b); Shankle v. Shankle, 289 N.C. 473, 223 S.E.2d 380 (1976).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance
when defendant is vigorously represented at trial by two lawyers, although the first attorney is
inhibited from full participation for some reason and the second has only brief notice before trial.
United States v. Abshire, 471 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Gower, 447 F.2d 187 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied,404 U.S. 850 (1971).
The practical problems for the attorneys in this situation are obvious. Counsel with all the
relevant knowledge, including an awareness of the proposed perjury, has not really been relieved
of his ethical problems because he is still, albeit indirectly, participating in the presentation of
false testimony. The newly appointed counsel is handicapped by his lack of familiarity with the
case and may also be burdened by the realization that the defendant is planning to prejure himself.
172. 41 N.C. App. at 454, 255 S.E.2d at 285.
173. The issue whether defendant has the right to testify when that testimony is false is discussed in Lefstein, supra note 153, at 682-83 and Polster, supra note 153, at 36-37.
174. See N.C.C.P.R., supra note 169, DR 4-101, 283 N.C. at 811-12.
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ingly aid in a fraud upon the court. 75 At least four solutions to this
dilemma have been proposed, but none has been adopted in North
Carolina.
The first proposal takes the view that counsel's obligation of confidentiality to his client and the necessity of promoting frankness between client and counsel so that counsel is told of all relevant facts
outweigh counsel's duty toward the court. Counsel, therefore, should
attempt to dissuade his client from perjuring himself, but if the client is
determined to lie, counsel has no t7alternative
to putting the client on the
6
stand without alerting the court.

A second approach, favored by the American Bar Association
[ABA], is embodied in section 7.7 of the Standards Relating to the Defense Function. 77 Under this proposal, counsel should attempt to
withdraw from the case if he is unable to dissuade his client from committing perjury, but without necessarily informing the court of the reason for his motion to withdraw. If the motion to withdraw is denied,
the ABA advocates allowing the defendant to present the perjurious
testimony without aid of counsel and without argument to the jury.
Counsel, however, should make an appropriate record, without revealing it to the court, that defendant is testifying against counsel's advice.
The most significant problem with invoking section 7.7 is that the
judge, and possibly the jury, will note the unusual manner in which
counsel is treating a portion of the defendant's testimony and infer it is
perjurious.178 This was the opinion of the North Carolina Supreme
Court in State v. Robinson,'79 when it held that the section 7.7 approach denied defendant a fair trial because it prejudiced his case
before the jury.'
A third proposal suggests that counsel warn his client at an initial
meeting that the scope of the attorney-client privilege does not extend
to perjured testimony. This serves to reduce the likelihood of the prob175. Id., DR 7-102, 283 -N.C. at 835-36.
176. Freedman, supra note 153, at 1475-79.
177. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 7.7 (Approved Draft 1971).
See also Burger, supra note 153, at 13.
178. Lefstein, supra note 153, at 684.
179. 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976); 55 N.C.L. REV. 321 (1977).
180. Further dissatisfaction with § 7.7 was shown when it was not formally adopted in the
latest revision of the ABA defense standards. The section was withdrawn prior to submission to
the ABA House of Delegates and is therefore not included in the 1980 ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
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lem even arising. Moreover, in following this procedure counsel has

not misled the client if he subsequently reveals the proposed perjury to
the court.'' If the client, even after warning, proposes perjury then
counsel must choose between
the ABA approach and revealing the pro82
posed perjury to the court.'

Finally, in one commentator's view, 18 3 counsel should warn his client at an initial meeting that perjurious testimony is not encompassed
in the attorney-client privilege. If the client begins to perjure himself
on the stand, counsel will immediately inform the court and will serve
as the state's chief witness in a subsequent perjury trial. The significance of Palmer and Simms is not that they adopt one or a combination of the proposed solutions but that they serve to emphasize the need

for further analysis and ultimate adoption of a clear guide for counsel.
In Palmer the supreme court set forth its belief that counsel must attempt to dissuade a defendant from intended perjury and, failing that,
move to withdraw from the case. There is no clear standard of conduct, however, for making the motion so as not to prejudice the defendant's case, nor for the trial judge to follow in assuring that the
defendant is effectively represented. This is a critical gap in both the
national and state codes of professional responsibility. Until some
workable standards are agreed upon, the not uncommon problem of
the perjurious defendant will continue to plague both courts and defense attorneys.
G.

Limits to an Accused's MirandaRights
During 1979 the North Carolina courts decided several cases limit-

ing the scope of an accused's rights established by the United States
Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona.'8 4 Under Miranda an accused
181. Lefstein, supra note 153, at 687-91. See also, CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF
ch. VIII, Commentary 9 (1974).
182. Lefstein, supra note 153, at 691.
183. Polster, supra note 153, at 34.
184. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In one case the North Carolina Supreme Court held that Miranda
does not require police to inform an individual of the crime he is suspected of having committed
before he can knowingly and intelligently waive his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney
present during custodial interrogation. State v. Carter, 296 N.C. 344, 250 S.E.2d 263, cert. denied,
441 U.S. 964 (1979). That the accused is not informed of the nature of the suspicions against him
is only one factor to consider when assessing the validity of his waiver of rights. Id. at 353, 250
S.E.2d at 269. In Carter defendant was asked to accompany police to the police station for questioning about a break-in. After he had waived his rights and been interrogated for an hour, he
learned he was really being questioned about a more serious crime of homicide. Id. at 347, 250
S.E.2d at 265. Defendant testified on voir dire that he would not have waived his right to an
attorney had he known that the investigation concerned a homicide, and that he had assumed that
signing the waiver precluded him from later asserting his right to an attorney when police changed
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
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must be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to

have an attorney present whenever questioning is "initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 85 In
State v. Perry'8 6 the North Carolina Supreme Court clarified the test
for determining when a person has been taken into custody. The court

expressly adopted18 7 an objective test of custodial interrogationwhether a reasonable person would believe under the circumstances
that he was free to leave-rather than a subjective test of whether the
defendant believed, even unreasonably, that his freedom of movement
the subject of the interrogation. Id. at 347-48, 250 S.E.2d at 265. On appeal, therefore, he argued
that his incriminatory statements made during the latter part of the interrogation were inadmissible because he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Mirandarights. The supreme court
rejected defense counsel's argument that "[Tihe chilling effect. . . on an accused once a waiver
has been signed, intimidat[esi him from later asking for a lawyer once the true nature of the
interrogation is divulged." Brief for Defendant at 11. The court thus refused to follow a minority
line of cases holding that a knowing waiver requires awareness of the crime being investigated.
296 N.C. at 350, 250 S.E.2d at 267. The court said Miranda did not require police to disclose the
nature of the charges; rather, all Mirandarequires is that police inform the accused of his constitutional rights so they will not be forfeited because of an unawareness of their existence. Id. at 352,
250 S.E.2d at 268.
Justice Exum's dissenting opinion distinguished the situation in which police simply fail to
tell the accused anything about the nature of the crime being investigated from the situation in
which police affirmatively misrepresent the nature of the crime under investigation. Id. at 354,
250 S.E.2d at 269 (Exum, J., dissenting). Justice Exum clearly believed that the facts of Carterfell
into the latter category because it appeared that the police affirmatively misled defendant to believe the crime under investigation was much less serious than the crime they were actually investigating. Id. at 355-56, 250 S.E.2d at 270. Since the police told defendant they were investigating
a break-in and defendant was not involved in a break-in, he naturally did not see the need for an
attorney. Id. at 355, 250 S.E.2d at 270. Under these circumstances, Justice Exum said, an intelligent and knowing waiver of defendant's right to counsel could not have been made. Id. Justice
Exum also argued that waiver of counsel must be specifically made, citing State v. Butler, 295
N.C. 250, 255, 244 S.E.2d 410, 413 (1978), and that defendant's continued answering of questions
after being informed of the true nature of the investigation did not constitute a specific waiver. Id.
at 356, 250 S.E.2d at 270. Reliance on State v. Butler is no longer appropriate, however, after the
decision in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), holding that a specific waiver of the
right to counsel is not required. For a discussion of both Butler opinions, see notes 225-43 and
accompanying text infra. The court's decision in Carterappears constitutionally sound, although
it would be preferable for police, when giving Mirandawarnings in the future, to emphasize that a
waiver of one's right to have an attorney present is not final and that at any point in the questioning the accused can revoke his waiver and ask to speak to an attorney.
185. 384 U.S. at 444; State v. Martin, 294 N.C. 702, 707, 242 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1978). Miranda
warnings are required in these circumstances in order to safeguard the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 467.
186. 298 N.C. 502, 259 S.E.2d 496 (1979).
187. The Perry court noted that while it had never expressly adopted the objective test before,
it had applied such a test for all practical purposes in prior cases addressing this issue. E.g., State
v. Martin, 294 N.C. 702, 707, 242 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1978) (no custodial interrogation because "all
the evidence shows that defendantsl. . . freedom to depart was not restricted" (emphasis added)); State v. Hill, 294 N.C. 320, 327-28, 240 S.E.2d 794, 800 (1978) (no custodial interrogation
because statement was made during casual conversation between sheriff and defendant while defendant was waiting to be interrogated about an unrelated offense).
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88

In Perry a detective was investigating a missing person report.' 89
Upon discovering that defendant was the last one seen with the missing
person, 90 the detective went to defendant's place of work and asked
him if he would sit in the detective's car to talk.'
Defendant voluntarily entered the front seat of the car and shut the door. 92 The detective testified on voir dire that he did not give defendant his Miranda
warnings at this time, because he did not know a crime had been committed (the victim's body was not discovered until the next day) and
did not suspect the defendant of anything. 93 While being questioned
in the detective's car, defendant made an inculpatory statement, 94 and
the detective immediately took defendant to the police station. 95 Defendant was frisked, arrested for carrying a concealed weapon, read his
Miranda rights and released on bond. 96 Later he was convicted of first
97
degree murder of the previously missing person. 1
Defendant contested' 9 8 the admission in evidence of inculpatory
statements he made while in the detective's car, arguing that he had
been subjected to custodial interrogation and should have been advised
of his Miranda rights before being questioned. '9 9 The North Carolina
Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument 2°° by objectively evaluating the facts and circumstances surrounding his questioning and con188. 298 N.C. at 507, 259 S.E.2d at 499.
189. Id. at 503, 259 S.E.2d at 497.

190. The detective questioned two little boys who testified that they went to help a lady whose
car had broken down and that they introduced her to defendant, a gas station attendant they both
knew. Defendant offered the woman a ride to a phone or gas station, and the last the boys saw of
her she was riding in defendant's car. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 504, 259 S.E.2d at 497.
194. The detective asked defendant about the missing person whereupon defendant denied
ever having seen her or having given her a ride the previous day. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Defendant was also convicted of first degree rape, kidnapping and crime against nature.
He was sentenced to two consecutive life terms for murder and rape, a 30 year term for kidnapping, and a concurrent 10 year sentence for crime against nature. Id. at 505, 259 S.E.2d at 498,
198. The supreme court granted defendant's petition for certiorari on the sentences imposed

for murder and rape since time for appeal as of right, pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a)
(1969), had lapsed. The court also allowed defendant's motion to bypass the court of appeals for
review of the sentences imposed for kidnapping and crime against nature, pursuant to Id. § 7A-3 1.
298 N.C. at 505, 259 S.E.2d at 498.
199. 298 N.C. at 506, 259 S.E.2d at 498-99.
200. The court did, however, accept defendant's argument that his conviction for first degree
rape was erroneous because the indictment for first degree rape did not properly allege all the
necessary elements of the crime. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the
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cluding that up to the time when defendant made his inculpatory
statements, no reasonable person would have believed he was "in cus-

tody." ''

This approach is the one adopted by the majority of courts

that have specifically addressed this issue20 2 and is the approach the

court found to have been implicitly adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Oregon v. Mathiason.113 In Mathiason the Supreme
Court held that a defendant was not under custodial arrest, despite his
having been questioned in a police station.2" The Court focused on
the following facts: that defendant came voluntarily to the police office; that he was immediately informed he was not under arrest; and
that after the interview he left without hindrance.20 5 The Supreme
Court thus objectively analyzed the events occurring prior to, during
and after questioning to determine whether he was in custody.

The North Carolina court in Perry adopted this three factor approach for determining whether a reasonable person would have believed under the circumstances that he was free to leave.2" It noted

that in prior North Carolina cases in which the court had implicitly
used this approach, the court had identified several factors that were

important to its finding of noncustodial interrogation. First, prior to
questioning, the police had initially sought out the defendant to gather

information about missing persons or known crimes from him because
he happened to be a witness or had volunteered information, rather

than because they had suspected him of having committed a crime in
connection with the events being investigated.20 7 Second, during questioning, only one or two policemen were involved, and questioning was
trial court to resentence defendant for the crime of second degree rape instead. Id. at 511-12, 259
S.E.2d at 501-02.
201. Id. at 509, 259 S.E.2d at 500.
202. See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1071 (5th Cir. 1978) (four factor test
applied to determine whether custodial interrogation occurred: (1) whether probable cause to
arrest had arisen; (2) whether the subjective intent of the officer conducting the interrogation was
to hold the defendant; (3) whether the subjective belief of the defendant was that his freedom was
significantly restricted; and (4) whether the investigation had focused on the defendant at the time
of interrogation); United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
990 (1970) (factors to be considered include: place of questioning, number of officers present,
length of questioning, and degree to which police investigation has "focused" on defendant);
United States v. Bekowies, 432 F.2d 8,12-14 (9th Cir. 1970);.People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 9-10, 233
N.E.2d 255, 260, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 232-33 (1967); Note, Custodial Interrogation After Oregon v.
Mathiason, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1497, 1500-02 (collecting cases).

203. 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 495.

206. 298 N.C. at 509, 295 S.E.2d at 500.
207. Id. at 508-09, 295 S.E.2d at 500.
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conducted by them in an open-ended, nonthreatening manner. °s Finally, after questioning, the defendant was released, or was arrested
only if the investigation had given the police probable cause to make
an arrest. 20 9 Applying this analysis to the Perry facts, the court con-

cluded that the interrogation was noncustodial because the detective
was investigating a routine missing person report and did not know
that a crime had been committed. During the questioning defendant
voluntarily entered the car and immediately gave an inculpatory statement. At that point the detective ceased questioning and took defendant to the police station where he was given his Miranda warnings 21and
0
was allowed to leave after being arrested on an unrelated charge.
Neither the subjective nor objective test of determining whether an
accused is under custodial interrogation and entitled to his Miranda
warnings is faultless. Obviously, the most practical test in terms of
proof is the objective test. As pointed out by Judge Friendly,
The Court could scarcely have intended the issue whether the person
being interrogated had "been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in any significant way" to be decided by swearing contests in which officers would regularly maintain their lack of
intention to assert power over a suspect save when the circumstances
would make such a claim absurd, and defendants would assert with
equal regularity that they considered themselves to be significantly
deprived of their liberty the minute officers began to inquire of them.
Moreover, any formulation making the need for Miranda warnings
depend upon how each individual being questioned perceived his situation would
require a prescience neither the police nor anyone else
2
possesses. 11

On the other hand, the purpose of Mirandawarnings is to reduce
the inherent pressures put on an individual in coercive settings. Proponents of the subjective test, therefore, argue that "[tihe person who honestly but unreasonably thinks he is under arrest has been subjected to
precisely the same custodial
pressures as the person whose belief in this
212
regard is reasonable."
One procedure for reducing uncertainty about whether a person
being questioned is in custodial surroundings would be to require the
police officer to specifically ask whether that person would be willing to
208. Id. at 509, 295 S.E.2d at 500.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
212. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67
MICH. L. REv. 39, 105 (1968).
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answer some questions, but clearly emphasize that he is under abso-

lutely no obligation to do so and is free to leave at any time. This at
least would ensure that most people would be aware that they were free
to leave and at the same time would avoid the2 13necessity for police to
look into the minds of everyone they question.
In another case, the North Carolina Supreme Court was forced to
abandon its requirement that a waiver of right to counsel must be explicit to be binding. On remand from the United States Supreme
Court, 1 4 the North Carolina Supreme Court held in State v. Connley 215 that an accused need not expressly waive his right to counsel for

his statements given during a subsequent custodial interrogation to be
admissible against him in court.
In Conniey the trial court had found that defendant was fully advised of and understood his Miranda rights, but had refused to sign the
Advice of Rights form.2 16 The first time the North Carolina Supreme

Court reviewed the case,21 7 it held that defendant's inculpatory statements made during in-custody interrogation 218 were inadmissible be-

cause there was no showing of an affirmative written or oral waiver of
his right to counsel.21 9 Following prior North Carolina decisions,220
the court relied on the statements in Mirandathat the accused's "failure

to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of
the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless spe-

cifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been
213. While officers' use of this procedure would be a factor for courts to consider in the state's
favor whenever the state contended that questioning occurred in a noncustodial setting, courts still
would be free to find the situation so coercive that Miranda warnings should have been given to
the defendant. For instance, coercive factors such as the surrounding of the accused by several
policemen, coupled with an accused's lack of education and legal experience, could render meaningless the officers' assurances that the accused is under no obligation to answer their questions.
214. North Carolina v. Connley, 441 U.S. 929 (1979).
215. 297 N.C. 584, 256 S.E.2d 234, cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 433 (1979).
216. Id. at 588, 256 S.E.2d at 236.
217. State v. Conley, 295 N.C. 327, 245 S.E.2d 663 (1978), vacated andremanded, 441 U.S.
929 (1979).
218. Defendant was questioned by an FBI agent in the Duke Medical Center emergency
room. Id. at 333, 245 S.E.2d at 667. The agent testified that prior to questioning he asked defendant if he would talk to him and defendant said yes. The agent handed him a copy of an Advice of
Rights form, then read it orally to him and asked him if he understood his constitutional rights.
He answered, "I know what it says and I understand, but rm not going t6 sign it." Id. at 336, 245
S.E.2d at 669. Thereafter, in response to the agent's questions, defendant told the agent how he
had wounded the policeman he was charged with murdering and how he had kidnapped him at
gunpoint. Id. at 333-34, 245 S.E.2d at 667-68.
219. Id. at 337-38, 245 S.E.2d at 669-70.
220. Eg., State v. Lawson, 285 N.C. 320, 325-26, 204 S.E.2d 843, 847 (1974); State v. Thacker,
281 N.C. 447, 453-54, 189 S.E.2d 145, 149-50 (1972); State v. Blackmon, 280 N.C. 42, 49-50, 185
S.E.2d 123, 127-28 (1971).
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It thus concluded that Miranda requires an explicit waiver

of counsel by the accused before his later statements made during cus-

todial interrogation may be properly admitted against him. 2 2
,

The United States Supreme Court, however, vacated and re-

manded the Connley decision2 23 with instructions to reconsider the case
in light of its decision in North Carolina v. Butler.2 24 In State v. Butler 2

5

the North Carolina Supreme Court examined the trial court's

findings that defendant was given Miranda warnings, refused to sign a
waiver of rights, but said he understood his rights and would talk with
arresting officers. 22 6 He then made an inculpatory statement2 2 7 that
was later admitted as evidence against him. 2 8 The North Carolina
22 9
Supreme Court found that there was no explicit waiver of counsel

and consequently ordered a new trial for defendant. 230 Having granted

certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held in North Carolina v.

Butler2 31 that an express written or oral statement is not a prerequisite

to an effective waiver of Miranda rights. 232 The test of whether the
rights were validly waived is "whether the defendant in fact knowingly
and voluntarily waived the [Miranda] rights."2 33 Although there is a
strong presumption against waiver, in some cases the court may properly infer that a knowing and voluntary waiver occurred by looking at
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case. 34 Facts to
consider include defendant's background and experience, 23 his silence
221. 295 N.C. at 337, 245 S.E.2d at 669 (quoting 384 U.S. at 470).
222. Id. The supreme court ordered a new trial because it could not say with certainty that the
evidence improperly admitted did not contribute to the defendant's conviction. Id. at 338, 245
S.E.2d at 670.
223. North Carolina v. Connley, 441 U.S. 929 (1979).
224. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
225. 295 N.C. 250, 244 S.E.2d 410 (1978), vacated andremanded,441 U.S. 369 (1979). Apparently the North Carolina Supreme Court has not yet decided Butler on remand.
226. Id. at 252-53, 244 S.E.2d at 411-12. An FBI agent testified on voir dire that he arrested
defendant on a fugitive warrant and immediately advised him of his rights. Defendant was then
transported to a police office, again advised of his rights, given an Advice of Rights form to read,
and asked if he understood his rights. He replied that he did, but refused to sign the form. Id.
227. Defendant admitted that he was present at the armed robbery where a gas station attendant was shot, but said it was his accomplice who had done the shooting. Id. at 253, 244 S.E.2d at
412.
228. Id. at 254, 244 S.E.2d at 412.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 256, 244 S.E.2d at 413. The court ordered a new trial because it found there was a
reasonable possibility the improperly admitted statement contributed to his conviction. Id.
231. 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (5-3 decision).
232. Id. at 373.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 374-75 (quoting Johnson v. Zeibst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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after the rights are read, his understanding of his rights and his course
of conduct indicating a waiver of those rights.2 36 The Supreme Court
noted that North Carolina was the only state that had a per se rule
requiring express waiver of the right to counsel 237 and that the North
Carolina Supreme Court had gone beyond the mandates of the United
States Constitution.23 8 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall
and Stevens, dissented,239 referring to the Miranda language, 2' relied
on by the North Carolina Supreme Court, that a specfic waiver of the
right to counsel must be made before it is effective.2 41 Without this
requirement, Justice Brennan argued, courts are free to construct inferences from ambiguous words and gestures of the defendant, yet the
premise of Miranda is that any such ambiguity should be interpreted
against the interrogator.2 42
Following the instructions in the majority opinion, the North Carolina Supreme Court reconsidered State v. Cohnley24 3 on remand by
analyzing defendant's actions and words preceding and during his interrogation and the trial court's conclusion with respect to these factors. 244 The court considered defendant's free and voluntary choice to
talk with the FBI agent and defendant's refusal to answer questions he
did not want to answer. 245 It also considered the agent's failure to exert
any pressure on defendant and the agent's immediate cessation of questioning when defendant said that he wanted a lawyer. 2' The court
found that under these circumstances defendant's actions clearly implied a waiver of his Miranda rights and, therefore, that he was not
entitled to a new trial.24 7
While the United States Supreme Court decision in Butler does
appear to ignore the language in Miranda248 relied on by both the
236. Id. at 373.
237. Id. at 370, 375. The Supreme Court noted that North Carolina's position is contrary to
II United States Court of Appeals decisions and 17 state court decisions. Id.at 375. For a listing
of these cases, see id. at 375 nn.5 & 6.
238. Id. at 376.
239. Id. at 377.
240. 384 U.S. at 470.
241. 441 U.S. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
242. Id.
243. 297 N.C. 584, 256 S.E.2d 234 (1979).
244. Id. at 586-89, 256 S.E.2d at 236-37.
245. Id. at 588, 256 S.E.2d at 237.
246. Id. at 588-89, 256 S.E.2d at 237.
247. Id.
248. The Butler Court quoted the language in Miranda that an express statement can constitute a waiver but that waiver cannot be presumed simply from silence after the warnings are
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North Carolina courts and the dissenting Supreme Court justices, its
conclusion on this issue is consistent with the underlying purpose of
Miranda. The apparent purpose behind Miranda requirements is to
combat the pressures inherent in custodial interrogation by providing a
defendant with warnings of his constitutional rights so he will not forfeit them simply because he is unaware of their existence.249 If a defendant has been read his rights and has expressly stated that he

understood them, as both trial courts found in Connley and Butler,250
then the purpose of the Mirandawarnings is fulfilled despite the lack of

an express waiver. 255 Without an express waiver requirement, however, there exists some uncertainty about whether a defendant really

did understand and waive his rights, as well as the potential for abuse
by courts in drawing the inference that the defendant understood his
rights whenever they were read to him. 5 2 But as the Supreme Court

noted, there is a strong presumption against waiver, and absent an express waiver, the prosecution carries a heavy burden of proof to show
waiver actually occurred. 3 In order to help the prosecution carry this
burden, therefore, it is still wisest for police to obtain express written
waivers, or if this is not possible, to specifically ask the defendant
25 4
whether he waives his right to counsel before questioning.
In State v. Burnett 25 5 the North Carolina Court of Appeals dimin-

ished the protection afforded an accused under the fifth amendment
right to remain silent.25 6 The court decided in an alternative holding 257
given, 441 U.S. at 373 (quoting 384 U.S. at 475), but failed to mention the statement in Miranda
that an effective waiver must be specifically made after the warnings are given. 384 U.S. at 470.
249. State v. Carter, 296 N.C. 344, 352, 250 S.E.2d 263, 268, cert. denied,441 U.S. 964 (1979)
(citing United States v. Hall, 396 F.2d 841, 845 (4th Cir. 1968)).
250. 297 N.C. at 587-88, 256 S.E.2d at 236-37; 295 N.C. at 252-53, 244 S.E.2d at 411-12.
251. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374 (1979).
252. See id. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 373.
254. The dissenters in North Carolina v. Butler argued that because it would be so easy merely
to ask a defendant if he waives his right to counsel that police ought to be explicitly required to do
so. Id. at 379 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
255. 39 N.C. App. 605, 251 S.E.2d 717, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 302 (1979).
256. U.S. CONsT. amend. V provides that "No person.. . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.
... The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination extends to state court defendants through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 315 U.S. 1 (1964).
257. The court discussed the merits of defendants' fifth amendment argument, but noted in
addition that defendants could not properly object on appeal to introduction of the contested
evidence because they had failed to properly object to its introduction at trial. 39 N.C. App. at
609, 251 S.E.2d at 720. The prosecution first questioned defendant Sanders about his postarrest
silence to police, without objection by defense counsel. Next the prosecution questioned defendant about his postarrest silence to the District Attorney's office, to which defense counsel objected.
The court held that defendants waived their right to object to the evidence because they had once
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that a prosecutor may use an accused's postarrest silence258 to impeach

the credibility of his exculpatory testimony offered for the first time at
trial if the record on appeal fails to disclose that he was read his Miranda rights. 9
In Burnett defendants were charged with breaking or entering a
motor vehicle and felonious larceny of its contents. 260 A police undercover agent testified that he purchased from defendants goods that
were later identified as being stolen. 261 Defendants presented evidence
that a man named Ike, whose existence and whose role in the transaction defendants had not previously revealed to the authorities, sold the
equipment to them and that they in turn sold it to the agent.2 62 At trial
the prosecution attempted to impeach defendants' story by questioning
2 63
defendant Sanders about his failure to make a statement after arrest.

After defendants were found guilty as charged, they argued on appeal that the comment on Sanders' postarrest silence should not have
been permitted because it violated his fifth amendment right to remain
silent . 26 Rejecting this argument, the court of appeals distinguished
the United States Supreme Court case of Doyle v. Ohio,2 6 which held
that the impeachment use of silence at the time of arrest and after
receiving Miranda warnings is a violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.266 The court said that the Doyle holding
allowed the same evidence to come in without objection. Id. at 610,251 S.E.2d at 720. Because of
this procedural holding, the court's holding on the merits is arguably dictum.
258. The use of an accused's prearrest silence is discussed at length in Note, Robeson v. State:
Cross-Examination of Prearrest Silence, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1205 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CALIF.
L. REv.], which analyzes the Maryland Court of Special Appeals' holding that a criminal defendant who elects to testify at trial may be cross-examined regarding his prearrest silence. Robeson v.
State, 39 Md. App. 365, 386 A.2d 795 (Ct. Spec. App. 1978), aft'd, 285 Md. 498, 403 A.2d 1221
(1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 680 (1980). See also Brooks v. State, 347 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) (prearrest silence used to support an inference of guilt).
259. 39 N.C. App. at 609, 251 S.E.2d at 720.
260. Id. at 605, 251 S.E.2d at 718.
261. Id. at 606, 251 S.E.2d at 718. State's evidence showed that Ollie Garris, Jr. left photography equipment in his car on February 24, 1978, and discovered it was missing February 27. On
February 25 defendants sold some photography equipment to a police undercover agent. The
equipment was later identified as the equipment missing from Garris' car.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 608, 251 S.E.2d at 719. See note 257 supra.
264. Id.
265. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
266. 39 N.C. App. at 608-09, 251 S.E.2d at 719-20. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I provides:
"No state shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
The court of appears distinction between Doyle and the situation presented in Burnett is a
valid one. The Supreme Court's rationale in Doyle is that it would violate the fundamental fairness assured by due process to use defendant's silence against him at trial for impeachment pur-
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was based on the implicit assurance an accused receives from the Miranda warnings2 67 that his silence will not be used against him. 26 8 The
court used Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Doyle, which suggested that the Doyle holding is limited to situations in which Miranda

warnings have been given, 269 to bolster its distinction between Doyle
and Burnett.2 70 The court concluded, therefore, that Doyle places no

constitutional bars on using silence for impeachment purposes against
defendants who have not been given their Miranda warnings.2 1t
The Burnett court did not discuss an opinion2 72 in which the Flor-

ida District Court of Appeals reached an opposite conclusion when
faced with this identical issue. In Webb v. State7 3 it was also argued

by the State that when a record does not reflect whether or not Miranda
warnings were given, the State is free to confront the defendant at trial

with his prior silence for impeachment purposes if he offers an exculpaposes after he has received assurances by police that his silence will not be used against him. The
Doyle Court, however, never reached the issue presented in Burnettof whether a defendant has a
separate fifth amendment right not to have his postarrest silence used against him in a situation in
which he did not receive assurances at his arrest that his silence would not be used against him.
Similarly, the Doyle Court did not reach the question whether its decision in Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), would permit use of postarrest silence against a defendant who had not
been given his Miranda warnings. The Court held in Harris that a defendant's postarrest statements may be used against him at trial for impeachment purposes, even though the statements are
inadmissible as substantive evidence of defendant's guilt because he was not given his Miranda
warnings. By analogy, it was argued to the Court in Doyle that a defendant's postarrest silence
should be admissible for impeachment purposes. The Doyle Court was not required to address
this argument because defendant in Doyle had received Mirandawarnings and because his right
to due process had been violated.
267. "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
384 U.S. at
[and] that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him .
444.
268. 39 N.C. App. at 609, 251 S.E.2d at 719-20. Both petitioners in Doyle received their M.
randa warnings soon after their arrests. At trial petitioners presented testimony about a frame-up
by the police informer, and the prosecutor cross-examined both petitioners as to why they had not
told their stories to the police after they were arrested. 426 U.S. at 612-13.
269. "For without reliance on the waiver, the case is no different than if no warning had been
given, and nothing in the Court's opinion suggests that there would be any unfairness in using
petitioners' prior inconsistent silence for impeachment purposes in such a case." Id. at 624-25
(Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
270. 39 N.C. App. at 609, 251 S.E.2d at 720.
271. Id. In another case decided in 1979 the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the
constitutionality of the State's direct examination of a police officer and cross-examination of
defendant as to defendant's refusal, through counsel, to make a statement the day he was arrested.
The court held that defendant had not timely objected to this evidence, and that its introduction
did not violate Doyle v. Ohio anyway because the evidence was not used for impeachment purposes, but to explain the chronology of the investigation. State v. Holsclaw, 42 N.C. App. 696,
701-02, 257 S.E.2d 650, 654 (1979). For further discussion of Holselaw, see this Survey, Criminal
Law: Homicide.
272. Webb v. State, 347 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
273. Id.
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tory explanation while on the witness stand.27 4 The prosecutor also relied on language from the dissenting opinion in Doyle that indicates
that Doyle was limited to situations in which Miranda warnings are
given.275 In rejecting this argument, the Florida District Court of Appeals reiterated that the language relied upon by the State was from a
dissenting opinion. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court
had not reached the issue before the court in Webb because in Doyle
the accused had received his Miranda warnings.27 6 In addition, the
court reasoned:
[W]e note that, while Miranda warnings make it even more offensive to use a person's silence upon arrest against him, the absence
of such warnings does not add to nor detract from an individual's
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. If one has a right upon
arrest not to speak for the fear of self-incrimination, then the mere
fact the police call his attention to that right does not elevate it to any
higher level. If it were otherwise, an ignorant defendant who was
advised of his right to remain silent would be protected against use of
his silence to impeach him at trial; but an educated, sophisticated
defendant familiar with his right to remain silent who was not apprised of that right by the police would be subject to impeachment
for the exercise of a known constitutionally protected right.277
The Webb court's decision is preferable to the North Carolina
Court of Appeals holding in Burnett on both evidentiary and constitutional grounds. While the North Carolina court held that defendant's
prior silence was relevant evidence, 27 the Supreme Court has held that
silence at the time of arrest is inherently ambiguous and carries too
great a potential for prejudice to be admitted in evidence. 279 At the
274. Id. at 1055-56. In Webb, the defendant was cross-examined about his postarrest silence
after he had offered an alibi in his testimony at trial. Id. at 1055.
275. Id. at 1056.
276. Id. See notes 266-69 and accompanying text supra.
277. 347 So.2d at 1056.
278. 39 N.C. App. at 609, 251 S.E.2d at 720.
279. In United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), the Court determined that the potential for
prejudice in use of postarrest silence outweighs the probative value of any such evidence. Id. at
180. While Hale involved evidentiary use of postarrest silence after Mirandawarnings, id. at 177,
and is not binding on state courts because the Supreme Court was exercising its supervisory powers over federal courts, id. at 181, its reasoning seems equally applicable to postarrest situations in
which no Mirandawarnings have been given. As the Court in Doyle stated, "But in UnitedStates
v. Hale we noted that silence at the time of arrest may be inherently ambiguous even apartfrom
the effect ofMiranda warnings, for in a given case there may be several explanations for the silence
that are consistent with the existence of an exculpatory explanation." 426 U.S. at 617 n.8 (emphasis added).
The North Carolina courts have followed Hale in cases in which Miranda warnings have
been given by holding that a defendant's postarrest silence is inadmissible because it is "not sufficiently probative of an inconsistency with his in-court testimony." State v. Love, 296 N.C. 194,
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time of arrest and thereafter an accused may remain silent because of

fear or unwillingness to incriminate another, or such a reaction may
stem from the intimidating circumstances or antipathy toward police in
general.28
Even more disturbing than its holding on the evidentiary issue is
the Burnett court's decision on the constitutional question. It is undis-

puted that a person has a constitutional right to remain silent when
confronted by his accusers following an arrest or in a custodial interrogation setting. 28 I However, if a person's silence can be used against
him for impeachment purposes when Mirandawarnings are not given,
an unwarned arrestee personally aware of the widely known right to
remain silent 28 2 may be forced to assert his fifth amendment privilege
only at the risk of later having his exercise of this right used against

him.283 This approach is inconsistent with the statement in Mfiranda
that "[i]t is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his
Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he
stood mute or claimed his [fifth amendment] privilege in the face of
accusation. 28 4 Moreover, the court of appeals' approach could induce

police to forego Miranda warnings if they thought a defendant would
not talk to them but would later testify. 211 Under these circumstances
the failure to give Miranda warnings would operate to the State's ad-

vantage since it then would not be limited by Doyle's restrictions
28 6
against the use of postarrest silence in the face of Mirandawarnings.

It is hoped that the court's analysis will be viewed as mere dictum by
North Carolina courts in subsequent cases.2 87
202, 250 N.E.2d 220, 226 (1978); accord, State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 693, 220 S.E.2d 558, 568
(1975).
280. 422 U.S. at 177.
281. Id.; Robeson v. State, 39 Md. App. 365, 377-78, 386 A.2d 795, 801 (Ct. Spec. App. 1978),
~ft'd, 285 Md. 498, 403 A.2d 1221 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 680 (1980).
282. CALIF. L. REv., supra note 258, at 1214; Comment, Evidence-Doyle v. Ohio. Use of
Defendant's Silencefor Impeachment at Trial, 8 Loy. CHIi.L.J. 438, 461 (1977).
283. See Webb v. State, 347 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); CALIF. L. REV.,
supra note 258, at 1217. "The Supreme Court consistently has held that it is constitutionally
impermissible to fetter a defendant's free choice of the exercise of his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination by attaching high costs to the exercise of that right." Id.
284. 384 U.S. at 468 n.37 (emphasis added). This language seems to apply to the situation
confronting the court in Burnett because defendant's silence at and after arrest was surely claimed
"in the face of accusation," despite the absence of Miranda warnings.
285. CALIF. L. REV., supra note 258, at 1214.
286. Id.
287. Such an interpretation is possible since the court apparently could have decided Burnett
on procedural grounds. See note 257 supra. But see North Carolina's recent use of postarrest
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Breathalyzer Test Administration288
In Seders v. Powell

majority of

states 29°

9

the North Carolina Supreme Court joined a

by holding that there is no constitutional right to

the assistance of counsel2 9 ' during administration of a breathalyzer
test. 92 The court also overruled Price v. North CarolinaDept. ofMotor
Vehicles,29 3 the 1978 court of appeals decision that interpreted G.S. 2016.2(a)(4)194 and G.S. 15A-510(5)295 as providing a driver a reasonable
time to communicate with an attorney before submitting to a
breathalyzer test.2 9 6
297
Petitioner in Seders was arrested for driving under the influence

and taken to the breathalyzer room where he was read his statutory
rights, including G.S. 20-16.2(a)(4), which provides "[t]hat he has the
right to call an attorney and select a witness to view for him the testing
procedures; but that the test shall not be delayedfor thispurpose for a

period in excess of 30 minutes from the time he is notified of his
rights. 298 Petitioner was unable to contact his attorney within thirty
silence in another context in State v. Holsclaw, 42 N.C. App. 696, 701-02 (1979), discussedat note
271 supra.
288. For a comprehensive summary of the use of breathalyzer tests in North Carolina, see J.
DRENNAN

& A.

MOSELY,

LEGAL ASPECTS

OF CHEMICAL TESTING

FOR INTOXICATION

(Administration of Justice Memo No. 79/14, Oct. 1979).
289. 298 N.C. 453, 259 S.E.2d 544 (1979).
290. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 110 Ariz. 214, 516 P.2d 1226 (1973); Goodman v. Orr, 19 Cal.
App. 3d 845, 97 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1971); Calvert v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue, 184 Colo. 214, 519
P.2d 341 (1974); Davis v. Pope, 128 Ga. App. 791, 197 S.E.2d 861 (1973); Swenumson v. Iowa
Dept. of Pub. Safety, 210 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 1973); State v. Palmer, 291 Minn. 302, 191 N.W.2d
188 (1971); Lewis v. Nebraska State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 191 Neb. 704, 217 N.W.2d 177
(1974); Harlan v. State, 113 N.H. 194, 308 A.2d 856 (1973); Phares v. Dept. of Public Safety, 507
P.2d 1225 (Okla. 1973); Capretta v. Motor Vehicles Div., 29 Or. App. 241, 562 P.2d 1236 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Cannon, 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 119, 286 A.2d 24 (1972); Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 170 S.E.2d 199 (1969).
291. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall.
have the assistance of counsel for his defence." The sixth amendment right to counsel applies to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
292. 298 N.C. at 461, 259 S.E.2d at 550.
293. 36 N.C. App. 698, 245 S.E.2d 518, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 551, 248 S.E.2d 728 (1978).
294. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a)(4) (1978), quoted at text accompanying note 298 infra.
295. Id. § 15A-501(5), quoted at note 302 infra.
296. 36 N.C. App. at 702-03, 245 S.E.2d at 521. For a discussion of the Price decision, see
Survey of Developments in North CarolinaLaw, 1978, 57 N.C.L. REV.827, 1031-34 (1979).
297. 298 N.C. at 454, 259 S.E.2d at 546.
298. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a)(4) (1978) (emphasis added). The other statutory rights provided in G.S. 20-16.2(a) require informing the accused:
(1) That he has a right to refuse to take the test;
(2) That refusal to take the test will result in revocation of his driving privilege for
six months;
(3) That he may have a physician, qualified technician, chemist, registered nurse or
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minutes and refused to take the test at the expiration of that time
limit.2 9 9 Subsequently his license was revoked for six months because
of his wilful refusal 3°° to take the test within the statutory time limit. 30 I
He appealed, asserting that he was denied both his constitutional right
to the assistance of counsel before taking the test and his statutory right
to communicate with an attorney within a reasonable time after arrest,
pursuant to G.S. 15A-501(5). 30 The court of appeals rejected these ar-

guments, 30 3 and the supreme court affirmed, 304 expressly overruling30°
other qualified person of his own choosing administer a chemical test or tests in addition
to any administered at the direction of the law-enforcement officer.
299. 298 N.C. at 455, 259 S.E.2d at 546-47. Seders was read his breathalyzer rights at 3:30
p.m. After unsuccessfully attempting to reach several attorneys, he contacted the wife of an attorney who promised to have her husband call him back shortly. At 4:01 p.m., before the attorney
called, the trooper wrote Seders up as having failed to take the test. After finally conferring with
his attorney 10 minutes later, Seders consented to take the test, but the trooper had dismantled the
machine and refused to administer the test.
300. Petitioner unsuccessfully argued that the Division of Motor Vehicles presented insufficient evidence to show that petitioner wilfully refused to submit to the breathalyzer test because it
did not show that he was made aware of the passage of time. His refusal, petitioner maintained,
resulted from accidentally allowing the 30 minute period to elapse while waiting for his attorney
to call. The supreme court found the evidence sufficient to support a finding that "[pilaintifi's
" Id. at 461, 259 S.E.2d at 549-550.
action constituted a conscious choice purposefully made ..
In another 1979 case involving wilful refusal to take the test, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held in Bell v. Powell that wilful refusal encompasses failure to follow the instructions of
the breathalyzer operator, such as failure to give a sufficient breath sample to allow an accurate
reading. 41 N.C. App. 131, 254 S.E.2d 191 (1979). Seea/so Poag v. Powell, 39 N.C. App, 363, 250
S.E.2d 93, cert. denied, 296 N.C. 736, 254 S.E.2d 178 (1979) (similar facts).
301. 298 N.C. at 454, 259 S.E.2d at 546. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(c) (1978) provides in part:
"However, upon the receipt of a sworn report of the arresting officer and the person authorized to
administer a chemical test that the person arrested, after being advised of his rights as set forth in
subsection (a), willfully refused to submit to the test upon the request of the officer, the Division
[of Motor Vehicles] shall revoke the driving privilege of the person arrested for a period of six
months."
302. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-501(5) (1978) requires that a law enforcement officer "[mlust
without unnecessary delay advise the person arrested of his right to communicate with counsel
and friends and must allow him reasonable time and reasonable opportunity to do so."
In addition to these right to counsel arguments and the argument that he had not wilfully
refused to take the test, note 300 supra,petitioner asserted that the statutorily prescribed 30 minute
time limit is irrational and violative of due process. 298 N.C. at 463, 259 S.E.2d at 55 1. The
supreme court rejected this argument on the ground that the 30 minute period is not unreasonable
in view of the legislature's conflicting desires to afford the arrestee sufficient time to contact an
attorney and yet preserve evidence of his condition before it "metabolizes away." Id. Although
plaintiff argued that a meaningful test result could be obtained several hours after arrest by extrapolation, the court refused to examine the merits of such a procedure, since this is the function of
the legislature rather than the court. Id. at 463-64, 259 S.E.2d at 551.
303. 39 N.C. App. 491, 250 S.E.2d 690, afd,298 N.C. 453, 259 S.E.2d 544 (1979). The court
of appeals rejected any implication that under its prior decision in Price v. North Carolina Dept.
of Motor Vehicles, 36 N.C. App. 698, 245 S.E.2d 518, cert. denied,295 N.C. 551, 248 S.E.2d 728
(1978), a person would have more than 30 minutes to call an attorney. See text accompanying
notes 349-52 infra.
304. 298 N.C. at 457, 259 S.E.2d at 547.
305. Id. at 460, 259 S.E.2d at 549. The supreme court did not agree with the Division of
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Price v. North CarolinaDept. of Motor Vehicles3° upon which petitioner had relied to support his statutory claim.
The supreme court rejected petitioner's constitutional argument on

two grounds. First, it held that petitioner could not successfully claim a
denial of his constitutional right to counsel because license revocation

proceedings are civil in nature and distinct from any criminal proceedings that may arise from the same action. 0 7 Revocation is not punitive

in nature, but is "a civil and administrative licensing procedure instituted by the Director of Motor Vehicles to determine whether a person's privilege to drive is revoked. ' 3 8 As another basis for its holding,
the court found that petitioner could not claim the right to consult with
an attorney before the administration of a breathalyzer test because he
had already consented under G.S. 20-16.2(a) °9 to take the test by driving on North Carolina highways.3 1 0 In effect, the court observed, this

prior consent statute operates to waive any right to counsel because
there is nothing an attorney can do to void that prior consent. 31 ' The
result reached by the court is consistent with the decision in Schmerber
3 t2 in which the United States Supreme Court held that
v. Calfornia,
Motor Vehicles that the reasonable time language in Price was mere dictum, but instead chose to
expressly overrule that decision.
306. 36 N.C. App. 698, 245 S.E.2d 518, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 551, 248 S.E.2d 728 (1978).
307. 298 N.C. at 462, 259 S.E.2d at 550.
308. .d. (quoting Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C.'226, 238, 182 S.E.2d 553, 562, cert. denied, 279
N.C. 397, 183 S.E.2d 241 (1971)).
309. N.C. GuN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a) (1978) provides in part:
Any person who drives or operates a motor vehicle upon any highway or any public
vehicular area shall be deemed to have given consent ... to a chemical test or tests of
his breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if
arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the
person was driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor.
310. 298 N.C. at 462-63, 259 S.E.2d at 550-51.
311. Id. The advice of an attorney, however, could be helpful to one facing the decision
whether to take a breathalyzer test, because the arrestee might reasonably want to know the potential effects of his refusal to take the test on subsequent proceedings against him as compared with
the use of a high blood alcohol content reading against him if he does submit to the test. While
both the results of a breathalyzer test and an arrestee's refusal to take the test are admissible
against the defendant in a criminal proceeding, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-139.1(a), -139.1(f) (1978), a
refusal to submit to the test might be explicable and therefore constitute less damaging evidence
than high test results. Furthermore, while refusal to submit to the test incurs an automatic six
month license revocation, id. § 20-16.2(a)(2), the penalties for a criminal conviction for driving
under the influence of alcohol can be significant. Fines range from $100 to $500 for a first offense,
$200 to $500 for a second offense, and a minimum of $500 for a third or subsequent offense. Id.
§ 20-179(a)(1) to (a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979). If convicted, a criminal defendant also faces possible
imprisonment of six months for a first offense, a year for a second offense and two years for a third
or subsequent offense. Id. For a discussion of 1979 statutory changes in sentencing procedures,
see this Survey, CriminalProcedure: Sentencing.
312. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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Schmerber had no right to counsel after he was arrested for drunk driv31 3
ing and before he was involuntarily forced to submit to a blood test.
Addressing petitioner's statutory claim, the North Carolina
Supreme Court noted that G.S. 15A-501(5) is a general statute providing an arrestee reasonable time and opportunity to communicate with
an attorney, 314 while G.S. 20-16.2(a)(4) gives him the right to select a
witness to view the test and to call an attorney, but adds that the testing
procedure shall not be delayed "for this purpose" more than thirty
315
minutes from the time the driver is notified of his breathalyzer rights.
The Price decision 3 6 had resolved the apparent conflict between the
statutes by holding that the language "for this purpose" refers only to
the right to select a witness, thus leaving the right to call an attorney
governed by the reasonable time limit in G.S. 15A-501(5)
rather than
31 7
20-16.2(a)(4).
G.S.
by
imposed
limit
the thirty minute
The Seders court analyzed legislative intent and found that the
words "for this purpose" in subsection (a)(4)3 t1 were added to the statute at the same time that the rights in subsections (a)(1) through
(a)(3) 3t 9 were added. 32 0 Thus, said the court, the language in the statute providing that the test shall not be delayed "for this purpose" refers
to the "single generic right" enumerated in subsection (a)(4), i.e., the
313. Id. at 765-66. Schmerber was appealing a criminal conviction for driving under the influ.
ence and objected to the use of blood analysis against him as a violation of his right to due process
under the fourteenth amendment, his privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment, his right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures under the fourth amendment and his right to counsel under the sixth amendment. The blood was extracted from him in a
hospital after his counsel had advised him to refuse to take the test without the presence of his
attorney. The Supreme Court rejected Schmerber's sixth amendment argument, as well as his
other constitutional arguments.
The Schmerber decision is consistent with other Supreme Court cases holding that the right
to counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of judicial proceedings, Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 398 (1977), Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972), and not when, as in the instant
case, petitioner is arrested and brought to a breathalyzer room but is not yet subject to formal
charges.
314. See note 302 supra for the partial text of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-501(5) (1978).
315. See text accompanying note 298 supra for full text of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a)(4)
(1978).
316. 36 N.C. App. 698, 245 S.E.2d 518, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 551, 248 S.E.2d 728 (1978).
317. Id. at 702-03, 245 S.E.2d at 521. The court in Priceapplied the rules of construction that
statutes imposing penalties must be strictly construed, and statutes inparimaeriashould be construed together. Strict construction of G.S. 20-16.2(a)(4), the Price court said, would require the
singular phrase "for this purpose" to refer to the phrase closest to it, the right to "select a witness."
This interpretation would harmonize the statutes in par!materia because G.S. 15A-501(5), allowing a reasonable time to communicate with an attorney, would then apply to the right to "call
an attorney." Id.
318. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a)(4) (1978).
319. Id. § 20-16.2(a)(1) to (3).
320. 298 N.C. at 458, 259 S.E.2d at 548.
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right to call an attorney and select a witness, as opposed to the other
newly-enumerated rights in subsections (a)(1) through (a)(3). 32 1 The
court also found this interpretation grammatically correct since the
phrase "for this purpose" refers to a singular right with two compocomponents, therefore, are
nents-the right to call and to select. 3Both
22
subject to the thirty minute time limit.
Because the court considered the language of G.S. 20-16.2(a)(4) in
context with G.S. 20-16.2(a)(1) through (a)(3), its analysis of legislative
intent was sound. Furthermore, as the court pointed out, the thirty
minute time limit serves important policies. It provides the arrestee
enough time to decide whether to take the test, but does not tie up the
arresting officer for an unreasonable length of time.323 The thirty minute time limit is also justified because it ensures that the test will be
given reasonably close to the time the driver was operating the vehicle,

and therefore, that the test will be reasonably accurate. 24
I

Right to Counsel

The North Carolina Supreme Court considered whether an
accused's sixth amendment right to counsel325 attaches at, or after, her
321. Id.
322. Id. at 459, 259 S.E.2d at 548. Compare this with the grammatical interpretation advanced by the court of appeals in Price that the first clause in G.S. 20-16.2(a)(4)--the right to call

an attorney and select a witness-sets out two separate rights rather than a singular right with two
components. 36 N.C. App. at 701, 245 S.E.2d at 520.
The Seders court also applied the rule of construction that when two statutes apparently
overlap, the special and particular statute should control over the general statute, absent clear
legislative intent to the contrary. G.S. 20-16.2 is a more specific statute dealing with breathalyzer
administration, while G.S. 15A-501 deals with the rights of an arrestee in general. 298 N.C. at
459, 259 S.E.2d at 549. But see the contrary rules of construction, applied by the court of appeals
in Price, discussed at note 317 supra.

323. Id. at 465, 259 S.E.2d at 552. The arresting officer must remain with the arrestee during
the 30 minute time period because, if the arrestee ultimately refuses to submit to the test, the
officer must then make a sworn report of his refusal to do so. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(c)
(1978).
324. 298 N.C. at 463, 259 S.E.2d at 551. The Seders court also found that simply calling and
obtaining advice from an attorney in most cases will take less time than finding a friend to drive to
the testing room to witness the test. Therefore, the court concluded, since the legislature has given
drivers 30 minutes to find a witness, it could not have found the imposition of a 30 minute time
limit on the right to call an attorney unreasonable. Id. at 459-60, 259 S.E.2d at 549. Compare this
with the Price reasoning that since the exercise of the right to call an attorney generally requires
only a few minutes, there is no great need for a time limitation on this right, beyond the reasonable time limit imposed by G.S. 15A-501(5). 36 N.C. App. at 704, 245 S.E.2d at 521. Both courts'
analyses assume that an arrestee will be able to contact an attorney quickly. The assumption is
questionable especially regarding the majority of arrests, which are more likely to occur during
nonbusiness hours.
325. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall...
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initial appearance before a district court judge,326 pursuant to G.S.
15A-601(a). 327 In State v. Defter 3 8 the court held that the initial appearance before a district court judge is not a critical stage triggering
the sixth amendment right to counsel. 329 Thus, defendant's conversation with a police informer after her initial appearance but before her
probable cause hearing was properly admitted at trial.330
Defendant in Detter was arrested for the first degree murder of her
husband and released on bail. 33' The next day she had her initial ap-

pearance before a district court judge 332 who determined the sufficiency
of the charges against her, informed defendant of those charges, assured her of her right to counsel for the subsequent stages of the proceedings, and set the date for her probable cause hearing. 33 3 Defendant
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The sixth amendment applies to states through
the fourteenth amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
326. State v. Detter, 298 N.C. 604, 624, 260 S.E.2d 567, 582 (1979).
327. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-601(a) (1978) provides that "[A]ny defendant charged in a magistrate's order under G.S. 15A-51 I or criminal process under Article 17 of this Chapter, Criminal
Process, with a crime in the original jurisdiction of the superior court must be brought before a
district court judge in the judicial district in which the crime is charged to have been committed.
This first appearance before a district court judge is not a critical stage of the proceedings against
the defendant."
The stages in the criminal justice system occurring prior to a person's initial appearance
before a district court judge are set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-301 to -544 (1978 & Cum.
Supp. 1979).
328. 298 N.C. 604, 260 S.E.2d 567 (1979).
329. Id. at 624, 260 S.E.2d at 582.
330. Id. at 626, 260 S.E.2d at 583.
331. Id. at 623, 260 S.E.2d at 581. Defendant's husband died on June 9, 1977, from arsenic
poisoning allegedly administered by defendant at different times during January, February, and
March 1977. Id. at 607-08, 260 S.E.2d at 572-73. Defendant was arrested for murder on Nov. 22,
1977, and was released on bail that same day. Id. at 623, 260 S.E.2d at 581.
332. Id. Defendant had no initial appearance before a magistrate, but instead had her initial
appearance before a district court judge, pursuant to G.S. 15A-601(a), quo/ed at note 327 supra.
333. 298 N.C. at 625, 260 S.E.2d at 582. The court did not in fact say that all these procedures
were followed. Nevertheless, the court's discussion of these procedures as mandated by statute
indicates that the procedures must have been followed in this case. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A603, -604(a), -605(1), -606 (1978).
Another function of the district court judge at the initial appearance is to determine or review
the defendant's eligibility for release on bail. Id. § 15A-605(3). The judge did not perform this
function at the initial appearance in Defter because defendant had already been released on bail
the day of her arrest. Therefore, in ruling that the initial appearance is not a critical stage requiring counsel, the court did not have to consider the effect ofid. § 7A-45 l(b)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979),
which provides that "[a] hearing for the reduction of bail, or to fix bail if bail has been earlier
denied" is a critical stage requiring the assistance of counsel. 298 N.C. at 626, 260 S.E.2d at 583.
Because no bail hearing was conducted at the initial appearance in De//er, the court did not
have to address the potential conflict between G.S. 15A-605(3) and G.S. 7A-451(b)(3), nor did it
have to consider the language addressing this subject in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
In Coleman the United States Supreme Court held that Alabama's preliminary hearing was a
critical stage requiring counsel. While the primary basis for the court's holding was that Alabama's preliminary hearing includes a probable cause hearing involving cross-examination of wit-
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thereafter hired her own attorney.33 4 The day before her probable

cause hearing, a little more than a month and a half after her initial
appearance before the district court judge, the police surreptitiously
taped defendant's conversation with a prosecution336 witness. 3
tape recording was later played to the jury at trial.

This

On appeal, defendant contended that the use of the tape violated
her sixth amendment right to counsel3 37 as interpreted in the United
States Supreme Court cases of Massiah v. United States338 and Brewer
v. Williams.3 39 The court recognized that under those cases, once a

critical stage in the proceedings against a defendant is reached, police
nesses, it also noted, as one of its reasons for finding the hearing to be a critical stage requiring
counsel, that "counsel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective arguments for the accused on such matters as. . . bail." Id. at 9.
334. 298 N.C. at 626, 260 S.E.2d at 583. Defendant had hired counsel soon after her arrest
and before the contested recording of her conversation with witness Brooks. Id.
335. Id. at 623, 260 S.E.2d at 581. Defendant was arrested November 22, 1977, and had her
initial appearance November 23, 1977. Her conversation with the informer, Brooks, was taped
January 11, 1978. Defendant had her probable cause hearing January 12, 1978, was indicted
January 30, 1978, and arraigned February 27, 1978. Id.
Defendant also contested the use of another tape recorded conversation she had with prosecution witness Christy before she was arrested. Id. Because defendant clearly was not entitled to
counsel before her arrest, the court focused on whether the recording of the conversation was an
unreasonable search in violation of the fourth amendment or a violation of defendant's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court properly concluded that neither the
fourth nor the fifth amendment was violated and that this tape was admissible under Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), and United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745. 298 N.C. at 622,260
S.E.2d at 581. Under Hoffa, the use of informers to overhear a defendant's statement does not
violate the fourth amendment because there is no surreptitious search of the oral statements. Instead, the defendant has talked freely to someone in whom he has misplaced his confidence. 385
U.S. at 302. Nor is there a fourth amendment violation if the informer is wired for sound so that
defendant's statements are recorded. 401 U.S. at 751. Similarly, there is no fifth amendment
violation when police use an informer because the defendant is under no compulsion to speak.
385 U.S. at 304.
336. 298 N.C. at 616, 260 S.E.2d at 577.
337. Id. at 619, 260 S.E.2d at 579.
338. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
339. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
Defendant also argued that imposition of the death penalty violated the constitutional proscription ofex post facto laws. Id. at 636,260 S.E.2d at 589. Defendant's alleged acts of poisoning
occurred after the United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional North Carolina's automatic death penalty statute for first degree murder, Law of Apr. 8, 1974, ch. 1201, 1973 N.C. Sess.
Laws 323 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1979)), but before North
Carolina had enacted its new death penalty statute, Law of June 1, 1977, ch. 406, 1977 N.C. Sess.
Laws 407 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2000 to 2003 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1979)). The
North Carolina Supreme Court held that for the purposes of determining if a punishment is
barred by the ex post facto laws, murder is committed on the day of the murderous act rather than
the day of death. 298 N.C. at 638, 260 S.E.2d at 590. Therefore, although decedent died June 9,
1977, after the effective date of the new death penalty, June .1, 1977, the court found the murder
occurred before that time and that application of the new death penalty statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 637-38, 260 S.E.2d at 589-90. Consequently, defendant's sentence was vacated and
the case was remanded for imposition of a life sentence. Id. at 639, 260 S.E.2d at 590.
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may not interrogate a defendant without the presence of counsel, unless
there is a valid waiver of that right. 340 Furthermore, police may not
34 1
accomplish through an informer what they may not do themselves.
The supreme court determined, however, that there is no right to counsel at or after the initial appearance before a district court judge because it is not a critical stage. 34 2 The court noted that North Carolina
has two preliminary hearings-the initial appearance before a district
court judge and the probable cause hearing. 343 Although G.S. 7A451(b)(4) 3 4 provides for the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing,345 G.S. 15A-601(a) 346 says that the first appearance before a district
347
court judge is not a critical stage requiring the assistance of counsel.
The court followed G.S. 15A-601(a) because the first appearance is
nonadversarial-no rights or defenses are preserved or lost at it nor are
any pleas taken.34 8 In Hamilton v. Alabama, 3 49 the United States
340. 298 N.C. at 621, 260 S.E.2d at 580 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397-401
(1977)). The Brewer Court, however, did not discuss the right to counsel in terms of "critical
stages" of the trial. Instead, it referred to the right to counsel once adversary or judicial proceedings have begun. 430 U.S. at 398-99, 401.
341. 298 N.C. at 621, 260 S.E.2d at 580 (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206
(1964)).
342. Id. at 624, 260 S.E.2d at 582. The court noted its previous decision, however, that the
probable cause hearing is a critical stage triggering the right to counsel. Id. (citing State v. Cobb,
295 N.C. 1, 243 S.E.2d 759 (1978)).
343. Id. at 624, 260 S.E.2d at 582 (quoting Official Commentary to Article 30 of Chapter 15A).
The preliminary hearing was divided into two parts under the Criminal Procedure Act of 1975,
Chapter 15A, which became effective Sept. 1, 1975.
344. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
345. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that a defendant has the right to counsel at a
preliminary hearing in State v. Hairston, 280 N.C. 220, 185 S.E.2d 633, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888
(1972). Hairston, of course, was decided before the division of the preliminary hearing into two
parts. See note 343 supra.
346. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-601(a) (1978).
347. The apparent conflict between G.S. 7A-451(b)(4) and 15A-601(a) can be resolved by noting that G.S. 7A-451(b)(4) was originally enacted in 1969, Law of June 23, 1969, ch. 1013, 1969
N.C. Sess. Laws 1154, prior to the enactment of G.S. ISA-601(a) in 1974, Law of Apr. 11, 1974, ch,
1286, 1973 Sess. Laws 514. At the time § 7A-451(b)(4) was enacted, a preliminary hearing before
a magistrate (called a preliminary examination) was required under Chapter 15, Article 9 and
included cross-examination of witnesses. Specifically, the magistrate's duties included examination of the complainant and prosecution witnesses under oath in the presence of the defendant,
Proceedings in Criminal Cases, ch. 178, § 3(13), 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 429 (formerly codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-87 (1965) (repealed 1973)), and cross-examination of defendant's witnesses,
id. § 3(17) (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-92 (1965) (repealed 1973)). The defendant
was guaranteed the right to counsel during this preliminary examination under id. §§ 3(14), 3(17),
1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 429 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-88 (1965) (repealed 1973)
and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-92 (1965) (repealed 1973)). When G.S. 15-88 and G.S. 15-92 were
repealed in 1974, law of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 1286, 1973 Sess. laws 556, and Chapter 15A was enacted in their place, Law of Apr. 11, 1974 ch. 1286, 1973 Sess. Laws 490, the legislature apparently
neglected to amend G.S. 7A-451(b)(4) to conform with new G.S. 15A-601(a).
348. 298 N.C. at 624, 260 S.E.2d at 582.
349. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
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Supreme Court said that when rights or defenses are preserved or lost
or pleas taken, an innocent defendant without counsel may face "the
danger of conviction350[merely because he does not know how to estab-

lish his innocence.

In determining whether defendant was improperly denied her
right to counsel, the North Carolina Supreme Court failed to follow a
controlling case, Brewer v. Williams,5 1 in which the United States
Supreme Court said "Itlhe right to counsel granted by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment means at least that a person is entitled to the
help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been

initiated against him-"whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' ",352 Until Brewer
the Supreme Court had not clarified what it meant by the initiation of
judicial proceedings.35 3 But in Brewer the Court found that defendant
had been denied his right to counsel when he was questioned by police
on a car ride back to Des Moines, Iowa where his arrest warrant had
been issued. 354 The only proceedings that had been initiated against
defendant in that case were the same as those that had been brought
against defendant in Detter. In Brewer, defendant contacted his attorney, turned himself in to the Davenport, Iowa police, was read his Miranda rights and taken before a judge who read him the charges
against him from the warrant and placed him in jail until the Des
Moines police arrived to take him back to Des Moines. 355 In the car
with the police and without counsel, defendant made incriminating
350. Id. at 54 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
351. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
352. Id. at 398.
353. Before Brewer the Court had been confronted with cases in which defendants had been
questioned without the assistance of counsel at or after: (1)arraignment (Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)); (2) indictment (United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)); or (3) preliminary
hearing (Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), discussedat note 333 supra, White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam)).
354. 430 U.S. at 390-93, 401.
355. Id. at 390-91. The Supreme Court's statement in Brewer that defendant "was arraigned
before a judge in Davenport on the outstanding arrest warrant," id.at 391, may have misled the
North Carolina court in Detter. In Brewer the term "arraigned" was used in its nontechnical sense
to refer to proceedings in which the judge merely read to defendant from the arrest warrant the
charges against him before committing him to jail. In its technical, formal sense, an arraignment
is a "[pirocedure whereby the accused is brought before the court to plead to the criminal charge
in the indictment or information. The charge is read to him and he is asked to plead 'guilty' or
'not guilty' or, where permitted, 'nolo contendere."' BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 100 (5th ed.
1979). It is clear that in Brewer defendant was not forced to plead to the charges immediately
after his arrest in Davenport. Rather, his formal "arraignment" took place much later in Des
Moines after he was indicted. The Detter court was incorrect, therefore, in categorizing Brewer as
involving a situation in which arraignment had already occurred. 298 N.C. at 623, 260 S.E.2d at
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statements that he later challenged as having been made without a
waiver of his constitutional right to have counsel present. 6 The
Supreme Court in Brewer found that there was "no doubt in the pres-

ent case that judicial proceedings had been initiated against Williams
before the start of the automobile ride from Davenport to Des
Moines. ' 35 7 Defter cannot be distinguished from Brewer. Detter had
been arrested, read her Miranda rights, and taken before a district court
judge who determined the sufficiency of the charges and formally read
them to her. 8 Just as the police interrogation of defendant in Brewer
without an attorney violated the sixth amendment, so also did the interrogation of Defter through an informant and in the absence of counsel
violate the sixth amendment. 3 9 Although the admission of the tape

against defendant in this case was clearly harmless error,360 the North
Carolina Supreme Court may have established precedent that is clearly
581. Actually, defendant in Brewer had not been formally arraigned any more than had been
defendant in Detter.
356. 430 U.S. at 390-93.
357. Id. at 399.
358. 298 N.C. at 623, 260 S.E.2d at 581-82.
359. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
The Detter court further confused the issue when it said that since defendant had employed
her own counsel, "the issue concerns the use of an informer to directly invade confidential communications between a defendant and his attorney," assuming the sixth amendment right to counsel had attached. 298 N.C. at 626, 260 S.E.2d at 583 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545
(1977), and Hoffa v. United States, 358 U.S. 293 (1966)). That issue and the cases cited discussing
it are clearly irrelevant to the Detter situation. In those cases the informer had listened to communications between the defendant and his counsel and the issue was whether the defendant had
been denied effective assistance of counsel. Detter,on the other hand, did not involve the taping
of communications between defendant and her attorney, but involved the use of a taped conversation between defendant and a friend in the absence of defendant's attorney. This issue is clearly
controlled by Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 587
(1977), rather than by cases dealing with interference between defendant and counsel. Under
Masslah and Brewer, once the initiation of formal judicial proceedings has begun, the defendant
is entitled to the presence of counsel at any direct or indirect prosecutorial confrontation, absent a
valid waiver of that right. Thus, the Detter court was incorrect in suggesting that even if the right
to counsel had attached, Detter's sixth amendment rights had not been violated because there was
no invasion of her confidential communications with her attorney.
360. The admission was harmless because the court found defendant's statements to the informer were not incriminatory and in no way contributed to her conviction. 298 N.C. at 626-27,
260 S.E.2d at 583-84. The court was thus not required to reach the issue of whether the right to
counsel attaches at an accused's initial appearance before a district court judge, and the court's
statements concerning that issue are arguably dicta. Nevertheless, the court's lengthy discussion
of its position on this issue indicates that if it were confronted with a case in which the taped
conversations were clearly harmful to the defendant, it would hold that the initial appearance
before a district court judge does not trigger the right to counsel.
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inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the sixth amendment.
MICHAEL

A.

STICK

SUSAN G. KELLY
BARBARA G. JOHNSON

VII.
A4.

EVIDENCE'

PhotographicEvidence
In State v. Hunt2 the supreme court created another exception to

I. In Moore v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 297 N.C. 375, 255 S.E.2d 160 (1979), the North
Carolina Supreme Court analyzed the "presumption" of accidental death that North Carolina
courts recognize when a plaintiff, seeking recovery under an accidental death insurance policy,
offers evidence that the death was a result of unexplained, violent and external means, Justice
Exum, writing for the majority, concluded that such evidence gives rise to a "true" presumption
(as opposed to a mere inference), and therefore shifts to the defendant the burden of producing
evidence to rebut the presumed fact of accidental death. Justice Exum summarized the majority
position as follows:
[W]hen a plaintiff makes a showing of unexplained, violent death by external means,
'which is not wholly inconsistent with accident, the presumption arises that the means
were accidental.' . . . The effect of the presumption is to place the burden of going
forward with evidence on defendant. If there is no evidence tending to show that death
was non-accidental then the jury should be peremptorily instructed that if it finds an
unexplained, violent death by external means, it should also find that the death was
accidental. If evidence of non-accidental death is presented, then the presumption per se
no longer applies, and the question of accidental death is one for the jury. It is, however,
still permissible for the jury to infer from the circumstances that the death was
accidental, and it is proper for the judge to so instruct. . . . Finally, in no event does the
presumption operate to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of persuasion on the issue of
accidental death.
Id. at 382, 255 S.E.2d at 165.
Justice Copeland dissented and argued that the majority gave an unwarranted advantage to
the plaintiff by allowing her to get to the jury despite clear evidence of non-accidental death. In
Justice Copeland's view the plaintiff had the advantages of both a presumption and a prima facie
case. Unlike the majority, he felt that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence was suicide. He therefore would have affirmed the trial court's directed verdict for the
defendant-insurer. See id. at 385-88, 255 S.E.2d at 167-68 (Copeland, J., dissenting).
In State v. Britt, 42 N.C. App. 637, 257 S.E,2d 468 (1979), the court of appeals reaffirmed the
view that the admissibility of evidence tending to show the guilt of one other than the accused
should depend upon general concepts of relevancy. Such evidence is admissible if it logically
tends to prove or disprove a material fact in issue in the case. The court examined the limits of
relevancy in this area and found that such evidence is too remote and thus excludable if it "tends
to show nothing more than that someone other than the accused had an opportunity to commit the
offense, without tending to show that such person did commit the offense and that therefore the
... Furthermore, such evidence is excludable if it merely shows "that
defendant did not do so.
... Id. at 641,
someone other than the accused may have had a motive to commit the offense.
257 S.E.2d at 471. Although the law in North Carolina on this point has been "rather unsettled,"
id. at 641, 257 S.E.2d at 470, it appears that the general principle of relevancy has become the
accepted rule in determining admissibility. See I D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLtNA EVIDENCE
§ 93 (Brandis rev. 1973).
In State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979), the North Carolina Supreme Court
decided an important evidence case dealing with expert opinion testimony. The court held that:
[a] physician, as an expert witness, may give his opinion, including a diagnosis, based
either on personal knowledge or observation or on information supplied him by others,
including the patient, if such information is inherently reliable even though it is not
independently admissible into evidence. . . . If his opinion is admissible the expert may
testify to the information he relied on in forming it for the purpose of showing the basis
of the opinion.
Id. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412. For an in-depth discussion of State v. Wade and its implications, see
Comment, Evidence-State v. Wade-Expert Testimony andthe DualReliabilily Test, this issue.
2. 297 N.C. 447, 255 S.E.2d 182 (1979).
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the general rule in North Carolina that photographs are admissible

only for the limited purpose of illustrating the testimony of a witness,
and not as substantive evidence.' The court held "that a photograph of
a shoe sole impression, when shown by extrinsic evidence to represent,
depict or portray accurately the shoe sole print it purports to show, is

admissible as substantive evidence."' 4 The Hunt decision is a logical
extension of State v. Foster,' a 1973 case in which the supreme court
departed from the general rule and allowed the admission of a photo-

graph of fingerprints as substantive evidence.6 Nevertheless, Hunt is a
disappointing decision because the court failed to repudiate the "illus-

trative" doctrine in its entirety.
In North Carolina, a photograph is admissible as a graphic illustration of the testimony of a witness once the witness testifies that it

represents a fair and accurate portrayal of the scene he or she observed.' The photograph "is admissible in evidence and is subject to

inspection by the jury; but the opposing party is entitled, upon request,
to an instruction limiting its use in accordance with the rule."8
The commentators have found no persuasive rationale for North
Carolina's distinction between "illustrative evidence" and substantive
evidence.9 The better view is that, when the photographic process has
3. This rule has been firmly entrenched in North Carolina evidence law since 1929. See
Honeycutt v. Cherokee Brick Co., 196 N.C. 556, 146 S.E. 227 (1929). Prior to 1929 there is conflicting case law on the issue. For a history of the development of this rule in North Carolina, see
Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court, 24 N.C.L. REV. 233 (1946). See generally C. McCORMtCK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 214 (2d ed. 1972); 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 34; 3
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 790 (J. Chadbour rev. 1970).
4. 297 N.C. at 451, 255 S.E.2d at 185. In Hunt, the prosecutor introduced photographs of
shoeprint impressions taken at the scene of the crime, and of impressions taken from defendant's
shoes, which were seized from his home during a consent search. The photographs were compared by an expert witness for the state who noted the similarities between the two impressions.
The expert concluded that the shoeprints at the scene of the crime were made by defendant's shoes
and the photographs were admitted as substantive evidence. See id. at 450-51, 255 S.E.2d at 18485.
5. 284 N.C. 259, 200 S.E.2d 782 (1973). See 6 N.C. CENT. L.J. 349 (1975).
6. Id. at 272-73, 200 S.E.2d at 792. The Foster court examined extensively the criticism of
the general rule, but limited its holding to the facts of the case and refused to abolish the rule
entirely.
7. See 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1,§ 34, at 93-96.
8. Id. at 99-100. (emphasis in original). It is questionable whether a jury gives any significance to the limiting instruction accompanying the admission of a photograph. Therefore, as a
practical matter, in most cases the use for which a photograph is admitted probably will be insignificant.
9. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 214, at 531 (distinction "groundless"); 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 34, at 99 ("inability to grasp the significance of this distinction"); Gardner,
supra note 3, at 244-46. Professor Stansbury, in his original treatise on North Carolina evidence,
questioned the significance of the distinction with the following example:
If a witness says, "There was a three-foot hedge at the northeast corner of the intersec-
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been properly authenticated, photographs stand as "silent witnesses" to
be weighed by the jury in the same manner as any other substantive
evidence.'" North Carolina refuses to recognize that modern developments in technology have made photographic evidence more accurate
and reliable than human testimony in many cases."I Instead of straining to apply the rule in extraordinary situations' 2 and creating exception," beyond question that is substantive evidence. Wherein is the difference if, instead,
he testifies that a photograph at which he is looking is an accurate portrayal of the scene,
and the photograph shows a hedge at the northeast corner? In the latter case the words
alone are meaningless, and the photograph alone is meaningless, but the combination of
the two conveys the same message as did the witness's verbal testimony in the former
illustration. If the photograph is not evidence, what is it, and on what ground can its use
for any purpose be justified? If it is evidence, in what respect does it fail to meet the test
for "substantive" evidence?
D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EvIDENCE § 34, at 53 (lst ed. 1946). See also 2 C. Scorr,
PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE, § 1022, at 327-28, 329-30 (2d ed. 1969). Scott criticizes the North Carolina rule and finds the "illustrative" doctrine

the poorest reason for the use of photographs in that, considered by itself, it fails to
recognize their independent probative value. At its weakest, photographic evidence usually either corroborates or contradicts human testimony instead of merely illustrating or
explaining it, and at its best, photographic evidence may constitute an irrefutable demonstration of physical facts.
Id. at 330.
10. See 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 790, at 220:
[Elven though no human is capable of swearing that he personally perceived what a
photograph purports to portray (so that it is not possible to satisfy the requirements of
the "pictorial testimony" rationale) there may nevertheless be good warrant for receiving
the photograph in evidence. Given an adequate foundation assuring the accuracy of the
process producing it, the photograph should then be received as a so-called silent witness
or as a witness which 'speaks for itself.'
11. In his criticism of the North Carolina rule, Mr. Gardner gives an extreme example of the
absurd results it can produce:
If a defective eye with a damaged optic nerve conveys an impression (gained in twilight
or under other deceptive visual conditions) to a diseased brain, even after the eroding
effects of weeks have advanced the process of forgetting, the owner of the eye-though
he may be a simple soul of limited intelligence and an even more limited vocabularywill be permitted to describe in court what he thinks that he remembers that he saw; but,
if a camera with cold precision and absolute fidelity records the view permanently and
with minute accuracy that view is kept from the jury, perhaps. . . or its use is sharply
circumscribed (under the "illustration" rule). Such strange logic has a baffling, Alice-inWonderland quality far removed from the realistic directness of the man-of-the-street.
Gardner, supra note 3, at 245.
12. E.g., Branch v. Gurley, 267 N.C. 44, 47-48, 147 S.E.2d 587, 590 (1966) (x-ray photograph); State v. Johnson, 18 N.C. App. 606, 197 S.E.2d 592 (1973) (closed circuit T.V. representation of defendant's actions).
The application of the "illustrative" doctrine to x-ray photographs has been particularly criticized. See Baer, Radar Goes to Court, 33 N.C.L. REv. 355, 362 (1955) ("instead of the x-ray photo
explaining and making clear the testimony of the witness to the jury. . . the physician is explaining and making clear to the jury the significance of the x-ray itself'); Gardner, supra note 3, at
244-45. Realistically, photographs such as x-rays and those taken by hidden cameras (where no
one observes a defendant's actions) can be admitted only as silent witnesses. No one else has
observed the thing depicted. See I D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 34, at 61-62 n.23 (Cum. Supp.
1979).
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tions to the rule in others,13 the court should allow the use of all
photographs as substantive evidence once an adequate foundation has
been laid for their admission.' 4 It is time for the court to follow the
advice of Dean Henry P. Brandis, Jr. that "the illustrative doctrine
even in Washington, there
should be given a death sentence, to which,
5
should be no constitutional objection."'1
6

B. Admissions1

Whether classified as nonhearsay 7 or as an exception to the hearsay rule,' 8 a party's own relevant statements are generally admissible as

substantive evidence against that party, unless excluded by a specific
statute or rule.' 9 Admissions can be classified as eitherfjudicial or evi13. Hunt and Foster belong in this category along with State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 511,
243 S.E.2d 338, 344-45 (1978) (exact set of photographs from which witnesses made pre-arrest
identification); State v. Travis, 33 N.C. App. 330, 334, 235 S.E.2d 66, 68, cert. denied,293 N.C. 163,
236 S.E.2d 707 (1977) (photographs used for handwriting comparison). In certain instances, the
use of photographs as substantive evidence is allowed by statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1511.1(a) (Supp. 1979) (photograph of property lawfully seized but returned to the rightful owner
prior to trial); N.C.R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4), 32(a)(4) (videotape deposition). See generally I STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 34, at 61-63 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
14. See, e.g., Bergner v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1012 (Ind.App. 1979) (citing State v. Hunt with
approval and adopting the "silent witness" theory as an alternative basis for admissibility of photographic evidence). The Bergner court commended other courts for not blindly following the
"illustrative" doctrine, noting that
these jurisdictions have analyzed the theory behind the traditional requirements, and
have recognized the probative potential of photographic evidence. As a result, these
courts view photographic evidence in a modem, realistic light and admit photographs
where their authenticity can be sufficiently established in view of the context in which the
photographs are sought to be admitted. We think this creative analysis and refusal to
follow traditional standards merely because such standards exist is laudable as the highest form of a progressive judiciary.
Id. at 1016.
15. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1,§ 34 at 62 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
16. In State v. Burnett, 39 N.C. App. 605, 251 S.E.2d 717, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 302, 254
S.E.2d 924 (1979), the court of appeals allowed the silence of a defendant after arrest to be used
against him as an admission for impeachment purposes. For a criticism of this case, see this
Survey, CriminalProcedure.
17. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2). See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 262; 2 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 167, at 6; Strahom, 4 Reconsiderationof the HearsayRule andAdmissions,
85 U. PA. L. REv. 564, 573, 576 (1937).
18. Eg., State v. Blakeney, 194 N.C. 651, 653, 140 S.E. 433, 434 (1927). See E. MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 265-66 (1962).
19. 2 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 167, at 4. See generally 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
§ 1048 (J.
Chadboum rev. 1972); Morgan,Admissions, 12 WASH. L. REv. 181 (1937). For a list of
exceptions in North Carolina to the general rule of admissibility, see 2 D. STANSBURY, supra note
1, § 167, at 4 n.10. An admission should be clearly distinguished from a declaration against interest, although courts often confuse the two. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, §§ 276-280; 1 D.
STANSBURY, supra note 1,§ 147; 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 1049.
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dential admissions.2' A judicial admission is a formal concession that
removes a disputed fact from contention and dispenses with the need

for proof of the admitted fact. 2 ' Final pleadings, formal pretrial admissions, and stipulations are examples of this type of admission.22 An
evidential admission, on the other hand, is not conclusive and may be
explained or contradicted by other evidence.23 Examples include oral
and written statements, or conduct, of the party or someone vicariously
related to the party.24
In Woods v. Smith25 the North Carolina Supreme Court faced the
question whether a party should be conclusively bound by his own ad26
verse testimony despite the existence of other contradictory evidence,
and adopted the position that a party's adverse statements are to be

treated as evidential admissions only, rather than conclusive judicial
admissions.2 7 Woods arose out of an automobile accident that injured

plaintiff, a passenger in her own car, operated by defendant Smith at
the time it collided with a car driven by defendant Stallings. Plaintiff
alleged that both Smith and Stalings were negligent. 2 The defendants
denied their own negligence, and each admitted the negligence of the
other.2 9 The trial court entered summary judgment for both defendants, and plaintiff appealed.3
On his motion for summary judgment, Smith argued that plaintiff's deposition testimony so unequivocally repudiated her allegation
20. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 262, at 630; 2 D. STANSBURY, supra note i,
§ 166.
21. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 262, at 630. Mr. Stansbury offers the following description of a judicial admission:
It is binding in every sense. Evidence offered in denial of the admitted fact should undoubtedly be rejected. Evidence offered in affirmance of such fact may properly be excluded on the ground of irrelevancy, and exclusion certainly serves the purpose of
judicial admissions--that is, the promotion of trial efficiency.
2 D. STANSBURY, supra note I, § 166, at 1-3.
22. 2 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 166, at 1.
23. Id. at 4.
24. Id.; see id. §§ 167-181.
25. 297 N.C. 363, 255 S.E.2d 174 (1979).
26. This issue has been described as "one of the most troublesome questions in the law of
evidence and has been the subject of much diversity of judicial opinion." 32A CJ.S. E'idence
§ 1040(3), at 776 (1964).
27. 297 N.C. at 373-74, 255 S.E.2d at 181.
28. 297 N.C. at 365, 255 S.E.2d at 176.
29. Id.
30. The supreme court granted certiorari to review the entry of summary judgment in favor
of Stallings after the court of appeals denied a similar writ. At the same time, the court certified
for review plaintiff's appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of Smith. Id. at 366,
255 S.E.2d at 176.
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of negligence against him that she should not be allowed to rely on
other contrary evidence to support her claim.3' Smith relied on Cogdill
v. Scales,32 a case of first impression, in which the North Carolina
Supreme Court examined three major approaches other jurisdictions
have taken when faced with the issue of the conclusiveness of a party's
adverse testimony.3 3 Rather than adopt one of these views, however,
the Cogdill court, in a narrow decision limited to its facts, held that
"[i]f, at the close of the evidence, a plaintiff's own testimony has unequivocally repudiated the material allegations of his complaint and
his testimony has shown no additional grounds for recovery against the
defendant, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict should be allowed." 34
Justice Brock, writing for a unanimous court in Woods, distinguished Cogdill and reversed the entry of summary judgment in
favor of Smith. The court characterized plaintiff's deposition testimony as indicating "her continuing uncertainty about the events that
led up to the accident ' 36 and found it "distinguishable from the unequivocal repudiation of the allegations of the complaint that were
present in Cogdill."3 7 Unconstrained by Cogdill, the Woods court was
31. Id. at 365-66, 255 S.E.2d at 176. At the hearing the court had before it the depositions of
plaintiff, both defendants, Stallings' daughter (a passenger in the Stallings car), and the investigating patrolman. The judge accepted the argument and entered summary judgment. Id.
32. 290 N.C. 31, 224 S.E.2d 604 (1976). For a thorough examination of Cogdill v. Scares and
the issue of testimonial admissions in general, see 55 N.C.L. REV. 1155 (1977); 12 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 1113 (1976).
33. 290 N.C. at 40-43, 224 S.E.2d at 609-11. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra.
34. Id. at 44, 224 S.E.2d at 611.
35. 297 N.C. at 372, 255 S.E.2d at 180.
36. Id. (emphasis in original). Plaintiffhad claimed that Smith was negligent in not keeping
a proper lookout, speeding, and failing to reduce speed to"avoid an accident, among other things.
Id. at 370-7 I,255 S.E.2d at 179. The court quoted extensively from the deposition of plaintiff to
illustrate the equivocal and uncertain nature of the testimony:
'[I]t was just that we were going down the road and it was just one of those things, just, I
just saw a flash of light. . . then it was an accident. It happened so quickly I didn't have
a long time to sit and watch it happening. The accident happened very suddenly ....
To my knowledge he ISmith] appeared to be looking out where he was driving and he
had control of the car.
I said the accident happened very quickly.... I don't think he [Smith] had time to turn
the car and get out of the way and keep from being hit.
The only thing I am really sure about is that I just saw a flash of light.'
297 N.C. at 371-72, 255 S.E.2d at 179-80. Compare the unequivocal testimony in Cogdill. 290
N.C. at 33-37, 224 S.E.2d at 606-08.
37. 297 N.C. at 372, 255 S.E.2d at 180. Discussing the testimony in Cogdill, the Wood court
noted that:
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required to affirmatively adopt one of the three major approaches
courts follow in this area. 8 These three views, often overlapping and
39
quite nebulous, are summarized by McCormick as follows:
First, the view that a party's testimony in this respect is like the testimony of any other witness called by the party, that is,
the party is
free ...to elicit contradictory testimony from the witness himself or
to call other witnesses to contradict him ...
Second, the view that the party's testimony is not conclusive
against contradiction except when he testifies unequivocally to matters "in his peculiar knowledge." 4 .
Third, the doctrine that a party's testimony adverse to himself is
in general to be treated as a judicial admission, conclusive against
him, so that he may not bring other witnesses to contradict it, and if
he or his adversary does elicit such conflicting testimony it will be
disregarded.4 '
The Woods court adopted the first approach-that a party's ad-

verse testimony should be treated as an evidential rather than a judicial
admission.4" The court, however, recognized two exceptions to this
general rule. First, under the Cogdill rule, unequivocal, adverse testimony will be treated as binding judicial admissions in a case where the
Mrs. Cogdill testified to concrete facts, not matters of opinion, estimate, appearance,
inference, or uncertain memory; her testimony was deliberate, unequivocal and repeated;
her statements were diametrically opposed to the essential allegations of her complaint
and destroyed the theory on which she brought her action; her attorney did not seek to
elicit any remedial testimony from her, and she manifested an intent to be bound by
repeating her testimony even after being warned of the consequences of perjury.
Id. at 370, 255 S.E.2d at 179. See Cogdill v. Scates, 290 N.C. at 33-37, 224 S.E.2d at 606-08, noted
at 55 N.C.L. REV. 1155 (1977); 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1113 (1976).
38. The court summarily rejected plaintiff's contention that deposition testimony should be
treated differently from testimony at trial. 297 N.C. at 373 & n.1, 255 S.E.2d at 180-81 & n.l.

39. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 266, at 637. The Cogdill court quoted extensively from
id. See 290 N.C. at 41-42, 224 S.E.2d at 610-11. See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2594a

(3d ed. 1940) (collecting cases); Annot., 169 A.L.R. 798 (1947) (collecting cases); 55 N.C.L. REV.
1155 (1977); 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1113 (1976); Note, Evldence-PartsrTestimnony as Judicial
Admission, 5 W. RES. L. REV. 398 (1954).

40. "These matters may consist of subjective facts, such as [the party's] own knowledge or
motivation, or they may consist of objective facts observed by him." C. MCCORMICK, supra note
3, § 266, at 637.
41. See id. § 266, at 637-38:
Obviously, this general rule demands many qualifications and exceptions. Among these
are the following: (1)
The party is free to contradict, and thus correct, his own testimony;
only when his own testimony taken as a whole unequivocally affirms the statement does
the rule of conclusiveness apply. The rule is inapplicable, moreover, when the party's
testimony (2) may be attributable to inadvertence or to a foreigner's mistake as to meaning, or (3) is merely negative in effect, or (4) is avowedly uncertain, or is an estimate or
opinion rather than an assertion of concrete fact, or (5) relates to a matter as to which the
party could easily have been mistaken, such as the swiftly moving events just preceding a
collision in which the party was injured.
42. 297 N.C. at 373-74, 255 S.E.2d at 181.
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facts are similar to those in Cogdill. 3 Second, summary judgment or a
directed verdict most likely will be proper "when a party gives adverse
testimony, and there is insufficient evidence to the contrarypresentedto
support the allegationsof his complaint. . ... 44 Applying these rules to

the facts in Woods, the court found that neither exception was applicable and that sufficient evidence existed to contradict plaintiff's adverse testimony and support a finding that Smith was negligent.45
Therefore the court held that the trial judge erred in not allowing the
case to go to the jury.
The decision of the supreme court is a sound one. Of the three
views discussed, treating a party's adverse testimony as an evidential
admission is the preferable rule.46 In most situations, a party's testimony should be weighed by the jury in the same manner as that
presented by any other witness.47 Only in the most extreme cases
43. Id. at 374, 255 S.E.2d at 181. See text accompanying notes 35 & 37 supra; C. McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 266, at 638 n.82; Annot., 169 A.L.R. 798, § III (1947).
44. 297 N.C. at 374, 255 S.E.2d at 181 (emphasis in original). See Thompson v. Purcell
Construction Co., 160 N.C. 390, 76 S.E. 266 (1912); Fulghum v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 158
N.C. 555, 74 S.E. 584 (1912); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 266, at 636-37; Annot., 169 A.L.R.
798, § 11 (1947). This "exception" appears to be the only logical application of directed verdict
and summary judgment proof standards to the evidential admission.
45. 297 N.C. at 374-75, 255 S.E.2d at 181-82. Stallings testified at her deposition that the car
driven by Smith crossed into her lane of traffic. Stallings' daughter, a passenger in his car, testified
at her deposition that Smith was speeding and crossed into the lane of the Stallings car before the
accident. Id. at 372-73, 255 S.E.2d at 180.
46. This is the position of the major commentators. See, e.g., C. McCoRMICK, supra note 3,
§ 266, at 638 ("preferable in policy and most in accord with the tradition of jury trial"); 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 2594a, at 597-601.
The other two approaches have been severely criticized. The "peculiar knowledge" rule has
been viewed as being based on an incorrect assumption that a person is substantially less likely to
be mistaken as to facts within his "peculiar knowledge." See Alamo v. Del Rosario, 98 F.2d 328,
332 (D.C. App. 1938) ("Knowledge may be 'special' without being correct. Often we little note
nor long remember our 'motives, purposes, or knowledge.' There are few, if any, subjects on which
plaintiffs are infallible.")
The view that all adverse testimony constitutes judicial admission has been particularly criticized. McCormick characterizes this approach as one "of doubtful validity" and argues that most
parties testifying adversely are not trying "to play fast and loose with the court" but rather are
"pushed into an admission by the ingenuity or persistence of adverse counsel, or it is the unusually
candid or conscientious party willing to speak the truth to his own hurt, who is penalized by the
rule of conclusiveness." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 266 at 638-39.
Wigmore, in accord with the McCormick view, points out that the rule: 1) is hard to apply
properly; 2) delays disposition of cases because it affords a technical ground for an appeal; 3) is
useless in that "its purpose can usually be as well attained by a ruling upon the insufficiency of
evidence for the jury" and 4) is unsatisfactory because "it assimilates testimony on the stand to
formal deliberate admissions." 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 2594a, at 601.
For judicial criticism of the judicial admission approach, see Alamo v. Del Rosario, 98 F.2d
328, 331 (D.C. App. 1938).
47. McCormick notes, however, that a party may have a hard time persuading a jury that the
facts are other than as the party himself has testified. "[O]bviously the trial judge would often be
justified in saying, on motion for directed verdict, that reasonable minds in the particular state of
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should a court apply the Cogdill exception and give a binding effect to

a party's testimony. 48 Before it is treated as a judicial admission, testimony should be consistent, definite, and clearly unequivocal and
should present a strict repudiation or formal concession of the party's

claim, in the nature of a waiver.49 Injustice generally will be avoided if
a party's testimony is treated as a judicial admission only in rare cases,
with any doubts resolved in favor of the general rule of evidential admissions.
The Woods case also presented for the first time the question

whether pleadings against multiple defendants framed in the aiternadve
constitute binding judicial admissions of the facts alleged. ° In her
complaint, plaintiff alleged that both defendants, Smith and Stallings,
were negligent and claimed in the alternative that the negligence of
"either or both" of the defendants caused the accident." The two defendants were properly joined under N.C.R. Civ. P. 20(a). 2 Stallings

moved for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) any negligence
of Smith, the driver of plaintiffs car, should be imputed as a matter of
the proof could only believe that the party's testimony against his interest was true." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 266, at 637.
48. Even McCormick, who argues for the evidential admissions approach, concedes that in
some extreme cases a party's testimony must be given a conclusive effect. But this should occur
only when "the party and his counsel advisedly manifest an intention to be bound," ld.§ 266, at
638 n.82.
The Cogdill court felt that to allow plaintift's testimony to be treated other than as a binding
admission, when she so directly repudiated her allegations even after consultation with her attorney, "would be contra bonos mores [against good morals) and a violation of public policy." 290
N.C. at 44, 224 S.E.2d at 612.
49. See generally 9 J. WiGMORE, supra note 39, § 2588, at 586. Cf. Alamo v. Del Rosario, 98
F.2d 328, 330 (D.C. App. 1938) ("Mere testimony, though it come from a party, is not 'by intention an act of waiver.' A witness is not selling something or giving something away, but simply
reporting something. 'The testimony of parties to a suit must be regarded as evidence, not as facts
admitted.' ").
50. The Woods court framed the issue as
[W]hether the allegation of negligence against one defendant in the complaint of a plaintiff who joins two defendants asserting claims of negligence against them in the alterna.
tire,
when admitted by the second defendant in his answer, is a binding judicial
admission entitling the second defendant to summary judgment when the negligence of
the first defendant is, as a matter of law, imputed to the plaintiff?
297 N.C. at 366, 255 S.E.2d at 177 (emphasis in original).
51. Id. at 365, 255 S.E.2d at 176.
52. Id. at 364, 255 S.E.2d at 176. Rule 20 allows permissive joinder of parties and provides in
part that:
All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them
jointly, severally, orin the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question
of law or fact common to all parties will arise in the action.
N.C.R. Civ. P. 20(a) (emphasis added).
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law to plaintiff, the owner of the car,53 and (2) plaintiffs allegations of
negligence against Smith in her complaint constituted binding judicial
admissions by plaintiff of Smith's negligence.5 4 Under Stallings' theory, the negligence of Smith alleged in plaintiffs complaint would be
treated as a judicial admission and imputed to plaintiff, barring her
recovery against Stallings as a matter of law because of the contributory negligence doctrine." The trial judge5 6accepted this argument and
granted summary judgment for Stallings.
The supreme court reversed and, following the clear majority rule
in other jurisdictions, 57 held that such alternative claims could not form
the basis for binding judicial admissions. 58 The court acknowledged
the general rule that a party is conclusively bound by his final pleadings, 59 but found that such a rule should not be applied to alternative
pleadings. 6° Treating alternative pleadings as judicial admissions
"could well defeat the salutary purposes of Rule 20's joinder provisions."6 Alternative joinder of defendants allows a plaintiff to assert
claims against multiple defendants when he is unsure of the exact defendant from whom he is entitled to recover. 62 The court said that
53. In framing the issue in this case, the court assumed that the negligence of Smith, if any,
would be imputed to plaintiff. It did not have to decide if negligence would indeed be imputed,
however, because the admissions issue was answered in the negative. 297 N.C. at 366-67, 255
S.E.2d at 177.
54. Id. at 365, 255 S.E.2d at 176.
55. Id. at 365, 366, 255 S.E.2d at 176, 177.
56. Id. at 365, 255 S.E.2d at 176.
57. "[Tihe decisions with seeming unanimity deny [inconsistent, alternative, and hypothetical
claims] status as judicial admissions, and generally disallow them as evidential admissions." C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 265, at 634. Although the express language in Woods refers only to
the use of alternative pleadings as judicial admissions, the underlying reasons for the decision
apply equally to the treatment of alternative pleadings as evidential admissions. See notes 61-66
and accompanying text infra.
58. 297 N.C. at 369, 255 S.E.2d at 178.
59. Id. at 368, 255 S.E.2d at 178. See, e.g., 2 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1,§ 177, at 37.
60. 297 N.C. at 367-69, 255 S.E.2d at 177-78. See, e.g., McCormick v. Kopmann, 23 Ill. App.
2d 189, 161 N.E.2d 720 (1959); Van Sickell v. Margolis, 109 N.J. Super. 14, 262 A.2d 209, a 'd 55
N.J. 355, 262 A.2d 203 (1969). See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 265, at 634; 4 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 1064, at 70; 29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence, § 692 (1967); 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 302 (1964); Annot., 90 A.L.R. 1393 (1934); Annot., 14 A.L.R. 22 (1921).
61. 297 N.C. at 368, 255 S.E.2d at 178. See C. MCCORMICKsupra note 3, § 265, at 634; 4 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 1064, at 70.
62. "The need for such joinder most often arises when 'the substance of plaintiffs claim
indicates that he is entitled to relief from someone, but he does not know which of two or more
defendants is liable under the circumstances set forth in the complaint.'" 297 N.C. at 367, 255
S.E.2d at 177 (quoting 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL,
§ 1654, at 278). See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Carroll's Transfer, Inc., 14 N.C. App. 481, 188 S.E.2d 612
(1972); Conger v. Travelers Ins. Co. 260 N.C. 112, 131 S.E.2d 889 (1963); 1 MCINTOSH, NORTH
CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2D § 661 (1956); Brandis & Graham, Recent Developments
in the Field ofPermissive Joinder of Partiesand Causes in North Carolina, 34 N.C.L. REV. 405
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Woods was "a classic example of the need for joinder of defendants in

the alternative" because it was clear that plaintiff's injuries were caused
by one or both of the defendants.63
The most important reason for not treating alternative pleadings

as binding admissions lies in the very nature of alternative pleadings
themselves. Such pleadings are based on uncertainty and are not admissions of facts. 6 4 The pleader "is not 'admitting' anything other than
his uncertainty.

' 65

The burden of determining which one of several

defendants is liable to the plaintiff is for the judge or jury, and should
not be shifted to the plaintiff through the recognition of judicial admissions in alternative pleadings. 6 Therefore, the Woods court properly

concluded that alternative pleadings are not conclusively binding upon
a party.
C

PrivilegedCommunicalions

Statutory protection against forced disclosure of communications
between a physician and his patient has existed in North Carolina since
1885.67 This physician-patient privilege, which did not exist at common law, was created primarily to encourage full disclosure to a physician so that proper treatment could be accomplished. 68 It applies not
(1956); Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Partiesand Causes in North Carolina, 25 N.C.L. REv. 1, 4349 (1946); Note, Pleadings-AlternativeJoinder of Defendants, 42 N.C.L. REv. 242 (1963).
63. 297 N.C. at 367, 255 S.E.2d at 177.
64. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 265, at 634 ("[P]leadings of this nature are directed
primarily to giving notice and lack the essential character of an admission.").
65. McCormick v. Kopmann, 23 II1. App. 2d 189, 203, 161 N.E.2d 720, 729 (1959).
66. This point was acknowledged by the Illinois Court of Appeals in McCormick v,
Kopmann, id:
Alternative fact allegations made in good faith and based on genuine doubt are not
admissions against interest so as to be admissible in evidence against the pleader. The
pleader states the facts in the alternative because he is uncertain as to the true facts ...
An essential objective of alternative pleading is to relieve the pleader of the necessity and
therefore the risk of making a binding choice, which is no more than to say that he is
relieved of making an admission.
Id.
67. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (Cum. Supp. 1979). See generally C. DEWITT, PRiVILEOED
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT (1958); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3,

§§ 98-105; 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note I, § 63; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 2285, 2380-2391 (J.
McNaughton rev. 1961); 81 AM. JUR. 2d Witnesses §§ 230-283 (1976); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses §§ 293301 (1957); Comment,.A Survey of the North Carolina Law ofRelational Privilege, 50 N.C.L. REv.
630, 639 (1972); Note, The Physician-Patient Privilege, 58 W. VA. L. REV. 76 (1955).
68. "It is the purpose of such statutes to induce the patient to make full disclosure that proper
treatment may be given, to prevent public disclosure of socially stigmatized diseases, and in some
instances to protect patients from self-incrimination." Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins, Co.,
257 N.C. 32, 36, 125 S.E.2d 326, 329 (1962), See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 98, at 212-13; 8
J. WIGMORE, supra note 67, § 2380a, at 828-32.
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only to oral or written communications, but also to any knowledge a
physician may obtain in the course of treating a patient.69 The privilege, however, is qualified. A court may order disclosure of privileged
information when necessary to the proper administration of justice. In
In reAlbemarle MentalHealth Center"° the court of appeals interpreted

legislative intent to determine the relationship between the qualifying
provisions of the physician-patient privilege, G.S. 8-53, 7' and the psychologist-client privilege, G.S. 8-53.3.72 The Health Center court held
69. See Smith v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 62, 64, 60 S.E. 717, 718 (1908).
70. 42 N.C. App. 292, 256 S.E.2d 818 (1979).
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides:
No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be required to disclose
any information which he may have acquired in attending a patient in a professional
character, and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act for him as a surgeon. Confidential information
obtained in medical records shall be furnished only on the authorization of the patient,
or if deceased, the executor, administrator, or, in the case of unadministered estates, the
next of kin; provided, that the court, either at the trial or prior thereto, or the Industrial
Commission pursuant to law may compel such disclosure, if in his opinion the same is
necessary to a proper administration of justice.
In 1979 the supreme court interpreted and applied the physician-patient privileges of N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 8-53 and 122-8.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979) in Smith v. State, 298 N.C. 115, 257 S.E.2d
399 (1979). The Smith decision involved tape records of a meeting of the Credentials Committee
of Broughton Hospital, a state hospital for the mentally disordered. Plaintiff, at the time the
superintendent of the hospital, refused to turn over the tapes when requested by his superiors in
the course of an investigation into the deaths of two patients at the hospital. Id. at 129, 257 S.E.2d
at 407. He claimed that to comply with the request would require him to violate the physicianpatient privilege. Id. at 130, 257 S.E.2d at 407. The information on the tapes pertained to the
hospital staffs discovery of and response to the deaths and contained no discussion of the psychiatric or medical treatment administered the two patients while at Broughton. Id.
The supreme court, finding the privilege inapplicable to the information disclosed at the
meeting, cited three separate grounds for the decision, any one of which would have supported the
denial of the privilege. First, the only arguably privileged information related to facts already on
public record in the death certificate of the patients. "[N]o privilege of confidentiality can attach
to information which is already public." Id. at 131, S.E.2d at 408. Second, even if the tapes
contained information otherwise privileged, the court found that G.S. 122-8.1 did not protect information from disclosure to the superiors of the physician "attempting to investigate complaints
of improprieties or neglect on the part of members of the hospital medical staff." The court felt
that the patient's expectation of confidentiality and privacy "does not extend to hospital administrators or employees who need the information in order to facilitate the patient's treatment or
properly administer the hospital in accordance with approved standards." Id. at 131-32, 257
S.E.2d at 409. Finally, the court held that the privilege does not extend to information obtained
by observations made after the patient's death because treatment is not then possible. Id. at 131,
257 S.E.2d at 408.
In 1979 the legislature created another relational privilege by providing statutory protection
for communications between certified marital and family therapists and clients. Law of May 30,
1979, ch. 697, § 2, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 357 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.5 (Cum. Supp.
1979)).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3 (1969) provides:
No person, duly authorized as a practicing psychologist or psychological examiner, nor
any of his employees or associates, shall be required to disclose any information which
he may have acquired in rendering professional psychological services, and which information was necessary to enable him to render professional psychological services: Pro-
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that, despite the differences in the qualifying language, the statutes
should be construed together in order to allow a trial court to compel
pretrialdisclosure of privileged communications under both privileges
73
where necessary to assure the proper administration of justice.

Prior to filing an indictment, a district attorney made a motion in
the Superior Court of Pasquotank County seeking discovery of information from certain professional employees of the Albemarle Mental
Health Center pertaining to an alleged homicide. 4 The motion requested the court to conduct an immediate in camera examination of

the employees to determine if the information sought was privileged
under G.S. 8-53.3, and if so, whether disclosure of the information was
necessary to a proper administration of justice. 75 After hearing argu-

ments on the motion the superior court judge dismissed the action, deciding that his court was without jurisdiction over the mental health
center or its employees because judicial proceedings had not been initiated.7 6

The court of appeals, however, found the case to be in the nature
of a special proceeding."

Although admitting that the action was not

commenced according to statutory requirements, 78 the court concluded
that the superior court had an inherent power to assume jurisdiction in
such an extraordinary situation. 79 The Health Center opinion focused
on the qualifying language of G.S. 8-53 and G.S. 8-53.3 that allows a
court to order disclosure of privileged information when necessary to
the proper administration of justice.8 " Disclosure of communications
between a physician and his patient, generally protected by G.S. 8-53,
vided, that the presiding judge of a superior court may compel such disclosure, if in his
opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of justice.
See generally Comment, supra note 67, at 643-44.
73. 42 N.C. App. at 299-300, 256 S.E.2d at 823.
74. Id. at 293, 256 S.E.2d at 819. The district attorney had been notified by the director of
the health center that certain professional employees of the center had received the information
from a client of the center. The director, however, would not disclose any details of the information because he had been advised by counsel that it was privileged. Id.
75. Id. at 293-94, 256 S.E.2d at 819-20.
76. Id. at 294-95, 256 S.E.2d at 820.
77. Id. at 295, 256 S.E.2d at 820.
78. Id. at 295-96, 256 S.E.2d at 821. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 3 (filing of complaint, or issuance of
summons followed by complaint within 20 days).
79. "We believe that this is one of those extraordinary proceedings and that our rules of
procedure should not be construed so literally as to frustrate the administration ofjustice." 2 N.C.
App. at 296, 256 S.E.2d at 821.
80. The court of appeals concluded that the legislature, by failing to provide statutory guidelines for implementation of the G.S. 8-53 and G.S. 8-53.3 qualifying provisions, intended for the
courts to perform that task. Therefore, a trial court can assume jurisdiction and compel disclosure
of otherwise privileged communications as a part of its inherent power to issue all orders neces-
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can be compelled either before or at trial.8 ' Under G.S. 8-53.3, how-

ever, which protects psychologist-client communications of the type at
issue in the Health Center case, the qualifying language refers only to
the judicial right to compel disclosure at trial.8 2 While acknowledging
that G.S. 8-53.3 did not expressly provide for disclosureprior to trial as

requested by the district attorney, the court found it inconsistent to allow pretrial disclosure under G.S. 8-53 and not under G.S. 8-53.3, and

thus assumed that the legislature did not intend such an inconsistency.8 3 The court viewed the language of both statutes as "sufficient to
allow the trial court to compel disclosure prior to trial and prior to the
filing of criminal charges when such action is necessary to the exercise
of its implied or inherent powers to provide for the proper administration of justice. '8' 4 Therefore, the decision of the superior court was reversed, and an in camera hearing was ordered.8
The present qualifying provision of G.S. 8-53.3, which simply
states that "the presiding judge . . . may compel . . . disclosure," 6 is

identical to the qualifying language found in G.S. 8-53 before the statute was amended in 1969 to provide that disclosure was proper "at the
trial or prior thereto."8 7 Before the amendment, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that disclosure of information protected by G.S. 853 could be ordered only by the presiding superior court judge at the
sary to the proper administration of justice, unless inconsistent with express statutory provisions.

Id.
81. The qualifying provision for G.S. 8-53 states "that the court, either at the trial or prior
thereto, . . . may compel such disclosure, if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper

administration of justice." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (Cum.Supp. 1979).
82. The qualifying provision for G.S. 8-53.3 provides "that the presiding judge of a superior
court may compel such disclosure, if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper administra-

tion of justice." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3 (1969).
83. 42 N.C. App. at 297, 256 S.E.2d at 822.
84. Id. at 298, 256 S.E.2d at 822.
The heart of a statute is the intention of the law-making body. In performing our
judicial tasks, 'we must avoid a construction which will operate to defeat or impair the
object of the statute, if we can reasonably do so without violence to the legislative language.'. . . In construing a statute, we must view it as giving effect to the obvious intention of the legislature as manifested in the entire act and other acts in pari materia.
Id. (quoting Ballard v. City of Charlotte, 235 N.C. 484, 487, 70 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1952)).
85. 42 N.C. App. at 300, 256 S.E.2d at 823. The court did not decide whether disclosure
should be ordered, but suggested that such an order by a superior court would be particularly
proper where the requested information concerned an alleged homicide. Id. at 299, 256 S.E.2d at
822-23. The court also commended the parties for the procedure employed in bringing the matter
before the superior court. Id. at 298, 256 S.E.2d at 822.
86. See notes 71, 81 supra.
87. See Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 914, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1059 (codified at N.C. GEN
STAT. § 8-53 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). See note 80 supra.
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trial,and not prior to the trial.88 When the legislature amended G.S. 853 to clearly state that disclosure could be compelled prior to trial, 89 it
failed to similarly amend G.S. 8-53.3. The Health Center court ac-

knowledged the pre-1969 supreme court decisions, but refused to apply
them to G.S. 8-53.3.9 0 According to the court of appeals, the legislature
clearly intended the two statutes to be construed with reference to each
other; therefore the reworded provision of G.S. 8-53 should apply to
G.S. 8-53.3 as well. 9 1 "The reasons for the exceptions to the privileges
granted by the two statutes are the same and it would be discordant
'92
. . .to fail to extend the latter amendment of one to the other.
Although some of the Health Center court's logic and its treatment

of prior precedents is not beyond attack, the ultimate conclusion
reached by the court of appeals is correct. Two statutes with the same

intended purpose should not produce conflicting results under a similar
set of facts. The legislature should clear up this conflict by amending
language identical to that in the present
G.S. 8-53.3 to add qualifying
93
version of G.S. 8-53.

MALLARD

Guy

BROOKS,

III

88. See Gustafson v. Gustafson, 272 N.C. 452, 158 S.E.2d 619 (1968); Johnston v. United Ins.
Co. of America, 262 N.C. 253, 136 S.E.2d 587 (1964); Lockwood v. McCaskill, 261 N.C. 754, 136
S.E.2d 67 (1964); Yow v. Pittman, 241 N.C. 69, 84 S.E.2d 297 (1954); Comment, supra note 67, at
644.
89. See text accompanying note 87 supra. G.S. 8-53 was amended a second time in 1977 to
bring it to its present form. See Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 1118, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1405
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). G.S. 8-53.3 was not changed by either
amendment.
90. 42 N.C. App. at 299, 256 S.E.2d at 823.
91. Id. at 299-300, 256 S.E.2d at 823.
92. .d. at 300, 256 S.E.2d at 823. The court obviously rejected a negative implication theory
and instead relied on the policy reasons for the exceptions to the privileges.
93. The psychologist-client privilege of G.S. 8-53.3 was applied in 1979 by the supreme court
in State v. Crews, 296 N.C. 607, 617, 252 S.E.2d 745, 752 (1979). Although some of the privileged
information examined by the court in Crews was requested via motions for pretrialdiscovery, the
Health Center issue apparently did not arise. The language used by the court in Crews is confusing, but from an examination of the record it appears that the trial judge examined the privileged
information in camera a few days prior to trial and issued orders denying disclosure during the
trial.

VIII.
4.

FAMILY LAW

Child Custody'

The court of appeals gave a new twist to the rule that a showing of
changed circumstances is necessary to obtain modification of a custody
decree' in Newsome v. Newsome.' The court in Newsome held that a
custody order entered on the basis of a separation agreement may be
modified merely by a showing that a change in custody would be in the
best interest of the child rather than a showing that the situation had
changed substantially since the original custody decision was made.4
The court reasoned that because the "changed circumstances" rule is
designed to prevent relitigation of the same issues, no purpose is served
by invoking it if, as in the case at bar, there has been no previous evidentiary hearing.5
Defendant-husband and plaintiff-wife in Newsome separated in
September, 1976, and were divorced in October, 1977. Their separation agreement, which was incorporated into the divorce decree, established custody of their only child, Amy, then age two, with plaintiff.
After Mr. Newsome left the family residence in Goldsboro, Virginia
Gooding moved in with Mrs. Newsome and Amy, and the three of
them subsequently moved to Winston-Salem. Mr. Newsome then filed
for a change in custody, complaining that his wife's move was surreptitious, that she refused for a time to give him any information on Amy's
whereabouts and that she was engaged in an illicit homosexual rela1. A 1979 addition to the child custody statutes, N.C. GEN STAT. § 50-13.5 (j)(Cum. Supp.
1979), gives grandparents the right to intervene in a custody action when their own child had been
awarded custody and subsequently died. In these cases, the court has discretion to award custody
or visitation rights to grandparents as it deems appropriate.
2. The procedure for modifying custody decrees is set forth in Id. § 50-13.7(a), which states:
An order of a court of this state for support of a minor child may be modified or
vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances
by either party or anyone interested. Subject to the provisions of G.S. 50A-3 jurisdictional prerequisites, an order of a court of this State for custody of a minor child may be
modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed
circumstances by either party or anyone interested.
See Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974); In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150
S.E.2d 204 (1966); Elmore v. Elmore, 4 N.C. App. 192, 166 S.E.2d 506 (1969). The change in
circumstances is often required to be "substantial" in a custody case, though this requirement is
not usually found in cases dealing only with the amount of support. CompareFuchs v. Fuchs, 260
N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963) (support) with Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d
140 (1969)(custody).
3. 42 N.C. App. 416, 256 S.E.2d 849 (1979).
4. Id. at 425, 256 S.E.2d at 854.
5. Id.
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tionship with Gooding that was detrimental to the child. 6 At a hearing,

defendant presented evidence to substantiate his claims, but he did not
challenge plaintiffs ability or fitness to care for Amy. The trial judge
did not explicitly find plaintiff to be homosexual, but granted custody
to defendant. The judge concluded that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred since the entry of the divorce decree, stating,

"the environment in which the minor child is now being raised is not
conducive or beneficial to the raising of a minor child of such tender
years." 7

On appeal, plaintiff argued that there was insufficient evidence of
a change in circumstances to warrant modification of custody. The
court of appeals, over one dissent, affirmed the trial court's determination and further ruled that a showing of changed circumstances was not

required in this instance.' Because the separation agreement establishing custody was incorporated into the divorce decree, the court assumed that the decree had been rendered without a factual
determination of the best interest of the child, 9 and thus reviewed the

lower court judgment as if it were an original custody determination.
Discerning no abuse of discretion in the finding that it was in Amy's
best interest to be in her father's custody at that time, as opposed to the
time the original agreement was made, the court allowed the district
court's holding to stand.' 0 Judge Clark, dissenting, noted that the deci-

sion was based on assumptions made about the parties' divorce decree,
which was not before the court, and that it ignored the law regarding
the standards for an adjudication of custody."
The majority's holding is surprising for several reasons. First it is
unnecessary to support the court's affirmance because the court hinted
6. Id. at 418, 256 S.E.2d at 850.
7. Id. at 423, 256 S.E.2d at 853.
8. Id. at 425, 256 S.E.2d at 854.
9. The court stated:
We are advised only that "the divorce decree incorporated the separation agreement by
reference." There is no indication, however, that the question of custody was litigated
and decided by the judge after hearing evidence tending to show the circumstances as
they then existed relating to the best interest of this child.
42 N.C. App. at 424, 256 S.E.2d at 854.
10. Id. at 427, 256 S.E.2d at 855.
11. Id. In addition, Judge Clark stated that the entire proceeding should have been stayed to
allow for an investigation of a charge made by Mr. Newsome that Mrs. Newsome had taken the
child for a weekend visitation and had not returned her as scheduled. If true, Mrs. Newsome
would have committed the felony of transporting a child outside the state with an intent to violate
a custody order set forth in G.S. 14-320,1. Id, 256 S.E.2d at 855.

1980]

FAMILY LAW

1473

in dicta that a material change in circumstances had occurred.'" In
addition, as Judge Clark pointed out, the trial judge based his opinion

only upon the assumption that the original custody order was not litigated; the record on appeal contained neither the separation agreement
nor the divorce decree.' 3 Third, the rule has never before been interpreted this way in North Carolina,' 4 and the Newsome court's interpretation could in fact lead to just the kind of "turmoil and insecurity"

that the rule is designed to prevent.' 5 One explanation for the ruling
might be the court's reluctance to face squarely the factual issue

presented: Can the newly-discovered homosexuality of a custodial parent constitute a change in circumstances significant enough to warrant
a modification of the custody decree?
If the court rendering the divorce decree did in fact adopt the parties' determination of custody as presented in their separation agreement without a factual inquiry, the Newsome holding finds some
support in the general policy related to child custody. The goal of
courts in awarding custody is to promote the best interest of the child;' 6

for this reason parents may never remove their children from the protective supervision of the court once it is invoked. 7 If a court accepts
without inquiry the agreement of the parents concerning custody, it has
not assured itself that custody was decided in accordance with the
child's best interest. Thus, the Newsome court reasoned, if the agreement is later challenged, the burden on the complaining parent should
be only to establish what is then in the child's best interest, just as he or
12. Id. at 426, 256 S.E.2d at 855.
13. Id. at 424, 256 S.E.2d at 854. See note 9 supra.
14. Neither the statute, quoted at note 2 supra, nor the North Carolina cases indicate that a
custody order based on a separation agreement should be treated any differently than one entered
after litigation. See e.g., In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 204 (1966); Elmore v. Elmore, 4
N.C. App. 192, 166 S.E.2d 506 (1969). In addition, the court's holding contradicts the majority
rule. See Annot. 73 A.L.R.2d 1444 (1960). ("It is clearly and universally established that the
conclusiveness of custody provisions in divorce decrees is neither abridged nor enhanced by the
fact that the decree incorporates, adopts or informally follows an agreement of the parties." Id.).
15. 42 N.C. App. at 425, 256 S.E.2d at 854. The court of appeals cited the case of Stanback v.
Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965), to illustrate the need for the changed circumstances
rule. In Stanback, a superior court judge awarded custody to the father after an evidentiary hearing. Sixteen days later, the mother petitioned for a custody determination before a different superior court judge who ruled in her favor. The supreme court disallowed this second hearing
because no change in circumstances was properly shown; the wife's only remedy therefore was to
appeal the first judge's ruling or wait for a more favorable factual background.
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979) states: "An order for custody of a minor child shall award the custody of such child to such person, agency, organization or institution
as will, in the opinion of the judge, best promote the interest and welfare of the child."
17. See, e.g., Blackley, v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260
N.C. 635, 639, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963).
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she would have been required to do in an original custody hearing.
When the court has yet to determine that circumstances justify a particular custodial arrangement, the more difficult8 burden of showing
changed circumstances should not be imposed.'
This practice, however, inhibits couples from attempting to settle
custody problems themselves and discourages judges from accepting
the parties' agreement without a time-consuming, costly and potentially
bitter fact-finding endeavor. It also deprives the separation agreement
of much of its integrity by allowing a parent to avoid his or her courtsanctioned contract by proving, not that circumstances have changed,
but that the first agreement was flawed. In short, this approach creates
a divorce decree with no resjudicata effect vis d vis custody and produces the very effect the "changed circumstances" rule tries to prevent-the insecurity that results when parents and children cannot rely,
in the absence of changed circumstances, on the finality of a custody
order. Furthermore, the case holding seems to be in substantial disagreement with a North Carolina Supreme Court case that held:
[W]here parties to a separation agreement agree upon the amount for
the support and maintenance of their minor children, there is a presumption in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the amount
mutually agreed upon is just and reasonable. We further hold that
the court upon motion for an increase in such allowance, is not warranted in ordering an increase in the absence of any evidence of a
change in conditions or of the need for such increase .... 19
Although this case involved child support rather than custody, the
court exhibited a willingness to accept an agreement of the parents as
determinative, in the absence of changed circumstances, and it seems
likely that the same acceptance would apply to a custody agreement as
well.
Dicta in Newsome indicates that the court considers the homosexuality of the custodial parent, not alleged at the time of the original
custody decree, a change significant enough to warrant a shift in custody. The case does not stand for this proposition, however, and another case will be required for the court to establish its position on that
question.
In a later 1979 case involving issues similar to Newsome, a differ18. 42 N.C. App. at 425, 256 S.E.2d at 854.
19. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 639, 133 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1963). Accord Perry v. Perry, 33
N.C. App. 139, 234 S.E.2d 449, cert. denied 292 N.C. 730, 235 S.E.2d 784 (1977). Because Fuchs
dealt with child support rather than custody, the burden was only to show a change in circumstances rather than a substantial change. See note 2 supra.
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ent court of appeals panel 0 applied the majority rule2 ' rather than following the Newsome court. In Hassellv. Aeans,2 a couple established
custody in a separation agreement that was later incorporated into a
divorce decree.2 3 When the noncustodial parent challenged the custody arrangement six years later, the court held that "the agreement is
sufficient to establish permanent custody of the children"'2 4 because
"[p]arents are in a better position on most occasions to provide custody
arrangements for their children .... - The court invoked the rule
that a substantial change in circumstances must be shown to justify a
modification of permanent custody.2 6 The remarriage of both parents
and the relocation of the custodial parent and the children from North
Carolina to Georgia were held to be insufficient to warrant a custody
modification.2 7
The Newsome problem is unlikely to recur, however, because of a
1979 addition to G.S. 50-13.228 that obviates the need for a higher court
determination of the effect of a custody agreement made solely by the
parents and incorporated into the divorce decree without a factual inquiry. The new law requires that "lain order awarding custody must
contain findings of fact which support the determination by the judge
of the best interest of the child."' 29 Presumably, even when the court is
prepared to accept the custody agreement of the parents, it must now
include findings of fact to support that agreement, thereby preventing a
problem similar to that in Newsome 31 from arising.
In 1979 North Carolina joined the majority 3 ' of states that have
enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),3 2
20. Judges Carlton, Vaughn, and Clark heard the Newsome case; a decision was filed July 31,
1979. Hassell v. Means was heard by Judges Erwin, Parker, and Mitchell; a decision was filed
Aug. 7, 1979.
21. See note 14 supra.
22. 42 N.C. App. 524, 257 S.E.2d 123 (1979).
23. 42 N.C. App. at 530, 257 S.E.2d at 1260. Rather than assuming, as the Newsome majority
did, that this incorporation signified that no factual determination had taken place, this court
inferred that the court had been approved below. Id.
24. Id. at 528, 257 S.E.2d at 126.
25. Id. at 530, 257 S.E.2d at 127.
26. Id. at 530-31, 257 S.E.2d at 127.
27. Id. at 530, 257 S.E.2d at 127.
28. Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 967, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1305 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
29. N.C. GEN STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
30. See text accompanying notes 9-19 supra.
31. As of October, 1979, forty states had passed the UCCJA. 5 FAM. L. REP. 2976 (October

1979).
32. Law of March 6, 1979, ch. 110, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 67 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
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which addresses problems encountered in interstate custody disputes.
The overriding purpose of the act is to promote the best interest of the

child by keeping custody decisions within a single state. The act attempts to avoid jurisdictional competition among states by designating

one state as the most appropriate forum for a custody determination
and enhancing cooperation among states. 3 Custody determinations
made under the act bind all parties properly served and notified. 4
States complying with the act agree to recognize and enforce the decrees of other states 35 and to decline jurisdiction to modify the decision

of another state unless that state no longer has jurisdiction. 6
Under the act, a state may exercise jurisdiction over a custody dispute if it is the child's home state37 or the state with the most significant
connection with the family.3 8 Physical presence of the child is not required, 39 and jurisdiction will ordinarily be declined if the child is in

the state because of a wrongful taking.4 0 Furthermore, jurisdiction
cannot be exercised if it appears another state has already properly established it, 4 ' and should not be exercised if another forum appears
more convenient. 42 To encourage the parties to choose the most convenient state, the act allows the court to require the party who com§ 50A

(Cum. Supp. 1979)). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the American Bar Association approved the UCCJA in 1968. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. I II
(West 1979). For commissioner's notes and a complete annotation of the UCCJA, see id at I ll70. Articles particularly influential in the drafting of this legislation include: Ehrenzweig. The
Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: 4 PleaforExtra-LitigiousProceedings, 64 MICt, L.
REV. 1 (1965). Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REV. 795 (1964); and
Ratner, LegislativeResolution ofthe Interstate Child Custody Problem: 4 Reply to Professor Currie
and a Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S.CAL. L. REV. 183 (1965). For two views on the success of the
UCCJA, see Bodenheimer, Progress under the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct and Re.
malning Problems: Punitive Decrees,Joint Custody, andExcessive Modfications,65 CAL. L. REV.
978 (1977); Fleck, Child Snatching by Parents; What Legal Remedies/or "Flee and Plea'?, 55
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 303 (1979).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-l(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979),
34. Id. § 50A-12.
35. Id. § 50A-13.
36. Id. § 50A-14.
37. "Home state" means the state in which the child has lived for at least six consecutive
months before the commencement of the action. Id. § 50A-2(5).
38. Id. § 50A-3(a)(1) and (2). Even in the absence of a "significant connection," emergency
jurisdiction may be established if a child has been abandoned or abused. Id. § 50A-3(a)(3). Furthermore, the court may exercise jurisdiction if no other state has. Id.§ 50A-3(a)(4).
39. Id. § 50A-3(c).
40. Id.§ 50A-8(a).
41. Id. § 50A-6.
42. Id.§ 50A-7. Factors that may be taken into account in determining whether a forum is
convenient include the child's home state, the connection of any state to the child or his family, the
availability of evidence and witnesses, any agreement of the parties and the overall purposes of
the act. Id.§ 50A-7(c)(l) to (5).
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menced the proceeding to pay the necessary travel and other expenses
of the other parties and their witnesses.4 3
Cooperation among the courts and parties involved is encouraged
in a number of ways. In addition to requiring that a central registry be
kept by each court,' the act suggests that courts exchange information
directly4 5 and requires parties to submit extensive information when a
court is tryihg to determine the most appropriate location for a trial.4 6
The act authorizes judges to request that testimony and evidence be
adduced or studies be made in other states and encourages courts so
requested to comply in order to facilitate proceedings in other states.47
B. Paternity
In affirming a conviction of abandonment and nonsupport of a
child, the court of appeals in State v. White 48 applied a conclusive presumption of paternity that it admitted might be unconstitutional. The
court upheld the trial court's requirement that defendant, husband of
the mother, prove he had no access to his wife during the period when
the child could have been conceived, despite evidence that another man
had access to the mother during the same period. Although it was no
more probable that the child was fathered by the defendant than the
lover, defendant was convicted upon his failure to present proof of
nonaccess.
The evidence showed that although defendant was married to the
mother, he had separated from her 265 days before the birth, and that
the mother began living in open adultery with another man 262 days
before the birth. 9 Thus, both men had access to the mother within the
normal gestation period." Applying the "modem doctrine"5 1 on the
43. Id. § 50A-7(g).
44. Id. § 50A-16. Custody decrees of other states, information on pending custody proceedings in other states, information on findings of inconvenient forum in other states and other pertinent information is kept in the registry. Id.
45. Id. § 50A-7(d).
46. Id. § 50A-9.
47. Id. § 50A-18 to -20.
48. 42 N.C. App. 320, 256 S.E.2d 505 (1979).
49. Id. at 321, 256 S.E.2d at 506.
50. As the opinion points out, one series of North Carolina cases sets the normal gestation
period at seven to ten months, another group finds the period to be 280 days, while another notes
that there is no agreement even among medical experts as to the normal period. See 42 N.C. App.
at 322, 256 S.E.2d at 507, and cases cited therein. In this case, if the mother were presumed to
have had sexual relations with each man during the time she lived with him, the child could have
been conceived by either of them regardless of the standard used to measure the normal gestation
period, because the time periods were so close together.
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issue of paternity, the trial court instructed the jury that unless defendant could prove he had no access to the mother within the normal gestation period, he was conclusively presumed to be the father. Because
defendant provided no such proof, the jury found him guilty of abandonment and nonsupport. The court of appeals affirmed the jury verdict.
Judge Carlton, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the presump-2
tion denies defendant his fourteenth amendment due process rights.1
He referred to the United States Supreme Court's holdings that due
process requires the prosecution in a criminal case to prove each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 If this rule is applied
to White, then the burden of proving lack of access arguably should not
have shifted to defendant; rather, the state should have been required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the father. Because evidence established that both defendant and another man had
access to the mother within the normal gestation period, the state could
not have met its burden.
The conflict over the proper use of the presumption in this case
stems from the court's application to criminal proceedings of rules established for civil cases. For example the old bastardy laws,5 4 which
were codifications of the common law, combined elements of both civil
and criminal law. A complaint could be brought by either the mother
or the county commissioner,55 and defendant could be imprisoned for
failure to support the child if he were adjudged to be the father.56 After
some dispute, the courts concluded that the proceeding was civil in na51. The "modem doctrine" is contrasted with the strict common law rule, which did not
allow proof of nonaccess if the husband were "within the four seas" [i.e. in England). 42 N.C.
App. at 322, 256 S.E.2d at 507.
52. Id. at 324, 256 S.E.2d at 508.
53. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court set forth the principle that the "Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 397 U.S. at 364.
Applying that concept in Mullaney v. Wilburn, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), the Court struck down an
application of Maine's homicide statute that required the defendant to prove he acted in the heat
of passion in order to rebut a presumption that an unlawful and intentional killing was done with
malice aforethought. The state thus was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence
of the heat of passion. 421 U.S. at 704.
54. See, e.g., Law of March 5, 1879, ch. 116, 1879 N.C. Pub. Laws 213; Law of February 28,
1879, ch. 92, § 2, 1879 N.C. Pub. Laws 174; An Act for the Better Observation and Keeping of the
Lord's Day, Commonly Called Sunday; and for the More Effectual Supression of Vice and Immorality, ch. 14, §§ 10-I1, 1741 General Assembly, reprintedin I THE EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF
NORTH CAROLINA 1669-751 (J. Cushing ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as AN ACT].
55. Law of March 5, 1879, ch, 116, § 1, 1879 N.C. Pub. Laws 213.
56. AN AcT, supra note 54, §§ 10-11.
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ture57 and therefore applied a civil standard of proof. In the wake of a
legislative change making wilful nonsupport a misdemeanor,5 8 how59
ever, the courts recognized a paternity action as criminal in nature.
In making this switch, however, the courts failed to revise the procedures used under the old law and apparently did not stop to consider
that a presumption of paternity in the mother's husband, which satisfied a "preponderance of the evidence" standard, might not satisfy a
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard." The presumption was simply
carried over, and, as is seen in the White case, continues to be used in
criminal actions today.
If the minority in White had prevailed, the presumption would not
have been applied to this case and the prosecution would have been
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant conceived
the child. Absent additional evidence, the prosecution could not have
met this standard. This failure, however, would not have precluded the
mother from bringing a civil suit against her husband to establish paternity and support obligations. In other words, under criminal law,
defendant would not be considered to be the father, but under civil law
he would be.6 ' Although this anomaly is avoided in the majority's position, another one emerges: the defendant is criminally convicted
through the use of a presumption that does not satisfy a criminal standard of proof. This conflict is inherent in the statutes because they provide both criminal and civil actions to establish paternity and support
obligations. Given the dual procedure, however, it seems much preferable to allow the distinction between "criminal paternity" and "civil
paternity" to exist rather than to permit a defendant to be criminally
convicted under a civil standard of proof.
The problem of establishing paternity in White might have been
57. See, e.g., State v. Liles, 134 N.C. 735, 47 S.E. 750 (1904); 11 N.C.L. REv. 191, 205 n.4

(1933).
58. Law of April 6, 1933, ch. 228, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 354 (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 49-2 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
59. See, e.g., State v. Ellis, 262 N.C. 446, 448, 137 S.E.2d 840, 842 (1964); State v. Cook, 207
N.C. 261, 176 S.E. 757 (1934).
60. Compare, e.g., State v. Pettaway, 10 N.C. 623 (1825) (case considered civil in nature) with
State v. Green, 210 N.C. 162, 185 S.E. 670 (1936) (criminal case)(both cases invoked same presumption, thereby placing same burden of proof upon defendant).
61. See N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 49-14, -15, (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
As in the criminal case, the presumption in the civil suit that defendant was the father could
be rebutted if the defendant could show he was impotent or did not have access to the mother. 42
N.C. App. at 322, 256 S.E.2d at 507.
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avoided had the parties introduced evidence of blood tests. Test results
must be accepted by juries under certain conditions as conclusive 62 and

can often exclude the possibility of a defendant's paternity. The General Assembly rewrote the statute authorizing the use of blood group-

ing tests in 197963 to allow for the use of more sophisticated tests that
not only exclude the possibility of parentage, but can establish it in
over ninety percent of the cases.' In addition, the new statute allows
for the possibility that on some occasions maternity may need to be
established.6 5 A further change provides that the costs of the tests shall
be included in the costs of the action rather than assessed to the party
requesting the tests. 66 As before, the tests are admissible in both crimi-

nal and civil paternity actions at the request of any of the parties.67
In a related matter, the court of appeals determined in Joyner v.

Lucas68 that the three-year statute of limitations for a civil action to0

determine paternity 69 is procedural rather than substantive in nature.7
The effect of this classification was to toll the statute while defendant

was out of the state, thus allowing plaintiff to bring her suit three and a
half years after the illegitimate birth.
62. See Law of June 2, 1975, ch. 449, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 447 (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-50.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The results of blood grouping tests are conclusive if the results are not in conflict with any other tests, the jury believes the tests were properly conducted
and the witness presenting the results testified truthfully. The conclusiveness is not altered by any
presumptions. Id.
63. Law of May 16, 1979, ch. 576, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 606 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-50.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
64. See Terasaki, Resolution by HL4 Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases not Excluded by ABO
Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543, 543 (1977-78). See also Jaffee, Comment on the Judicial Use of HL4
Paternity Test Results and Other StatisticalEvidence: A Response to Terasaki, 17 J. FAM. L. 457
(1978-79).
65. The new version speaks in terms of establishing parentage rather than paternity. See
Law of May 16, 1979, ch. 576, preamble, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 606.
66. Compare Law of June 2, 1975, ch. 449, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 447 (costs assessed, at
judge's discretion, to party requesting tests) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1(a) (Cum. Supp.
1979)(costs assessed with other costs of action).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1(a), and (b) (Cum. Supp. 1979). In criminal actions, either the
state or the defendant may request that tests be taken. In civil actions, any interested party may
request tests. The judge must order tests when they are requested. Id.
68. 42 N.C. App. 541, 257 S.E.2d 105, cert. denied 298 N.C. 297, 259 S.E. 2d 300 (1979).
69. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 49-14(c) (1976) states: "Such action shall be commenced within one
of the following periods: (I) Three years next after the birth of the child; or (2) Three years next
after the date of the last payment by the putative father for the support of the child . .. ."
70. A procedural statute of limitations is not part of a right of action, but merely a limitation
on when the right of action may be exercised. A substantive statute of limitations defines the
existence of a right of action. Thus, the lapse of a procedural limitation does not extinguish the
right of action, but cuts off access to the courts to enforce that right. The lapse of a substantive
statute of limitations extinguishes the right completely. See 51 AM. JuR.2d Limitation ofActions
§ 21 (1970).
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Defendant urged the court to apply the doctrine, which it has invoked in connection with the North Carolina wrongful death statute,7 1
that time limits included in rights of action created by the legislature
are part of the substantive right of action and not true statutes of limitations7 2 . If the time limit were not a true statute of limitations, the rule
73
tolling statutes of limitations while a defendant is out of the state
would not apply, defendant reasoned." Instead, the substantive right
to establish paternity in a civil action would be extinguished after the
three years had passed.
The court rejected application of the rule on the basis of the equities of the situation and the potential constitutional problem of strictly
limiting the rights of an illegitimate child to support.7 5 It was also
aware that by precluding the mother's suit, the court might have forced
the state either to institute a criminal action for nonsupport or to support the mother and child through public assistance. The result in this
case is consistent with the recent national trend to disregard the harsh
procedural/substantive distinction with regard to limitations of actions.76
C. Domestic Violence
The 1979 General Assembly enacted a chapter7 7 to respond to the

problem of domestic violence.78 It allows the victim of spouse abuse to
71. See, e.g., Webb v. Eggleston, 228 N.C. 574, 46 S.E.2d 700 (1948); Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N.C. 397, 151 S.E. 857 (1930).
72. 42 N.C. App. at 545, 257 S.E.2d at 108 and sources cited therein.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-21 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
74. 42 N.C. App. at 545, 257 S.E.2d at 108.
75. 42 N.C. App. at 546-47, 257 S.E.2d at 109. The court cited Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762 (1977), Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973)(per curiam) and Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972), which forbade certain types of discrimination against illegitimate children.
Two recent cases reached contrary conclusions on the question of the constitutionality of statutes
of limitations in paternity suits. In State v. West, 378 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 1979), the Florida Supreme
Court held that a four-year limitation on paternity actions denied equal protection to illegitimates.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas however, in Texas Department of Human Resources v.
Chapman, 570 S.W.2d 46 (rex. Civ. App. 1978) found a one-year statute of limitations constitutional.
76. See 51 AM. JUR.2d Limitations of Actions § 15, at 601 (1970) and cases cited therein.
77. Law of May 14, 1979, ch. 561, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 594 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50B (Cum. Supp. 1979)). A number of states have enacted domestic violence legislation. See,
e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (Page Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 §§ 10180 to
10190 (1976).
78. For a discussion of the law's response to spouse abuse, see Note, The Battered Wife The Legal System Attempts to Hep, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 419 (1979); Trent, Wt/ye Beating: A PsychoLegalAnalysis, Part I, 65 WOMEN LAW. J. 9 (Spring 1979) and Part II 65 WoMEN LAW. J. 21
(Summer 1979).
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file a civil action to obtain both emergency and long-term relief. The
act defines domestic abuse as acts between past or present spouses, or
persons who are or were living together as if married, intended to cause
or actually causing bodily injury or fear of such harm.7 9
On motion for emergency relief, a hearing must be held within ten
days." Prior to this hearing, the court may enter a protective order
designed to stop the violence."' These orders range from directing the
offending party to refrain from violence to evicting the abusive spouse
and assisting the victim in returning to the household.8 2 Similar measorders
ures to protect minor children are also authorized.8 3 Protective
84
may be entered for any time period not exceeding one year.
The act provides for enforcement in several ways. Local police are
authorized to arrest persons believed to be in violation of a protective
order 5 and to take whatever steps are necessary to protect victims from
harm. 6 They are also permitted to assist victims by advising them
about available facilities and services and are authorized to provide
transportation to these facilities.8 7 The act gives police permission to
ignore multiple complaints if they have reason to believe immediate
assistance is not needed.88 In addition, the new law makes it a misdemeanor to enter the premises of a spouse after being forbidden to do
so.8 9 The offense is punishable by a maximum of a $500 fine or six
months imprisonment or both.90
.

Divorce and Separation
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in White v. White,9 adopted

79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (Cum. Supp. 1979). This definition excludes acts between persons of the same sex and acts against children. The latter are covered in the juvenile code, id.
§§ 7A-516 to -732 and at id. § 14-318A. Mental cruelty is also not subject to remedy under this

act.
80. Id. § 50B-2(b).
81. Id. § 50B-2(c). The court may enter a temporary order upon a finding of good cause.
Immediate and present danger of violence against the victim or minor children constitute good
cause. Id.
82. Id. § 50B-3.
83. See id. § 50B-3.
84. Id. § 50B-3(b).
85. Id. § 50B-4(b). The charge is civil contempt. Id See id. § 5A-21.
86. Id. § 50B-5(a).
87. Id.
88. Id.

89. Id.

§

14-134.3. This provision also applies to a former spouse or a person with whom the

person charged has lived as if married. The crime is domestic trespass.
90. Id.

91. 296 N.C. 661, 252 S.E.2d 698 (1979).
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a presumption to be used in interpreting separation agreements that
will simplify litigation on these agreements and gave practitioners some
guidelines to be followed in drafting them. In essence, the court ruled
that provisions for support and property settlement in separation agreements and consent judgments shall be presumed to be independent of
each other, so that in the absence of evidence to the contrary the support provisions may be modified without regard to the property settlement.92 The implicit advice in the presumption is clear: if the support
provisions and the property settlement are intended to be reciprocal,
this intention should be made explicit in the document.
The separation agreement at issue in White was adopted by the
divorce court in the form of a consent judgment.93 It provided that Mr.
White would pay Mrs. White a weekly stipend and a lump sum, and
would convey to her his half interest in their house.94 The agreement
did not indicate if these provisions were intended to be separable or if
they were reciprocal. The litigation arose when Mrs. White petitioned
for modification of the support provisions. Mr. White contended that
the provision for support and the property settlement were reciprocal, 95
so that to modify one without modifying the other would be improper.
96
Because the court has no power to modify the property settlement,
neither can be modified if the provisions are in fact reciprocal.
The North Carolina court first set forth the theory espoused by
defendant in Bunn v. Bunn97 in which it held, "if the support provision
and the division of property constitute a reciprocal consideration so
that the entire agreement would be destroyed by a modification of the
support provision, they are not separable and may not be changed
without the consent of both parties." 98 Because there was no evidence
available in White upon which to apply this rule, the case was remanded to determine the intent of the parties on the issue of severabil92. Id. at 672, 252 S.E.2d at 704.
93. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240
(1964), explained the operation of the type of consent judgment entered in this case as follows:
ITlhe court adopts the agreement of the parties as its own determination of their respective rights and obligations and orders the husband to pay the specified amounts as alimony. . . . [Bjeing an order of the court, [iti may be modified by the court at any time
changed conditions make a modification right and proper.
262 N.C. at 69, 136 S.E.2d at 242-43.
94. 296 N.C. at 663-64, 252 S.E.2d at 700.
95. Id. at 667, 252 S.E.2d at 701.
96. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. at 70, 136 S.E.2d at 243. Support provisions may be modified.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9 (1976).
97. 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964).
98. Id. at 70, 136 S.E.2d at 243.
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ity. 99 To simplify this issue, the White court adopted a rule articulated

by an Idaho court"° that the provisions are presumed to be separable
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.'' The court viewed its rule

as a "common sense"' 0 2 approach, relieving the courts of making fine
distinctions regarding reciprocity. 03 In future proceedings, the party
opposing modification will be required to establish reciprocity by
showing, for example, that the wife agreed to take lower support payments in return for a greater share of the property than she might have

expected, or higher payments in return for less property.' 4 If no such
proof is provided, the court will be free to modify the support provisions without reference to the couple's division of property.
The court of appeals in Edwards v. Edwards' made several note-

worthy rulings. First, it held that the provision of North Carolina's
divorce statute that bars recrimination as a defense to divorce 0 6 applies
to any divorce action filed after July 31, 1977, the effective date of the
statute.10 7 The court rejected defendant's claim that because the activities that formed the basis of the recrimination defense occurred before
the statute was enacted, the defense should be allowed. The court also
ruled that fraud in the procurement of a separation agreement is no
defense to divorce'0 8 and that one parent cannot recover from the other

for alienating the affections of their child. 10 9
The parties in Edwards were separated in July 1977 and entered

into a separation agreement in October 1977. Plaintiff-husband sued

for absolute divorce in July 1978. Defendant wife set up three defenses
99. 296 N.C. at 670, 252 S.E.2d at 703.
100. Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 386, 462 P.2d 49, 51 (1969).
101. Under the Idaho rule, the presumption must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 387, 462 P.2d at 52. The North Carolina court, however, held that only a preponderance of the evidence is necessary to rebut the presumption. 296 N.C. at 672, 252 S.E.2d at 704.
The burden of proof is on the party opposing modification. Id.
102. Id. at 671, 252 S.E.2d at 704.
103. For a discussion of the rules used in determining whether provisions are separable or

reciprocal, see Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 520 §§ 19-23 (1975 & Supp. 1980).
104. 296 N.C. at 670 n.l, 252 S.E.2d at 703 n.1.
105. 43 N.C. App. 296, 259 S.E.2d 11 (1979).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The doctrine of recrimination allowed a
defendant in a divorce action to set up a defense in bar of the plaintiff's action by alleging that
plaintiff was guilty of misconduct that in itself would be a ground for divorce. Recrimination was
recognized in North Carolina until the 1977 amendment barring the defense. See Harrington v.
Harrington, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E. 190 (1974); Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492
(1945).
107. 43 N.C. App. at 299, 259 S.E.2d at 13,
108. Id. at 300, 259 S.E.2d at 14.
109. Id. at 300-02, 259 S.E.2d at 14-15.
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and a counterclaim. First, she alleged that her husband had been engaged in adultery before and at the time of their separation and
claimed this to be a valid defense to a divorce under the doctrine of
recrimination."' The court recognized that this would have been correct before the General Assembly's passage of the 1977 amendment to
G.S. 50-6,111 but noted that the defense was no longer available. The
rise to such a defense is of no consequence,
time of the events giving
2
the court declared."
Defendant also contended that plaintiff concealed his adultery and
that this concealment caused plaintiff to enter a separation agreement
she would not otherwise have entered. The court held that such an
of recrimination and
allegation of fraud was essentially an assertion
13
thus unavailable to defendant as a defense.'
In her third defense and counterclaim, defendant claimed that her
husband had alienated the affections of their son from her. At common
law, the action of alienation of affections was a right in the husband to
sue a third party for alienating his wife's affections so that he suffers a
loss of consortium, and subsequently has been held to be a right of the
wife as well." 4 Common law did not recognize a right in either parent
to sue for the alienation of a child's affection." 5 In a ruling of first
impression, the Edwards court decided that no such action should exist
in this state, thereby aligning North Carolina with the few other states
6
to have considered the issue as it relates to children."
In another case named Edwardsv. Edwards,"17 the court of appeals
ruled on a variety of issues relating to divorce actions. Of note are its
holdings that summary judgment is never appropriate in an action for
absolute divorce and that a jury trial should be granted in divorce suits
even when all the essential facts have been admitted in the pleadings."I 8 The court also found the compulsory counterclaim rule," 9 ap110. Id. at 298, 259 S.E.2d at 12.
111. See Law of June 29, 1977, ch. 817, § 20, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1106 (current version at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50.6 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). For a general discussion of recrimination and this
amendment, see I R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 88 (1979).
112. 43 N.C. App. at 299, 259 S.E.2d at 13.
113. Id. at 300, 259 S.E.2d at 14.
114. See generally 2 R. LEE, supra note 111, § 207, at 553. Many states have abolished the
action by statute. Id. at 566-67.
115. 3 R. LEE, supra note 111, §244, at 132 n.122 (1963).
116. See Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 931 § 5 (1974 & Supp. 1980) and cases cited therein.
117. 42 N.C. App. 301, 256 S.E.2d 728 (1979).
118. In addition, the court held that the North Carolina statute allowing divorce based on one
year's separation, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (Cum. Supp. 1979), is constitutional. 42 N.C. App. at
305-06, 256 S.E.2d at 731.
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plied to divorce actions in the 1978 case of Gardner v. Gardner,120
inapplicable to the facts of Edwards.
After nine years of marriage, plaintiff-husband in Edwards filed
for divorce from bed and board 12 in early December, 1976. The
couple separated several weeks later. In March of the following year,

defendant-wife counterclaimed for alimony in her husband's suit for
divorce from bed and board. 2 2 Neither of these actions was resolved
by June 1978, when plaintiff instituted a new suit for absolute divorce

based on a year's separation.123 In her answer, defendant admitted that
the parties had been separated for a year, but pleaded adultery and

abandonment as defenses to the divorce and demanded a jury trial.
Upon plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, defendant moved that
the action be dismissed and filed as a compulsory claim in the previous
unresolved action.1 24 The trial court heard evidence and found that the

parties had been separated for more than a year. Denying defendant's
motion5 to dismiss, the court granted plaintiff's summary judgment mo2

tion. 1

On review, the court of appeals found no reason to apply the compulsory counterclaim rule because the husband could not have sued for
absolute divorce at the time of his earlier action for divorce from bed
and board or when his wife counterclaimed for alimony.' 26 The court

correctly distinguished the Gardner holding on these grounds, pointing
out that in Gardnerthe counterclaim was mandatory because the husband's claim for absolute divorce had accrued before his answer was

due in his wife's earlier suit for alimony without divorce. Furthermore,
119. N.C.R. Civ. P. 13(a) provides in part:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
120. 294 N.C. 172, 240 S.E.2d 399 (1978). In Gardner, a husband's action for absolute divorce
was held to be a compulsory counterclaim in his wife's earlier action for alimony without divorce.
For a discussion of Gardner, see 57 N.C.L. REv. 439 (1979).
121. 42 N.C. App. at 302, 305, 256 S.E.2d at 729, 731. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (1976 &
Cum. Supp. 1979).
122. 42 N.C. App. at 302, 256 S.E.2d at 731.
123. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
124. 42 N.C. App. at 302, 256 S.E.2d at 730.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 305, 256 S.E.2d at 731. Plaintiff's original action was filed in December 1976.
Defendant answered and counterclaimed in March 1977. The one year statutory period, upon
which plaintiff's action for absolute divorce was based, did not expire until December 1977. Thus,
the requirement of Rule 13(a) that the claim exist at the time of the pleading was not met.
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the denial in Edwards of defendant's motion to dismiss did not
prejudice defendant; her pending alimony rights were not affected in
any way by her husband's suit.1 27
Nevertheless, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was reversed. The court of appeals ruled that summary judgment may not be
entered in an action for absolute divorce and that a timely demand for
a jury trial should be honored. The court based its findings on G.S. 5010, which provides that material facts alleged in a complaint for divorce are always deemed denied and that no judgment shall be given
until such facts have been found by a judge or jury. 2 8 The statute
creates a material issue of fact in every divorce case, and accordingly
makes summary judgment, which may be entered only when no genuine issue of material fact exists, 129 inappropriate. Though the trial
court had purported to enter summary judgment, the court of appeals
found no prejudicial error because the trial court had in actuality heard
testimony of witnesses and made appropriate findings of fact. 3 ° A new
trial was ordered, however, to honor defendant's timely request for a
jury trial. 131
The purpose of G.S. 50-10, which has been part of the statutes
since 1868, 132 is to prevent collusion. When applied to a divorce action
grounded only upon a separation period, the law is of limited value.
The only defense to a divorce based on the statutory period is proof
that the parties have not been separated for the requisite time. The
incentive for collusion on that issue seems slight' 33 and probably does
not justify the increased court time and costs necessary to fulfill the
mandate that every fact be determined by a judge or jury. In the Edwards case, for example, where the essential facts are admitted in the
pleadings, summary judgment should have been allowed.
A 1979 statutory addition, G.S. 50-19, comports with the court's
127. 42 N.C. App. at 305, 256 S.E.2d at 731. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (Cum. Supp. 1979),
which provides in part: "a divorce under this section obtained by a supporting spouse shall not
affect the rights of a dependent spouse with respect to alimony which have been asserted in the

action or any other pending action."
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-10 (1976).
129. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 56.
130. 42 N.C. App. at 307, 256 S.E.2d at 732. The only facts necessary for the adjudication
were that the parties had been married, were separated for a year and had not resumed marital
relations. 42 N.C. App. at 303, 256 S.E.2d at 730.
131. N.C.R. Civ. P. 39(a) provides: 'When trial by jury has been demanded .. the action
shall be designated upon the docket as a jury action."
132. Law of March 27, 1869, ch. 93, § 47, 1868-69 N.C. Sess. Laws 217.
133. Conceivably, a couple might collude on establishing the date of their separation to accelerate the time of their divorce to permit remarriage sooner.

1488

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.
58
[

ruling in Edwards that an action for absolute divorce filed while a prior
related action is pending need not be denominated a compulsory counterclaim. The new provision allows the independent prosecution of an
action for divorce, based on either fault grounds or the statutory period, despite the pendency of an action for divorce, custody and support of minor children, alimony or alimony pendente lite. 3 4 The
statute works in the opposite direction as well, allowing those related
actions to be maintained during the pendency of an action for absolute
divorce. 35 Curiously, the statute does not include divorce from bed
and board 36 as one of the actions that may be pursued during the pendency of other related actions.
The statute is to be applied without regard to Rule 13(a) of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that certain
counterclaims be asserted,137 and overrules the application of that rule
in Gardnerv. Gardner.' 38 The Gardner court concluded that the application of Rule 13(a) to divorce proceedings would not contravene the
state policy favoring maintenance of marital ties and would avoid a
multiplicity of actions by keeping the litigation in one forum. 139 A
potential flaw in the Gardnerscheme is that it allows one party to defeat the other's choice of forum. 4 ' Although G.S. 50-19 mends this
forum choice problem, it undermines the goal of efficient court procedure emphasized in Gardner. The new law permits, for example, the
wife to file for divorce and alimony in one city while the husband is
litigating divorce and custody in another.
The court of appeals significantly safeguarded the alimony rights
of dependent spouses in Wilhelm v. Wilhelm. 4 ' In a first impression
interpretation of a 1978 amendment to G.S. 50-6, which preserves the
alimony rights of a dependent spouse if they have been asserted in the
divorce action at bar or any pending action, 42 the court held the term
134.
135.
136.
137.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-19(a)(Cum. Supp. 1979).
Id. at § 50-19(b).
See id. § 50-7.
Id. § 50-19(a) & (b) begin: "Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. § IA-I, Rule 13(a)
.
See
. N.C.R. Civ. P. 13(a) quoted at note 114 supra.
138. 294 N.C. at 172, 240 S.E.2d 399 (1978). See note 120 supra.
139. 294 N.C. at 178, 181, 240 S.E.2d at 404, 406.

140. Under the compulsory counterclaim rule, the first party to file can force the entire litigation to take place in his or her choice of forum, as long as the other party's cause of action is
available by the time the answer is due. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 13(a), quoted at note 119 supra; 57
N.C.L. REv. 439, at 445 (1979).
141. 43 N.C. App. 549, 259 S.E.2d 319 (1979).
142. N.C. GEN. STAT § 50-6 (Cum. Supp. 1979) allows an absolute divorce on the basis of a

one year separation. The amendment added the following provision: "Notwithstanding the pro-
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"alimony" to include "alimony pendente lite." 143 As a result, a dependent spouse, who had asserted only a claim for temporary alimony, was

permitted to maintain her right to support after her husband had been
granted an absolute divorce."44

Plaintiff-wife in Wilhelm sued for divorce from bed and board and

alimony pendente lite. ta5 The court awarded temporary alimony, but
retained the action without a decision on the divorce action. 146 Seven

months later, in an independent action, the husband was granted an
absolute divorce, whereupon he ceased paying alimony. When the wife
attempted to have her former husband held in contempt, he claimed
that the absolute divorce barred further alimony pendente lite. The
trial court agreed with him and accordingly dismissed the action. 4 7
The court of appeals' decision on review hinged on whether the
wife's claim for alimony pendente lite in her action for divorce from

bed and board should be considered an assertion that would protect her
alimony rights. The court looked to the statutory definitions of alimony and alimony pendente lite"4 1 and to the legislative intent of G.S.
visions of G.S 50-11, or of the common law, a divorce under this section obtained by a supporting
spouse shall not affect the rights of a dependent spouse with respect to alimony which have been
asserted in the action or any other pending action."
143. 43 N.C. App. at 551, 259 S.E.2d at 322.
144. Id. at 552, 259 S.E.2d at 322. The general rule is that after a decree for absolute divorce
is entered, all marital incidents are ended and the right to sue for alimony is lost. Thus, to preserve alimony claims, a dependent spouse must adjudicate them before or at the time the divorce
decree is rendered. See McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976); Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 154 S.E.2d 71 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (1976).
Defendant in the 1979 case of Hamilton v. Hamilton, 296 N.C. 574, 251 S.E.2d 441 (1979),
was estopped from asserting this principle. Plaintiff-wife and defendant-husband in Hamilton
stated that they had settled their differences on the issues of custody, support and alimony. On
this representation, pending the execution of a consent order, the court granted defendant an
absolute divorce. Subsequently, defendant refused to sign the consent order, and a trial ensued.
Defendant moved to amend his answer to plead that his absolute divorce barred his wife from
claiming alimony. The court held that he was equitably estopped from doing so, because both his
wife and the court had relied on his original agreement to the alimony terms in the consent order.
145. 43 N.C. App. at 549, 259 S.E.2d at 320. The court's opinion does not mention when this
action was initiated. The suit also sought child support and custody, which were granted to plaintiff.
146. Id. Alimony pendente lite was awarded on February 2, 1978. No reason is given to
explain the lack of a decision on the suit for divorce from bed and board.
147. Id. Apparently, the wife did not assert a claim for permanent alimony in her action for
divorce from bed and board or in her husband's action for absolute divorce. The reason for this
failure is not evident.
148. Id. at 550, 259 S.E.2d at 321. Alimony is defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(1)(1976)
as "payment for the support and maintenance of a spouse, either in a lump sum or on a continuing
basis, ordered in an action for divorce whether absolute or from bed and board, or an action for
alimony without divorce." Alimony pendente lite is "alimony ordered to be paid pending the
final judgment of divorce in an action for divorce, whether absolute or from bed and board, or in
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50-6149 and decided that the word alimony was meant to include "ali-

mony pendente lite." The trial court's dismissal was reversed, and the
action remanded, apparently for a determination of a permanent alimony award.1 0
Clearly, a dependent spouse should not lose support rights if a
claim for them is outstanding. The interpretation here, however, leads
to some incongruous implications. After the absolute divorce was
granted, the wife's action for divorce from bed and board became
moot. Therefore, after the divorce, no pending action remained. Yet
the husband was required to continue paying alimony despite the fact
the wife had asserted rights only to alimony pendente lite, which, by
definition, is owed only during the pendency of an action.' 5 ' The incongruity in this case resulted from the wife's failure to assert a claim
for permanent alimony, which she could have done in her own action
for divorce from bed and board, in her husband's action for absolute
divorce, or even after the divorce was granted. The court recognized
that although she never asked for alimony, her prayer for divorce from
bed and board was an action that would have supported an award of
alimony. Because she had asked for "such other and further relief as to
the court may seem just and proper,"' 5 2 the court considered her to
have asserted "'rights of a dependent spouse with respect to alimony' "'I" as is required by G.S. 50-6.'"1 This is a very liberal reading
of the requirement that rights be asserted; future litigants would be
an action for annulment, or on the merits in an action for alimony without divorce," Id. § 5016.1(2).
149. 43 N.C. App. at 551, 259 S.E.2d at 321. The court determined that the intent and spirit of
the legislature was to protect the rights of a dependent spouse by allowing a supporting spouse to
obtain a divorce without closing the door on the adjudication of previously asserted alimony
rights. Id.
150. Id. at 552, 259 S.E.2d at 322. The court gave no specific instructions-to the lower court on
how to proceed. The appeal reviewed a dismissal of plaintiff's motion asking that defendant be
held in contempt for failure to pay alimony pendente lite. Id. at 549, 259 S.E.2d at 320. A
reversal would seem to indicate that defendant should be ordered to resume paying alimony
pendente lite or be held in contempt. Yet, the court suggested that plaintiff should be allowed a
trial on the merits on her right to alimony. The court noted that she pleaded for "further relief" in
her action for divorce from bed and board, then it stated, "this would support an award of permanent alimony in the event plaintiff is successful upon a trial on the merits." Id. at 552, 259 S.E.2d
at 322.
151. See note supra 148. The statute providing the grounds for alimony pendente lite states:
"The determination of the amount and the payment of alimony pendente lite shall be in the same
manner as alimony, except that the same shall be limited to the pendency a/the suit in which the
application is made. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
152. 43 N.C. App. at 552, 259 S.E.2d at 322.
153. Id.
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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wise, however, to affirmatively claim their rights to permanent alimony
before the entry of a decree of absolute divorce.
E

Alimony
Several 1979 alimony5 cases explored the meaning of dependent

and supporting spouses,'

5 6 that a
The court of appeals emphasized in Gardner v. Gardner"
spouse need not be unable to exist without the aid of the supporting
spouse before he or she is considered dependent. 5 7 In this suit for divorce from bed and board and alimony pendente lite, the court affirmed the trial court's award of temporary alimony of $1,250 a month,
despite the plaintiff's net worth of $220,000 and monthly income of
$930158 because plaintiff had established monthly expenses exceeding
$2,000. The court held that her ownership of property did not relieve
the husband of his duty to maintain 59her at the standard of living to

which they had become accustomed.

In Galloway v. Galloway, 6 ' the court of appeals invoked the presumption that the husband is the supporting spouse16' to vacate a trial
court determination that because the wife was "able-bodied, intelligent
62
and capable to find employment" she was not a dependent spouse.
While observing that the presumption could have been, but was not,
challenged on the ground that it constitutes unconstitutional genderbased discrimination, 63 the court found that defendant-husband failed
to show his wife was neither substantially dependent upon him for support nor in need of such support. The court suggested defendant could
show either that his wife was supporting herself, or was capable of sup155. Dependent spouse is defined as one "who is actually substantially dependent upon the
other spouse for his or her maintenance and support or is substantially in need of maintenance
and support from the other spouse." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(3) (1976). "Supporting spouse" is
one "upon whom the other spouse is actually substantially dependent or from whom such other
spouse is substantially in need of maintenance and support. A husband is deemed to be the supporting spouse unless he is incapable of supporting his wife." Id. § 50-16.1(4). Only a dependent
spouse is entitled to alimony. Id. § 50-16.2.
156. 40 N.C. App. 334 252 S.E.2d 867, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 299, 254 S.E.2d 917 (1979).
157. Id. at 338, 252 S.E.2d at 870. This proposition was established in Peeler v. Peeler, 7 N.C.
App. 456, 461, 172 S.E.2d 915, 918 (1970), and reiterated in Sprinkle v. Sprinkle, 17 N.C. App.
175, 183, 193 S.E.2d 468, 474 (1972).
158. 40 N.C. App. at 338, 252 S.E.2d at 870.
159. Id See Strother v. Strother, 29 N.C. App. 223, 223 S.E.2d 838 (1976).
160. 40 N.C. App. 366, 253 S.E.2d 41 (1979).
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(4) (1976).
162. 40 N.C. App. at 368, 253 S.E.2d at 43.
163. Id. at 369, 253 S.E.2d at 43.
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porting herself but had not taken advantage of a reasonable opportunity to do so. 6
This formulation of the evidence needed to show lack of dependency is new. To support the proposition, the court relied, by analogy,
on two cases that deal with the amount of alimony owed, not a determination of dependency.16- Those cases held that an alimony award
should be based on earning capacity rather than actual earnings only if
evidence showed the husband failed to exercise his capacity to earn
because of a disregard of his marital obligation. 166 It is a substantial
leap to contend that those decisions support, even by analogy, a holding that a dependent spouse may be denied alimony if she is capable of
supporting herself but has not taken advantage of a reasonable opportunity to do so.
In addition, the formulation differs sharply from the implication of
G.S. 50-16.1, which presumes the husband to be the supporting spouse
unless he is incapable of supporting his wife."6 That presumption
seems to require rebutting evidence showing the incapability of the
husband to support his wife, not evidence of the wife's capability to
support herself. Courts have shunned this construction, however, preferring to determine factually whether the wife fits the definition of a
dependent spouse. 68 While the Galloway holding follows this general
164. Id. The court gave some examples of evidence that would have sustained defendant's
burden. He could have shown
that the plaintiff did not make reasonable efforts to obtain employment for which she
was suited and which was available, that she had refused employment opportunities that
were available to her, or that she had been employed in a manner which would have
adequately supported her but terminated such employment in order to establish her status as a dependent spouse.
Id. at 370, 253 S.E.2d at 44.
165. Robinson v. Robinson, 10 N.C. App. 463, 179 S.E.2d 144 (1971); Conrad v. Conrad, 252
N.C. 412, 113 S.E.2d 912 (1960).
166. 10 N.C. App. at 468, 179 S.E.2d at 148; 252 N.C. at 418, 113 S.E.2d at 917.
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1 (1976).
168. Rayle v. Rayle, 20 N.C. App. 594, 202 S.E.2d 286 (1974), appears to be the only case to
have addressed the point explicitly. In construing the provision deeming the husband to be the
supporting spouse the court said:
[T]he sentence does not constitute an irrebuttable presumption and where there is evidence tending to show that the husband is not the supporting spouse, a question of fact
for jury determination is presented.
A different construction would render meaningless many portions of the 1967 Act,
particularly the provisions of Subsection (3) and (4) of G.S. 50-16.1 defining "dependent
spouse" and "supporting spouse" and contravene the manifest purpose of the General
Assembly.
Id. (citations omitted). In other cases, the presumption has been ignored, and the inquiry focused
on the actual financial status of the parties. See, e.g., Loflin v. Loflin 25 N.C. App. 103, 212 S.E.2d
403 (1975); Manning v. Manning, 20 N.C. App. 149, 201 S.E.2d 46 (1973); Peeler v. Peeler, 7 N.C.
App. 456, 172 S.E.2d 915 (1970); Radford v. Radford 7 N.C. App. 569, 172 S.E.2d 897 (1970).
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trend away from applying the statutory presumption, it changes the issue of dependency from a determination of the actual financial relationship between the parties to a determination of the wife's ability to
earn her own living. Although this may be a more reasonable and equitable way to determine the necessity for alimony, it is not the scheme
prescribed by the General Assembly.
F. Juvenile Law
The 1979 North Carolina legislature, in one of its most important
enactments, adopted a new Juvenile Code effective January 1, 1980.169
The new Code repeals G.S. 7A-277 to -289 and -289.7,170 enacting in its
place G.S. 7A-516 to -732.'"1 This Code is the product of a committee
established by the 1977 General Assembly 172 to evaluate the existing
North Carolina Juvenile Code and other statutory law pertaining to
juveniles, which had been adopted in a "piecemeal fashion,"' 73 and to
propose new, comprehensive legislation. ' 4 The 1979 legislature
adopted nearly all of the Committee's proposals with few variations
and modifications.
The new Code differs from its predecessor in both its focus and
content.' 75 Whereas the former Code focused on providing the juve169. Law of June 7, 1979, ch. 815, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 966 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 7A-516 to 732 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). This same law repealed parts of Chapter 134A, Youth
Services, and Chapter 10, Child Welfare. Id. These chapters have been incorporated into the new
Code.
For a discussion of the new Juvenile Code, see Bowman, North Carolina'sNew Juvenile Justice Code, 10 WAKE FOREST JURIST 20 (Fall 1979) and M. THOMAS, A SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION AFFECTING JUVENILE CORRECTIONS BY THE 1979 GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1979).

170. Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 911, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1047 (repealed 1979).
171. Law of June 7, 1979, ch. 815, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 966.
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-480(c)(6) (1978).
173. JUVENILE CODE REVISION COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT ii (1979) ihereinafter cited as FiNAL REPORT1. The provisions regarding child abuse, for example, were adopted at a different time

and located in a different section of the statutes than the Juvenile Code. Law of July 1, 1971, ch.
710, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 827 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-115 to -123).
174. The Committee's purpose was to "develop a legislative plan ... [that would] best serve
the needs of young people and protect the interests of the State." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B480(c)(6) (1978). The Committee, in considering what the scope of its inquiry should be, decided
not to limit its evaluations and proposals to matters involving a court order, but to consider dispositional alternatives, intake proceedings and community resources as well. FINAL REPORT, supra
note 173 at 2.
175. The statement of purpose of the new Code states that it should be construed to
implement the following purposes and policies:
(1) To divert juvenile offenders from the juvenile system through the intake services
authorized . . . so that juveniles may . . . be treated through community-based serv-

ices... ;
(2) To provide procedures for the hearing of juvenile cases that assure fairness and equity and that protect the constitutional rights of juveniles and parents.
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nile with an informal, flexible procedure that placed the court system in

the role of the overseer of the juvenile's activities, the new Code seeks
to ensure the juvenile's rights by requiring a more formal hearing. In
addition, in contrast to the limited dispositional alternatives available
under the former Code, the new Code seeks to utilize all available com-

munity resources in providing dispositional alternatives both before
and after invoking the court's jurisdiction.
In order to implement this new focus, the 1979 legislature made
material changes in substance and procedure and clarified and expanded some aspects of the former Code. The most important proce-

dural changes in the new Code provide screening procedures prior to
adjudication, new rules for temporary custody, a statutory process for
emancipation and totally new discovery procedures. In addition, the
new Code restricts the jurisdiction of the juvenile court by imposing

new age limitations on the class of juveniles and clarifies the law of
nontestimonial identification, the juvenile's right to an attorney, venue,
pretrial hearings and the right to an open trial. Finally, the new Code
contains a greatly expanded definitional section that makes the jurisdiction of the juvenile court more explicit.

Three aspects of the new definitional section' 76 expand and clarify
prior juvenile law. First, the definition of "abuse"' 77 has been expanded to include emotional abuse,' 7 8 and the definition of "abused

juvenile" has correspondingly been expanded to include a juvenile
whose parent or any other person responsible for his care "[c]reates or

allows to be created serious emotional damage to the juvenile and refuses to permit, provide for, or participate in treatment.'" 79 According
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-516 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The goal of the prior Code was to provide procedures that were "different in purpose and philosophy from the procedures applicable to criminal
cases involving adults" in order to "provide a simple judicial process. . . appropriate in relation
to the needs ofthe child." Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 911, § 2. 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1047 (formerly
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-277(1978)). See also, Thomas, Juvenile Justice in Transition-,4
New Juvenile Code for North Carolina, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. I (1980).
176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(Cum. Supp. 1979).
177. For a discussion of the history of child abuse in North Carolina see Thomas, ChildAbuse
and Neglect Part P" HistoricalOverview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives. 50 N.C.L. REV.
293 (1971-72) and Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part II.HistoricalOverview, Legal Marix
and Social Perspectives on North Carolina, 54 N.C.L. REv. 743 (1976).
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(l)(d)(Cum. Supp. 1979). The new statute also adds encouraging, directing, or approving of delinquent acts involving moral turpitude committed by the juvenile to the definition of abuse. Id. § 74-517(l)(e).
The former statute defined abuse as causing physical injury, creating a substantial risk of
physical injury, or committing or allowing to be committed any sex act upon a child. Law of July
1, 1971, ch. 710, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 827 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110117(l)(1978)).
179. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(l)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). See VA. CODE
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to the statute, emotional damage is manifested by "severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or aggressive behavior" toward oneself or
others.' 80
While it is laudable that the legislature now recognizes the seriousness of emotional abuse, the statute may not offer the intended protec-

tion because of the difficulty of proving causation when emotional
injury is unaccompanied by physical symptoms. North Carolina courts
have been reluctant to allow recovery for mental or emotional injury

when unaccompanied by physical symptoms because of the difficulty of
establishing a causal connection between the defendant's actions and
the plaintiff's injury.'' Under the new definition of abuse, it may be
equally difficult to demonstrate that the parent "created or allowed to

be created" the emotional abuse. The statute may be construed, however, to presume that because the parent is responsible for the juvenile's
care, the parent necessarily allowed emotional damage suffered by the
juvenile.
The statutory requirement that the parent must refuse to seek, or
allow the child to seek, treatment may also provide less protection than
the legislature intended. The statute does not specify the conditions
under which the refusal must be made. It could be construed either to
mean that a refusal made to a person who is not an officer of the court,
such as a social worker, is sufficient, or that the refusal must be made to

a court officer during formal proceedings.' 82
§ 63.1-248.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The Virginia statute similarly provides that an abused child includes one who suffers mental injury, but it does not require that the parent or guardian refuse to
help the child seek treatment. Numerous other states recognize emotional or mental injury as a
form of abuse. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 49-1-3 (Cum. Supp. 1980)(substantial emotional injury);
S.C. CODE § 20-10-20 (Cum. Supp. 1979)(harm or threatened harm to mental health or welfare).
180. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(l)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Cf TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-202(16)
(Cum. Supp. 1979) (emotional injury evidenced by "severe psychosis, severe neurotic disorder
• . . or severe impairment of the child's ability to function adequately in his environment").
181. See Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 503, 112 S.E.2d 48, 53 (1960); McDowell v.
Davis, 33 N.C. App. 529, 537, 235 S.E.2d 896, 901, appealdismissed,293 N.C. 360, 237 S.E.2d 848
(1977); Alltop v. J.C. Penney Co., 10 N.C. App. 692, 695, 179 S.E.2d 885, 888, cert. denied 279
N.C. 348, 182 S.E.2d 580 (1971).
182. Obviously, if the causal connection between the juvenile's emotional abuse and the parent's acts or omissions is established, the court should interpret refusal of treatment as broadly as
possible to include the situation in which the parent refuses treatment for himself or the child after
a request by a social worker. The statute will likely be construed, however, to mean that only the
parent's refusal to allow or participate in treatment when requested by a court is sufficient. Any
other interpretation of the statute would create insurmountable problems of proof. For example,
the social worker could claim that a request has been made and the parent could simply deny it. It
would, therefore, be difficult for the state to meet its burden of proof. Moreover, if refusal were
construed to mean refusal to a social worker, this interpretation could lead to inconsistent results.
Without uniform guidelines for when a request for treatment should be made each social worker's
decision would be based on his individual judgment, and would not be reviewable.

1496

NORTH CAROLINA LA4WREVIEW

[Vol. 58

However these statutory requirements are construed, the legislature clearly could have provided greater protection for emotionally
abused children by requiring either refusal of treatment or emotional
abuse, but not both. The reason for this is simple: whether the emotional abuse is caused or allowed to be caused by the parent or a totally
unrelated person, the child in either case needs treatment. By refusing

treatment for the child, the parent is guilty of allowing the abuse to
continue. As written, the statute places a heavy burden of proof on the

State 83and leaves emotionally abused children with limited protection. 1
The definitional section also expands the definition of a juvenile to
include the juvenile's attorney whenever rights and privileges are involved.'1 4 The reason for this new definition of "juvenile" is not altogether clear. 18 5 Apparently, with the addition of new statutory
procedures for pretrial discovery' 8 6 and venue, t11 the legislature felt it
was necessary to clarify that the attorney may make the motions permitted under these provisions, but the attorney's right to make these
motions is clear without expanding the definition of "juvenile" to include attorneys. The new definition merely reflects the Code's emphasis on protecting the juvenile's constitutional rights.
Finally, the definitional section imposes new age parameters on
"delinquent"' 8 and "undisciplined"'8 9 children; it establishes a minimum age for inclusion in these categories and makes the upper age
183. One problem the legislature may have considered, however, is that a parent might be

unable to recognize when he is inflicting emotional abuse. The legislature may have added the
requirement that the parent refuse to permit, provide for, or participate in treatment to the definition of abused juvenile to prevent penalizing a parent for this shortcoming.
184. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(20) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
185. A literal interpretation of this section leads to absurd results. For example, under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-595(a)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979), a juvenile must be told prior to questioning that he
has the right to an attorney. Does this mean that the juvenile's attorney must be informed of this
right and that the attorney also has this right?
186. Id. §§ 7A-618 to -621. See text accompanying notes 230-33 infra.
187. Id. § 7A-558. See text accompanying notes 241-43 infra.
188. A delinquent juvenile is defined as a "juvenile less than 16 years of age who has committed a criminal offense under State law or under an ordinance of local government, including
violation of the motor vehicle laws." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(12) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
189. An undisciplined juvenile is defined as "[a] juvenile less than 16 years of age who is
unlawfully absent from school; or who is regularly disobedient to his parent, guardian, or custodian and beyond their disciplinary control; or who is regularly found in places where it is unlawful for a juvenile to be; or who has run away from home." .d. § 7A-517(28). See Thomas, stupra
note 175, at 21 for a discussion of the difference between undisciplined juveniles, also called status
offenders, and juvenile delinquents. An allegedly delinquent child is afforded a higher standard
of due process than an undisciplined juvenile because the delinquent juvenile may lose his freedom. Id. at 8.
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limit the same for both. Now, a child may not be found to be delinquent or undisciplined unless he is at least six years old, 9 0 and undisciplined juveniles, as well as delinquent juveniles, must be under
sixteen.' t9 As under earlier law, different limits apply to juveniles al-

leged to be abused, dependent, or neglected: these juveniles may be
brought within the court's jurisdiction at any time up to age eighteen. 192 Also, the new statute provides that the age at which an offense
t93
is committed is the age that determines the jurisdiction of the court.
Two of the most important changes in the Juvenile Code concern

the screening procedures for delinquent and undisciplined juvenile
complaints, and for abuse, neglect, or dependency complaints.

94

Gen-

erally, under the former Code, after a delinquency or undisciplined petition was filed, thereby invoking the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,

the judge could arrange for the case to be evaluated by the Department
of Social Services, the chief family counselor, or other personnel available to the coirrt.t 95 Thus, the statute authorized diversion only after a
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-523 (Cum. Supp. 1979). This minimum age limit has no counterpart in the former Code and was not a part of the Juvenile Code Revision Committee's proposal.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 173, at 111-12. The legislature apparently inserted this provision because of the unlikelihood that children less than six years old would meet the statutory definitions
of undisciplined or delinquent. Further, the idea of subjecting a child under age six to court
proceedings apparently repulsed the legislature's sense of justice.
191. N.C. GEN. STAT § 7A-517(12), (28) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Prior to this change, the Code
limited the undisciplined category to children under the age of eighteen and the delinquent category to children under sixteen. Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 911, § 2, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1047
(repealed 1979).
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-523, -524 (Cum. Supp. 1979. Any child who once comes under the
jurisdiction of the court remains within its jurisdiction until he becomes eighteen or until released
by court order. Criminal offenders over the age of sixteen, however, may be prosecuted in superior court. Id. § 7A-524. Prosecution as an adult is not required under these circumstances unless
the juvenile allegedly committed a felony. Id. § 7A-608 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-280 (1978)). The Committee noted that these statutes are intended to allow a juvenile, after
termination of supervision by the superior court, to be returned to the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court if he commits another offense or is alleged to be undisciplined. FINAL REPORT, supra note
173, at 114.
193. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-523 (Cum. Supp. 1979). In setting the age at which an offense is
committed as the determinant of the juvenile court's jurisdiction, the Committee settled the issue
under prior law whether the juvenile or superior court had jurisdiction when a juvenile committed
several offenses immediately before his sixteenth birthday. FINAL REPORT, supra note 173, at 11213.
194. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-530 to -536, 7A-542 to -552 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
195. Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 911, § 2, 1969 N.C. Seas. Laws 1047 (formerly codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-281 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (repealed 1979)). Although the court generally could not
divert the case before a petition alleging that the child was undisciplined or delinquent was filed,
the prior statute did authorize the chief court counselor to establish screening services to be used
prior to the filing of the petition. The decision to establish these services was left up to each
judicial district. Law of April 12, 1973, ch. 1339, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 709.
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petition had been filed and the juvenile was before the court as an allegedly undisciplined or delinquent juvenile.
The new Code changes the former law in two important respects.

First, diversion can now occur prior to the filing of the petition unless
the juvenile allegedly committed one of a specified list of crimes. 196 An
intake counselor, who is a member of the staff under the chief court

counselor, now receives and screens the petitions without invoking the
court's jurisdiction. Second, certain procedures in screening the petition that were left to the counselor's discretion under the prior Code are
now mandatory.' 97 Whereas the former Code merely instructed the in-

take counselor to be guided by the "best interests of the juvenile" in
gathering evidence and making a decision on whether to divert,1 98 the
present Code requires the counselor to interview the complainant, the

victim, the juvenile, his parents or custodian, and any other person who
has information about the case.

In addition, the counselor must render a decision on whether to
divert within fifteen days of receipt of the complaint, with a possible
extension of an additional fifteen days. 199 If the counselor determines

that a petition should not be filed, the complainant must now2 0° be
notified of this decision, including the reasons therefor, in writing. 20 '
The complainant then has five days from receipt of the notice to request review of the decision by the prosecutor. 0 2 If the prosecutor re196. If the intake counselor has reasonable grounds to believe that a juvenile has committed a
crime against nature, murder, rape, arson, first degree burglary, any felony involving willful infliction of serious bodily injury or use of a deadly weapon, or any violation of the North Carolina
Controlled Substances Act that would be a felony if committed by an adult, he must authorize the
filing of a petition and cannot divert the case. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-531 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The
Committee considered including all felonies as nondivertible, but rejected that idea as too "farreaching." FnalReport,supra note 173, at 117. Because the statute does not specify whether the
judge may divert the case after the petition is filed, diversion for these offenses arguably is not
completely eliminated.
197. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-532 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
198. Law of April 12, 1974, ch. 1339, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 709 (repealed 1979). See
FINAL REPORT, supra note 173, at 119.
199. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-533 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Formerly, an intake counselor had to
complete his inquiry within 15 days, but did not have to render a decision within a specified length
of time. Law of April 12, 1974, ch. 1339, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 709.
200. Former law did not require the counselor to state the reasons for his decision. FINAL
REPORT, supra note 173, at 121.
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-533 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
202. Id. § 7A-533, -535. Former law provided for review by the judge only.
Law of April 12, 1974, ch. 1339, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 709 (formerly codified at N.C,
GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.7 (1978)). In recommending this change, the Committee sought to remove
potential prejudice to the trier of fact. FINAL REPORT, supra note 173, at 124.
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jects the decision of the counselor, the petition is filed, 20 3 and the
juvenile comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, where he
may be adjudicated delinquent or undisciplined. If a petition is not
approved for filing, it is destroyed.2" In the event of diversion,2"' the
juvenile must contact the resource to which he is referred; if the juvenile does not do so, the intake counselor can authorize the filing of a
petition.20 6 A counselor has no authority to file a petition if he does not
follow these procedures.

The new Code provides for similar screening of abuse and neglect

07

complaints by the Director of the Department of Social Serv-

ices.208

Initially, all reports of abuse or neglect are channeled to the
Director of the Department of Social Services in the county in which
the juvenile resides or is found. 2a 9 The Director may pass any of these
reports on to a law enforcement agency, which is required by statute to
investigate upon request by the Director.21 0
The provisions requiring screening of abuse and neglect com-

plaints have been expanded in several respects. First, a duty has been
placed on every citizen to report abuse and neglect.2 ' Prior law required only professional people to report both abuse and neglect and
203. The prosecutor may overrule the counselor's decision within twenty days; at the conclusion of this review he may file a petition. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-536(Cum. Supp. 1979).
204. Id. § 7A-533.
205. If, after a confirmation of delinquency, a judge does not divert, but instead commits a
juvenile to the Division of Youth Services, the judge must consider all potential alternatives in the
best interests of the child. In re Hardy, 39 N.C. App. 610, 251 S.E.2d 643 (1979). Although In re
Hardy was decided under the previous North Carolina statute, the mandatory language of the
court's decision is clear and is equally applicable to the new Juvenile Code.
206. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-534 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The subsequent petition must be filed
within sixty days of the date of referral. Id.
The Committee did not want to require the intake counselor to decide whether the services
the juvenile received were effective; however, the wording of the statute leaves open the possibility
that all the juvenile need do to preclude the filing of a petition is contact the resource, without
following any of the resource's directions. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 173, at 123.
207. A neglected juvenile is defined as one
who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from his parent, guardian,
custodian, or caretaker, or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary
medical care or other remedial care recognized under State law, or who lives in an environment injurious to his welfare, or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517 (21) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
208. Id § 7A-542, -552.
209. Id. § 7A-543. While the Director may utilize his staff in carrying out his investigation, he
must make the final decision. Id. § 7A-544.
210. Id. § 7A-543.
211. Id. Although every person is required to report abuse or neglect, the statute provides no
sanctions for those who fail to report.
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required other persons merely to report abuse.2t 2 Second, as required
of the intake counselor in screening delinquent and dependency cases,
the Director of the Department of Social Services must notify the person who reported the abuse or neglect if a petition is not filed. This
notice must specify either that the Director found no abuse or that the
Department of Social Services is taking action.2 '1 3 The Director may
then either remove the juvenile from his home, if necessary for his protection, or provide for protective services, which include county services and casework.21 4 If the person who made the initial report is not
satisfied with the actions of the Director, he may appeal to the prosecu21 5
tor.
The screening procedures to be used prior to the filing of a petition
are laudable in that they seek to match appropriate community resources to the needs of the juvenile.21 6 The community and the juvenile both benefit: the juvenile receives the most appropriate care and
the community corrects a delinquent child. Furthermore, the screening
procedures preclude court participation prior to the juvenile hearing,
thereby promoting judicial economy and avoiding extraneous influence
on the judge's subsequent determinations of fact. By requiring a more
thorough review of each case, the new mandatory procedures eliminate
the potential for abuse of discretion that results when individual counselors make the final decision.
Another important provision of the new Juvenile Code more
clearly details the procedures for taking a juvenile into temporary custody. These procedures are intended to protect the juvenile's rights.
Although prior law made it clear that a juvenile could be taken into
custody pursuant to a court order, the proper grounds for taking a juvenile into custody without a court order remained unsettled.2 17 Officers
212. Law of July 1, 1971, ch. 710, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 827 (repealed 1979).
213. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-544 (Cum. Supp. 1979)..
214. Id. § 7A-542, to -544.
215. Id. § 7A-546. The appeal procedures to the prosecutor are virtually identical to those for
undisciplined and delinquency petitions referred to in note 197 supra . Prior law contained no
procedure for review of a Director's decision not to file a petition. FINAL REPORT, supra note 173,
at 132.
216. The new Code greatly expands the dispositional alternatives for juveniles who have been
adjudicated delinquent. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-649 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Included in the possibilities are restitution, fines, performance of community service, and vocational education, Id. The
alternatives for juvenile offenders in general have remained virtually unchanged. Id. § 7A-648.
For example, the judge may continue the case to allow more appropriate care to be provided, to
place the juvenile under a court counselor's supervision, or to excuse the juvenile from compulsory school laws in order to find more appropriate alternatives. Id.
217. FINAL REPORT, supra note 173, at 154.
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were assumed to act under the broad authority ofparenspatriae21 in
taking juveniles into custody without a court order but the officers had
no statutory guidelines. The statute now specifies that a juvenile may
be taken into temporary custody without a court order upon the existence of: grounds sufficient to arrest an adult; a reasonable basis to believe a juvenile is undisciplined; a danger that the juvenile who is
alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent will be injured if he is not
to believe that the juvenile
taken into custody; or reasonable grounds
219
has absconded from training school.
The current statute also outlines in more detail the procedures to
be followed once a child has been taken into temporary custody. A
juvenile taken into custody without a court order cannot be held for
more than twelve hours without judicial involvement. Within this
twelve hours either a petition or motion for review must be filed by an
intake counselor or by the Director of the Department of Social Services and a court order issued authorizing secure or nonsecure custody,220 or the juvenile must be released.22 '
The criteria for ordering secure or nonsecure custody also have
been more clearly delineated. Prior North Carolina law simply authorized immediate custody when a child was in danger or when custody
was in the best interests of the child. 22 Under the current Code, a
218. Id See In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 39, 191 S.E.2d 702, 709-10 (1972).
219. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-571 (Cum. Supp. 1979). A police officer may take the juvenile
into custody in all situations that are authorized under the statute. Id. A court counselor may
take a juvenile into custody if there are reasonable grounds to believe the child is undisciplined or
if there are reasonable grounds to believe the juvenile is an absconder from training school. Id. A
department of social services worker may take the juvenile into custody if there are reasons to
believe that the juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent and that the juvenile might be injured
if he is not taken into custody. Id. Employees of the Division of Youth Services may take a
juvenile into custody if he is believed to be an absconder from training school. Id.
A police officer, acting pursuant to a custody order, is not liable for executing the order if it is
complete and regular on its face. Id. § 7A-575.
220. Secure custody entails detention of the juvenile and generally is ordered only when a
child may be adjudicated delinquent. Thomas, supra note 175, at 27-28. Nonsecure custody usually involves placement in a foster home or a facility operated by the Department of Social Services. Id. § 7A-576.
221. See id. § 7A-572. The new statute outlines specific procedures to be followed by the
person who takes the juvenile into custody, including giving notice to the juvenile's parents,
guardian, or custodian and procedures for requesting that a petition be drawn. Id.
A judge may, by filing an administrative order in the office of the clerk of superior court,
delegate the court's authority to issue secure and nonsecure custody orders. Id. § 7A-573. This
authority is similar to that given under the former provision, which allowed the court to delegate
authority to issue detention orders when the district court was not in session. Law of April 26,
1973, ch. 269, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 259 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-281
1
(Cum. Supp. 1977) (repealed 1979)).
222. Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 911, § 2, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1047 (formerly codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-284 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (repealed 1979)).
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juvenile may be placed in nonsecure custody in the following situations: when he has been abandoned; when he has suffered "physical
injury or sexual abuse or is exposed to a substantial risk of physical

injury or sexual abuse because the parent, guardian, or custodian has
inflicted" or allowed to be inflicted the injury or abuse, or has failed to
provide adequate supervision; when he needs treatment, and the parent

or guardian is unable to or fails to provide it; or when his parent or
guardian consents to the order.z z3 Similarly, the Code lists nine circumstances in which a secure custody order may be issued including
when the juvenile is charged with a nondivertible offense or with one or

more felonies, and when the juvenile has a history of violent conduct
petition alleges delinquency, and the
resulting in physical injury, the224
injury.
physical
involves
charge
Following either a secure or nonsecure custody order, the juvenile
cannot be held for more than five days without a hearing on the merits

or a hearing on the need for continued custody.225 While this section
more fully secures the juvenile's due process rights, as a practical mat-

ter the statute may create difficulties in scheduling juvenile court sessions in smaller districts.2 2 6

Once a juvenile is taken into custody, either temporarily by the
police or pursuant to a court order, he is protected in various ways from
227
overt or subtle pressure to make statements against his interests.

Most importantly, a juvenile must be advised of his Miranda rights. In
addition, if the juvenile is under fourteen years of age, no admission or
confession resulting from interrogation may be admitted into evidence

unless it is made in the presence of the juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney. 28 Furthermore, a juvenile's parent, guardian, or
223. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-574(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
224. Id. § 7A-574(b).
225. Id. § 7A-577. Former North Carolina law required that a juvenile could not be held in a
delention house or jail for more than five calendar days without a hearing to determine the need
for continued detention. Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 911, § 2, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1047 (formerly
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-286(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (repealed 1979)). The current statute
expands the law to include any custody, apparently including both secure and nonsecure custody.
226. For example, in many counties one judge is assigned to hear criminal and civil cases.
This judge will now have to interrupt his schedule to hear the juvenile cases that have been given
priority under G.S. 7A-577.
227. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-595 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
228. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-595(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The North Carolina Court of Appeals
has indicated that when a confession is made, the age of the person making the confession is an
additional factor that the court must take into consideration in deciding if the confession was
voluntary. In re Meyers, 25 N.C. App. 555, 558, 214 S.E. 2d 268, 270 (1975); In re Simmons, 24
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custodian may not waive any of the juvenile's rights.22 9
In addition to clarifying custody procedtires, the Code contains a

new section on discovery. Previous North Carolina law did not provide guidelines for pretrial discovery in juvenile cases. According to
the Committee, this section was added to balance the investigative resources between the state and the juvenile, expedite trials and satisfy
the juvenile's constitutional rights,2 30 including the sixth amendment
right to counsel and the fourteenth amendment right to due process.2 3
As provided in this section, discoverable evidence includes names of

witnesses, documents, photographs, motion pictures, and reports of examinations and tests.2 32 Upon written motion by a party, however, the
judge may issue a protective order denying, restricting, or deferring discovery.2 33
The new Juvenile Code also adds a procedure for the emancipa-

tion of individuals under eighteen 234 and declares that all married
N.C. App. 28, 32, 210 S.E. 2d 84, 87 (1974); In re Ingram, 8 N.C. App. 266, 268, 174 S.E. 2d 89, 91
(1970). This emphasizes the necessity of giving Mirandawarnings to a juvenile.
The statute may be criticized for allowing into evidence statements made by the juvenile in
the presence of his parents, guardian, or custodian, because they may subtly pressure the child into
making statements an attorney would discourage.
229. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-595(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
230. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), sets forth the basic constitutional rights of juveniles, which
include notice, right to counsel, right to confront witnesses, and a privilege against self incrimination. In discussing juvenile rights, the United States Supreme Court stressed that protecting these
rights is more important than the state's interest in maintaining special procedures for children.
The unique benefits of the system "will not be impaired by constitutional domestication." Id. at
22. Juveniles lack, however, the constitutional rights of adults to indictment by a grand jury, bail,
public trial, and trial by jury. Id. at 14.
231. FINAL REPORT, supra note 173, at 203.
232. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-618 (Cum. Supp. 1979). In proposing this new section the Committee was concerned that allowing the juvenile to obtain from the petitioner a "copy of the record
of witnesses under the age of 16" if this record is accessible to the petitioner, as provided in G.S.
7A-618(b), would "negate the confidentiality of juvenile records and proceedings." FINAL RePORT, supra note 173, at 204. The Committee concluded, however, that limiting discoverable
information under this provision to that accessible to the petitioner adequately protected the confidentiality of juvenile records.
Although not discussed by the Committee, disclosure of a juvenile's record in a,criminal case
may be constitutionally required. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). In Da;'s the Alaska
trial court upheld the assertion of a vital witness that he did not have to testify about his juvenile
record. The United States Supreme Court overruled the trial court and the state supreme court,
holding that "[w]hatever temporary embarrasment might result to. . .[the witness] or his family
by disclosure of his juvenile record. . . is outweighed by petitioner's right to probe into the influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness." Id. at 319. The Court
based its decision on the sixth amendment right of an accused to confront witnesses. Id. at 315.
233. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-620 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The rules of procedure for discovery in
juvenile court are based in large part on the discovery procedures of the North Carolina Criminal
Procedure Act set forth in Id. §§ 1SA-901 to -910 (1978).
234. Id. § 7A-717 to -726.
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juveniles are emancipated.2 3 5 Prior to the enactment of the Code, no

statute authorized emancipation.236 In order to utilize the new procedure, a juvenile must be sixteen or older and have been a resident of

North Carolina for six months.237 In addition, the petitioner must establish that emancipation is in his best interests. 238 The statute lists
factors the judge must consider in determining whether emancipation is
in the child's best interests, including the parental need for petitioner's
earnings, the petitioner's ability to function as an adult, and the juvenile's employment status. 39 Upon emancipation the juvenile has the
same right to make contracts as an adult, and the parent is relieved of

duties owed to petitioner and is divested of all rights over him. The
decree is irrevocable.2

Several sections of the Code either slightly modify prior statutory
law or codify existing case law. Under the Code's new section on
venue, for example, when a juvenile is alleged to be delinquent or undisciplined proper venue lies in the district where the offense occurred.2 41 Formerly, proper venue lay in the district where the child
lived or was found.24 2 The new venue section also establishes a flexible

procedure for transferring a case, when appropriate, to the district
where the juvenile resides.24 3

As an additional procedural protection, a juvenile's right to an attorney has been statutorily extended. Under the prior Code a juvenile
had the right to an attorney either when he was alleged to be undisciplined or delinquent, or when he could be committed to a state institution. 2 4 Now a juvenile is presumed to be indigent 245 and therefore
235. Id. § 7A-726.
236. FINAL REPORT, supra note 173, at 299.
237. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-717 (Cur. Supp. 1979).
238. Id. § 7A-720.
239. Id. § 7A-721.
240. Id. § 7A-724.
241. Id. § 7A-558(a).
242. Law of June 19, 1969, 911, §2, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1047 (formerly codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-279 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (repealed 1979)).
243. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-558 (Cur. Supp. 1979). See FINAL REPORT, supra note 173, at
141-42. Article 45 of the Juvenile Code on venue, petitions, and summons also designates the
pleading in a juvenile action as a petition and the process as a summons, id. § 7A-559, and establishes that a case commences either on the date when the petition is filed in the clerk's office or on
the date when a petition is issued by a magistrate. Id. § 7A-563; FINAL REPORT, supranote 173, at
148.
244. Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 911, § 2, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1047 (formerly codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-285 (Cum. Supp. 1977)) (repealed 1979).
245. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-584(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The North Carolina Supreme Court
had held that an undisciplined child had no right to counsel although a delinquent child did have
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has the absolute right to court-appointed counsel. In delinquency
cases, the judge is required to appoint counsel and apparently, under
the statutory additions, this counsel cannot be waived.24 6 The parent 24 7
in abuse, neglect, or dependency cases also has the right to a court appointed attorney in cases of indigency.2 48
The new Code codifies procedures to be followed during the juvenile hearing.2 4 9 When a juvenile is not capable of proceeding during a

delinquency case because he is unable to assist his attorney, he may
proceed through the statutory procedure on incapacity formerly available only to adults.25

Juveniles had been committed under prior

North Carolina law, but without a statutory basis.25
The new Code notably changes the public nature of juvenile hearings. As under prior law, the judge decides in his discretion whether a
hearing is open to the public. A new section provides, however, that "a
request by the juvenile for a public hearing must be granted. 2 This
this right. The reason for this difference was the possibility of commitment for the delinquent
child. In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 191 S.E.2d 702 (1972).
246. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-584 (Cum. Supp. 1979); Bowman, supra note 169, at 20. The
statute explicitly states that the judge must appoint an attorney, thereby creating the inference that
the right cannot be waived.
247. As under earlier law, appointment of a guardian is authorized when no parent is present
at a hearing or when the judge finds it would be in the juvenile's best interests. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-585 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
The statutory section providing for appointment of a guardian ad/item has been changed to
require the appointment of a guardian ad Iltem, who must be an attorney when a child is abused
or neglected. Id. § 7A-586. This eliminates the former qualification that a guardian did not have
to be appointed if it was shown that the child would not benefit from the protection.
248. Id. § 7A-587 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Under the new Code the court may require the parent
or custodian to pay the fees of the attorney except when the parent or guardian is indigent. Id.

§ 7A-588.
249. Id. § 7A-627 to -640. A petition may now be amended after it has been filed if the
amendment does not change the nature of the offense. Id. § 7A-627.
250. Id. § 7A-628.
251. FINAL REPORT, supra note 173, at 210.
252. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-629 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Cf.VA. CODE § 16.1-302 (Cum. Supp.
1980) (closed hearings unless juvenile charged with violation of criminal law or law defining traffic infraction, in which case juvenile has right to public hearing).
The Committee discussed the holding of OklahomaPublishingCo. v. District Court, 430 U.S.
308 (1977), and rejected its application to G.S. 7A-629. FINAL REPORT, supranote 173, at 211. In
Oklahoma Publishing,newspaper reporters were present during proceedings in which an eleven
year old boy was charged with second degree murder and were not asked to leave. As a result the
juvenile was exposed to substantial publicity. Overruling the court order enjoining publication of
information about the juvenile, the Court specifically avoided deciding the constitutionality of the
Oklahoma statute that allowed juvenile proceedings to be held in private unless ordered by the
judge to be conducted in public. 430 U.S. at 310. Rather, the Supreme Court concluded that
because the press was present, and therefore lawfully acquired its information, the information
was public knowledge and could be reported. Id. at 311. A public hearing in juvenile proceedings
is not a due process requirement. In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 530, 169 S.E.2d 879, 887 (1969), aff'd
sub nomr. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).

1506

NORTH CAROLINA L,WREVIEW

[Vol. 58

change in the statute emphasizes the Code's focus on protecting juvenile's rights.
This focus is also reflected in the new Code's procedures for authorization of nontestimonial identification, which have been expanded

and clarified.

53

Before conducting any nontestimonial identification

an officer must now obtain a court order authorizing the procedure.

4

diverse,255

Interpretations of the earlier statute were
ranging from a total proscription of photographing or fingerprinting to authorization of
fingerprinting only after the juvenile had been brought to trial.25 6 The
new Code specifies that a request for authorization for nontestimonial
identification may be made either prior to taking the juvenile into cus-

tody or after custody, but in either case the judge must base his authorization only on affidavits sworn before him. 257 The grounds for the
order must include: (1) probable cause to believe that the juvenile
committed an offense that if committed by an adult would be punish-

able by more than two years in prison; (2) reasonable grounds to believe the juvenile committed the offense; and (3) a determination that
the results of a nontestimonial identification would be of material
253. FINAL REPORT, supra note 173, at 185. The new Code clarifies other procedural rights as
well, including the right to pretrial release, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-611 (Cum. Supp. 1979); the
application of double jeopardy once the judge begins to hear evidence, id. § 7A-612; the requirement that a judge apprise the juvenile of the charges against him prior to accepting an admission
in court, id. § 7A-633; and the necessity of proving delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt, Id.
§ 7A-635.
254. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-596 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
255. In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 260 S.E.2d 591 (1979), although decided under the old Juvenile Code, offers guidelines on how the new Juvenile Code, particularly the provisions on nontesti-

monial identification and dispositional alternatives, is to be interpreted. In discussing the history
of juvenile law in North Carolina, the supreme court stated in dictum that, whereas the former
Code made no provisions for maintaining nontestimonial identification records of prior juvenile
offenders, the new testimonial identification procedures will permit the criminal justice system to
"track" serious youth offenders. Id. at 651, 260 S.E.2d at 599. The court emphasized that the
procedures set forth in the statute for conducting and maintaining nontestimonial identification
must be followed closely. Id. at 656, 260 S.E.2d at 601.
The court noted that unless the juvenile is given sufficient time to present evidence, consideration of dispositional alternatives is meaningless. Recognizing that the language of the statute did
not clearly indicate "the extent to which the trial court must postpone the dispositional hearing in
order to give the juvenile an opportunity to be heard," the court stated that "the statutes. . . make
clear the legislative intent that the dispositional hearing must be continued for the respondent to
present evidence when he requests such a continuance." Id. at 662, 260 S.E.2d at 605 (emphasis in
original).
256. FINAL REPORT, supra note 173, at 185. The former statute stated that the Code did "not
authorize the taking of photographs or fingerprints of a 'child'. . . , unless the case [had] been
transferred to the superior court .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-502(c) (1978).
257. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-597, -598 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The Committee discussed including
the polygraph and the breathalyzer tests within this statute; however, the Committee concluded
that they should neither prohibit nor authorize these procedures. FINAL REPORT, supra note 173,
at 185.
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aid.
If the juvenile is alleged to have committed a crime that if committed by an adult would be punishable by imprisonment for more
than two years, the juvenile may request nontestimonial identification
procedures.2 5 9 The results of this nontestimonial identification are to
be destroyed in the event no petition is filed, the juvenile is found not
guilty, or the juvenile is under fourteen and has committed what would
be a misdemeanor if committed by an adult.266 The juvenile's rights
are further protected by the addition of criminal sanctions for wilful
violation of the provisions of the article governing nontestimonial identification.26 '
In summary, the new Juvenile Code makes material changes in
both the substance and the procedure of the earlier code. Most notably, the new Code places a greater emphasis on diverting juveniles
from the court system by providing for diversion both before and after
a delinquency or undisciplined petition is filed. Also, the Code clearly
shows a desire to protect the juvenile's basic rights by more fully correlating the rights of juveniles with those of adults. Although the Code
does not expand the rights of juveniles as far as it could, for example by
guaranteeing juveniles the right to a jury trial,262 it is a substantial im258. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-598 (Cum. Supp. 1979). This section adopts the grounds applicable to adults. See id § 15A-273 (1978).
259. Id. § 7A-600 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The judge has some discretion in authorizing the identification; identification must be permitted if it would materially aid the juvenile's defense. "Material aid", however, is not defined by statute.
The limitations on the juvenile's request for nontestimonial identification may seem unusually restrictive. These restrictions, however, serve to prevent an overzealous defense attorney from
creating records that may later be used for investigative purposes. See id. § 7A-601.

260. Id. § 7A-601. Prior law was confusing and, although juvenile records were to be closed,
the information was often used in subsequent proceedings. See Bowman, supra note 169, at 20.
See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-676 (Cum. Supp. 1979), which provides for expunction ofjuvenile
records on petition of the juvenile adjudicated delinquent if he is sixteen or older, and either the
act committed by him would have been a crime if committed by an adult, or he was not thereafter
adjudicated a delinquent or convicted as an adult of any felony or misdemeanor other than a
traffic violation. In addition, juvenile records of persons adjudicated undisciplined may be expunged on petition by the juvenile when he reaches sixteen.
261. It is now a misdemeanor. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-602 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Virginia also
allows fingerprints and photographs taken of a juvenile to be retained under certain circumstances, for instance, when a child is at least fifteen and has committed a delinquent act which
would be an adult felony, or been found guilty of malicious wounding or murder and is at least
thirteen. VA. CODE § 16.1-299 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
262. See In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 528, 169 S.E. 2d 879, 886 (1969), a,9dsub nom. McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no right to jury trial) and Thomas, supra note 175 (general
discussion of rights juveniles do not have).
The 1979 court of appeals upheld earlier North Carolina law that clearly established that the
Speedy Trial Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-701(1978), does not apply to juveniles. In re Beddingfield, 42 N.C. App. 712, 257 S.E.2d 643 (1979). Following the reasoning of In re Burrus the
court concluded that the Act did not apply because juvenile prosecutions are not criminal in nature. Id. at 714, 257 S.E.2d at 644-45.
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provement over prior North Carolina law.
JANE R. WETTACH
M. ANN ANDERSON

IX.

A.

Joint

PROPERTY'

Ownershi02

The Supreme Court of North Carolina resolved a question of first
1. In Mobile Oil Corp. v. Wolfe, 297 N.C. 36, 252 S.E.2d 809 (1979), and Bank of North
Carolina v. Cranfill, 297 N.C. 43, 253 S.E.2d 1 (1979), the supreme court addressed the question
whether parol testimony may be introduced that a signatory of an instrument did not intend to
adopt a seal printed on the instrument as his own. In both cases the court held that where there is
no ambiguity on the face of the instrument as to the adoption of the seal, parol evidence cannot be
introduced.
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Chambless, 44 N.C. App. 95, 260 S.E.2d 688 (1979), the
court of appeals ruled that children adopted pursuant to a valid decree of another state qualify as
"descendants" within the meaning of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (1976). Thus, they can take
property under a will with the same status as natural-born children unless a contrary intent
appears on the face of the will. Children adopted in another state also have the right to inherit
from their adopted parents under the intestacy statutes.
In an eminent domain case, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Board of Transp. v. Jones,
297 N.C. 436, 255 S.E.2d 185 (1979), interpreted N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-112(1) (1976), which sets
forth the means by which land is to be valued in a condemnation proceeding for a partial taking.
The court determined that the statute addresses only the exclusive measure of damages to be
employed by the finder of fact and does not restrict a real estate expert to any particular method of
calculation fair market value. Thus, an expert may use the "value to the part taken plus damages
to the remainder" theory to determine the "after" value in an application of the "before and after
value" measure of damages.
In another case dealing with eminent domain, Board of Transp. v. Terminal Warehouse
Corp., 44 N.C. App. 81, 260 S.E.2d 696 (1979), two questions were decided by the North Carolina
Court of Appeals. First, the court held that the fact of a taking does not make compensable
elements of damages which would otherwise be damnum absque injuria. Id. at 88, 260 S.E.2d at
700. Second, the court extended the "reasonable use rule," articulated in Pendergrast v. Aiken,
293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977), to govern the rights and liabilities of landowners in public
condemnation actions. 44 N.C. App. at 90, 360 S.E.2d at 701.
Resolving another question of first impression for this jurisdiction, the court of appeals ruled
in favor of the insured of a title insurance policy in Mortgage Corp. v. Insurance Co., 41 N.C.
App. 613, 255 S.E.2d 622 (1979), rev'don other grounds, 299 N.C. 369, 261 S.E.2d 844 (1980), by
holding the insurer liable for an ineffective deed of trust and the litigation expenses incurred by
the insured in defending its title. The insurer denied liability on the ground that the policy
exempted coverage for defects or adverse claims against title that were "created, suffered, assumed
or agreed to" by the insured. Basing its decision on similar rulings in the majority of other
jurisdictions that had considered the question, the court concluded that the exclusionary language
did not preclude recovery for defects resulting from conduct of the insured that was, at most,
negligent. Rather, the provision was held to restrict "coverage for losses incurred because of the
insured's own conduct only when it is a result of some dishonest, illegal, or inequitable dealings by
the insured." Id. at 617, 255 S.E.2d at 622; see Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 515 (1978).
In a prior action by a third party to prevent the insured from foreclosing on its deed of trust,
the insurer offered to defend the suit on behalf of the insured, but with a "reservation of rights."
The court determined that the insured was not required to accept this conditional offer because of
its "fear that the insurer may not be motivated to provide a vigorous defense despite its duty to use
good faith in its undertaking." 41 N.C. App. at 622, 255 S.E.2d at 629. Thus, an insurer who
refuses to defend without a reservation of rights must indemnify the insured for the costs of
litigation if it is later determined that the loss was within the coverage of the policy.
2. In Etheridge v. Etheridge, 41 N.C. App. 39, 255 S.E.2d 729 (1979), the court of appeals
discussed the legal effect the filing of a dissent to a will has on the title to real property. It
conceded that "the dissenting spouse, upon filing dissent to the will, becomes vested, eo instante, as
of the date of the testatrix' death, with title to the intestate share of the testator's realty which is
allowed by the statutes providing for dissent." Id. at 49, 255 S.E.2d at 732. However, the court

1510

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

impression in Collins n' Quincy MutualFire Insurance Co.,' by holding
that a statutory insurance policy provision limiting coverage to the "interest of the insured ' 4 is broad enough to permit recovery for the full
value of property destroyed by fire, although the named insured is only
one of several tenants in common and is acting, without notice to the
insurer, as an agent for the other property owners. Plaintiff was a tenant in common with only a one-third interest in a family tenant dwelling, but he engaged a broker to insure the entire value of the unit
against loss by fire. The broker communicated the request for insurance to the insurer, but he neglected to inform it of plaintiffs limited
interest in the property.' Defendant issued coverage to the extent of the
actual cash value of the property at the time of loss, but pursuant to
G.S. 58-176 the policy provided that the amount recoverable would not
in any event be for more than the "interest of the insured."6 The trial
court equated "interest of the insured" with legal title7 and limited
plaintiffs recovery to the amount of one-third of the appraised damage.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff for the remainder of his claim, holding that the
question of whether plaintiff was acting as agent for the other cotenants
was a triable issue of fact and that the determination of that issue in
plaintiff's favor would give him an insurable interest in the whole property." The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals decision.9
The supreme court recognized the general rule that "where, by the
terms of the policy, the insurer is not to be liable beyond the interest of
rejected the claim that the dissenting spouse was entitled to one-third of the rental value of a
homeplace since the death of the testatrix, because, the court determined, no interest in the
homeplace had been allotted to the surviving spouse. Instead, the surviving spouse had been
allotted other portions of testatrix' realty in order to accommodate her intent as expressed in the
will. See In re Etheridge, 33 N.C. App. 585, 235 S.E.2d 924, cert.denied, 293 N.C. 253, 237 S,E.2d
435 (1977). The court reasoned that when the property was finally allotted, the dissenting spouse's
seizure related back to the death of testator. Thus, the spouse became vested with one-third of the
realty upon testator's death, but he never had an interest in the homeplace. Accordingly, the
surviving spouse was not entitled to rents and profits from the homeplace following the testatrix'
death.
3. 297 N.C. 680, 256 S.E.2d 718 (1979).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-176 (1975).
5. The court took special note that the difficulty in Collins would not have arisen if the
broker had been an agent for defendant. "In such case, the agent's knowledge that plaintiff was
acting on behalf of himself and his co-tenants would have been imputed to the insurer making it
liable for the full value of the property in case of loss." 297 N.C. at 686, 256 S.E.2d at 721 (emphasis in original).
6. Id. at 682, 256 S.E.2d at 719.
7. Id. at 684, 256 S.E.2d at 721.
8. 39 N.C. App. 38, 249 S.E.2d 461 (1978). aft'd, 297 N.C. 680, 256 S.E.2d 718 (1979).
9. 297 N.C. 680, 684, 256 S.E.2d 718, 721 (1979).
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the insured in the property, a stranger to the contract cannot collect
thereon simply because he was the owner of an undivided interest in
the property destroyed.""0 The court, however, determined that a cotenant acting as manager of property held in common may have a policy issued in his own name for himself and the benefit of the other
tenants, and that failure to give notice to the insurer of the joint ownership does not void or limit the coverage under the policy.II In other
words, a managing cotenant has an insurable interest in the entire
property within the meaning of the term "interest of the insured" and
therefore he does not have to possess full legal title in order to have full
recovery. 2 If a fire insurance policy is issued for the whole property,
and the premiums are paid with rents collected from the common property or with contributions from each of the cotenants, then in fairness
and in accordance with the court's view, all the owners should share in
3
the proceeds in the event of loss.'
The liberal construction given to G.S. 58-176 appears to be in line
with the purpose of the statute. There are, of course, obvious reasons
for limiting the coverage to the interests of the insured. If the state
were to allow recovery on damaged property interests in which the policy holder has no stake, preserving the policy would be, at best, a wager
on the misfortunes of others and, at worst, an incentive for the beneficiary to create the casualty. If the insurance proceeds are divided and
distributed among the several cotenants in proportion to their respective property interests, however, the named insured does not stand to
profit from the property loss while acting as agent for the other owners.' 4 Moreover, the insurer is not harmed since the premiums are proAPPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3361 (1970)). But Sf.
§ 58-180.1 (1975):
Any policy of fire insurance issued to husband or wife, on buildings and household furniture owned by the husband and wife, either by entirety, in common, or jointly, either
name of one of the partiesin interest named as the insuredor beneficiary therein, shall be
sufficient and the policy shall not be void for failure to disclose the interest of the other,
unless it appears that in procuring of the issuance of such policy, fraudulent means or
methods were used by the insured or owner thereof.
Id. (emphasis added)
11. 297 N.C. at 685, 256 S.E.2d at 721.
12. See Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Britt, 254 S.W. 215 (Tex. App. 1923). Although not expressly so described by the court, this decision seems to be merely an application of the rule that
an agent may make a contract for an undisclosed principal.
13. 297 N.C. at 684, 256 S.E.2d at 721 (1979). See 5A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 3361; 46
C.J.S. Insurance § 1141 (1946).
14. For a case in which the tenant did profit from insurance, see Summers v. Stark County
Patrons' Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio App. 73, 23 N.E.2d 331 (1939), rev'd on other grounds, 63 Ohio
App. 369, 26 N.E.2d 1021 (1940). The insurer examined the property in which plaintiff owned a
one-third interest and issued a policy on the whole property. The court held that in the absence of

10. Id. (quoting 5A J.
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portionate to the risk assumed, and if an applicant procures the
insurance by fraud or misrepresentation of a material fact, the insurer
will be protected from liability.'" By adopting this sensible construction of a statute susceptible to an unduly narrow interpretation, the
court protected the reasonable expectations of the insured without prej6
udicing the rights of the insurer.'
In Craver v. Craver,'7 a case of first impression, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a tenant in common in exclusive pos-

session of a tenancy by court order cannot charge the excluded
cotenant with a proportional part of the periodic costs of repairs made

to property by the possessing tenant. Plaintiff retained exclusive possession pursuant to a judgment for alimony. Upon refusal by defendant to contribute for one-half of the costs of repairs, plaintiff filed suit.
In upholding the trial court's judgment for defendant, the court of appeals distinguished Holt v. Couch,'8 in which, upon division of the
property, a cotenant in sole possession was allowed credit for the value
of improvements and presumably for the costs of repairs made on the
property.' 9 The Craver court observed that the tenant in Holt, unlike
the plaintiff in Craver, had made his claim at a partition and had not

fraud the insurer was bound by its own examination and valuation, and, therefore, plaintiff was
entitled to recover the full amount named in the policy, apparently without having to share the
proceeds with the other tenants. The plaintiff in Collins, on the other hand, if truly an agent for
the other cotenants, would be required to hold the insurance proceeds for the principals' benefit.
15. 297 N.C. at 685, 256 S.E.2d at 721.
16. Although the court considered Collins to be a case of first impression, dictum in Shores v.
Rabon, 251 N.C. 790, 112 S.E.2d 556 (1960), foretold the decision in Collins. In Shores the
supreme court denied recovery to a cotenant not named in the insurance policy because there was
"nothing in the policy. . . to indicate an intention to insure her interest" nor was the insured "her
agent in the management thereof in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary." Id. at 793,
112 S.E.2d at 559. Thus, as early as 1960 the supreme court was apparently willing to accept the
principle that an insured can act as an agent for the other cotenants and that a policy issued in his
name alone will inure to their benefit. The plaintiff in Shore failed on her proof rather than on
legal theory.
17. 41 N.C. App. 606, 255 S.E.2d 253 (1979).
18. 125 N.C. 456, 34 S.E. 703 (1899).
19. It is not entirely clear from the opinion in Holt whether the tenant was credited with the
expenditures made for repairs in addition to those made for improvements. The court noted that
a valuation for improvements was made and that such improvements were "reasonable, necessarj,
and advantageous to the property." Id. at 458, 34 S.E. at 704 (emphasis added). It is possible that
repairs were included in this figure, but the court did not itemize the expenses. In any event, the
court of appeals in Craver interpreted Holt as a case in which "a co-tenant was allowed credit in
the division of the property for the value of improvements he had made to the property as well as
money he had paid to maintain the property." 41 N.C. App. at 607, 255 S.E.2d at 254. But se J.
WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 109 (1971): "While North Carolina is not
clear on the point, in most jurisdictions a co-tenant who is in possession of the common property is
not entitled to compensation for expenditures made for repairs to the common property while he
is in possession." Id. § 109, at 118.
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been in exclusive possession of the property. With respect to the present case, the court reasoned that the "'value of the possession and enjoyment of the common property is deemed to compensate the
repairing cotenant.' "20 The court refused to speculate on what plaintiff's position would have been on a partition of the property.
It is important to emphasize that the court was not required to
adopt entirely the rule of most jurisdictions that "a co-tenant who is in
possession of the common property is not entitled to compensation for
expenditures made for repairs 2 to the common property while he is in
possession.''22 The court specifically limited its holding to the facts of
this case-a tenant in exclusive possession suing directly for the costs of
repairs. The law in North Carolina is unclear on the point.23 In this
particular instance plaintiff had been awarded exclusive possession of
the property, but the cotenant's mere possession was probably a sufficient ground to deny recovery in any case. Even if this conclusion is
inaccurate and it is possible for a cotenant in possession to sue for repairs, the court's observation that the claim had not been made during
a partition of the property indicates that it might have denied recovery
for this reason alone. "Statements are sometimes made indicating that
no affirmative relief will be afforded to the co-tenant who makes repairs
and that his right to equitable contribution will be limited to cases in
24
which an accounting is required."
Although the court was satisfied to rest its holding on the combination of facts presented in Craver, it could have justified its rejection of
plaintiff's claim on any of three alternative grounds: (1) a cotenant in
possession is not entitled to be compensated for the costs of repairs; (2)
a cotenant inexclusive possession is clearly not entitled to contribution,
regardless of what the rule is for a cotenant in mere possession; or (3)
no affirmative relief can be granted to a repairing cotenant, and contribution will be granted, if at all, at the time of an accounting. While
general principles of judicial restraint support the court's decision not
to go beyond the facts, the opinion leaves the law on this subject some20. 41 N.C. App. at 607, 255 S.E.2d at 255 (quoting J. WEBSTER, supra note 19, § 109, at 118).
21. It is important to distinguish "repairs" from the payment of taxes, insurance, or installation of improvements. Although a tenant in possession may be denied credit for the costs of
repairs, there may be an allowance for other expenditures. See Jenkins v. Strickland, 214 N.C.
441, 199 S.E. 612 (1938 ) (tenant in possession credited for improvements upon partition); Holt v.
Couch, 125 N.C. 456, 34 S.E. 703 (1899) (tenant in possession given credit upon partition for the
payment of taxes and insurance).
22. J. WEBSTER, supra note 19,,§ 109, at 118.
23. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
24. J. WEBSTER, supra note 19, § 109 (1971) (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).
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what unclear. The court's cautious approach is understandable, but is
nevertheless a source of frustration for the attorney who is unable to fit
his client's cause into the Craver mold.
B.

Land Use

In Wilcox v. Pioneer Homes, Inc.25 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals for the first time addressed the question whether an existing
violation of public restrictions on the use of real property constitutes an
encumbrance within the meaning of the covenant against encumbrances in a warranty deed.26 Defendant conveyed a house and lot to
plaintiffs by warranty deed,27 and plaintiffs subsequently entered into a
contract to sell the property. Prior to closing the sale they discovered
that the lot was narrower than the defendant had represented, in violation of a minimum side lot requirement under a city ordinance. 28 To
make the lot comply with the ordinance, plaintiffs purchased a triangular strip of property adjacent to the lot for $1,500. They then brought
this action to recover the money, alleging breach of the covenant
against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed.2 9 Determining
that the failure to comply with the restrictions did not breach the covenants in the deed, the trial court ordered summary judgment for defendant.3 °
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the existing violation
of the municipal ordinance did constitute an encumbrance on the property. 3 The general view is that an encumbrance does not arise from
32
the mere existence of a public restriction on the use of real property.
As the court pointed out, however, there is a split of authority on the
question whether an existing violation gives rise to an encumbrance.33
Courts that have found an existing violation to be an encumbrance
have done so on the theory that marketable title cannot be transferred
25. 41 N.C. App. 140, 254 S.E.2d 214 (1979).
26. See generally Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 362 § 5 (1971).

27. 41 N.C. App. at 140,254 S.E.2d at 214. Defendant agreed to convey a "good and marketable title, free of all encumbrances." Id.
28. Additionally, the house violated a restrictive covenant providing that no structure can be
located less than a certain distance from the side lines of the lot. Id. at 141, 254 S.E.2d at 214,
29. Id. at 141, 254 S.E.2d at 214.
30. Id.

31. Id. at 143, 254 S.E.2d at 216.
32. Id. at 142, 254 S.E.2d at 215 (citing Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 362 § 5 (1971); Fritts v. Gerukos,
273 N.C. 116, 159 S.E.2d 536 (1968)).
33. 41 N.C. App. at 142-43, 254 S.E.2d at 215. Compare, Lohmeyer v. Bower, 170 Kan. 442,
227 P.2d 102 (1951) (minimum side lot violation constitutes an encumbrance) with cases cited in
Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 362 § 5(b) (1971).
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when the property is threatened with the potential for fines or litigation
resulting from the violation.3 4 The mere existence of an unfavorable

ordinance, though, does not necessarily subject the property to a violation and thus an encumbrance.3 5 In distinguishing between the exist-

ence of a municipal ordinance and an existing violation of an
36
ordinance the court appears to have joined the majority viewpoint.

C.

Torrens Registration

In Richmond Cedar Works v. FarmersManufacturing Co., 3 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals for the first time addressed the ques-

tion of what constitutes adequate notice for a Torrens registration3" of
title pursuant to G.S. 43- 10. 3 In August of 1972 Samuel Chesson filed
34. In Lohmeyer v. Bower, 170 Kan. 442, 452, 227 P.2d 102, 110 (1951) the court stated:
A marketable title to real estate is one which is free from reasonable doubt, and a title is
doubtful and unmarketable if it exposes the party holding it to the hazard of litigation. . . . [W]e have little difficulty in concluding the violation . . of the ordinances
. . . as well as the violation of the restrictions. . .so encumber the title. . as to expose
the party holding it to the hazard of litigation and make such title doubtful and unmarketable.
See also, Oatis v. Delcuze, 226 La. 751, 77 So.2d 28 (1954).
35. Oatis v. Delcuze, 226 La. 751, 77 So.2d 28, 30 (1954).
36. See Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 362 (1971).
37. 41 N.C. App. 233, 254 S.E.2d 673, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 202 (1979).
38. "Torrens Law" is a specialized method of land transfer developed by Robert Richard
Torrens of Australia in the late 1850's. 6a R. POwELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 919, at 302
(rev. ed. 1979). Chapter 43 of the North Carolina General Statutes codifies the Torrens Law in
North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 43-1 to -64 (1976). The Torrens system is designed to facilitate land transfers efficiently and accurately through registration. A certificate of title is first obtained by a decree of court. The certificate gives its owner a title impregnable against any attack.
Any subsequent transfers, encumbrances, or proceedings affecting the title are then placed on the
certificate and a page of the register. The certificate, as the memorial of title, becomes the exclusive evidence of ownership. With each sale of the parcel a new certificate is issued and the old
surrendered. Thus, at any time, the certificate is the complete repository of all that may affect the
title to the land. Cape Lookout Co. v. Gold, 167 N.C. 63, 83 S.E. 3 (1914). "The basic principle of
this system is the registration of the title to land, instead of registering, as the old system requires,
the evidence of such title." State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N.W. 175 (1902)
(holding constitutional 1901 Minn. Laws, ch. 237, establishing title registration in Minnesota).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 43-10 (1976). The statute requires that notice of the petition for Torrens registration, containing a short but accurate description of the land and the relief demanded,
be published in some secular newspaper in the county where the property is located. The notice
must set forth the title of the cause and in legible or conspicuous type the words "To whom it may
concern." There is also provision for the serving of personal notice when the interested party is
ascertainable by the record. Id.
The recital in a final Torrens decree of registration that "publication of notice has been duly
made" is conclusive evidence of such publication. Any attempt to invalidate a certificate after 12
months from the time of the decree is barred by G.S. 43-26. State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 126, 179
S.E.2d 371 (1971).
State v. Johnson, however, was not controlling in this action as the 12 month period provided
in G.S. 43-26 had not yet expired. See Brief for Appellee at 6, Richmond Cedar Works v.
Farmer's Mfg. Co., 41 N.C. App. 233, 254 S.E.2d 673 (1979). Assuming, arguendo,that the wait-
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a petition and motion to have certain land registered in the Torrens
system. Chesson alleged that he had purchased the land from Richmond Cedar Works but that Richmond had lost its certificate, which
had been issued in 1928.40 Notice of the petition was published in the
Gates County Index4" and read in part: "The lands covered by said
certificate of title are descibed as follows: Being Registered Estate No.
9, Book 1, Page 33, of Gates County Public Registry, to which reference is made for a more full and complete description." 4 2 The clerk of
superior court issued the new certificate to Chesson on September 15,
1972, but on August 31, 1973, Charles Edwards filed a motion to vacate
the order, contending that the purported notice of publication was invalid and that he and the other plaintiffs held record title superior to
Chesson's.4 3 Edwards claimed that he purchased the land in question
from Richmond prior to Chesson, but that Richmond had failed to surrender its certificate at the time of the transfer. 44
Chesson defended his claim by relying on the certificate of title
issued to him by the clerk of superior court, alleging that the certificate,
once issued, was conclusive against adverse claimants.45 Chesson also
argued that Edwards' action was barred by Edwards' negligence and by
operation of the doctrine of laches. 46 The court, however, affirmed the
trial court's decision to vacate the September 15 issuance of title.47 The
trial court made its determination by relying on Rule 60 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.48
ing period had expired and that adequate notice had been given, Edwards should have lost under
the provisions and purposes of the land registration statute. See notes 51-55 and accompanying
text infra.
40. 41 N.C. App. at 233, 254 S.E.2d at 674.
41. Id. at 234, 254 S.E.2d at 675.
42. Id. at 238, 254 S.E.2d at 677.
43. Id. at 234, 254 S.E.2d at 675. Edwards and the other plaintiffs alleged that they were
bona fide purchasers for value of the land by reason of a mesne conveyance of Richmond to
Edwards. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. As a general rule a purchaser for value in good faith who relies on the certificate of
title to registered land and seeks to register his newly acquired title will be protected against any
unregistered claims to the land even though such claims may be prior in time to the purchaser's
acquisition of title. 66 AM. JUR. 2d Registration of Land Titles § 1 (1973).
46. 41 N.C. App. at 234, 254 S.E.2d at 675.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 236, 254 S.E.2d at 676. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The trial court vacated the order
of the superior court under Rule 60 (b)(1), holding that the inadequate notice led to "surprise." 41
N.C. App. at 236, 254 S.E.2d at 676. The rule permits relief for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect" from a final order if the motion is made within a year after the judgment
was entered. N.C.R. Civ. P. Rule 60 (b). The court also might have relied upon N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 43-26 (1976). The statute provides, in pertinent part:

19801

PROPERTY

1517

After affirming the order vacating Chesson's certificate of title, the
court next confronted the crucial issue of notice. G.S. 43-10 requires

that notice be published "with a short but accurate description of the
land" for valid registration.4 9 The court found the notice provided by
Chessan's registration inadequate, noting that a complete and adequate
description of the land was available to Chesson and that no reason
was shown why a fuller description was not given." It is clear, however, that a full description is not necessary, since the court indicated it
would be satisfied with notice that clearly calls the attention of adjoin-

ing landowners and other interested persons to the particular property.5 '

Having invalidated Chesson's certificate of title, the court

granted title to Edwards, the holder of a prior deed in the chain of title,
under the common source doctrine.5
The court's decision in Cedar Works reflects the frustration that
the Torrens system has encountered in this and other states. 3 Torrens
registration has been on the decline since its inception, largely as a result of sloppy administration and adverse decisions that undermine the
conclusiveness of registered title. 54 While the Cedar Works court correctly determined that the purported notice given here was inadequate,
No decree of registration hereafter entered and no certificate of title hereafter issued
pursuant thereto shall be adjudged invalid or revoked or set aside, unless the action or
proceeding in which the validity of such decree or of the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto is attacked or called in question be commenced or the defense alleging the
invalidity thereof be interposed within 12 months from the date of such decree.
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 43-10 (1976).
50. 41 N.C. App. at 239, 254 S.E.2d at 677.
51. "[W]here the notice is required to contain a short form of description of the property, it is
sufficient if it clearly calls the attention of adjoining owners or others interested to the particular
property intended and need not contain all of the elements of a full description... ..Id. at 239,
254 S.E.2d at 677 (quoting 76 C.J.S. Registration of Land Titles § 14a (1952)). A registration of
title obtained without the notice required under a Torrens act is void. 66 AM. JuR. 2d Registration
of Land Titles § 12 (1973). The importance of the notice provision of a Torrens act is apparent
when one considers that a valid registration extinguishes all unregistered claims whether or not
they are superior in a chain of title theory. In addition, the constitutionality of a Torrens statute is
linked with its statutory requirements of notice. It is a deprivation of property without due process of law to issue a certificate with inadequate publication of notice. See State ex rel Douglas v.
Westfall, 85 Minn.437, 89 N.W. 175 (1902).
52. 41 N.C. App. at 241, 254 S.E.2d at 678-79. According to the common source doctrine
whenever "'both parties claim under the same person, neither of them can deny his right, and
then, as between them, the elder is the better title and must prevail.'" Id. (quoting Gilliam v.
Bird, 30 N.C. 280, 283 (1848)). See Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 375 (1966).
53. T. Mapp, Torrens' Elusive Title, I ALBERTA L. REv. BOOK SER. 3 (1965-66) (citing Fifis,
Land Transfer Improvement: The Basic Factsand Two Hypothesesfor Reform, 38 COLO. L. REv.
431, 431-36; S.SIMPSON, LAND LAW AND REGISTRATION 71, 86-90 (1976)). Of the nineteen states
that have adopted the Torrens system, five have repealed their Torrens statutes, and in only three
states has the system enjoyed any measure of success. Id. The use of Torrens in North Carolina
has declined since its early years. 6A R. POWELL, supranote 38, § 921, at 309.
54. 6a R. POWELL, supra note 38, § 922.
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and thus that the statutory requirements of G.S. 43-10 were not met, it

could have taken the opportunity provided by these facts to strengthen
the certainty of Torrens registration. This could have been accom-

plished by indicating that had adequate notice been given, Edwards'
claim could not defeat a bona fide purchaser's reliance on a reissued

certificate of title when Edwards failed to use all available means to
secure a certificate on his purchase."

Such a statement would lend

much needed support for the Torrens concept and help avoid its further
dismantlement.
D.

Wills, Trusts, andEstates

1. Constructive and Resulting Trusts
In Cline v. Cline56 the Supreme Court of North Carolina found
plaintiff's evidence sufficient to create either a constructive or resulting

trust in realty held by her former husband. While the imposition of a
constructive trust was supported by well-settled legal principles in this
state, for the first time in North Carolina the court held that a purchase

money resulting trust could be created in favor of a person who, prior
to the delivery of the deed, promises the grantee to pay for the property

and in accordance with that promise pays the grantee the agreed upon
amount.5 7 Plaintiff alleged that while they were married, she agreed

with defendant to move onto a farm owned by his mother and had
promised him that she would contribute toward the removal of an ex-

isting mortgage on the property. In return for her promise, plaintiff
was assured by defendant that they would both take title to the property when the mortgage was paid. Shortly after they moved to the

farm, however, title was placed solely in the name of the defendant
55. See note 39 supra. See generally Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 1387 (1955). In addition, an argument can be made that even though Edwards brought a Rule 60 or G.S. 43-26 action within the 12
month limitation period, he should not prevail over Chesson in spite of his superior title. When
Edwards purchased from Richmond he apparently was aware that Richmond had originally recorded the property in the Torrens system, and he therefore should have had a new certificate
issued in his name. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 43-33, -37, -39 & -40 (1976). Even if Richmond
"failed to surrender" its certificate of title as Edwards contended, Edwards could have petitioned
the court for a certificate, Id. § 43-17.1. Edwards' failure to do so, whether intentional or negligent, left the register and certificate without a reference to the conveyance from Richmond to
Edwards and thus made possible a false reliance on either indicator of title. It is arguable, then,
that Edwards' failure to register should estop him from attacking a validly registered subsequent
conveyance. In essence, an affirmative duty to register would be placed on the purchaser. That
way, the certificate of title would be more clearly the memorial of all conveyances, and reliance on
it would be more justified.
56. 297 N.C. 336, 255 S.E.2d 399 (1979).
57. Id. at 345, 255 S.E.2d at 405.
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without plaintiffs knowledge. Several years later, after she had paid
for one-half of the mortgage and was divorced from defendant, plaintiff discovered the true nature of the title and sued for one-half interest
in the land.
One of the theories upon which plaintiff relied was a constructive
trust.5 8 The court determined that, assuming plaintiffs evidence to be
true, "defendant clearly breached this confidential relationship [of husband and wife] when he took title to the farm in his name alone after
representing to his wife that the land would be theirs jointly after the
mortgage was paid."5 9 A constructive trust arose at the time defendant
took title, and as plaintiff had fulfilled her promise to pay one-half the
mortgage, the equities remained in her favor and entitled her to enforce
the trust.60
The court found, somewhat surprisingly, that plaintiffs claim
could also be sustained on the basis of a purchase money resulting
trust. Under this theory, if both A and B pay for the property, but only
A takes title, there is a rebuttable presumption that B intended to share
in the beneficial enjoyment of the property and, therefore, a proportionate part of the property will be held in a resulting trust for B. 61 The
person alleging a resulting trust, however, must prove that he or she
furnished part of the consideration for purchase. "The general rule is
that the trust is created, if at all, in the same transaction in which the
legal title passes, and by virtue of the consideration advanced before or
at the time the legal title passes."' 62 The question that arose in Cline
was whether plaintiff had actually contributed anything toward the
purchase price of the property, or had merely aided defendant with the
mortgage payments after the sale of the property. The court determined that a resulting trust can arise if the claimant "proves a payment
on the purchase price made to the grantee or grantor after the delivery
of the deed but pursuant to a promise made to the grantee before the
deed was delivered." 63 According to the court, "There is no difference
in principle between paying money toward the purchase price at the
58. "Whenever one obtains legal title to property in violation of a duty he owes to another
who is equitably entitled to the land or an interest in it, a constructive trust immediately comes
into being." Id. at 343, 255 S.E.2d at 404.
59. Id. at 344, 255 S.E.2d at 404. Accord, V A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 499 (3d ed.

1967).
60. 297 N.C. at 344, 255 S.E.2d at 404.
61. Id. at 345, 255 S.E.2d at 405.
62. Id. at 344, 255 S.E.2d at 405.
63. Id. at 345, 255 S.E.2d at 405 (citing G. BOGART, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 456 (2d ed.

1977)).
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time of the delivery of a deed and contracting at that time to pay the
same sum later and then paying it as promised."'
While its reasons for adopting this new rule may have been sound,
the court failed to recognize that plaintiffs evidence was insufficient in
another respect to establish a resulting trust. Plaintiff never intended
for title to be put in defendant's name alone; in fact, she did not learn
of the conveyance from her mother-in-law until almost twenty-five
years later.65 In order to create a resulting trust, the person paying the
purchase price must intend to vest the grantee with legal title, while
retaining an equitable interest in the property. 66 If plaintiff was ignorant of the transfer, she could not have intended her husband to have
sole title to the property. According to one authority,
The situation is different [from a resulting trust] where A did not
consent to the use of his money in making the purchase or did not
consent to the conveyance to B. Thus if B uses A's money without
his consent in purchasing land, A can follow the money into the land
by enforcing a constructive trust. Similarly A can enforce a constructive trust where he directed B to use A's money in purchasing land in
the name of A, but B wrongfully used A's money in purchasing the
land in his own name. . . . In these cases B holds the land upon a
constructive trust rather than upon a resulting trust. His duty to surrender the property to A arises not because A intended to permit him
to have legal title but didnot intend him to have the beneficialinterest,
but because B would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to
retain the property which he has wrongfully acquired with A's
money.67
Thus, plaintiff's proof was inadequate to sustain a resulting trust along
with a constructive trust in the property, 68 even though her contributions toward the purchase price were held to relate back to the time of
transfer of title.6 9
64. Id. at 346, 255 S.E.2d at 406 (citing G. BOGART, supra note 63, § 456).
65. Id. at 339, 255 S.E.2d at 402.
66. See V A. Scorr, supra note 59, § 440.1.

67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. There are situations, however, in which it would be proper to impose both a resulting and
constructive trust. "Where A purchases property in the name of B intending that B should hold
the property in trust for A, and A was induced to do so by fraud or undue influence exercised by
B, there are grounds for imposing either a resulting trust or a constructive trust." Id.
69. It is significant to note that, although defendant took title from his mother twenty-four
years before plaintiff brought suit, the court did not find the plaintiffs claim to be barred by the
statute of limitations. "So long as an equitable owner retains possession, nothing else appearing,
the statute of limitations does not run against him. The statute begins to run only from the time
the trustee disavows the trust and knowledge of his disavowal is brought home to the cesltul que
trust.
... 297 N.C. at 348, 255 S.E.2d at 407.
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Discretionary, Protective, Spendthrift, and Support Trusts

In 1979 the North Carolina General Assembly passed an act to

70
clarify the law on the alienability of beneficial interests held in trust.
Under the new G.S. 36A- 115, equitable interests are freely transferable,
either voluntarily or involuntarily, unless those interests are created by
a discretionary trust, 7 I a support trust, 72 a protective trust 73 or any combination of the three. The act specifically repealed a former spendthrift
trust statute.7 4
Before passage of the new act, North Carolina settlors were able to
70. Law of March 22, 1979, ch. 180, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 126 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 36A-l 15 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
71. "Discretionary trust.-A trust wherein the amount to be received by the beneficiary, including whether or not the beneficiary is to receive anything at all, is within the discretion of the
trustee." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-I 15(b)(l) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
Discretionarytrust. Where by the terms of the trust a beneficiary is entitled only to
so much of the income or principal as the trustee in his uncontrolled discretion shall see
fit to give him, he cannot compel the trustee to pay him or to apply for his use any part of
the trust property. In such a case, an assignee of the interest of the beneficiary cannot
compel the trustee to pay any part of the trust property, nor can creditors of the beneficiary reach any part of the trust property.
II A. ScoTT, supra note 59, § 155 (footnotes omitted).
72. Support Trust. - A trust wherein the trustee has no duty to pay or distribute any
particular amount to the beneficiary, but has only a duty to pay or distribute to the
beneficiary, or to apply on behalf of the beneficiary such sums as the trustee shall, in his
discretion, determine are appropriate for the support, education or maintenance of the
beneficiary.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-l15(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
Trustsfor support. By the terms of the trust it may be provided that the trustee shall
pay or apply only so much of the income as is necessary for the education or support of
the beneficiary. In such a case, even though there is no provision in the trust instrument
restraining alienation of the beneficiary's interest, it is held that he cannot assign his
interest, and that his creditors cannot reach it.
II A. ScoTT, supra note 59, § 154 (footnotes omitted).
73. Protective Trust. - A trust wherein the creating instrument provides that the interest
of the beneficiary shall cease if
a. The beneficiary alienates or attempts to alienate that interest; or
b. Any creditor attempts to reach the beneficiary's interest by attachment, levy, or
otherwise; or
c. The beneficiary becomes insolvent or bankrupt.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A- 115(b)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
Forfeiturefor alienation. . . . The other way is to restrain alienation indirectly by
providing that if the beneficiary should attempt to transfer his interest or if his creditors
should attempt to reach it his interest should cease. . . . In this situation there is no
attempt by the settlor to permit the beneficiary to enjoy his interest under the trust in
spite of his assignment of his interest and in spite of his failure to pay his debts, although
there is an attempt to prevent his assignees and creditors from reaching his interest by
putting an end to his interest.
II A. ScoTT supra note 59 § 150.
74. Law of February 12, 1872, 1871-72 N.C. Pub. Laws 368 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 41-9 (1976)) (repealed 1979).

1522

NORTH CAROLINA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 58

impose very limited spendthrift restrictions on trust property. 75 Ac-

cording to a statute enacted in 1872,76 an income interest in trust could
be burdened with a disabling restraint77 to immunize it from assignment or attachment, provided that at the time the trust was created the
annual income from the property did not exceed five hundred dollars.

In addition, spendthrift trusts were permitted only to the extent the income interests were for the "support and maintenance" of close rela-

tives.7" As indicated above, the new act repealed the 1872 spendthrift
statute.79
While the repeal of the spendthrift statute may be cause for con-

cern for those settlors who wish to place their property beyond the
reach of their beneficiary's creditors, they should not overlook the other
alternatives provided by the General Assembly. Although the spendthrift trust is no longer available as a method for placing restrictions on
equitable interests, a skillful use of the other devices can clearly approximate its protective shield. One author has suggested the following
as an alternative way to control the property:
A testator provides that the income of the trust estate shall be paid to
a beneficiary, but it is provided that if he should alienate his interest
or should become bankrupt or if his creditors should seek to reach it
by attachment or other judicial process, his right to receive the income shall cease and thereupon the trustee may in his discretion apply the income for80 the benefit of the beneficiary or of some other
designated person.

Thus, through a combination of protective and discretionary trust provisions, a settlor can provide substantial protection against the beneficiary's own imprudence or creditors.
Enactment of G.S. 36A-115 and repeal of the prior spendthrift
75. "Trusts in which the interest of a beneficiary cannot be assigned by him or reached by his
creditors have come to be known as 'spendthrift trusts.'" II A. Scorr, supra note 59, § 151. The

spendthrift trust imposes a direct, or "disabling restraint" on alienation, whereas the protective
trust places an indirect or "forfeiture restraint" on alienation. See note 73 supra. The beneficiary
of a spendthrift trust retains his interest although he attempts to convey it or his creditors try to
reach it; his interest is not terminated by such attempts as is the interest of the beneficiary of the
protective trust. This is the distinction between a disabling restraint and a forfeiture restraint. See
Christopher, Spendthritand Other Restraints in Trusts. North Carolina, 41 N.CL. REV. 49 (1962).

76, Law of February 12, 1872, ch. 204, § 1, 1871-72 N.C. Pub. Laws 368 (formerly codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-9 (1976)) (repealed 1979).
77. See note 75 supra.

78. Law of Feb. 12, 1872, ch. 204, § 1, 1871-72 N.C. Pub. Laws 368 (formerly codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 41-9 (1976)) (repealed 1979).
79. Law of Mar. 22, 1979, ch. 180, § 2, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 126 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 36A-1 15 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
80. II A. ScoTr, supra note 59, § 150.
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provision is certainly consistent with the common law of this state. For
example, in the area of restraints on equitable interests, North Carolina
has typically followed English law which authorizes the use of protective trusts but not spendthrift trusts."' Therefore, the spendthrift statute might appropriately be viewed as a century-old aberration in the
North Carolina trust law that no longer exists.8 2
83
Although the decision to expressly legitimize the protective trust

and emphatically deny the spendthrift trust is consistent with North
Carolina common law, the broader question seems to be whether such
action by the legislature constitutes an acceptable compromise between
the necessarily conflicting interests of settlors and creditors in this state.
From the former's point of view, the spendthrift trust is better suited to
insure that the only beneficiary of the trust property will be the one
intended by the settlor. As far as creditors are concerned, no permissible restraint on equitable interests is the better option. There is significant merit to the settlor's argument that a person should be able to do
with his property as he pleases, and if he chooses only to enrich his
beneficiary and not an unforeseen creditor, then this desire should be
respected by the law. On the other hand, it is unfair to allow an extravagant beneficiary to enjoy an uninterrupted flow of trust income while
his creditors are made to suffer the burden of his unpaid debts. Perhaps the more equitable solution to this dilemma is the one adopted by
the General Assembly: recognition of the protective trust and prohibition against the spendthrift trust. With the protective trust a settlor can
be assured that his property will ultimately pass only to those of his
own choosing, though they may not be his first choice, and a beneficiary will not be permitted to multiply with impunity his insolvency to
the interest he holds in the trust. Thus, the new act achieves a proper
balance of the competing demands of those who are concerned with
restrictive trusts and, in any event, is much more sensible than the
watered-down spendthrift trust statute that preceded it.
3.

Intestate Succession

In Mitchell v. Freuler84 the North Carolina Supreme Court sus81. See Christopher, supra note 75, at 50-56.
82. Id. at 66.
83. Although the matter was somewhat uncertain, it was previously assumed on the basis of
dicta in several North Carolina cases that a protective trust was enforceable in this state. See
Christopher, supra note 75, at 53-54.
84. 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762 (1979).
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tained the constitutionality of G.S. § 29-19,8" which restricts the right of
an illegitimate child8 6 to inherit from his father in intestate succession.

Relying on the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Lai v.
Lali, 87 the North Carolina court did not find the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution a bar to denying illegitimate

children inheritance rights when certain prerequisites for proof of paternity are not met.
Plaintiff claimed to be the illegitimate son of William Henry
Freuler, who died intestate. Though Freuler never adopted nor legitimated plaintiff, he lived with plaintiff's mother during his last seven
years, purchased insurance policies for him, maintained savings accounts for him and had plaintiff work in his automobile shop. Although he had expressed an intention to provide for plaintiff after his
death, he died suddenly without having executed a will.88 Upon

Freuler's death, plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action 89 to invalidate G.S. 29-19 as "an invidious discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy".

. .

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 The trial

court dismissed plaintiff's case and the North Carolina Supreme Court
allowed discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31(a), 9' bypassing the
court of appeals.92

Plaintiff based his claim entirely upon the United States Supreme
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (1976 & 1979 Cum. Supp.). G.S. 29-19 and 49-12 provide for
inheritance by an illegitimate child from his father if: (1) a judicial decree determining paternity
is entered in either a civil or criminal proceeding. Id. § 29-19 (1976). (At the time Mitchell was
decided, the 1977 amendment adding the criminal proceeding to accepted methods of proving
parentage was not in effect. This did not influence the resolution of the case, however, as Freuler
was never changed with nonsupport of the plaintiff); (2) the father acknowledges paternity by a
written admission recorded in his lifetime and filed with the appropriate office of the clerk of
superior court; (3) the father acknowledges paternity in his duly probated will; (4) the intermarriage of the mother and putative father takes place at any time after the birth of the illegitimate
child. Id. § 49-12. In all other cases an illegitimate child is barred from inheriting from his father
by intestate succession.
86. See Comment, Domestic Relations-Mllegitimacyin North Carolina,46 N.C.L. REv. 813
(1968).
87. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
88. 297 N.C. at 207, 254 S.E.2d at 762.
89. The defendants in the action were Freuler's two daughters, their husbands, and Freuler's
administrator. Id.
90. Plaintiff relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977), which invoked the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to invalidate an intestate succession scheme that distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate children. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text infra.
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(a)(1969).
92. Plaintiff's prayer for relief on appeal was that the court "(1) set aside the State's intestate
succession statutes insofar as they operate to prevent plaintiff from sharing Freuler's estate equally
with his two daughters, and (2) order Freuler's administrator to distribute his net estate in equal
shares to the two daughters and plaintiff." 297 N.C. at 207, 254 S.E.2d at 763.
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Court decision in Trimble v. Gordon.93 In Trimble the Supreme Court
struck down an Illinois statute94 which provided that an illegitimate

child could not inherit from his intestate father unless the father acknowledged the child as his own and married the child's mother. In an
opinion by Justice Powell, the Court balanced the difficult problems of
proof in a paternity-related action, which might justify demanding a

higher standard of proof for illegitimates in intestate descent, against
the exclusion of significant categories of illegitimate children whose inheritance rights could be recognized without jeopardizing the state's interest in the orderly disposition of decedents' property. 9
The Court concluded that the Illinois intestacy statute unjustifiably excluded those illegitimates whose status as children of the intestate had been demonstrated in ways other than that provided by the
statute. 96 The statute thus violated the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection.97
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, found that Trimble
did not control the present action, asserting that the Illinois statute differed significantly from the North Carolina statute before the court.9"
Instead, it relied on Lalli v. Lali,9 9 a more recent Supreme Court case
93. 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (5-4 decision).
94. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1973) (amended 1976).
95. In Trimble, the putative father of the illegitimate child had neither acknowledged the
child nor married the child's mother, though he was determined to be the natural father of the
child in a judicial proceeding that ordered him to contribute towards her support. When the
father died intestate, the Illinois statute barred the illegitimate daughter from inheritance since the
father had not married the child's mother. If the daughter had been legitimate she would have
inherited the entire estate. 430 U.S. at 764.
Trimble overruled Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), in which the Court upheld the
constitutionality of Louisiana's statute excluding illegitimates completely unless the decedent left
no other descendents, ascendants, collateral relations, or wife. The five-to-four majority based'
their decision on the traditional power of the state to regulate property rights. 401 U.S. at 535.
For a discussion of the Trimble decision, see 27 DE PAUL L. REv. 175 (1977); Note, Trimble v.
Gordon and Lolli v. Lolli: Shall the Sins ofthe FatherBe Visited Upon the Sons, 48 U. CIN. L.
REv. 575 (1979). For a history of the law prior to Labine, see Krause, Equal Protectionforthe
Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. Rev. 477 (1967). See generaly Note, Illegitimacy andEqual Protection,
49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 479 (1974).
96. The Court held that a statute that places exceptional burdens on illegitimates must be
"carefully tuned to alternative considerations." 430 U.S. at 772.
97. See, e.g., Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Modelfor a New Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. Rev. 1 (1972); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protectionofthe Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341 (1949).
98. 297 N.C. at 215, 254 S.E.2d at 768. The court determined that it was the Illinois statute's
insistence on intermarriage of the mother and the intestate father that constituted the constitutional flaw. North Carolina's statute, by providing alternate means of proving paternity, avoids that
defect. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(b)(1) (1976).
99. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
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which upheld a New York statute'0 0 that also distinguished between
legitimate and illegitimate children for purposes of intestate succession.
Under the New York statute, the right to inherit depends only on proof
that a court of competent jurisdiction has made an order of filiation
declaring paternity during the lifetime of the father.' The Lal/i Court
found that the disruption of property disposition caused by difficulties
of proof in paternal inheritance by illegitimates justified the restrictions
in the New York statute,102 especially since the statute would not disqualify an unnecessarily large number of illegitimate children.' 0 3 It
distinguished Trimble by observing that the New York statute was concerned only with the accuracy and efficiency of proof of paternity,
while the Illinois statute barred illegitimates even if paternity had been
demonstrated in a judicial forum. ' Thus, the Court upheld the New
York statute even under a Trimble analysis.'0
In Mitchell the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the impact of both the Trimble and La//i decisions and determined that G.S.
29-19 manifested none of the hostility to illegitimates that plagued the
Illinois statute.0 6 Under G.S. 29-19 an illegitimate child could inherit
from his putative father upon proof of paternity by any one of the following methods: (1) a judicial decree during the life of the father; (2) a
written, acknowledged and recorded admission; (3) the father's acknowledgement of paternity in a duly executed will; and (4) the marriage of the mother and putative father after the birth of the illegitimate
child. 0 7 The court reasoned that these methods afforded the illegitimate a reasonable means to secure his intestate inheritance and yet
safeguarded the state's interest in a fair disposition of a decedent's
property and the validity of titles passing under intestate laws. 0 8
100. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967). The statute provides, in
pertinent part:
An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue inherit
from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the father,
made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child.
Id.
101. Id.
102. 439 U.S. at 268-71.
103. Id. at 272-73.
104. Id. at 273. The Court also found significant the New York court's previous liberal interpretations of § 4-1.2. Id.
105. For a good analysis of the Lalli and Trimble cases see 13 GA. L. REv. 620, 627-635
(1979). See also 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 578 (1979).
106. 297 N.C. at 215-16, 254 S.E.2d at 768.
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (1976).
108. 297 N.C. at 216, 254 S.E.2d at 768. The court noted that G.S. 29-19, like the New York
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There is no question that G.S. 29-19 avoids the pitfalls of the Illinois statute while encompassing, and probably expanding, the protection afforded by the New York statute upheld in Lalli. °9 It is
questionable, though, whether North Carolina, either legislatively or
judicially, should not have gone further in protecting the interests of
illegitimates. In Mitchell the decedent acknowledged plaintiff as his
son in all respects necessary to demonstrate his paternal status. Arguably, the state's interest in requiring speedy and efficient determination
of paternity is completely served by public acknowledgement of parentage. 0 It may be unrealistic to expect the institution of formal paternity proceedings when a child is openly acknowledged and supported

by his father.'

Further, it cannot be denied that illegitimacy is a

problem for which the child is not responsible." t2 While the Mitchell

court acted responsibly in its decision, the state must confront the difficulties inherent in this socially volatile area. Ultimately, the legislature

must remove the last obstacle to full equality among offspring.
statute, balanced the considerations of both illegitimate children and the state by (1) mitigating the
hardships of a complete bar to inheritance by illegitimates; (2) equalizing the relative positions
between legitimate and illegitimate children where practical; and (3) providing for stability in
state property dispositions. ld.
109. The North Carolina Court of Appeals noted in Outlaw v. Planter's Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 41 N.C. App. 571, 575, 255 S.E.2d 189, 191 (1979), that the "provision for this alternative
method of establishing paternity [see text accompanying note 23, supra], renders G.S. 29-19 even
more constitutionally sound, in our view, than the New York statute under review in Lalliwhich
the Court held constitutional."
110. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Lal, argued that the New York statute unconstitutionally
discriminates against illegitimates because it "excludes forms of proof which would not compromise the state's interests." 439 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Lalliall interested parties
conceded that Robert Lalli, plaintiff, was the son of Mario Lalli. Brennan asserted that when
there is no factual dispute over the relationship between the illegitimate child and the putative
father, there is no justification for denying the child his intestate share. Id.
I 11. In Lalli Justice Brennan argued:
Social welfare agencies, busy as they are with errant fathers, are unlikely to bring paternity proceedings against fathers who support their children. Similarly, children who are
acknowledged and supported by their father are unlikely to bring paternity proceedings
against them. First, they are unlikely to see the need for such adversary proceedings.
Second, even if aware of the rule requiring judicial filiation orders, they are likely to fear
provoking disharmony by suing their father. For the same reasons, mothers of such
illegitimates are unlikely to bring proceedings against the father. Finally, fathers who do
not even bother to make out wills (and thus die intestate) are unlikely to take the time to
bring formal filiation proceedings. Thus, as a practical matter, by requiring judicial filiation orders entered during the lifetime of the father, the New York statute makes it
virtually impossible for acknowledged and freely supported illegitimate children to inherit intestate.
Id. at 278.
112. Id See 46 N.C.L. REv. 813 (1968).
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4. Self-Proving Will Statute
The General Assembly recently amended," 3 and thereby improved, the "self-proving will" statute enacted in 1977.1 14 According to
this statute, evidence that a will has been duly executed can be created
by having the testator and attesting witnesses appear before a notary
public 1 5 to sign a sworn affidavit that acknowledges proper publication, attestation, and the fulfillment of all other requisites for due execution of a will.'1 6 The will is "self-proving" because it can be
admitted to probate on the strength of the accompanying affidavit without the testimony of the attesting witnesses who t7would otherwise be
required to testify following the testator's death."
Originally, the self-proving will statute contemplated two separate
documents-a will and an affidavit-with each requiring signatures by
the testator and witnesses. The new amendment has expedited the procedure by allowing a will to be "simultaneously executed, attested, and
made self-proved""II 8 with a single set of signatures by the testator and
witnesses. Although at first glance this change seems unimportant,
there is a definite advantage to the one-step method. Under the original statute, if an attesting witness overlooked the will itself and signed
only the attached affidavit, the will might or might not be valid. Perhaps the will could be saved by arguing that the witness's signature on
the affidavit was at the "end" of the will, and that it worked both to
validate the will and to make it self-proving. Indeed, there is authority
which supports the view that signing the affidavit alone is sufficient to
make the will valid." 9 On the other hand, there is a persuasive argument that the affidavit can be used only to prove pre-existing will.
Courts adopting this position have held that the operation of the self-0
proving affidavit is subject to the condition precedent of a valid will.12
113. Law of May 9, 1979, ch. 536, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 556 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 31-11.6 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
114. Law of June 29, 1977, ch. 795, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1045 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 31-11.6 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
115. The statute requires the testator and witnesses to appear before an "officer authorized to
administer oaths," which would, of course, include a notary public. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-11.6
(Cum. Supp. 1979).
116. See id. § 31-18.1(4).
117. Id. § 31-11.6(a). See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS:
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 290 (2d ed. 1978).
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-11.6(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
119. E.g., In re Leitstein's Will, 46 Misc. 2d 656, 260 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1965); Estate of Cutsinger,
445 P.2d 778 (Okla. 1968). See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 117, at 292.
120. E.g., Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966). See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON,
supra note 117, at 292.
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In light of this split of authority, it appears that the General Assembly
has made a wise decision in eliminating the unnecessary risk presented
therefore,
by a two-step self-proving will statute, and the amendment,
2
is a welcome change to the state's probate law.' 1
5.

Spousal Intestate Share

The 1979 General Assembly amended the Intestate Succession Act
22
to increase the share of a surviving spouse of an intestate decedent.'
Under the new provision, 12 3 even though the intestate is survived by
issue, the surviving spouse's share is the entire net estate provided that
it does not exceed $15,000. When the net estate is greater than that
amount, the spouse takes the first $15,000 plus one half of the remaining net estate if the intestate is survived by one child, or the issue of a
deceased child. When two or more children or the issue of two or more
children survive the intestate, the spouse will receive $15,000 plus one
third of the residuary estate. If the intestate leaves no lineal descendants and the net estate does not exceed $25,000, the spouse's inheritance
equals the entire amount, but if the net estate exceeds that amount and
the intestate is survived by one or both parents, the spouse is entitled
$25,000 in value plus one half of the balance. As before, when neither
issue nor a parent survives the intestate, the entire net estate passes to
the surviving spouse.
The new amendment represents a significant change in North Carolina intestacy law. Formerly, a surviving spouse automatically shared
in the net estate with the intestate's issue-taking one-half when there
was one lineal descendant, or one-third when there were two or more
stocks of issue-having no right to a specified minimum even though
the net estate was very small. 2 4 Similarly, the spouse was favored over
the parents only to the extent of the first $10,000 of personal property,
after which the realty and remaining personalty were divided
equally. 2 5 As indicated by the General Assembly's action, the dispositional scheme established by these prior provisions failed to implement
several important policies inherent in model intestacy legislation. As121. Under UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-504(a), a will may be simultaneously, executed, attested, and made self-proved. See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supranote 117, at 290-91.
122. Law of March 23, 1979, ch. 186, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 132 (amending N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 29-14 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-14 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
124. Law of June 10, 1959, ch. 879, § 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 886 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 29-14 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
125. Id.
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suming an intestacy statute ought to distribute the estate in a manner in
which the ordinary intestate would have desired had he left a will, there
is authority to the effect that most persons with relatively few assets
intend for their spouses to acquire the whole estate.1 26 For example,
one study sampling the distribution patterns of both living and deceased testators found that an overwhelming majority intended for
their entire estates to be left to the surviving spouse if there were no
27
lineal descendants or ancestors living at the time the will was drawn. 1
Of course the previous intestacy statute anticipated this desire, and in
this respect, has been incorporated into the present statute. More importantly, the study found that over 85% of both decedent and living
testators with surviving ancestors or issue altered the state's intestacy
plan by bequeathing all to the surviving spouse. 28 This preference for
spouse was clearly more proleaving everything to the surviving
129
nounced with the lesser estates.

Aside from more accurately approximating the presumptive intent
of most decedents, the current statute apparently better coincides with
the probable expectations of their heirs. In many cases children of an
intestate will redistribute part or all of their share to the surviving
spouse because it is the "right and proper thing to do."' 3 ° "A less charitable explanation [for children redistributing their intestate shares to
the parent] is that in depriving the surviving spouse of home and
hearth, it may be necessary for the child to assume financial and social
responsibility for the parent at a time not suitable for the child's family.' 1 3 ' Thus, it seems that in many instances the children of intestate
do not expect to ultimately share in the estate of their deceased parent
when he or she is survived by a spouse since they feel32the spouse is
morally or financially more deserving than themselves.'
Not only does the revised statute more nearly comply with the expectations of both the intestates and their heirs; it also avoids, at least in
large measure, the practical difficulties associated with distributions to
126. See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 117, at 45-47. Dunham, The Method,
Processand Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 241, 252-53 (1962).
127. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 86-89 (1970). In the
decedent sample the spouse was bequeathed the entire estate in 33 out of 37 cases. In the living
testator population the figures were 34 and 39 respectively. Id.
128. Id. at 89. See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra, note 117, at 45-47,
129. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, supra note 127, at 89-90.
130. Id. at 127.
131. Id. at 128.
132. Id.
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minor children. 3 3 If a minor child inherits property that requires active management or some type of title recordation to make it marketable, as in the case of real estate, it may be necessary to appoint a
guardian over the child's property. Appointment of a guardian is

costly in terms of time and money, and the guardian's investment powers are severely restricted,' 4 all of which seems unwarranted if the intestate's estate is fairly small. Under the new intestacy law, however,
such problems do not arise when the net estate is no greater than
$15,000, since title will vest completely in the surviving spouse and
there will be no need to appoint a guardian. 3 Although the intestate's
minor children are formally denied any portion of the estate if it is less
than $15,000, they will nevertheless indirectly benefit from the decedent's property because of the surviving parent's obligation to provide

support for the children. In addition to giving the spouse sole responsibility over the net estate until the $15,000 threshold is exceeded, the
statute offers a method for hurdling certain pitfalls created when the
minors are entitled to share in the property. If others are to participate
in the net estate, the spouse may elect the portion of the decedent's
property, whether real or personal, that will be used to satisfy his or her
fractional share.'3 6 Thus, the spouse can choose to take the property

that demands adult supervision or that presents possible title problems,
and the minors will consequently receive the more easily managed as-

sets of the estate. The family residence is a particularly good example
133. See Id. at 131-32:
It appears that the law governing inheritance of minors, although it has good intentions
in trying to protect the rights of children, causes incalculable difficulties for parents in
both psychic and monetary costs. The parent is caught in a maze of legal requirements
that not only are expensive in time and money but also potentially threaten his relationship with the child or children.
Id. at 133.
134. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-12 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (requirement to post bond); id. § 33-31
(court approval necessary to sell minor's estate).
135. Id. § 29-14(a), (b).
136. If. . . the surviving spouse is not entitled to the entire net estate, the surviving
spouse may elect to take his or her share wholly in personal property, wholly in real
property, or partly in personal property and partly in real property in such proportions
as the surviving spouse may elect.
Id. § 29-14(e). There is perhaps some ambiguity in the phrase "in such proportions as the surviving spouse may elect." One can imagine a strict interpretation which would only permit a spouse
to designate the percentages of realty or personalty that will be used to satisfy his or her share
(e.g., 50% real and 50% personal property), leaving the final disposition of specific assets to the
administrator. This construction, however, is clearly inconsistent with the purpose of granting the
spouse selection over the property in the first place. Surely the legislature did not intend for the
administrator to have the ability to intervene in a spouse's preference for a particular piece of
property. As such, the administrator's acquiescence should not be required before a spouse can
elect to take the decedent's house, or other property, which may have unique practical or sentimental value to him or her.
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of the kind of property over which the spouse would prefer to have the
flexibility of possessing the entire fee, whether for the purpose of selling
to a third party or avoiding the administrative task of having the minor
children redistribute their interests to their parent, and thus is an ideal
asset over which the spouse could exercise the power of selection., 37
The rewriting of the intestacy provisions for the surviving spouse
has brought about desirable changes in the operation of family inheritances. As a result of this revision, the law will conform more closely to
the desires of the decedent and his or her dependents and will eliminate
at least some of the hardship on the surviving spouse when the intestate
has left minor children. Thus, the amendment is an evident improvement to former intestacy statutes.' 38
6.

Spouse's Right of Dissent

In Phillips v. Phillips139 the North Carolina Supreme Court rendered an elaborate opinion detailing the many valuation problems encountered in determining whether a "second or successive" spouse may
dissent to a decedent's will under G.S. 30-114 ° and thereby receive a
statutory share. The court undertook a step-by-step examination of the
various effects that several common estate expenses have upon the
spouse's right to a forced share. After an exhaustive attempt to transform G.S. 30-1 into a workable provision, the court called upon the
General Assembly to adopt a simpler procedure for the protection of
the disinherited spouse.' 4 '
No children were born during the marriage of plaintiff and testator
in Phillps,but decedent was survived by a child from a prior marriage.
Testator devised his entire estate to his child and two grandchildren
42
and designated plaintiff as his beneficiary in a life insurance policy. 1
The decision by the trial court to grant plaintiff an elective share of the
net estate was affirmed by the court of appeals, 4 but reversed and
remanded by the supreme court. 44
137. It also should be mentioned that the election provision quite appropriately gives the mar-

ital partner first choice over the net estate when the decedent is survived by parents, Id.
138. Section 29-14 is very similar to UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102. Under that provision

the spouse takes the first $50,000 plus one half the balance of the net estate, if the intestate is
survived by issue or parents.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

296 N.C. 590, 252 S.E.2d 761 (1979).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1976).
296 N.C. at 604-07, 252 S.E.2d at 770-72.
Id. at 592, 252 S.E.2d at 763.
34 N.C. App. 428, 238 S.E.2d 790 (1977), rev'd, 296 N.C. 590, 252 S.E.2d 761 (1979).

144. 296 N.C. 590, 252 S.E.2d 761 (1979).
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Plaintiff sought to establish her right to dissent under G.S. 301(a)(1).14 5 This statute allows the spouse to dissent to the testator's will
in those cases "where the aggregate value of the provisions under the

will for the benefit of the surviving spouse," when combined with the

"property passing in any manner outside the will to the surviving
spouse. . . is less than the intestate share of such spouse."'14 6 Thus, in
order to sustain plaintiff's right to a forced share the court would have
had to find that the value of the insurance proceeds-the only property
passing to the spouse either inside or outside decedent's will-was less
than the value of one half the decedent's net estate-the amount to

which plaintiff would have been entitled had the property passed by
intestacy.' 4 7 Since the insurance proceeds were readily discernible, the

critical determination in this case was the value of the spouse's intestate
share in the net estate. The court's initial concern, therefore, was to
determine the value of the "net estate" so that the spouse's intestate
share could be ascertained and balanced against the figure payable on
the insurance policy.
Section 29-2(5) of the Intestate Succession Act defines "net estate"
as "the estate of a decedent, exclusive of family allowances, costs of
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a)(1) (1976).
146. Id. Actually G.S. 30-1(a)(3) is more directly applicable to the facts of Phillips than is
G.S. 30-1(a)(1), since the former provides that the spouse may dissent when the property taken
under and outside the testator's will
[is less than the one half of the amount provided by the Intestate Succession Act in those
cases where the surviving spouse is a second or successive spouse and the testator has

surviving him lineal descendents by a former marriage and there are no lineal
descendents surviving him by the second or successive marriage.
Id. § 30-1(a)(3). Under this subsection the insurance proceeds would only had to have been
greater than one half, as opposed to the whole, of the spouse's intestate share in order to defeat her
right of dissent. Since the decedent in Phillips died before the effective date of subsection (3),
however, it was held to be inapplicable. 296 N.C. at 596, 252 S.E.2d at 765.
Subsection (3) was apparently enacted to eliminate an anomaly in North Carolina elective
share provisions. Prior to the amendment adding this subsection the "second or successive"
spouse had a right to dissent if the value of the property passing to him or her upon the death of
the testator (whose descendants were all from a prior marriage) was less than an entire spousal
intestate share. A "second or successive" spouse who did dissent to the will, however, was only
entitled to receive one half of his or her normal intestate share. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(b). Thus,
in a case such as Phillips in which the decedent died prior to the enactment of subsection (3) of
G.S. 30-1(a), the spouse merely had to demonstrate that he or she had taken less than his or her
ordinary intestate share upon the death of testator to have a right to dissent to the will, but upon
exercise of that right, his or her actual distributive share would be limited to one half of his or her
intestate share.
147. At the time of this case the share of a surviving spouse was equal to one half of the net
estate when the intestate was survived by only one child. The statute has since been amended,
however, to allow the spouse the first $15,000 and one half of the remaining net estate when the
decedent leaves one child. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-14(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979). But see id. § 30-3(b),
discussed in note 146 supra.
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administration, and all lawful claims against the estate."' 14 8 As a preliminary matter, the supreme court held the court of appeals to be in
gross estate the widow's
error in failing to deduct from the decedent's
14 9
allowance and the costs of administration.
Perhaps the most difficult issue addressed in Phillips,however, was
the proper treatment of the federal estate tax as one of the "lawful
claims against the estate." The parties in this action had apparently
computed the federal estate tax on the premise that the estate would be
distributed in conformity with testator's will. In contrast the court held
"that the estimate required by G.S. 30-(1)(a) is not an estimate of the
actual tax which will be paid on the estate but rather an estimate of the
tax which would be paid if plaintiff received the share of the 'net estate'
specified by G.S. 30-1(a)(1) ... .5 In other words, to calculate the
net estate for forced share purposes an estimate of the federal estate tax
is deducted from the gross estate, such estimate being computed without regard to the testator's will and as though he had died intestate.' 5'
If the estate tax is to be projected on the assumption of intestacy, the
executor must necessarily determine the spouse's intestate share to allow for "any marital deduction the estate would receive as a result of
her taking that share."' 5 2 Under this formula there is a potential valuation problem encountered in computing the decedent's "net estate"-whether actually for the purpose of intestacy or when intestacy is assumed for the purpose of establishing the right to dissent-when the
estate tax must be deducted prior to allotting the spouse's fractional
share. If the spouse takes only a fraction of the net estate and the value
of that share after taxes will fall below the maximum allowable marital
deduction, i 3 then the problem posed for figuring the net estate is one
of circular mathematics. First, one must know the value of the spouse's
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-2(5) (1976).
149. 296 N.C. at 600, 252 S.E.2d at 767 (1979). Although the parties had agreed that the case
should be decided upon the uncontroverted facts, the court nonetheless found itself compelled to
remand the case on the issue of administration costs since no estimate of those costs had been
included in the stipulation. The court pointed out that the estimate should encompass executor's

commissions, reasonable management costs and attorney's fees. Id. at 602, 252 S.E.2d at 768-69.
150. Id. at 601, 252 S.E.2d at 768.
151. But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(a) (1976) (distributive share of dissenting spouse, except
that of a "second or successive" spouse, is not reduced by federal estate tax even though in establishing his or her right to dissent under G.S. § 30-1(a)(1) the estate tax is considered).
152. 296 N.C. at 601, 252 S.E.2d at 768.
153. In general, the maximum marital deduction allowable is the greater of(l) $250,000, or (2)
50% of the value of the adjusted gross estate. 26 U.S.C. § 2056(c)(1)(A) (1976). The "adjusted
gross estate" as defined in id. § 2056(c)(2)(A) is generally the gross estate minus deductions for
expenses, indebtedness, certain taxes under id. § 2053 and certain losses enumerated in id. § 2054.
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share in the net estate to determine the proper marital deduction and
consequent estate tax liability. In order to calculate the exact value of
the spouse's share, though, one must first decide on the correct marital
deduction and resulting tax on the gross estate.' 54 Stated differently,
computing the net estate may be difficult in some cases "since the
amount of the [marital] deduction will depend on the amount of the tax
and the amount of the tax will depend upon the amount of the deduction, with the result that there will be two mutually dependent indeterminates."155
To illustrate the problem, suppose the maximum marital deduction that can be allowed for a decedent's estate is one half of the adjusted gross estate, 56 and assume further that the surviving spouse is
entitled by the intestacy statutes to one half of the net estate. If one
half of the adjusted gross estate is used as the value of the spouse's
share, then by definition the marital deduction will equal that amount,
leaving the remaining one half of the estate fully taxable. Once this tax
reduces the estate the spouse will not receive one half of the adjusted
gross estate as previously assumed, but something less. To be more
specific, the spouse's share will equal one half of the adjusted gross
estate minus one half of the tax imposed upon the estate. Since the
spouse's share after taxes will necessarily be less than one half of the
adjusted gross estate, it is apparent that it was initially improper to use
that figure as a basis for the marital deduction. 5 7 Of course, the problem does not arise if the value of after-tax property passing to the surviving spouse will clearly exceed the maximum allowable marital
deduction, since the deduction will be fixed at that maximum and can
therefore be determined prior to fixing the spouse's intestate share.' 8
For example, suppose a decedent's adjusted gross estate is valued at
$1,000,000 and the spouse is entitled to the entire net estate. Here, the
marital deduction will be $500,000, but the spouse's share will be
greater than $500,000.'
While the estate tax will affect the spouse's
154. See id. § 2056(b)(4)(A) (effect of death taxes, both state and federal, is taken into account
in determining the value of the interest passing to the surviving spouse in order to assess the
amount of the marital deduction).
155. C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. MCCORD, ESTATE & GiFT TAXES § 17.4 (3d ed. 1974).
156. See note 153 supra.
157. For a solution to this problem see Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b) - 4(c)(4) (1958), which explains that "Imlethods of computing the deduction, under such circumstances, are set forth in
supplemental instructions to the estate tax return."
158. See C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCORD, supra note 155, § 17A.
159. The spouse's share will in fact equal $500,000 (tax free) plus $500,000 minus the applicable tax on $500,000.
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share, it will not affect the marital deduction as it is evident at the outset that the spouse will take more than one half of the adjusted gross
estate. Thus, in this case, the marital deduction would not be dependent on a precise computation of the spouse's share, and therefore, the
amount of the marital deduction could be calculated and deducted in
advance of distributing the spouse's portion of the net estate.
Although the federal estate tax should be deducted from the gross
estate, the court refused to allow a deduction for the interest and penalities owed because of the filing of a late estate tax return.16 0 While
these charges may be "lawful claims against the estate" and may affect
the actual distributive share of a dissenting spouse once a dissent is
allowed, the court held that they cannot initially reduce the decedent's
"net estate" to defeat the spouse's right of dissent.16 1 "The legislature
could not have intended to confer upon executors the power to extinguish any potential right to dissent merely by delaying the filing of an
estate tax return, or payment of the principal of the debt, until interest
and penalty charges sufficiently erode the 'net estate.' ,,162 Apparently
the reasonableness of the delay in filing a prompt tax return is immaterial in establishing the spouse's right to an elective share. The court
assumed that delay would usually be unnecessary and concluded,
therefore, that in an estimation of the "net estate" for purposes of G.S.
t63
30-1(a)(1), penalties and interest should not be considered.
Finally, the court addressed the question of when the right to dissent should be determined. In repudiating the conclusion reached by
the court of appeals that the right to an elective share could not be
"finally established until 'net estate' is ascertained,"' 61 the supreme
court held that the surviving spouse's right to dissent should be determined whenever "the value of the 'net estate' can be estimated with
160. 296 N.C. at 601, 252 S.E.2d at 768.
161. Id. Note the distinction between establishing the spouse's right to dissent under G.S. 30I and his or her distributive share under G.S. 30-3 once a dissent has been made. See note 146
supra.
162. 296 N.C. at 601, 252 S.E.2d at 768.
163. Id. On a related issue the court held that "for the limited purpose of determining plaintiff's right to dissent," the attorney's fees generated in litigation over the determination of this right
cannot be used to diminish the "net estate." A reasonable prediction of attorney's fees that will be
incident to the costs of administration should be used in arriving at an estimate of the "net estate,"
but the actual, and perhaps extraordinary attorney's fees caused by litigation over a spouse's right
to dissent are not deductible from the "net estate." Again, while the litigation fees may lessen the
surviving spouse's distributive share if he or she is found to have a right to dissent, they cannot
reduce his or her "intestate share" in the first instance to destroy his or her right to dissent. Id. at
603, 252 S.E.2d at 769.
164. 34 N.C. App. at 433, 238 S.E.2d at 793.
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reasonable accuracy."' 6 5 Thus, much of the troublesome mathematics
involved in computing the "net estate" can be alleviated by reasonable
estimates of the estate tax that would be due had there been intestacy,
the costs of administration and reasonable attorney's fees, the outstanding claims of creditors, and any other customary charges against the
gross estate. Still, the court realized that there was no perfect solution
to the problems created by the dissent statute. "While the use of an
estimated 'net estate' may work well where that right to dissent is clearcut, it will inevitably cause problems in cases such as this one where
that right is closely contested."' 6 6 A possible legislative remedy proposed by the court was to grant an unqualified right of dissent to the
surviving spouse and thereby avoid the necessity of estimating his or
her intestate share of the net estate and measuring it against the property taken inside and outside the will. Clearly some type of legislative
relief seems appropriate. 167
7.

Trust Termination

In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Sevier,'6 8 a decision by the trial
court to terminate prematurely a trust at settlor's request on the finding
that the settlor was the sole beneficiary of the trust was reversed by the
court of appeals. The terms of the trust granted the income interest to
settlor for life, with the trust corpus to be distributed upon settlor's
death to her issue per stripes. In addition, settlor retained a general
testamentary power of appointment over the trust principal and had
explicitly stated in the trust instrument that the transfer was irrevocable. Settlor and her children, all of whom were of capacity, petitioned
the court to authorize termination of the trust in order to permit an
alternative disposition of the property which would avoid the enormous estate tax liability posed by the inflexible trust agreement. 169 The
guardian ad litem, who had been appointed on behalf of the minor
165. 296 N.C. at 604, 252 S.E.2d at 770 (emphasis added).
166. Id.
167. Id. In an interesting commentary, the court expressed dissatisfaction with the current
dissent statute and advocated the adoption of a provision similar to the "augmented estate" provision of UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-201 to -207. See 296 N.C. at 606 n.2, 252 S.E.2d at 771 n.2.

Under this approach the testator cannot disinherit the spouse by removing assets from his or her
probate estate and thereby make the spouse's right to an elective share meaningless, nor can the
surviving spouse disrupt the decedent's dispository plan if he or she has been adequately provided
for either through or aside from the will.
168. 41 N.C. App. 762, 255 S.E.2d 636 (1979).
169. Plaintiff estimated that over one million dollars in federal estate taxes could be saved
with the proper use of deductions precluded by the irrevocable trust. Id. at 763-64, 255 S.E.2d at
639.
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grandchildren and unborn lineal descendants, filed an appeal from the

trial court's judgment to revoke the trust.
The court of appeals concluded that the settlor was not the sole
beneficiary, since she had granted a remainder in the trust to her issue
per stroes. Settlor's issue held protected interests, the court observed,
even though the settlor had reserved a general testamentary power of

appointment which could be exercised to exclude the remaindermen
the settlor was precluded from uniupon her death. 170 Consequently,
17
laterally revoking the trust.
Since the settlor was not the sole beneficiary of the trust, the court
was required to decide whether the trust could be discontinued by the
settlor with the consent of the other beneficiaries. It held that consent

could not be given by any of the beneficiaries and, therefore, there
could be no early termination of the trust. According to the court,
"[e]ffective consent may be given by a beneficiary in being, competent,
and possessing an indefeasibly vested interest in the trust estate."172
Under this standard those remaindermen who were unborn obviously
could not release their interests in the trust; the settlor's minor

grandchildren were unable to consent because they lacked legal capacity; and although the children and the grandchildren who were of majority agreed to the termination, they too were held incapable of giving

consent because
none possessed "an indefeasibly vested interest in the
173
trust estate."'

While the court's holding is correct on these particular facts, it
misstated the applicable law. In order to render effective consent the

beneficiary must be competent, in being, and ascertainable,

74

but he

170. Id. at 765, 255 S.E.2d at 639 (citing II A. ScoTr, supra note 59, § 127.1).
"If he has a general power of appointment by deed, however, he can make an appointment to
a new beneficiary, thereby excluding the original beneficiaries, and may then, with the consent of
the beneficiary to whom the appointment is made, revoke the trust." IV A. ScowT, supra note 59,
§ 340. Of course the settlor in Sevier retained only a testamentary power of appointment.
171. The court also found N.C. GEM. STAT. § 39-6 (1976) to be inapplicable. 41 N.C. App. at
765, 255 S.E.2d at 639-40. G.S. 39-6 provides that a settlor of a voluntary trust may revoke the
future contingent interests of "persons not in esse or not determined until the happening of a
future event" so long as the revocation is made prior to the vesting of the future estates. Since the
remaindermen in Sevier were either unborn, unascertainable, or both, G.S. 39-6 would seemingly
apply, but the statute further provides that "this section shall not apply to any instrument hereafter executed creating such a future contingent interest when said instrument shall expressly state in
effect that the grantor, maker, or trustor may not revoke such interest." d. As noted above, the
settlor in Sevier had explicitly relinquished her power of revocation in the trust instrument.
172. 41 N.C. App. at 765, 255 S.E.2d at 639.
173. Id.
174. See IV A. Scorr, supra note 59, § 340.
[I]f the settlor is not the sole beneficiary of the trust because there is a vested or contin-
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Of course, in

most cases a beneficiary who is ascertainable will also have a vested
interest, but this is not always the case. 176 For example, suppose settlor

creates a trust with income to himself for life, then upon settlor's death,
to A and his heirs if A has reached age thirty before settlor dies. Assuming A is of majority and in good mental health, he and settlor

should be capable of voluntarily terminating the trust since they are the
gent gift over to others, he cannot revoke the trust without their consent, and if any one
of them is under an incapacity, or is not ascertained,or is unborn, the settlor cannot re-

voke the trust.
Id. (emphasis added).
175. 41 N.C. App. at 765, 255 S.E.2d at 639. The primary authority cited by the court, Smyth
v. McKissick, 222 N.C. 644, 24 S.E.2d 621 (1943), was taken largely out of context and provides
little support for the proposition that a beneficiary's interest in trust must be "indefeasibly vested"
before he is capable of releasing it. The controversy in Smyth did not concern a premature termination of trust; the issue was whether a remainderman could devise his equitable interest when it
was vested subject to total divestiture. Greatly simplified, the essential facts in Smyth were: Testator devised property in trust, giving A an income interest during the life of B, then upon the
death of B, the corpus of the trust to A in fee. Testator's will further provided that A's children
would take if A predeceased B. A died before the income interest terminated and was survived by
his wife and child. A had devised his equitable interest to his wife. On these facts the court in
Smyth indicated merely that as a general rule, trust beneficiaries who are suijuris and whose
rights are vested may ordinarily dispose of their equitable interests in the trust property. "[Blut
where the interest of a beneficiary is made defeasible upon his dying with children to whom the
interest passes by substitution," the beneficiary may not dispose of his equitable interest by devising it to another. Id. at 652,24 S.E.2d at 627. Thus, in Smyth, a beneficiary without an indefeasibly vested interest was found incapable of devising it once the condition subsequent had occurred.
It does not follow, however, that a beneficiary's interest must necessarily be indefeasibly vested
before it is alienable. In fact, the court went on to hold that the contrary was true.
After its discussion on the devisability of vested interests, the Smyth court proceeded to state
the law applicable to the disposition of contingent interests. The court drew a distinction between
those contingencies which rendered the identity of the takers uncertain, and those which created a
condition precedent to the vesting of interests held by ascertainable takers. See note 176 infra. In
order to illustrate a valid devise of a contingent interest, the court cited Fisher v. Wagner, 109 Md.
243, 71 A. 999 (1909), with approval. In Fisher there had been a conveyance basically of the form,
"to A and her heirs, but in the event she dies without children, to B and his heirs." B predeceased
A and devised his interest to his wife. The Supreme Court of Maryland held the bequest to be
valid since the person to take in the event A died childless was certain. Thus, the holding in
Fisher was that a beneficiary can alienate his contingent interest so long as he is ascertainable.
Ironically, by adopting the decision in Fisher,Smyth more nearly supports the proposition that a
trust beneficiary may give consent to terminate his interest, whether contingent or vested, provided
he is ascertainable, than the contention announced in Sevier that a beneficiary's interest has to be
"indefeasibly vested" before he can consent to an early termination of trust.
176. See T.

BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS

76 (1966):
Having said that a remainder is vested -when (a) there is no condition precedent to the
estate becoming a present estate except the natural expiration of estates which are prior
to it in possession, and (b) the person or persons who will be entitled to possession if the
estate becomes present are ascertainable, we can now define a contingent remainder as a
remainder which lacks one or both of the characteristics of a vested remainder. A contingent remainder is one which is either subject to a condition precedent (in addition to the
natural expiration of prior estates), or one owned by unascertainable persons, or both.
(emphasis in original).
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only two persons who possibly could be beneficially interested in the
trust property.177 Notice that A is an ascertainable beneficiary, although he has only a contingent interest. Under the test for consent
formulated by the court, A would not be able to consent to early termination of the trust because he does not have an "indefeasibly vested
interest."'17s Thus, while it is true that a remainderman vested in interest will always be ascertainable, it does not follow that a remainderman
with a contingent interest will always be unascertainable, and as the
example above demonstrates, the power to consent should depend on
whether the beneficiary can be determined and not whether his interest
is vested or contingent.
As for the parties in Sevier, of course, it was of no consequence
that the court focused on the "indefeasibility of the interest" rather
than the "ascertainability of the beneficiary" to decide whether the remaindermen were capable of extinguishing their rights in the trust.
Since the corpus of the trust was given to settlor's issueper szr#pes, the
remaindermen were neither indefeasibly vested in interest nor ascertainable beneficiaries. The real problem with Se;'ier is that it may be
used as precedent against a settlor and his contingent, yet ascertainable,
beneficiaries who want to terminate a disadvantageous trust. Should
such a case arise in the future, it is evident that the terms "indefeasibly
vested remainderman" and "ascertainable remainderman" should not
be used interchangeably.
8. Widow's Allowance
In re Brown 179 presented the court of appeals with a question as
yet unanswered by any controlling authority, on the widow's allowance
provisions outlined in G.S. 30-15.110 The court determined that the
177. "But where the settlor and all the beneficiaries are of full capacity and consent, there
seems to be no good reason why they should not have power to make such disposition of the trust
property as they choose." IV A. Sco'rr, supra note 59, § 338 (emphasis added).
178. 41 N.C. App. at 765, 255 S.E.2d at 639. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6 (1976), discussed at note 171 supra. Section 39-6 may be illustrative of the notion that in order to give
consent to trust termination the beneficiary need only be ascertainable, but not necessarily vested
in interest. This section allows the settlor to revoke the future interest of a beneficiary who is
either unborn or unascertainable, but it does not authorize the settlor to terminate the interest of a
contingent beneficiary if he is ascertainable. Apparently the legislature realized that it is possible
to obtain consent from a contingent, determined beneficiary, whereas by definition it is impossible
to obtain consent from persons who are not in esse or unascertained. Thus, the clear inference is
that the line of distinction to be drawn between those who can consent and those who cannot is
whether they are ascertainable, not whether they have contingent or vested interests.
179. 40 N.C. App. 61, 251 S.E.2d 905 (1979).
180. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-15 (1976) provides:
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widow's year's allowance was not chargeable against the proceeds of a
life insurance policy and joint bank account, notwithstanding testator's
attempt to make the funds part of his probate estate.
Upon testator's death, his widow received the proceeds of a life
insurance policy and a joint bank account. Testator bequeathed onesixth of his net estate to the surviving spouse, with the direction that
any property passing by right of survivorship or from proceeds of life
insurance was to be considered part of his "estate" in calculating her
share. The ultimate effect of this provision was to deprive the spouse
from taking any of decedent's personal property. The magistrate accepted the widow's application for a year's allowance and granted payment from the deceased's estate, in spite of the executor's protest that
the amount provided for in testator's will exceeded the maximum
year's allowance, and that the widow, therefore, was not entitled to
anything under G.S. 30-15. The executor relied principally upon statutory language, applicable in cases of testacy, that the allowance must
"be charged against the share of the surviving spouse."18 Despite the
executor's tenacious efforts to deprive the widow of her yearly allowance, the superior court affirmed the magistrate's decision.'8 2
In a somewhat inconsistent style of statutory construction, relying
initially on the plain meaning of G.S. 30-15 and then attempting to
discern legislative intent, the court of appeals concluded that the surviving spouse was entitled to her allowance. First, the court noted that
the statute required the allowance to be paid from the "personal property of the deceased spouse." Since the insurance proceeds and the
money in the joint bank account were not included in "personal property of the deceased spouse," neither could reduce the widow's allowance.18 3 Actually, the proceeds and account were the widow's own
personal property, created and transmitted by contracts unaffected by
testator's will. Second, although G.S. 30-15 provides that the widow's
allowance must be charged against the spouse's legacy, the court refused to believe that "the General Assembly intended that if the testaEvery surviving spouse of an intestate or of a testator, whether or not he has dissented from the will, shall, unless he has forfeited his right thereto as provided by law, be
entitled, out of the personal property of the deceased spouse, to an allowance of the
value of two thousand dollars ($2,000) for his support for one year after the death of the
deceased spouse. Such allowance shall be exempt from any lien, by judgment or execution, acquired against the property of the deceased spouse, and shall, in cases of testacy,
be charged against the share of the surviving spouse.
181. Id.
182. 40 N.C. App. at 63, 251 S.E.2d at 906.
183. Id. at 62, 251 S.E.2d at 906.
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tor left a will under the terms of which the surviving spouse received

nothing from his personal property, that the spouse was deprived of an
allowance."' i

4

Nor did it believe "the General Assembly intended that

if the deceased left a will under the terms of which the surviving spouse
received only what she would have received by law as her own prop-

erty, that the surviving spouse is deprived of an allowance from the
deceased's personal property."' 85 Thus, property that does not pass
under decedent's will cannot affect the determination of the widow's

allowance, even if testator has expressed an intention to include such
property as part of his probate estate.
. Zoning
In a case of first impression, 8 6 the North Carolina Supreme Court
inA-S-PAssociates v. City ofRalegh tI7 upheld the validity of a historic
district preservation ordinance,' 8 8 adopted pursuant to G.S. § 160A395,189 in the face of challenges on constitutional and statutory
grounds. 190 The decision aligns North Carolina with an increasing
184. Id. at 63, 251 S.E.2d at 906.
185. Id.
186. Governmental regulation of private property for the purpose of historic preservation,
however, is by no means a novelty within North Carolina. In 1965 the City of Winston-Salem
passed a comprehensive zoning ordinance to create the Old Salem Historic Preservation District.
See Law of May 12, 1965, ch. 504, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 561 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-395 to -399 (1971)).
187. 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
188. RALEIGH, N.C., CODE, §§ 24-57 to -57.8 (1959). The ordinance established an historic
district in the City's Oakwood neighborhood, created Raleigh's Historic District Commission, formulated architectural standards for the Commission in its administration of the Oakwood Ordinance and provided civil and criminal penalties for non-compiance. The ordinance required
compliance with the pre-existing, underlying zoning regulations as well as the new historic district
standards. A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. at 211, 258 S.E.2d at 447.
189. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-395 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute authorizes municipalities to designate historic districts within an area as part of an enacted zoning ordinance. Such
an ordinance may treat historic districts as either separate use-district classifications or as districts
which overlap other zoning areas. Before it may designate one or more historic districts, a municipality must establish an historic district commission or make alternative arrangements as permitted by G.S. 160A-396. Id. § 160A-396. Once the commission is established, G.S. § 160A-397
provides guidelines for the enforcement of an historic districts zoning ordinance. See id. § 160A397.
190. Associates made five separate major challenges to the ordinance. First, they alleged that
the ordinance deprived them of property without due process of law. 298 N.C. at 213, 258 S.E.2d
at 448. Second, they contended that the ordinance was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Id. at 218, 258 S.E.2d at 451. Third, Associates argued that the exclusion from the
historic district of nearby property owned by the North Carolina Medical Association denied
Associates equal protection of the law. Id. at 224, 258 S.E.2d at 455. Fourth, they argued that the
ordinance was not enacted in accordance with G.S. 160A-383, which requires a comprehensive
zoning plan. Id. at 228, 258 S.E.2d at 457. Finally, they contended that the zoning regulations
were not "made with reasonable consideration, among other things, as to the character of the

1980]

number of jurisdictions'

PROPERTY
91 that

1543

accept the use of a state's police power

to regulate private property in the interest of historic preservation.1 92 It

further sustains the power of municipal governing bodies to delegate
zoning responsibilities to appointed commissions.' 93
On June 3, 1975, the city of Raleigh adopted two ordinances

amending the city's zoning plan to create an historic district1 94 in the
city's Oakwood Neighborhood, "a twenty-block area representing the

only intact nineteenth century neighborhood remaining in Raleigh."' 95
The ordinances were adopted pursuant to G.S. §§ 160A-395 to -399,196
which authorize municipalities to designate historic districts and lay
down guidelines for that purpose. Associates, owners of a vacant lot 97
district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses" in contravention of G.S. 160A-383. Id. at
230, 258 S.E.2d at 459.
191. See Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1397 (1972); Comment, Historic PreservationCases: A Collection, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 227 (1976). Historic district legislation similar to the provisions of
G.S. 160A-395 to -399 has now been enacted by at least thirty-nine states. Beckwith, Developments
in the Law o/Historic Preservationand a Refqection on Liberty, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 93, 95
n.18 (1976); Wilson and Winkler, The Response ofState Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36
LAW AND CONTEMP. PRo13. 329 (1971). More than 500 cities and towns have passed local
landmark or historic district ordinances. IV HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND THE LAW, ch. 5, at 3
(1978).
192. See, eg., J. MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 16 (1965); Note, Land Use Controls in HistoricAreas, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 379 (1969).
193. 298 N.C. at 218-24, 258 S.E.2d 451-55. The contention that an architectural zoning ordinance is unlawful because it delegates legislative power to an administrative body is a common
objection to such ordinances. Courts, however, have uniformly rejected the argument. See Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1397 § 5 (1972).
194. 298 N.C. 209, 258 S.E.2d at 446.
195. Id. at 210, 258 S.E.2d at 446 (quoting Survey and Planning Unit Division of Archives
and History of North Carolina Dept. of Cultural Resources, Statement of Significance for inclusion in National Register of Historic Places). The neighborhood is composed of Victorian houses
built between the Civil War and 1914. The area contains a great variety of Victorian architectural
styles representing the middle class tastes of its initial owners as well as the skill of local architects
and builders. The Division of Archives and History of the Department of Cultural Resources
concluded, "Oakwood is a valuable physical document of Southern suburban life during the last
quarter of the nineteenth century." 298 N.C. at 210, 258 S.E.2d at 446.
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-395 to -399 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979). After the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the superior court's summary judgment order in favor of defendant, 38 N.C. App. 271, 247 S.E.2d 800 (1978), the North Carolina General Assembly amended
these statutes to clarify their purpose and strengthen their legality. The amendments, inter alia,
provided for subsequent changes in an historic district, defined "historic district," and clarified the
authority of an historic districts commission to act as a planning agency. The amendments appear
to be in response to the challenge posed by A-S-P Associates to the constitutionality of the enabling legislation. Law of May 25, 1979, ch. 646, 1979 Sess. Laws 689. For a symposium on
historic preservation that includes a discussion of relevant North Carolina law, see Ross, Practical
Aspects ofHistoric Preservationin North Carolina, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9 (1976).
197. A-S-P Associates is the first case in the country to approve the application of historic
preservation to a vacant lot. The court noted that "preservation of the historic aspects of a district
requires more than simply preservation of those buildings of historical and architectural significance within the district." 298 N.C. at 217, 258 S.E.2d at 451. Since the potential for incongruity
with the character of the district is greater for a vacant lot than for an existing structure, the
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located within the historic district, brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the ordinance. The superior court
granted summary judgment t98 in favor of defendant city and the court
of appeals reversed, citing contradictory evidence presented by the city
of Raleigh and a prima facie showing of unauthorized "spot zoning" as
support. 99
In reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, the supreme
court rejected both constitutional arguments advanced by Associates
and those based on the state historic preservation statutes. The court
first held that the state's police power "encompasses the right to control
the exterior appearance of private property when the object of that control is the preservation of the state's legacy of historically significant
structures." 2" Relying on the growing body of authority in other jurisdictions, 20 ' the court noted that the preservation of historic structures
has educational, cultural, and economic value and is thus within the
parameters of police power regulation. 20 2 The court, however, was
careful to distinguish the case from a sanction of zoning on purely aesthetic grounds, broader concept which it was not yet prepared to endorse.2 °3
decision enhances preservation efforts. Botvinick, North Carolina Supreme Court Upholds Validiy

of Raleigh Historic PreservationZoning Ordinance, I NEWSLETTER OF THE PLANNING AND LAW
DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, No. 3 at 9 (Oct.-Dec. 1979).

198. 298 N.C. at 211, 258 S.E.2d at 447.
199. 38 N.C. App. 271, 247 S.E.2d 800 (1978), rev'd, 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
The court of appeals relied heavily on evidentiary inconsistencies and improprieties to reverse the superior court. Id. at 278. 247 S.E.2d at 805. The court also found that Associates had
made a prima facie showing of "spot zoning." Id. at 277, 247 S.E.2d at 804. The term "spot
zoning" has been used to describe the creation of a small area within the limits of a zone in which
are permitted uses inconsistent with those permitted in the larger area. The term has also been
used by some courts to indicate invalidity, rather than to describe a zoning technique. Spot zoning
is not necessarily invalid, but its validity requires a reasonable justification for distinguishing the
spot-zoned area. See 9 STRONG'S, NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 3d Munipal Corporations § 30.9
(1977); 82 AM. JUR. 2d Zoning and Planning § 76 (1976).
200. 298 N.C. at 216, 258 S.E.2d 450. The constitutional validity of every zoning ordinance
rests upon the police power. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The core of the
police power concept is the promotion of the public health, safety, welfare and morals of a community, and legislation enacted pursuant to this power must promote these broad concepts and
adopt means reasonably calculated to meet these ends. See J. WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA § 350 (1971 & Supp. 1977). The court cited strong authority to support its view
that historic district preservation promoted the welfare of a community and was clearly within the
state's police power. 298 N.C. at 213-18, 258 S.E.2d at 448-51.
201. See authorities cited in note 191 supra;see also State v. Vestal, 281 N.C. 517, 189 S.E.2d
152 (1972).
202. 298 N.C. at 216-17, 258 S.E.2d at 450. See R. MONTAGUE & T. WRENN, PLANNING FOR
PRESERVATION 11-17 (America's Society of Planning Officials 1964). See also, Newsom, Blacks
andHistoricPreservation, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 423 (1971); Schrader, The Preservationof
HistoricAreas, 62 Ky. L. J. 940 (1974).
203. 298 N.C. at 216, 258 S.E.2d at 450. Until quite recently, it was almost universally ac-
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The court next ruled that the Oakwood ordinance did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the Historic District Commission.2" It found that the limitation on the Commission to prevent only
those specified activities that would be incongruous with the historic
character of the district provided a sufficient contextual standard 20 5 to

guide the Commission in implementing the general policy of the statute.20 6 In making this determination, the court not only examined the
wording of the enabling statute, but also considered evidence of the
character of the neighborhood and concluded that the architectural de-

sign of Oakwood was sufficiently distinct to provide a standard against
which proposed development might be measured. Any Commission
action would then be subject to appellate review, adding additional

protection against any unforeseen effects of delegation.20 7

The court further rejected an equal protection challenge which
stemmed from the defendant city's decision to include Associates'
cepted that a zoning ordinance based solely or predominantly on aesthetic considerations was
necessarily invalid. Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1979). The North Carolina
Supreme Court has indicated that a statute or ordinance based purely on aesthetic considerations,
without any real or substantial relation to the public health, safety or morals, or the general welfare, deprives adversely affected individuals of due process of law. State v. Vestal, 281 N.C. 517,
189 S.E.2d 152 (1972); Little Pep Delmonico Restaurant, Inc. v. Charlotte, 252 N.C. 324, 113
S.E.2d 422 (1960). Although the,,-S-P court's distinction of purely aesthetic zoning from historic
district zoning is consistent with other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Annapolis v. Anne Arundel Co., 271
Md. 265, 316 A.2d 807 (1974), Rebman v. Springfield, Ill Ill. App. 2d 430, 250 N.E.2d 282 (1969),
its effect is to preserve a prohibition on purely aesthetic zoning in spite of the recent trend to allow
such regulations. Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483, 402 N.Y.S.2d 368,
373 N.E.2d 263 (1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 808 (1978); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc., v.
Outdoor Advertising Bd., 396 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222, 82
(Supp. 1979). It is significant, however, that the A-S-P Associates decision intimated that, in the
future, the court may be willing to retreat from this position and recognize a broad police power
concept which includes the authority to zone for purely aesthetic reasons. 298 N.C. at 216, 258
S.E.2d at 450.
204. The vesting of legislative power exclusively in the General Assembly by Article II, Section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution and from Article 1,Section 6 form the foundation of the
general rule that legislative power cannot be delegated. See Motsinger v. Perryman, 218 N.C. 15,
20, 9 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1940). That principle is not absolute, however, and bodies other than the
legislature may engage in quasi-legislative actions if the enabling statute provides sufficient guidance for the body. Coastal Highway v. Turnpike Auth., 237 N.C. 52, 61, 74 S.E.2d 310, 316
(1953).

205. North Carolina had already joined the increasing number of jurisdictions which recognize that the presence or absence of procedural safeguards is relevant to the broader question of
whether a delegation of authority is accompanied by adequate standards. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't. of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 698, 249 S.E.2d 402, 411 (1978); K.
DAvis, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.15 at 210 (2d ed. 1978).
206. 295 N.C. at 223, 258 S.E.2d at 454. The court also observed that practical necessity requires the delegation of a substantial degree of authority to administrative bodies. Id.
207. "A contextual standard is one which derives its meaning from the objectively determinable, interrelated conditions and characteristics of the subject to which the standard is to be applied." 298 N.C. at 222, 258 S.E.2d at 454.
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property in the historic district, but to exclude property owned by the

North Carolina Medical Association, which is located in the same
block.2"' The court found that a valid basis existed for excluding the
Medical Society in that the Society's building was extremely incongru-

ous with the architecture of the district, and that the Society had made
a substantial investment in the foundation of the building so that fur-

ther stories could be built. Associates' property, on the other hand, had
been vacant since 1972.209 The court of appeals had previously held

that Associates had made a prima facie showing of arbitrary and capricious spot zoning, but the supreme court correctly decided that this was
simply not the issue.210 The supreme court found that no spot zoning
existed because the exclusion of the Medical Society did not amount to
a reclassification of a small tract surrounded by a much larger area
within the technical definition of the term.?' Turning to the equal protection argument, the court noted that the applicable test is whether the

difference in treatment has a reasonable basis in relation to the purpose
and subject matter of the legislation.2 12 The court found in this deter-

mination that there is a presumption of validity and a strong deference
to the legislature.213 Unless the distinction is wholly without basis, it is
valid.2 14
Finally, the supreme court rejected the statutory grounds of Associates' challenge, determining that the city ordinance adequately complied with state enabling statutes in that it reflected a comprehensive
zoning plan, applied the regulations uniformly, and considered the "peculiar suitability" of the district for particular uses. 2t5
208. Id. at 224, 258 S.E.2d at 455.
209. Id. at 227, 258 S.E.2d at 457.
210. The court, however, disregarded the use of the spot zoning by this and other courts to
cover similar facts. See Zopfi v. Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325 (1968); Annot., 51
A.L.R.2d 263 (1957). A better basis for dealing with the spot zoning issue would have been to
acknowledge the existence of spot zoning in the descriptive non-conclusory sense of the term, but
dismiss it as valid in view of the circumstances. See note 99, supra.
211. 298 N.C. at 225, 258 S.E.2d at 456.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 226, 258 S.E.2d at 456 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
214. 298 N.C. at 226, 258 S.E.2d at 456 (citing State v. Greenwood, 280 N.C. 651, 658, 187
S.E.2d 8, 13 (1972)).
215. Zoning ordinances passed by a municipality must be in accordance with a comprehensive
plan. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-383 (1976). The court found that the Oakwood Ordinance met
this criterion after an examination of the various steps undertaken before passage of the ordinance
such as the report of Raleigh's Planning Department. 298 N.C. at 229, 258 S.E.2d at 458. The
court made it clear that a written plan is not required. Id. (citing Allred v. City of Raleigh, 7 N.C.
App. 602, 173 S.E.2d 533 (1970)).
Associates further argued that the Oakwood Ordinance violated G.S. 160A-382 and 160A383. G.S. 160A-382 requires uniformity of regulations throughout a zoning district, and G.S.
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The holding in A-S-P Associates is well-founded and is supported

by an almost unanimous line of similar decisions in other jurisdictions.2 6 The preservation of historic districts has been demonstrated to
enhance the cultural and economic welfare of a community, 21 7 and
such desirable ends should not be sacrificed to the interests of a few.
This is especially true where zoning restrictions do not prevent a reasonable use of property altogether, but merely restrain the intended
use. As population density increases, a recognition of the need for his-

toric conservation is imperative.
JOHN CRAIG CLONINGER
PETER WAYNE SCHNEIDER

160A-383 requires that the zoning plan take into consideration the suitability of a district for
particular uses in order to encourage the most appropriate use of the land. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 160A-382 to -383 (1976). The court determined that the uniformity mandated by G.S. 160A382 did not prevent the imposition of additional regulations through an overlay district which may
have the effect of placing greater restrictions on certain structures. Further, G.S. 160A-383 did not
mean that each individual tract of land must be put to its most profitable use. 298 N.C. at 230-31,
258 S.E.2d at 459. See Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972).
216. See authorities cited note 191 supra.
217. See 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 379 (1969) (discussing the value of good historic preservation
practices).

X. TAXATION

.4 Inheritance Taxes

Private settlements of bona fide estate disputes,' when approved
by a court of competent jurisdiction, are valid and binding,' provided
the rights of minors are protected.' The beneficiary's compromise of a
will contest will not, however, alter the state's entitlement to inheritance taxes.4 Each beneficiary's tax liability is determined by reference

to what he or she would have received under the testator's will, not by
reference to the share actually received under the settlement agree-

ment.5 The beneficiaries may, however, include in the agreement an
apportionment of the inheritance tax liability that6 corresponds to the
amount of property received under the settlement.

These are well-settled rules concerning compromise of will contests. In Inre McCoy 7 the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered
the effect on inheritance taxes of an estate settlement among beneficiaries of an intestate decedent.8 A number of decedent's heirs had

sought a declaration of the ownership of the Ada McCoy Holding Corporation.9 The eight plaintiff heirs claimed that the decedent owned all
the corporate stock and, therefore, that it should pass to all qualifying
heirs by intestate succession.' ° Two defendant heirs contended, however, that the decedent had transferred all of the corporate stock to

them through various gifts and other transfers before his death so that
the stock was no longer part of decedent's estate."I Ultimately, the dis-

pute was settled by agreement and embodied in a consent decree,
. See, e.g., O'Neil v. O'Neil, 271 N.C. 106, 155 S.E.2d 495 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Tise v. Hicks, 191 N.C. 609, 132 S.E. 560 (1926).
3. See, e.g., In re Reynolds 206 N.C. 276, 173 S.E. 789 (1934).
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §105-2 to -32 (1979).
5. Pulliam v. Thrash, 245 N.C. 636, 97 S.E.2d 253 (1957). See Note, Taxation-Effect of
North Carolina Inheritance Tax on a Will Compromise Agreement, 36 N.C.L. REv. 236 (1958). See
generally Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 917 (1954).
6. Pulliam v. Thrash, 245 N.C. 636, 97 S.E.2d 253 (1957). See also Cohn v. Cohn, 20 Cal.
2d 65, 123 P.2d 833 (1942); In re Estate of Rendsland, 92 Wash.2d 185, 594 P.2d 1346 (1979). See
generally Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 691, 717 (1976).
7. 39 N.C. App. 52, 249 S.E.2d 473 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 585, 245 S.E.2d 32 (1979).
8. Id. at 53, 249 S.E.2d at 474.
9. Id. The trial court, addressing the petition for interpleader and declaratory relief filed by
eight of decedent's heirs, aligned decedent's administrator as a party-plaintiff and the Ada McCoy
Holding Corporation as a party-defendant. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The court's opinion refers to the individual defendants merely as "appellants." Examination of the record indicates, however, that defendant-appellants were also heirs of decedent.
See Record at 3-5.
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which recognized the corporate assets to be approximately 71% of decedent's estate.12 A receiver was appointed to dissolve the corporation
and distribute the estate's assets according to certain fixed percentages
that differed from the 12% shares each heir would have been entitled to
receive under the North Carolina Intestate Succession Act.' 3 The

did not, however, provide for apportionment of tax liabilagreement
4

ity.1

After the consent judgment was entered, decedent's administrator

successfully petitioned the court to direct the receiver of the corporation to pay 71% of the federal estate taxes assessed against the estate,'"

the same percentage which the corporate assets represented in decedent's taxable estate.

6

The court further authorized the administrator

to deduct the state inheritance tax liability of each heir prior to distribution of the estate assets. Each heir's inheritance tax obligation was
computed as if he was entitled to a fixed 12% share of the.estate under
the Intestate Succession Act, thereby disregarding the actual shares
each received by agreement.' 7 On appeal, the defendant heirs disputed
this arrangement, contending that the administrator should have deducted state inheritance taxes according to the shares each heir actually
received by agreement.' 8
The McCoy court rejected this argument, however, and held that it
was proper to assess the state inheritance taxes according to the 12%

share each heir was entitled to receive under the Intestate Succession
Act.

9

Citing the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision on the tax

12. 39 N.C. App. at 53, 249 S.E.2d at 474.
13. Id See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1 to -30 (1976). The two defendant heirs were each to
receive 25% of the estate's assets. Three of the plaintiff heirs were each to receive 8/3% and the
remaining five were each to receive a 5% share of the assets. Record at 49.
14. 39 N.C. App. at 54, 249 S.E.2d at 475.
15. Id. at 53, 249 S.E.2d at 474.
16. See Appellee's Brief, page 21.
17. 39 N.C. App. at 55-6, 249 S.E.2d at 475. See note 13 supra.
18. 39 N.C. App. at 55-6, 249 S.E.2d at 475. It appears that the court of appeals was confused
when it concluded that defendants were objecting to assessment of inheritance taxes on the basis
of the 12% share each heir would have received under the Intestate Succession Act. Under the
consent decree each defendant received 25% of the estate, see note 13 supra, and, therefore, benefited by the trial court's tax assessment. Examination of the briefs indicates that defendants actually argued that the 12% inheritance tax shares should have been paid by the individual heirs after
distribution of the estate assets and not by the administrator before distribution. Appellant's Brief
at 15. If the assets had been distributed according to the consent decree, with the individual heirs
paying state inheritance taxes after distribution as if they had received 12% intestacy shares, defendants would have benefited by receiving a larger initial distribution. It is clear, therefore, that
the court of appeals misinterpreted defendants' basic contention.
19. 39 N.C. App. at 55-56, 249 S.E.2d at 475.
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consequences of a will settlement in Pulliam v. Thrash,2" the McCoy
court noted that "tax liability [in will contests] must be assessed according to the shares that the devisees took under the will, and not according to the shares the parties received under a family settlement
agreement, unless the agreement specifically provided otherwise. The
same rule applies here."'"
This decision emphasizes the importance of anticipating tax liability prior to settling any estate dispute, especially in the case of an heir
who is to receive less than he or she is entitled to receive under a will or
by intestacy. Unless the parties receiving more than the intestate share
have agreed to pay an equal proportion of the total tax liability, the
heirs receiving less than their lawful share will be required to pay a
disproportionate amount of the inheritance taxes.
In another development pertaining to inheritance taxes, the General Assembly adopted in 1979 a generation-skipping transfer tax.22
The tax applies to transfers of property interests subject to the federal
generation-skipping tax23 if the transferor is a North Carolina resident
at the time of the original transfer or the transfer includes real or personal property situated in North Carolina. 24 If the tax attaches because
the transferor is a state resident at the time of the original transfer, the
amount assessed is that sum authorized as a credit for state inheritance
taxes by the federal generation-skipping tax,25 less an allowance for
taxes actually paid to other states on the same transfer.26 If the transferor is not a state resident at the time of the transfer but the transfer
includes property situated in the state, the tax assessed is the same percentage of the allowable federal tax credit 27 as the value of the North
Carolina property bears to the value of all property subject to the federal generation skipping tax.28
The federal generation-skipping transfer tax, included as part of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, was enacted to close a tax loophole
presented by a generation-skipping transfer of property.29 The tax im20. 245 N.C. 636, 97 S.E.2d 253 (1957).
21. 39 N.C. App. at 55, 249 S.E.2d at 475. See generally Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 917 (1954).
22. Technical Revisions Act of March 22, 1979, ch. 179, § 1, 1979 N.C. ADV.LEGIS. SERV. 911 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-7.1 (1979)).
23. Id See I.R.C. §§ 2601-2603, 2611-2614, 2621-2622.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-7.1 (1979).
25. I.R.C. § 2602(c)(5)(C).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. §105-7.1(a) (1979).

27. I.R.C. § 2602(c)(5)(C).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-7.1(b) (1979).

29. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2006, 90 Stat. 1879 (adding I.R.C.
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posed by the Act generally applies, for example, to a trust formed to

benefit the grantor's child for life with remainder to the grantor's

grandchildren.3 0 Prior to the Act, the federal estate tax would not
reach the trust corpus upon the death of the grantor's child unless that
child held a general power of appointment.3 This enabled a prudent

grantor to effectively bypass one generation of estate tax imposition.32
With the changes brought about by the Act, the generation-skipping
transfer tax attempts to reach the corpus of the trust as if it were in33
cluded in the estate of the grantor's child at that child's death.
In addition to adopting the generation-skipping tax, the 1979 General Assembly abandoned the basic inheritance tax exemption al-

lowances for a surviving spouse or other qualifying Class A
beneficiaries of a decedent 34 in favor of a credit against taxes owed by
those beneficiaries. 35 The credit is equal to the lesser of $3,150 or the
total inheritance tax liability.36 A tax credit is more equitable because

it offsets tax liability dollar-for-dollar, whereas the total tax offset value
of an exemption is dependent on the taxpayer's marginal tax rate.

7

§§ 2601-2603, 2611-2614, 2621-2622 and amending I.R.C. §§ 303, 691(c), 2013). See generalv
Dodge, Generation Skipping TransfersAfter the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1265
(1977); Lee, The Tax on GenerationSkipping Transfers, 14 HOUSTON L. REv. 1021 (1977); 34 Am.
Jur. 2d Federal Taxation § 8855 (1980).
30. See Dodge, supra note 29, at 1266-67.
31. Id;see I.R.C. § 2041.
32. See Dodge, supra note 29, at 1266-67.
33. The exceedingly complex provisions of the federal generation-skipping transfer tax are
beyond the scope of this section. The topic is the subject of numerous law review articles and
practice seminars. See generally Dodge, supra note 29; Lee, supra note 29; Kartiganer, Working
With the Generation-Skioping Rules, 13 UNIv. OF MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN., chap. 17 (1979);
McCaffrey & Metrick, Planningforthe Generation-SkippingTransfer, 12 UNIV. OF MIAMI INST. ON
EsT. PLAN., chap. 20 (1978).
34. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-4 (1979). In addition to the surviving spouse, Class A beneficiaries include the decedent's lineal issue and ancestors, stepchildren, adopted children and, in
certain circumstances, sons and daughters-in-law. Id.
35. Revenue Act of 1979, ch. 801, § 21, 1979 NC. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. 310-12 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-4(b) (1979)).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-4(b) (1979).
37. See id. § 105-4(a). Other inheritance tax modifications include: (1) elimination of a state
tax statement when decedent's estate has a gross value of less than $20,000 and all beneficiaries are
in Class A of the taxing statute, id. § 105-23; (2) adoption of an unlimited exemption in place of
the prior $70,000 exemption allowance for payments received by a beneficiary under a military
family or survivor benefit plan, id. § 105-3(7); and (3) an increase in the exemption of life insurance proceeds from policies of decedents killed by enemy action from $10,000 to $20,000, id.
§ 105-3(4).
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8

The North Carolina General Assembly substantially revised the
procedure for securing judicial review of Property Tax Commission decisions by adding Article 24 to Chapter 105 of the General Statutes. 9
The new article, entitled "Review and Enforcement of Orders," pro-

vides for appeal of Property Tax Commission decisions by right to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals. 40 This effectively bypasses the
North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act's Article Four 4 require-

ment of a petition to the Superior Court of Wake County or the superior court of the county where the administrative decision was made.42

38. All real and personal property located within the jurisdiction of North Carolina is subject
to ad valorem taxation unless the state constitution or the General Assembly specifically excludes
that property from the tax base. Id. § 105-274. In 1979, the General Assembly designated certain
property owned by homeowner's associations to be a special class of property subject to nominal
value taxation. Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 686, § 1, 1979 N.C. ADv. LEGIS. SERV. 299 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-277.8 (1979)). This new provision might not reduce the gross value of
property subject to taxation, however, since "the enhanced value of the individual [association
member's] properties because of the right to the use and benefit of the facilities [owned by the
association] shall be a factor taken into consideration" in valuing the individually owned property.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-277.8(b) (1979).

Tax exempt status for timberland owned by the North Carolina Forestry Foundation, a nonprofit organization having tax-exempt status, was denied by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
In re North Carolina Forestry Foundation, 296 N.C. 330, 250 S.E.2d 236 (1979). The court noted
that the property was leased for ninety-nine years and used by a paper company having virtual
control over the property. This case was noted in the 1978 North Carolina survey, 57 N.C. L.
REV. 1148-51 (1979).
39. Act of May 17, 1979, ch. 584, § 2-4, 1979 N.C. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. 274 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 105-345 to 346 (1979)). See generally Lewis, The Property Tax in North CarolinaAn Introduction (Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 1978).
40. Act of May 17, 1979, ch. 584, § 1, 1979 N.C. ADV. LEGtS. SERV. 274 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-29 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (1978).
42. Id. § 150A-45. Article 4 of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
grants the right ofjudicial review, exercised initially in superior court, to persons aggrieved by a
"final agency decision under this Chapter." Id. The article applies to decisions of the Property
Tax Commission. See, e.g., Brock v. North Carolina Property Tax Comm'n, 290 N.C. 731, 228
S.E.2d 254 (1976). The right to judicial review under the APA is not available, however, if "adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by some other statute, in which case the review
shall be under such other statute." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 to -52 (1978). This limitation has
been construed to require that the scope of review in the other statute must be equal to that
provided in the APA. See Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963)
(scope of review in APA greater than in other statute). The scope of review provided in Article 24
of Chapter 105 appears to be substantially the same as that provided in Article 4 of the APA.
Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51 (1978) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-345.2 (1979). See text
accompanying notes 54-61 infra. It would appear certain, therefore, that "adequate procedure for
judicial review" is provided in Article 24 of Chapter 105, thus displacing judicial review under
Article 4 of the APA. Cf. Blackwell v. Granville County Dept. of Social Serv., 39 N.C. App. 437,
439, 250 S.E.2d 695, 697 (1979) (Article 4 of the APA displaced by § 108-44(e) of the Social Services Statute). See also, Daye, North Carolina'sNew AdministratieProcedureAct: An Interpretive
Analysis, 53 N.C. L. REv. 833, 899-900 (1975); see generally Campbell, JudicialReview ofListing
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Article 24 requires that an aggrieved party 3 exhaust his or her
administrative remedies" prior to an appeal by securing a final order
of the Property Tax Commission. 45 To perfect an appeal, the appellant
must give notice of appeal to the Commission and other parties to the
proceeding within thirty days of the entry of the final order.4 6 Appellant must include with the notice of appeal all exceptions to the order
and set forth the specific reasons he considers the order to be "unlawful, unjust, unreasonable or unwarranted," including any procedural
errors alleged to have been committed by the Commission. 4 7 After receiving notice the Commission may, by its own motion or that of any
party to the proceeding, provide for a rehearing to address the listed
exceptions. 48 Pending judicial review, the Commission is authorized to
postpone the effective date of any action taken by it if the Commission
"finds that justice so requires. ' ' 49 Alternatively, appellant or other parties may petition a judge of the North Carolina Court of Appeals for
issuance of a stay to prevent irreparable injury or to preserve the status
or rights of any party pending conclusion of the appeal.5" If no appeal
is taken within the time prescribed by law and a party disobeys the
Commission's order, the Commission may apply to a superior court
justice for a writ of peremptory mandamus to effectuate its order.5'
The grant or denial of a writ of mandamus is appealable to the court of
appeals by the affected party or the Commission.5" In any event, the
procedure for appeals to the court of appeals under Article 24 shall be
53
provided by the North Carolina rules of appellate procedure.
When the case is heard by the court of appeals, no evidence shall
andAppraisalDecisions, Property Tax Bull. No. 49, Institute of Government, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill (June 26, 1978).
43. See, e.g., In re Halifax Paper Co., 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963) (governmental
entity can be party aggrieved by Commission decision so as to provide standing to secure judicial
review).
44. See, e.g., Brock v. North Carolina Property Tax Comm'n, 290 N.C. 731, 228 S.E.2d 254
(1976) (exhaustion of administrative remedies by securing "final order" of commission is prerequisite to judicial review). See generally Lewis, supra note 39, at 36-42.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-345(a) (1979).
46. Id. "The failure of any party, other than the Commission, to be served with or receive a
copy of the notice of appeal shall not affect the validity or regularity of the appeal." Id. § 105345(b).
47. Id. § 105-345(a).
48. Id. § 105-345(c).
49. Id. § 105-345.3.
50. Id. The court may require the applicant for a stay to post adequate bond. Id.
51. Id. § 105-346(a).
52. Id. § 105-346(b).

53. Id. § 105-345(d).
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be received.54 If evidence has been discovered since the Commission's
decision that could not have been obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence for use before the Commission and the evidence will materially affect the merits of the case, the court may, in its discretion,
remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings. 5 The
court of appeals is generally authorized to affirm, reverse, void or remand the Commission's decision and is empowered to decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning and applicability of any Commission action. 6 If the Commission's decision is affirmed on appeal, the court
may include in its decree a writ of mandamus or other appropriate order to enforce the Commission's decision. 57 Reversal or modification
of the Commission's decision requires a finding by the court of appeals
that
the substantial rights of the appellants have been prejudiced because
the Commission's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(I) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(2) In excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commission; or
(3) Made upon unlawful proceedings; or
(4) Affected by other errors of law; or
(5) Unsupported 6y competent, material or substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious. 58
of
Any party may appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, by writ
61
certiorari5 9 or by right,60 from the ruling of the court of appeals.
The grounds for modification or reversal enumerated above are
identical to those set forth in Article Four of the Administrative Procedure Act. 62 Therefore, precedent arising out ofjudicial review of Property Tax Commission decisions under the Administrative Procedure
Act offers valuable and perhaps controlling guidance to a party appealing under Article 24 of Chapter 105.63
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 105-345.1.
§ 105-345.2(b).
§ 105-345.5.
§ 105-345.2(b).
§ 7A-31 (Cum. Supp. 1979).

60. Id. § 7A-30(3) (1969).
61. Id. § 105-345.4 (1979).
62. Id. § 150A-51 (1978).
63. See generally Campbell, supra note 42.
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It is useful to distinguish the various types of administrative prop-

erty tax decisions for purposes of assessing the standards of judicial
review that will likely be applied under the new article.64 Commentators on the North Carolina property tax system classify the decisions of
property tax authorities as either appraisal or listing decisions.6 5 Ap66
praisal decisions concern the valuation of real and personal property.
Listing decisions determine whether property should be taxed and may
involve questions of jurisdiction to tax,67 exemption or classification of
certain types of property,68 or "qualification for favorable treatment
based either on rate or appraisal reductions. '"69
In most appraisal decisions appealed prior to the adoption of Article 24, the aggrieved party argued either that the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence7 ' or that the appraisal
was arbitrary and capricious7 -the fifth and sixth standards of review
listed in Article 24 at G.S. 105-345.2(b). Courts have demonstrated a
reluctance to apply a rigorous standard of judicial review to appraisal
challenges; instead, the correctness and regularity of the Commission's
generally factual determinations are presumed.72 On the other hand,
courts have been more willing to overturn the Commission's listing de64. See id.
65. See, e.g., id See also Lewis, supra note 39.
66. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 42, at 1;Lewis, supra note 39, at 22-44.
67. See, e.g., Adams-Millis Corp. v. Kernersville, 281 N.C. 147, 187 S.E.2d 704 (1972).
68. See, e.g., In re North Carolina Forestry Foundation, 296 N.C. 330, 250 S.E.2d 236 (1979).
69. Campbell, supra note 42, at 1. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 39, at 17-22.
70. See Campbell, supra note 42, at 2. See, e.g., Brock v. North Carolina Property Tax
Comm'n, 290 N.C. 731, 228 S.E.2d 254 (1976); In re AMP, Inc., 287 N.C. 547, 215 S.E.2d 752
(1975); In re Property Located at 411-417 West Fourth Street, 282 N.C. 71, 191 S.E.2d 692 (1972);
In re Reeves Broadcasting Corp., 273 N.C. 571, 160 S.E.2d 728 (1968).
The new statute states that in reviewing determinations of the Commission, the court of appeals must consider the entire record. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-345.2(c) (1979). The "whole record" test of judicial review requires the court to take account of any evidence in the record that
fairly detracts from the Commission's evidence in determining the substantiality of evidence supporting the Commission's decision. Id. § 105-345.2(b)(5). See, e.g., Thompson v. Wake County
Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 (1977). The court may not, therefore, consider only the
evidence which supports the Commission's decision without taking account of contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn. Id. Nevertheless, the court
is not authorized to replace the Commission's judgment where there are two reasonably conflicting views. Id.
71. See, e.g., In re North Carolina Forestry Foundation, 296 N.C. 330, 250 S.E.2d 236 (1979);
Albemarle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Alexander, 282 N.C. 402, 192 S.E.2d 811 (1972); In re
Wagstaff, 42 N.C. App. 47, 255 S.E.2d 754 (1979).
72. See Campbell, supra note 42, at 2-4. See, e.g., In re North Carolina Forestry Foundation, 296 N.C. 330, 250 S.E.2d 236 (1979) (assessments are presumed correct); In re AMP, Inc., 287
N.C. 547, 215 S.E.2d 752 (1972). But cf.Brock v. North Carolina Property Tax Comm'n, 290 N.C.
731, 228 S.E.2d 254 (1976) (no "substantial evidence" to support Commission findings).
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cisions, 73 presumably because listing decisions generally involve questions of law, which the courts feel more competent to determine.74 The
court opinions applying the Administrative Procedures Act to listing
decision challenges have not, however, set forth a clear test for the
proper scope of review.75 Nevertheless, grounds one, two or six of G.S.
105-345.2(b) would appear to be the most applicable to listing questions. If a particular property is not subject to being listed for tax purposes, then the imposition of a property tax based on such a listing
would be either in violation of the constitution, in excess of statutory
authority, without jurisdictional grounds or arbitrary and capricious.7 6
Despite the new Article 24 appeals procedure eliminating the superior court review required by the Administrative Procedures Act, 7 it
appears likely that the review standards applied by the court of appeals
to appraisal and listing decision challenges will be determined by reference to precedent arising out of similar appeals under the Administrative Procedures Act because the grounds for reversal enumerated in
Article 24 are identical to those set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act.78 Where appraisal decisions of taxing authorities are challenged by a taxpayer, the courts probably will continue to demonstrate
a marked deference to the Commission's factual determinations. 9 If a
listing decision is questioned, however, the courts are more likely to
overturn the Commission's determinations of matters that are essentially questions of law."0
As previously indicated, Article 24 requires a taxpayer to exhaust
all administrative remedies by obtaining a "final order" from the Property Tax Commission before seeking appellate review of an allegedly
erroneous appraisal or listing.8 ' It should be pointed out, however, that
in certain limited situations it is possible for a taxpayer to avoid the
"exhaustion" requirement of Article 24 and receive judicial review of
73. See Campbell, supra note 42, at 4. See, e.g., In re North Carolina Forestry Foundation,

296 N.C. 330, 250 S.E.2d 236 (1979); In re Hanes Dye & Finishing Co., 285 N.C. 598, 207 S.E.2d
729 (1974); In re McLean Trucking Co., 281 N.C. 242, 188 S.E.2d 452 (1972); In re Asheville
Citizen-Times Publishing Co., 281 N.C. 210, 188 S.E.2d 318 (1972); In re Pilot Freight Carriers,
263 N.C. 345, 139 S.E.2d 633 (1965).
74. See Campbell, supra note 42, at 4-5. See, e.g., Billings Transfer Corp. v. County of Davidson, 276 N.C. 19, 170 S.E.2d 873 (1969).
75. See authorities cited note 73 supra.
76. See Campbell, supra note 42, at 4.
77. See text accompanying notes 39-61 supra.
78. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 73-76 upra.
81. See text accompanying notes 43-53 supra.
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an allegedly improper imposition of property tax liability by paying the
property tax assessment and suing for refund of an "illegal tax" under
G.S. 105-381.82 Review by the Property Tax Commission is not a condition precedent to a suit for a refund under G.S. 105-3 81.83 Therefore,
direct review of an "illegal tax" may be had in the court of competent4
jurisdiction in the county where the taxing authority is located.1
Whether a direct suit under G.S. 105-381 offers a viable alternative to
appeal of appraisal and listing decisions through administrative channels 85 and thus pursuant to Article 24, depends on the definition of an
"illegal tax."8 6
Unfortunately, there are no reported cases addressing the question
whether an improper property tax appraisal constitutes an illegal tax
under G.S. 105-381. A definition of "illegal tax" is offered by the
North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Redevelopment Comm'n of
High Point v. Guilford County.87 In that case a listing decision was
challenged and an injunction sought against assessment of property tax
on the ground that the taxpayer was exempt from the tax.89 The court
in High Point explicitly distinguished between an illegal tax and one
that is merely asserted to be erroneous.9" Although the court did not
define an erroneous tax, it did state that an illegal tax is one imposed
without authority, such as when the rate imposed is unconstitutional 9'
or the property is exempt from taxation.92 Appraisal decisions will be
difficult to challenge under the High Point definition of "illegal tax."
Generally, the issue on appeal is not whether the taxing entity has authority to levy the tax, but whether certain factors were properly con82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-381 (1979). See Campbell, supra note 42, at 5-8. See, e.g., In re
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 263 N.C. 345, 351, 139 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1965) (dictum) (alternative is
open although appeal here taken from decision of State Board, now the Commission).
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-381 (1979). See Campbell, supra note 42, at 5. A direct suit for a
refund is also available if a tax is allegedly imposed through a clerical error or is levied for an
illegal purpose. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-381(a) (1979). See also Wynn v. Trustees of Charlotte
Community College Sys., 255 N.C. 594, 122 S.E.2d 404 (1961) (illegal purpose alleged).
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-381(d) (1979). See Campbell, supra note 42, at 5. See, e.g.,
Redev. Comm'n of High Point v. Guilford County, 274 N.C. 585, 164 S.E.2d 476 (1968).
85. See generally Lewis, supra note 39.
86. See Campbell, supra note 42, at 6.
87. 274 N.C. 585, 164 S.E.2d 476 (1968).
88. See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
89. 274 N.C. at 587-88, 164 S.E.2d at 478.
90. Id. at 589, 164 S.E.2d at 479.
91. Id See, e.g., Perry v. Comm'rs of Franklin County, 148 N.C. 521, 62 S.E. 608 (1908).
92. 274 N.C. at 589, 164 S.E.2d at 479. See, e.g., Southern Ass'y v. Palmer, 166 N.C. 75, 82
S.E. 18 (1914).
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sidered in the appraisal.9 3 Such factual issues, clearly within the
expertise of the Property Tax Commission,94 probably will not fall
within the purview of an illegal tax and, therefore, will require the exhaustion of administrative review
channels before judicial review can
5
be granted under Article 24.1

There is substantial support, however, for allowing a taxpayer to
bypass administrative review channels and bring a direct suit for a refund under G.S. 105-381 if a listing decision challenge is involved.9 6

For example, the court in High Point specifically refers to an illegal tax
as one imposed on exempt property, clearly a result of improper listing.97 Allowing direct judicial review of the listing decisions under
G.S. 105-381 seems to be a proper result because, unlike appraisal disputes, questions that arise in listing disputes are ordinarily legal issues
of the type regularly handled by courts. The argument that the appropriate administrative agencies are more competent to review such matters carries little weight.9 8 Therefore, a taxpayer's direct suit for a
refund of an "illegal tax" under G.S. 105-381 remains a viable alterna-

tive to Article 24 for obtaining judicial review of property tax listing
decisions.
C

Income, Sales, and Intangibles Taxes99

To provide North Carolina citizens with relief from inflationary
93. Campbell, supra note 42, at 7. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 39,
94. See Campbell, supra note 42, at 7.
95. See id. at 6-7. See, e.g., King v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 316, 172 S.E.2d 12 (1970) (taxpayers
seeking to compel revaluation of county property by writ of mandamus and seeking injunction
against assessment arising out of alleged undervaluation of rural land at expense of urban land
required to exhaust administrative review remedies prior to attempting judicial review).
96. See, e.g., Billings Transfer Corp., Inc. v. County of Davidson, 276 N.C. 19, 170 S.E.2d
873 (1969); Adams-Millis Corp. v. Kernersville, 281 N.C. 147, 187 S.E.2d 704 (1972); Scovil Mfg.
Co. v. Guilford County, 28 N.C, App. 209, 220 S.E.2d 188 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 452, 223
S.E.2d 160 (1976). See Campbell, supra note 42, at 7-8.
97. See text accompanying notes 87-92 supra.
98. See Campbell, supra note 42, at 7-8.
99. For a complete listing of miscellaneous taxation measures adopted by the General
Assembly in 1979, including changes in income, sales, inheritance, intangibles and license taxes
see Liner, State Taxes, in NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1979, 266-74 (Institute of Government,
University of North Carolina 1979).
In a case law development, the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered whether an
automobile rental company, which paid sales tax on the leasing of its automobiles, should be
exempted from the state sales tax upon sale of its automobiles to private individuals, not for
resale. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Lynch, 298 N.C. 559, 259 S.E.2d 564 (1979). Plaintiff argued that the
payment of sales tax on its lease transactions satisfied the sales tax requirements. The court of
appeals agreed. 39 N.C. App. 709, 713, 251 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1979), rev'd, 298 N.C. 559, 259 S.E.2d
564 (1979). The supreme court concluded that the leasing of autos and the ultimate sale of the
same autos were separate transactions, each subject to the sales tax. 298 N.C. at 563, 259 S.E.2d at
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increases in their total tax burden, the North Carolina General Assem-

bly passed the Revenue Act of 1979.10 This measure marked the first
general tax relief provided to state taxpayers since the 1930's."0 The

legislature increased all existing personal income tax exemptions' 0 2 and
the standard deduction 0 3 by ten percent, raised the dependency ex-

emption by one-third over a two-year period, and modified the allowa-

04
ble deduction for expenses incurred in the care of dependents.1

Of further interest is the legislature's adoption of an elective meas-

ure allowing taxpayers over fifty-five years of age to exclude from gross
income gains from the sale or exchange of a principal residence. The

exemption is limited to $100,000 per taxpayer or $50,000 per spouse on
property held by husband and wife as joint tenants with rights of survivorship or as tenants by the entirety.' 05 This exclusion is substantially
similar to the parallel federal provision, which is elective and uses the
same age threshold and dollar ceilings.'

6

The court of appeals' decision in In re Alamance MemorialPark,
Inc.107 addressed the issue of valuation of promissory notes for in-

tangibles tax purposes. 08 Because promissory notes are important
commercial instruments, it is necessary that businesses be appraised of

the tax consequences of holding notes payable that arise out of the operation of the business. The most prevalent problem is valuation of
promissory notes that represent the sales price of a particular good and

include an allocable portion of the taxpayer's cost of doing business. In
determining the "actual value" of such notes the taxpayer may deduct
567. Therefore, payment of sales tax on the rental of autos did not exempt the company from
payment of sales tax on the resale of those autos to private individuals. Id. Prior to the supreme
court's decision the North Carolina General Assembly acted to mandate the result reached. Act
of May 8, 1979, ch. 527, § 1, 1979 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 140 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105164.4(1), -164.6(3A) (1979)).
100. Revenue Act of 1979, ch. 801, § 48, 1979 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 331-38 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-149 (1979)).
101. Liner, .rupra note 99, at 266.
102. Revenue Act of 1979, ch. 801, § 48, 1979 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 331 (codified at N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 105-149(a)(1) (1979)).
103. Id. § 44 at 327 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-149(a)(5) (1979)).
104. Id. § 45 at 328 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-147(26) (1979)). The allowable expense deduction for the care of dependent children or invalid adults was raised to $2,000 per
person with an overall ceiling of $4,000 per year. The taxpayer must be able to demonstrate that
the expenses were necessary to allow him to remain employed. Id. The prior ceilings had been
$100 per month per individual and $400 per month total. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-147(26) (Cum.
Supp. 1975) (amended 1979).
105. Id. § 38 at 320-25 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-141(b)(22) (1979)).
106. See I.R.C. § 121.
107. 41 N.C. App. 278, 254 S.E.2d 671 (1979).
108. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-202 (1979).
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"like evidences of debt"" owed by the taxpayer as of the valuation
date but may not deduct accounts payable,"' amounts held in reserve
accounts, or secondary liabilities."' The Secretary of Revenue has
adopted a regulation setting forth the methods for determining the "actual value" of promissory notes. According to this regulation, actual
value is to be determined by:
(1) the closing price quoted by security exchanges,
(2) the final bid price listed for over-the-counter securities,
balance as of the valuation date, or
(3) the outstanding or unpaid
2
(4) the appraised value."
The Secretary's methods of valuation were challenged in the MemorialPark case, which concerned the valuation of notes receivables
held by appellant arising out of its sale of cemetery plots, markers, and
crypts on a "preneed' basis." 3 Appellant sought to deduct 25% from
the face value of these receivables to cover money placed into its perpetual care funds, reserves arising out of the sale of preneed markers
and vaults, and the commissions payable to its employees because of
the sales. 4 The Secretary of Revenue refused to allow such a deduction. ' Upholding the Secretary's actions, the court of appeals determined that appellant's desired deductions were merely costs that were
incident to appellant's form of conducting business and thus were not
factors to be considered in the valuation of a note receivable or other
evidence of debt." 6 The court held that the value of a note or similar
evidence of debt is synonymous with market value, or what a willing
buyer would pay for the note." 7 Appellant did not show that the Secretary's regulations, designed to determine actual market value, were
illegal or arbitrary." 8 Therefore, the court of appeals held that the regulations provided reasonable methods of determining the "actual
value" of a note for purposes of the intangibles tax." 19
LAWRENCE
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

K. RYNNING

Id.
Id. § 105-202(I).
Id. § 105-202(3).
See I N.C. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 28-905.
41 N.C. App. at 278, 254 S.E.2d at 671.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 281, 254 S.E.2d at 673.
Id. at 280-81, 254 S.E.2d at 673. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-283 (1979) (appraisal of

property at "true value" means market value).
118. 41 N.C. App. at 281, 254 S.E.2d at 673.
119. Id. at 279-80, 254 S.E.2d at 673.

XI.
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TORTS

Abatement of Wrongful Death Actions
In 1969 North Carolina joined the numerous jurisdictions that

measure damages for wrongful death by the resulting loss to decedent's
beneficiaries,' as opposed to the resulting loss to decedent's estate.2
The majority of these jurisdictions hold that a wrongful death action
abates upon the death of the last surviving beneficiary. In Willis v.
Duke Power Co.,' however, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held
that the action does not abate upon the death of the sole beneficiary.'
The court relied heavily on Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co.,6 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that a death action

brought under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 does not abate upon
the death of the sole beneficiary,8 and on Neil v. Wilson, 9 in which the

North Carolina Supreme Court found that a right of action under the
pre-1969 version of North Carolina's wrongful death statute vests in

the decedent's estate at the time the action accrues 0 and is not divested
by the beneficiary's later death."
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (b)(4) (1976)("the present monetary value of the decedent to
thepersons entitled to receive the damages recovered")(emphasis added).
2. The former damages statute provided: "The plaintiff (the deceased's representative), in
such action may recover such damages as are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary
injury resulting from such death." An Act Concerning the Settlements of the Estates of Deceased
Persons, ch. 113, § 71, 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 257 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28174).
3. See Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina,44 N.C.L. REv. 402, 425
(1966). The deceased beneficiary's estate in some states, however, might still be able to recover
damages that accrue from the date of decedent's death to the time of the beneficiary's death. Id.
When all beneficiaries are dead the deceased's personal representative is still left to bring the
cause of action. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 28A-18-2(a)(1976).
4. 42 N.C. App. 582, 257 S.E.2d 471 (1979).
5. Id. at 590, 257 S.E.2d at 476. In North Carolina, as in a majority of states, a wrongful
death action survives the death of the decedent's personal representative. Harrison v. Carter, 226
N.C. 36, 36 S.E.2d 700 (1946). A wrongful death action also survives the death of the tortfeasor.
In re Miles, 262 N.C. 647, 138 S.E.2d 487 (1964).
6. 300 U.S. 342 (1937).
7. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
8. 300 U.S. at 347-51. See Willis, 42 N.C. App. at 587-89, 257 S.E.2d at 475-76.
9. 146 N.C. 242, 59 S.E. 674 (1907).
10. An Act Concerning the Settlements of the Estates of Deceased Persons, ch. 113, § 71,
1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 257 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174).
11. 146 N.C. at 245, 59 S.E.2d at 675. "[Tihe statute ... indicatles] the purpose of the Legislature to impress upon the right of action the character of property as a part of the intestate's estate
[and such right is] fixed and determined as of the time when the intestate dies.' Id See Willis, 42
N.C. App. at 587, 257 S.E.2d at 475.
The Willis court also found support in Warner v. West. North Carolina R.R., 94 N.C. 250
(1886), in which the supreme court held that the existence of beneficiaries need not be alleged in a
wrongful death action and suggested that the existence of beneficiaries is not even required for
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Although the Willis court noted that North Carolina's wrongful
death statute was drastically amended in 1969,32 it found that the portions of the statute relating to the issue remained unchanged.' 3 The
court stated that those states which follow the general rule of abatement upon the death of the sole beneficiary are "jurisdictions having
entirely different statutory provisions with respect to those entitled to
recovery."' 4 In North Carolina recovery is distributed according to the
Intestate Succession Act,' 5 not according to the loss to the individual
beneficiaries; 6 thus the recovery is treated more as an asset of the decedent's estate than as an asset of the beneficiaries for purposes of distribution. The Willis court also found a provision in the statute which
allows recovery of nominal damages,' 7 in addition to recovery of the
loss to the beneficiaries, as an indication that the legislature did not
intend the action to abate. 18 The general rule governing abatement is
based not on the provisions governing the identity of the beneficiaries' 9
but on those governing the measure of damages,2" and in North Carolina, as well as in the states referred to by the court that follow the
general rule requiring abatement, 2 ' damages are measured by the loss
to the beneficiaries caused by decedent's death. 2
Because plaintiff in Willis, the sole surviving beneficiary of her in23
testate son, died between the filing of the action and the date of trial,
the question remains whether the result would differ had the sole beneficiary died before the action was filed. Courts have not expressed any
policy reasons to distinguish between the abatement of pending wrongful death actions and that of those not yet filed at the time of the sole
recovery. Id at 259-60. See Willis, 42 N.C. App. at 585-87, 257 S.E.2d at 473-75. Again, Warner
was decided under a version of the wrongful death statute that measured damages by the loss to
decedent's estate. The Warner court distinguished cases from other jurisdictions holding the
wrongful death actions to abate upon the death of the last beneficiary on the ground that in those
states damages were measured by the loss to the decedent's beneficiaries. 94 N.C. at 258.
12. 42 N.C. App. at 589, 257 S.E.2d at 476. See Law of April 14, 1969, ch. 215, § 1, 1969
N.C. Sess. Laws 194.
13. 42 N.C. App. at 589, 257 S.E.2d at 476.
14. 42 N.C. App. at 590, 257 S.E.2d at 476 (emphasis added).
15.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-I to- 30 (1976).

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id § 28A-18-2(a).
Id § 28A-18-2(b)(6).
42 N.C. App. at 590, 257 S.E.2d at 476.
Id. at 589, 257 S.E.2d at 476.
See Comment, supra note 3, at 425.
Comment, supra note 3, at 425.
See note I supra.
42 N.C. App. at 584, 257 S.E.2d at 472-73.
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beneficiary's death, but at least one court has made such a distinction. 24
B.

ContributoryNegligence

In North Carolina, plaintiff's contributory negligence is a complete
bar to recovery for injuries caused by defendant's ordinary negligence.2 5 When defendant's conduct amounts to willful and wanton
26

negligence, plaintiff's ordinary negligence does not bar recovery. If
plaintiff's own conduct amounts to wilful and wanton negligence, however, the majority of pure negligence jurisdictions hold that plaintiff
cannot recover from even a wilful and wanton defendant.2 7 The rationale for the rule is that although a victim's mere carelessness should
not negate liability for gross conduct, when both parties contribute to
injuries by gross conduct they are inparidelicto and the courts will not
decide the losses.28 In the 1979 case of Harrington v. Collins 29 the
North Carolina Supreme Court adopted this majority rule.30
Harrington arose when plaintiff was injured while riding in de-

fendant's car during a pre-arranged drag race. Defendant claimed that
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in allowing himself to be in the

car when he should have known that a dangerous race was about to
occur.3 1 Although the court adopted the majority position, it refused to

hold that a failure to remonstrate and demand to be let out of a car
operated by a reckless driver constituted wilful and wanton conduct as
a matter of law.3 2
24. See Frazier v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 101 Ga. 77, 28 S.E. 662 (1897) (decided on
state constitutional grounds).
25. See, e.g., Weatherman v. Weatherman, 270 N.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 860 (1967).
26. Brewer v. Harris, 279 N.C. 288, 182 S.E.2d 345 (1971); Brendle v. Spencer, 125 N.C. 474,
34 S.E. 634 (1899).
27. See, e.g., Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1978).
28. This is consistent with the rule that rejects comparative negligence and completely bars a
contributorily negligent plaintiff from recovering from an ordinarily negligent defendant.
29. 298 N.C. 535, 259 S.E.2d 275 (1979).
30. Id. at 538, 259 S.E.2d at 278. The North Carolina Supreme Court took notice of the
wilful-wanton contributory negligence rule 12 years before Harrington in Pearce v. Barham, 271
N.C. 285, 289, 156 S.E.2d 290, 294 (1967). Despite having a fact situation appropriate for implementation of the rule, the court declined to adopt it because defendant failed to allege more than
ordinary negligence on the plaintiffs part. Id.
31. 298 N.C. at 535, 259 S.E.2d at 277.
32. The supreme court held that a directed verdict for defendant was improper. Id. at 541,
259 S.E.2d at 279.
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C Liability Without Privity

North Carolina has been reluctant to discard the privity requirement for tort actions based on negligent performance of contractual
obligations, and has done so only where there has been resulting personal injury or property damage,33 as in products liability cases. 4 In
1979, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in two cases decided by
separate panels,3 considered the validity of a cause of action against an
architect for negligent performance of a contract brought by a third
party with whom the architect was not in privity. In Davidson and
Jones, Inc. v. New Hanover,36 the court held that an architect may be
liable to persons not a party to his contract for negligent performance
of that contract. In Shoffner Industries,Inc. v. W.B. Lloyd Construction
Co. ,37 the court limited its holding to allow recovery only against an
architect put into a supervisory position.
In Davidson plaintiffs, general contractors, entered into a construction contract with defendant, property owner, who contracted with architects to design the structure. Damage to an adjacent building owned
by defendant occurred during construction. Plaintiffs sued defendant
for payments due under the contract and expenses incurred in repairing
the adjacent building. Defendant counterclaimed for costs of certain
repairs that were allegedly not made. Plaintiffs then filed a third party
complaint against the architects, with whom they had no contract, for
indemnity for any liability that they may incur under the counterclaim.
The architects moved to dismiss on the grounds that they had no duty
to plaintiffs, contractual or otherwise, by virtue of their contract with
defendants.3"
In reversing a summary judgment for the architects,39 the Davidson panel held that "an architect in the absence of privity of contract
may be sued by a general contractor.

. .

for economic loss foreseeably

33. See generaly Survey ofDevelopments in North CarolinaLaw, 1978, 57 N.C.L. REv. 827,
943-44 (1979).
34. See Hodge, Products Liability: The State ofthe Law in North Carolina,8 WAKE FOREST

L. REv.481 (1972). In addition, privity is technically not required in cases involving third party
beneficiary contracts, although it can be said that privity actually exists in these cases. See, e.g.,
Potter v. Carolina Water Co., 253 N.C. 112, 116 S.E.2d 374 (1960).
35. Shoffner Indus., Inc. v. W.B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 42 N.C. App. 259, 257 S.E.2d 50 (1979);
Davidson and Jones, Inc. v. New Hanover, 41 N.C. App. 661, 255 S.E.2d 580 (1979). Judge Erwin
sat on both panels.
36. 41 N.C. App. 661, 255 S.E.2d 580 (1979).
37. 42 N.C. App. 259, 257 S.E.2d 50 (1979).
38. 41 N.C. App. at 663-64, 255 S.E.2d at 581-83.
39. Ad. at 670, 255 S.E.2d at 586.
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resulting from breach of an architect's common-law duty of due care in
the performance of his contract with the owner."40 The court's holding
put no apparent limit other than foreseeability on the liability to which
an architect is subjected by breach of the duty of due care.
In Shoffner, plaintiff contracted to supply building materials to defendant contractor, who in turn had contracted with the local board of
education to construct a facility. The board, in addition, contracted
with an architect to design the structure. In plaintiff-supplier's suit for
payment due under a contract, defendant-contractor counterclaimed
for delivery of defective materials and impleaded the architect on the
ground that he had approved the materials, seeking damages from the
architect for costs of additional labor and materials. The trial court
granted the architect's motion to dismiss on the ground that he had no
legal duty to the defendant.41
In reversing the trial court's dismissal,42 the court of appeals held
that an architect can be liable in the absence of privity when he is a
supervisory architect, as opposed to a mere advisory or "arbitrating"
architect.43 Because defendant's counterclaim alleged that the architect
was acting in a supervisory capacity, the court did not decide whether
44
the architect would be liable if he were not a supervisory architect.
The court indicated, however, that a nonsupervisory architect would be
free from liability for negligence in the absence of privity.45 In addition, the Shoffner court refused to decide whether damages for economic loss, that is pecuniary loss, consisting of one or both of the loss
of bargain and consequential loss of profits, could be recovered. 46 The
court held that the costs of additional labor and material incurred because of defects in the original materials were a "loss as a result of
40. Id. at 667, 255 S.E.2d at 584.
41. 42 N.C. App. at 259-60, 257 S.E.2d at 53.
42. Id. at 272, 257 S.E.2d at 58.
43. Id. at 269-70, 257 S.E.2d at 55-56.
44. Id. at 267, 257 S.E.2d at 56.
45. Id. at 267-70, 257 S.E.2d at 56-58. The court distinguished two North Carolina cases on
the ground that they involved nonsupervisory architects. See Durham v. Engineering Co., 255
N.C. 98, 120 S.E.2d 564 (1961); McKinney Drilling Co. v. Nello L. Teer Co., 38 N.C. App. 472,
248 S.E.2d 444 (1978).
46. The court stated: "Assuming, arguendo, that there is validity to that subtle distinction
[between economic loss and property or personal damages], the cause of action here is for an
economic loss as a result of alleged propery damages." 42 N.C. App. at 271, 257 S.E.2d at 58
(latter emphasis added). The Shoffner court apparently allowed damages for economic loss. See
41 N.C. App. at 667, 255 S.E.2d at 584.
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allegedproperty damages"47 and thus recoverable from an architect.
Davidson also held valid, absent privity, a cause of action against
soil engineers for damages proximately resulting to contractors who
submitted a bid and conducted work in reliance on negligently prepared soil test reports.4 8 In addition, the court made clear that the engineers were not immune from liability by virtue of a provision in the
contract between the general contractor and the landowner stating that
the general contractor would rely solely on his own judgment5 0 in preparing his bid.4 1 Shoffner, however, could change this result.
In another case involving the issue of liability without privity, the
court of appeals refused to allow a cause of action. In Petro v. Hale5
plaintiff-doctor brought an action for negligent performance of a contract against an attorney who, on behalf of his client, had earlier sued
plaintiff for malpractice without properly inquiring into the merits of
his client's case. The court held that a lawyer who fails to inquire properly into the merits of his client's case is not liable to the adverse party
for negligently bringing suit against him. 5 2 A lawyer is under a duty to
advocate in favor of his client's interest and should not be required to
protect simultaneously the rights of an adverse party. 3 In addition, the
state's interest in having disputes settled in the courts outweighs the
interest of plaintiffs in reducing the number of frivolous actions
brought against them.5 4 The court did not make clear whether a duty
did in fact run from a lawyer to the adverse party, but did hold that
mere negligence in bringing suit would not subject an attorney to liabil47. Id. at 271, 257 S.E.2d at 58 (emphasis added). The Dapidson court also held that recovery for certain property damage is allowed:
Where an architect's negligence in performing his contract contributes to a defective

building and damage to adjacent property by means of a concurrent breach of the common law duty of care arising out of the circumstances surrounding the parties [the architect will be held liable to the injured parties].
41 N.C. App. at 668, 255 S.E.2d at 584 (distinguishing McKinney Drilling Co. v. Nello L. Teer
Co., 38 N.C. App. 472, 248 S.E.2d 444 (1978), in which recovery for damage to property covered

by the construction contracts, as opposed to adjacent unrelated property, was not allowed).
48. 41 N.C. App. at 668, 255 S.E.2d at 585. The court adopted the position of California,
Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958), and Massachusetts, Craig v. Everett M.
Brooks, Co., 351 Mass. 497, 222 N.E.2d 752 (1967) in not requiring privity. The court also cited a
New York case, R.H. Bowman Assocs. v. Danskin, 72 Misc. 2d 244, 338 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1972), a9d
menz, 43 A.D.2d 621, 349 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1973), as support for not requiring privity, but in that
case plaintiffs agent contracted with defendant, so privity actually did exist.
49. 41 N.C. App. at 669, 255 S.E.2d at 585.
50. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
51. 43 N.C. App. 655, 260 S.E.2d 130 (1979).
52. Id. at 661, 260 S.E.2d at 135.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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ity to the adverse party." Thus, the court leaves open the door for
similar actions grounded upon an attorney's gross negligence or intentional institution of frivolous suits.
D.

Standardof Care

The court of appeals considered the appropriate standard of care
to be applied to a professional in two different contexts. In Heath v.
Swift Wings, Inc. ,56 the court of appeals held erroneous a trial court's
jury instruction on the proper standard of care required of an airplane
pilot. The improper instruction was "negligence [is]. . . the failure to
exercise that degree of ordinary care and caution, which an ordinary
prudent pilot having the same training and experience as [defendant],
would have used in the same or similar circumstances.""s The court
held the instruction improper on the ground that it introduced a subjective standard of care into the definition of negligence, when an objective standard is appropriate.
The court in Heath correctly characterized the standard of care of
a professional as an objective one, and properly held that the special
training and experience of a member of a class of specially skilled persons is not to be considered in determining the existence of negligence.5 9 Instead, the degree of care required is "that degree of care
which the great mass of men, or an ordinarily prudent or reasonable
person, would use under the same or similar circumstances." 6 The result of Heath is that all pilots will be held to the same standard of
care-that of the reasonably prudent pilot-regardless of special abilities some pilots possess.
The court of appeals considered the standard of care required of a
55. Id.
56. 40 N.C. App. 158, 252 S.E.2d 526 (1979).
57. Id. at 162, 252 S.E.2d at 529 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 163, 252 S.E.2d at 529.
59. In North Carolina the standard of care required to be exercised is the same in every case:
the conduct of the reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances. Because
the circumstances vary from case to case, however, the degree or amount of care required is not
always the same. Pinyan v. Settle, 263 N.C. 578, 582, 139 S.E.2d 863, 866 (1965). The special
occupation one is engaged in is an example of such varying circumstances. See, e.g., Dickens v.
Everhart, 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E.2d 440 (1973) (general practitioner); Belk v. Schweiser, 268 N.C.
50, 149 S.E.2d 565 (1966) (orthopedic surgeon); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144
(1954) (attorney); Buckner v. Wheeldon, 225 N.C. 62, 33 S.E.2d 480 (1945) (orthopedic surgeon).
The degree of care required of those engaged in different professions varies from case to case; the
standard of care is always that of the reasonable person, however, and the requisite degree of care
is constant among cases involving similar professions.
60. Scarboro v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 242 N.C. 444, 448, 88 S.E.2d 133, 137 (1955) (citation
omitted).
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podiatrist for the first time in Whitehurst
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Boehm. 6 Plaintiff in White-

hurst attempted to introduce testimony of an orthopedic surgeon on the
standard of care required of a podiatrist. The court of appeals held the
introduction of such testimony improper because a podiatrist is held to
the degree of care and skill ordinarily exercised by other podiatrists.62
This holding is consistent with the general rule that a practitioner is
judged according to the standards of his own school of medicine without regard to the standards of other schools.6 3
E

IntentionalInfliction of EmotionalDistress/

4

The North Carolina Supreme Court in Stanback v. Stanback65
recognized "the tort of intentional infliction of serious emotional distress."66 Plaintiff in Stanback alleged that her husband intentionally
caused her mental anguish and anxiety by breaking their separation
agreement. The court held that although it is necessary for recovery
that plaintiff at trial show some resulting physical injury, an allegation
that she suffered "great mental
anguish and anxiety" is sufficient to sur67
vive a motion to dismiss.
The court, in adopting the tort of intentional infliction of mental
distress, took a minority position in requiring proof of physical injury
to sustain such an action. 6 Also, in characterizing the action as recovery for "serious emotional distress, ' 69 the court implies a quantum of
injury that has not been required in other North Carolina cases which
61. 41 N.C. App. 670, 255 S.E.2d 761 (1979).
62. Id. at 675, 255 S.E.2d at 765.
63. See, e.g., Hardy v. Dahli, 210 N.C. 530, 187 S.E. 788 (1936); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and
Surgeons § 44, at 953 (1951).
64. In McCracken v. Sloan, 40 N.C. App. 214, 252 S.E.2d 250 (1979), the court of appeals
considered a novel basis for a tort action based on emotional distress. Plaintiff brought an assault
and battery suit against defendant for smoking a cigar in plaintiffs presence with full knowledge
that plaintiff was allergic to smoke and took offense to smoking. The court held that neither the
apprehension of smelling cigar smoke nor the inhalation of the smoke will support an action for
assault and battery. "This is an apprehension of a touching and a touching which must be
endured in a crowded world." Id. at 217, 252 S.E.2d at 252. The court, however, expressed no
opinion on whether an allegation of resulting physical injury would survive a motion to dismiss.
Id.
65. 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
66. Id. at 196, 254 S.E.2d at 621-22. Recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress has been allowed in other North Carolina cases but never under this label. See, e.g.,
Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936).
67. 297 N.C. at 198-99, 254 S.E.2d at 623.
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment k (1965).
69. 297 N.C. at 196, 254 S.E.2d at 621.
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allow recovery for mental anguish.70 In allowing the complaint to
stand upon the facts alleged,7 1 however, the court indicated that these

above two requirements will not be stringently interpreted.72
JAY
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70. See Byrd, Recovery for Mental Anguish in North Carolina, 58 N.C.L. REv. 435, 462-63
(1979).
71. 297 N.C. at 198-99, 254 S.E.2d at 623.
72. For a full discussion of the emotional distress issue in Stanback, see Byrd, supra note 70,
at 450-63.

